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The creation of the parent-child relationship, producing a state of 
dependency and also concerning society’s existence, has always been a 
matter of great social interest and consequently of compulsory legal 
regulation. The traditional concept, however, perceiving children 
as an extension to their parents and therefore pursuing the satisfaction 
of their interests by showing concern over whether the parent relationship 
measures up to approved social norms, is extensively challenged by the 
attention given to the child's independent membership in the social 
setting. His interests increasingly receive independent social 
recognition notwithstanding that the role of the parent in his life 
remains of paramount importance. This change of principle, as far 
as the child’s interests are concerned, seems to leave without 
justification the so far diverse policy as regards biological procreation, 
the discriminatory status attributed to some natural relationships and 
the role that adoption comes to play in remedying defects of status. The 
ideal solution on the other hand seems to be to give legal recognition 
to any natural relationship and for adoption to have the role of creating 
a parent-chiId relationship where that with natural parents cannot come 
into existence or, though existent, functions against the interests of 
the child. However, such radical change in policy would overturn a
long lasting tradition and strike against fundamental principles involved 
in the creation of the parent child relationship. The issues are 
manifold and will be examined along with the existing law and the 
reform needed. The nature of the task undertaken by this study is partly 
determined by the choice of the legal systems selected for examination. 
They present a number of similarities in their approach to the matter 
developed upon basic principles of Roman law. On the other hand Scots 
law, by being largely a common law system, presents certain dynamics in
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its adjustibility to new conditions whereas Greek law as a codified 
system adheres more to the traditional development of the law and has 
certain advantages in terms of legal certainty.
On the basis of the fundamental assumption that a two parent family 
is the most promising unit for bringing up children both laws have been 
developed so far in a way that attempts to absorb all children submitted 
to their jurisdiction into a family unit formed by their parents. 
Accordingly for a child born to a married woman the legal relationship 
afforded to the child is a complete one and comes into existence by 
legal fiat. Thus the child is presumed to have been begotten by her 
husband or the man subsequently married to her. Also a child may 
be legitimated with the subsequent marriage of his parents or in Greece 
by a court decree if the parents cannot marry.
The status so accorded to the child enjoys strong legal protection but 
nevertheless receives considerable criticism in respect to its 
functioning under present social conditions. By being a purely legal 
construct resulting in an artificial and inflexible reception of 
status it is doubted to have succeeded in upholding the marital family 
in social opinion. Additionally, by incorporating a certain family 
stereotype doubts may be expressed as to whether it comprehends the 
current state of man-woman relationships and he effecrts of lils cnthe compodiion of 
the nuclear family. The diverse factors affecting the existence 
of the parental relationship make it insecure as a basis for determining 
the child's status by reference to it. Instead the introduction of the 
concept of parenthood is recommended, with applicability to cases of 
'illegitimacy' if this status is to be abolished (Chapter one) .
Discrimination against children whose parents' unit does not measure up 
to approved social norms dates back to early organized societies. It
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is regarded as having arisen from certain social needs mainly 
concerning the welfare of the family as a basic social institution and as 
Varying in correlation with the importance attached to those needs.
In parallel it was supported for moral, religious and pragmatic reasons*, 
this type of discrimination enduring in its own right and thus affecting 
the extent to which the law has reflected changes in social needs.
A number of improvements have come in the rights of children born out of
wedlock under the pressure of current humanitarian policies. However,
as it is shown, legal discrimination, though not the sole factor, has 
contributed to the creation of circumstances adverse to the interest of 
both parents and children. It is argued that the discrimination cannot 
nevertheless be justified in terms of other social ends : for example,
that the evidence does not support the view that a distinction between 
legitimacy and illegitimacy is necessary to sustain marriage as a 
social institution; that the rates of illegitimacy are not materially 
affected by the extent of the legal discrimination and accordingly it cannot 
be said to serve any real purpose in terms of deterrence, and in any 
event in the present context legal discrimination is no longer consonant 
with the predominant social mores nor can it be justified as a punitive
reaction to the circumstances under which pregnancies out of wedlock take
place. On the other hand the indications are that although married 
parents constitute the appropriate forum for rearing children, the parent 
child relationship can be maintained independently of the personal or 
legal relationship between the parents. Various countries have started 
readjusting their laws in recognition of the facts referred to above, 
either by abolishing the status of illegitimacy or by improving the legal 
relationship with the natural parents. Certain recommendations have 
been put forward with regard to Scots and Greek law, though not all of 
them as radical in nature as those adopted by many countries. The merits 
of the various approaches are discussed and preference is given to the 
abolition of the status of illegitimacy altogether. (Chapter two).
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In view of this change of policy selected aspects concerning the estab­
lishment of the relationship with the parents needs further consideration. 
The argument is put forward for introducing "licensed" paternity for 
children born out of wedlock - an idea that has to be rejected as 
inappropriate for the establishment of biological relationships, as 
sexually discriminatory and prejudicial to the child's rights. As 
regards the paternity of children born or conceived in wedlock, because 
marriage has undergone a democratic transformation, the present state of the 
law may be preserved as long as the presumption of paternity is maintained 
upon facts free of policy considerations. The same cannot, however, 
be suggested for informal relationships without resulting in arbitrary 
solutions. Paternity of children not covered by a presumption or 
fiction must be established by voluntary acknowledgementcr of a court decree. 
Voluntary acknowledgement is considered as the first option to be given 
to the father. Thus it has to be simple enough and easily accessible 
without thus running counter to the public importance of the fact 
acknowledged. This purpose may be served with the registration system 
in Scotland subject to the following changes : voluntary acknowledgement
should amount to proof in rem, the father should be entitled to enter his 
name whether or not the mother agrees and this should amount to full 
proof if not contested or otherwise attested within a reasonable period 
and finally acknowledgement should be possible prior to the birth. In 
Greece acknowledgement currently may be made by the father or the paternal 
grandfather with a notarial deed or will and operates in rem unless 
disproved. For this method there is suggested a need for further
attestation of the father's declaration and repeal of the right of the 
grandfather to acknowledge the child. As an alternative to voluntary 
acknowledgement is considered the judicial recognition of paternity, 
when the father omits to acknowledge the child. That the emotional 
and material interests of the child lie as much with the father's 
relatives as with the father himself outweighs any objections to establishing
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a complete relationship with the unwilling father. For the same 
reasons and in order to prevent the best evidence from becoming 
obsolete the action must be compulsory once a reasonable period for the 
parent to acknowledge the child has been allowed. Also, due to the 
importance of the matter, the issue should preferably be treated in an 
independent law suit. The finding of the court, which, for Scotland, 
would appropriately be the Sheriff Court and for Greece the City Court of 
three judges, must operate in rem and attribute to the child all rights 
and duties recognised in the parent child relationship. Proceedings 
could be initiated by the mother or the child through his guardian and 
in the last resort by a guardian ad hoc appointed by the public prosecutor, 
and should be directed against the father and on his death against his 
relatives. The action should be raised prior to the child's birth and 
within three months after birth after which the right should revert to 
the public prosecutor. With regard to proof it is suggested that there 
should be a tightening up of the conditions to minimise doubts, abolition 
of the exceptio plurium concubentium and extensive use of scientific 
evidence. In relation to the latter, blood test evidence seems to offer 
secure proof - a fact that is presently not acknowledged by either law.
An advanced system of blood testing, however, provides positive 
exclusion of paternity or high probability of who may be the father and 
therefore should be acknowledged as of primary evidence for a neutral 
judgemental system. Preferably such evidence should be supported by 
customary evidence and the court should have the power to order such 
evidence whenever necessary and even against the will of the individual. 
Other evidence like the duration of pregnancy or anthropological tests 
might also be used, though only with caution because of its relative 
value while lie detector tests have to be rejected altogether as unethical. 
(Chapter three).
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Adoption, as a formula artificially creating a parent-child 
relationship, may be used as an alternative to find substitute parents 
for the child whose natural parentage is not established or, though, 
established, malfunctions. In this respect it may operate as a social 
measure susceptible to detailed state control and thus may incorporate a 
number of elements of what is termed today "licensed parenthood". 
(Introductory considerations to part two).
The institution dates back to ancient civilizations and throughout history 
it has assumed many different forms and functions relevant to the dynamics 
of the needs in the contemporary family. In ancient cultures the 
function of adoption was primarily to ensure continuity of the childless 
family for the purposes of inheritance and ancestral worship. In a number 
of instances adequate consideration was given to the need to provide for 
consolation for the emotional strains of childlessness. Roman law shaped 
adoption in accord to the existing needs of society providing for adrogation 
of adults to provide an heir and a child for the childless person and 
adoption to increase the size of the family. Justinian advanced the 
methods in the forms of adoptio plena, placing a related child as a child 
of the adopter, and adoptio minus plena with the simple purpose of 
providing an heir. A combination of the latter forms was inherited by 
the civilian legislations of the recent past and among them is the Greek 
Civil Code. Scots law, on the other hand, like many common law systems 
ignored adoption until early this century. It was first introduced in 
1930 for the benefit of parentless or neglected children - a concept 
later adopted by civilian legislations. Within this scheme the welfare 
of the child is inextricably involved in any adoption, reflecting a 
general social concern not only to save the child but to do so in the 
best possible way. This priority of the child's interests became the 
subject of bitter litigation in jurisprudence in its relation to the
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interests of the parents (whether natural or adoptive). As a social 
measure it was bound, too, not to be destructive to the lives of other 
persons concerned. This threefold conflict it is left to the court to 
resolve under the general guideline that the welfare of the child is the 
first and most important consideration. Courts so far have adopted the 
form of a comparative assessment in this context - an approach which is 
found to intensify frictions between the parents and to leave unanswered 
questions as to whether the natural relationship could be saved by other 
means. It is recommended that instead the decision should be in two 
parts, first an assessment of the natural family to be followed, when adoption 
is held the proper solution, with an assessment of the placement. The 
issues to be faced by the court in deciding for a particular placement 
are various and refer to almost every aspect of the parent-child 
relationship. Health and physical fitness are of paramount importance 
for their bearing on the upbringing of the child. The same applies to 
the character and morality of the applicant while wealth comes as of 
secondary concern. Home environment is also an important factor along 
with other family circumstances, in terms of their effects on the happiness 
and psychological welfare of the child.(Chapter four).
In line with the importance attached to the welfare of the child there 
is evident a tendency in the laws to reduce legal prescription in order 
to increase judicial and administrative flexibility in arranging 
adoptions. Thus the basic requirements are for the child to be within 
the limits of age and personal status so that it can be in a proper sense 
the child of the adopter. For the applicant, apart from domicile, 
the laws also refer to Questions of age and status. The complex 
arrangement of the Adoption Act 1958 required repeal by the 1978 Act, 
setting the lower limit at the 21st year to avoid the risks involved in 
teenage marriages. In Greece the high limits of the civil code were
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lowered to the age of 35 by the LD 4532/1965 and to the age of 30 with 
the LD 610/1970 (with the allowance for adopting at the age of 
majority where there are special reasons). The relatively high limits
in Greece relate to the fact that the law adheres to single applications 
and to the condition of childlessness. Nevertheless, the choice of 
the age limit in both countries is based upon assessment of the experience 
required to perform parental roles in the artificial relationship of 
adoption. The married status of the applicant is a prime requirement 
in Scots law whereas in Greece it is implicitly involved. Exceptions 
are allowed on separation, disappearance of the spouse or on his mental 
illness. Scots law is directly concerned for the child to be 
adopted jointly by two spouses and permits adoption by single persons 
only exceptionally while Greek law, adhering to single applications, 
permits a married person to adopt with the consent of the other spouse.
The old formula of childlessness, though generally deplored, constitutes 
a rigid condition in Greek law which may be waived only under exceptional 
circumstances. Thus, a person having legitimate issue is permitted to 
adopt only if it suffers from an incurable disease, which involves rather 
a difficult family environment, and to legitimate a de facto relationship. 
With regard to adoption of natural children, step children and adoption 
by relatives, though this is generally permitted, current policy regards 
it as only rarely suitable since it makes no substantial difference
to the care of the child and extinguishes the relationship with the other
parent. The latter could become an aspect of considerable importance 
in adoptions by a natural parent alone or jointly with the step parent
if any distinction between children born in and out of wedlock were to be
removed. (Chapter five).
Probably the most crucial and controversial aspects of adoption emerge 
with the parental agreement. It is with this requirement that the court
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has to make essential assessments about the natural relationship and 
to award or refuse decree irrespective of whether the parents had 
agreed to the child's adoption or the court had been requested to dispense 
with it. Since each law initially requires the free and unconditional 
agreement of the parent his attitude illustrates clearly the degree 
of awareness that he has about his capacities to bring the child up. The 
matter nevertheless touches biological parenthood and, therefore, 
involves a number of issues in relation to the reform suggested earlier.
The natural father has no power to agree to the child's adoption unless 
by the rights attaching to voluntary acknowledgement in Greece. In 
Scotland he may challenge the proposed adoption by applying for custody and 
in Greece by proceeding to voluntary acknowledgement. The proposal to 
give natural fathers the right to agree to adoption was met with objections 
from many quarters though neither satisfactorily nor altogether convincingly 
as to why the unmarried parent should have different treatment from the 
married one. Thus it is considered to be a positive step both to
secure that effort is made to trace him and require his, agreement. 
Gbmplications may arise with the mother's husband if the mother alleges 
him not to be the father. The matter may be best resolved with a
declarator of bastardy though it is suggested that it might also be 
resolved by the court in the relinquishment procedure. The propositions of 
Houghton alter the amount of proof needed to rebut the presumption and 
additionally are found prejudicial to the child's interests. The
matter nevertheless involves further complications because of the diversity 
in the attitude of the spouses and the question of the true paternity of 
the child so that the solution of custody becomes rather dubious. Probably 
a way out of this problem could be given by the court making extensive 
use of its inquisitorial powers. A body assuming parental rights has 
no consenting power but a guardian has, and his agreement is always needed 
in Scots law and it is in Greek law if there are no parents to consent.
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The power of the court to dispense with parental agreement is exercisable 
in circumstances which contrast with what is considered as appropriate 
performance in parental rights and duties and may be classified under
the following headings ;
(a) Unfitness or neglect of parental duties including abandonment or neglect, 
illtreatment and failure to discharge parental duties. The grounds 
included in this section prove objective failure in the duties and therefore 
culpability in the conduct of the parent may be of little importance.
However the grounds have been treated by the courts with considerable 
caution so that they have been successfully invoked only in extreme 
situations involving considerable risk to the child. A more flexible 
construction of the grounds under this heading may avoid such risks and
at the same time may resolve problems faced in both jurisdictions if the 
decision to place the child for adoption follows that on the survivability 
of the natural relationship. In this respect an effort is made to 
assign a central meaning to each ground and define the scope of its 
application. The power of the court may also be exercised
(b) if agreement is unattainable because the parents cannot be found or 
suffer from mental illness; and (c) if the parent is acting unreasonably. 
The latter is one of the most frequently invoked and contested grounds
in Scots law and probably demonstrates more than anything else the 
difficulties in maintaining a balance between the conflicting interests.
Its application has given rise to what has been described as two distinct 
schools of judicial thought: the one following the special construction
requiring a degree of blameworthiness in the parental conduct while the 
other, the natural, giving weight to the welfare of the child, considering 
it possible for the parent to act unreasonably even when there is no 
element of culpability or reprehensible conduct. This approach, as 
adopted by the House of Lords, received the support of the Houghton 
Committee so that today it is acclaimed as the one and only construction
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of the ground. However, the ground can successfully be invoked 
only with a particular placement in mind and therefore courts may be faced 
with problems given the increasing use of anonymity and the introduction
of relinquishment procedure. The concept of a two-part decision as
described above is argued to be the proper approach for this case also.
In Greek law, unreasonableness of the parent is not expressly provided 
in the grounds for dispensing with agreement though it may be 
supported under the grounds of abuse of right. The power of the parent 
to withhold agreement under the welfare policy for the adoption of 
minors arguably has lost its character as a natural power. Comparing the
grounds under which parental agreement is required it becomes obvious
that the right of the parent receives consideration where the parent- 
child relationship appropriately exists. Therefore, it rather becomes 
a functional right as with the rest of the parent-child relationship 
and as such is subject to judicial control. (Chapter six).
The reduction of legal prescription along with the introduction of 
adoption as a social measure makes the adoption procedure, whether 
judicial or extra judicial, one of the most critical aspects of the order. 
Thus both laws provide for an adoption service which, under Scots law, 
is delegated to the local authorities or adoption agencies. These have 
the duty to provide for a comprehensive service including facilities for 
making proper assessments for the initial placement and for dealing with 
any problem that may arise before and after the order. In Greek law 
departments of local social services and certain infant centres are 
charged with investigatory duties in relation to placements and with after 
care supervision. Consequent on the advanced adoption service in 
Scotland the law prohibits private placements - an aspect still lacking in 
Greek law. Special care is given in the laws to prevent the trafficking 
of children and the court may direct such terms and conditions in the
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order as it thinks appropriate for the welfare of the child. A duty 
is assigned to the adoption agencies in each country to prepare a 
report for the court. In Greece this is the only report prepared for 
the court, whereas in Scotland an additional one is prepared by the 
Reporting Officer and is more concerned with the natural relationship.
A special procedure introduced in both laws permits the parent to relinquish 
parental rights to an adoption agency in advance and has been introduced 
with the purpose of easing their situation and eliminating the uncertainty 
about the future of the placement. Under this procedure Scots law shows 
adequate concern for the protection of the parent's rights whether he 
agrees or not to the making of such an order as well as for his desire 
to be informed of the child's future, and even allowing him to apply 
to resume parental rights. In Greek law such procedure can be used 
only with the concurrence of the parent and is irrevocable. Scots law 
also nevertheless complements the pre-order procedure with further 
requirements. The child has to live with the applicants for sufficient 
time for the necessary assessment of their suitability to be carried out 
and this period may not be disrupted by removing the child from them.
The same prohibition applies for children under the care of local authority 
if a person who has provided a home for the child for a certain period 
gives notice to them of his intention to apply for adoption. From then on 
the child is deemed a protected child and is subject to intense supervision. 
A notice of the hearing has also to be served to the persons concerned 
under each law.
The extensive use of social work in arranging adoptions dees not in any 
way diminish the role of the court in either country. The Court, which 
for Scotland is the Sheriff Court or the Outer House of the Court of 
Session and in Greece the City Court, retains its power in upholding or 
rejecting any decision taken so far and may endorse a variety of different
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assessments and arguments. It has the power to appoint an expert 
assessor to help with evidence and a person to defend the interests of
the child. Under Scots law it will have further assistance from the 
report of the Reporting Officer on matters concerning the dissolution of 
the natural relationship. The only drawback to be noticed is that this 
involvement starts late in the process which is inadequate in respect to 
the importance of the duties involved.
On the basis of the wide power of the court it is argued that the order 
should be considered as a judicial act, which has consequences for the 
validity of the order given non compliance with certain conditions.
As to its revocation, this is possible under Scots law if the child adopted 
by his natural parent has been subsequently legitimated while in Greek law 
it is permitted on a variety of grounds. Thus the order may be revoked 
if there is danger to the child's welfare, upon reasons justifying 
disinheritance or upon ingratitude towards the adopter. With regard 
to the status conferred by the order, in both laws it is that of legitimacy 
with the major distinction that under Scots law the natural relationship 
is extinguished in all respects whereas in Greek law it remains virtually 
un-affected. This, of course, is a major defect in the order since it 
runs counter to the effort to integrate the child in the new family. 
(Chapter seven).
I N T R O D U  C T I O N
To the many who are concerned with the current position of the parent- 
child relationship certain aspects of this study will come as something 
not entirely new. The diversity of the laws, in terms of the 
recognition they afford to biological procreation as the basis of the 
parent-child relationship, is a subject that has constantly aroused 
interest, however_furtively, in its long history. Nevertheless, 
everybody acquainted with the matter is aware of the importance attributed 
to the parents in the child's life and how this has affected the revival 
of interest in adoption as a measure either for radical intervention in 
a dysfunctional relationship or to find substitute parents for the 
parentless. The problems involved in each area of the law are 
familiar to all lawyers, sociologists and social workers, though seen 
from a different perspective and thus not always compatibly in terms 
of recommendations. These are known, too, to have a commitment to 
different priorities in their respective tasks and a different emphasis 
on certain values. This, somehow unavoidable, division has, however, 
resulted in all too great a distortion of approaches in an area requiring 
cohesion and coordination in perspectives. A jurisprudence, that seeks 
to render justice and equity in legal reasoning, finds its way not 
without difficulty amidst these diverse approaches and frequently has 
been torn between the attraction of opposite poles. It can be argued, 
however, with the certainty that one is allowed in a society which is 
constantly moving, that the situation has become somehow clearer recently 
with regard to the position that legislation is bound to take towards 
biological relationships and the role of adoption as an alternative to 
or substitute for natural parenthood. First impressions have been 
reassessed while a variety of alternatives, suggested and frequently
tested in the battle-field of life, have manifested inadequacy. Thus 
the conditions now seem mature enough for using this experience as a 
basis for a rethinking of the relationship, especially since a growing 
consciousness of the rights of the child points alarmingly to some 
fundamental misconceptions in the area.
Once put on the agenda of social scientists the problems appearing in 
the parent-child relationship, and the relationship itself, have seen a 
flourishing of analysis and concern. Aid the weight and significance 
of their observations have resulted in what can be seen as one of the 
greatest shocks ever received by dogmatic legal thinking. As far as 
family law is concerned its basic philosophies have reflected, as they 
still do to an extent, an authoritarianism founded upon concepts of a 
social deontology not altogether reliable in its perceptions and probably 
never submitted to a thorough examination in its implications. Without 
either exaggerating or over-simplifying the matter it may be argued 
that family law appears to be replete with doctrines comprehending rigid 
lines of human behaviour which prevailed at a time when enforcement was 
possible or justifiable, but which are generally understood to be outmoded 
in terms of present realities and the prevailing trends of contemporary 
thought.
The parent-child relationship, being a state of dependency and one 
undoubtedly of diverse social interest, has always been the subject of 
compulsory legal regulation and thus affected by legal philosophies 
and sociological influences. Being reflected in the traditional idea 
that sees children as an extension of their parents who ought to and 
should be responsible for them until they become independent, the 
legal regulation of the relationship accords to whether the parental 
relationship measures up - fully or partially - to prevailing social
norms. Marriage, as a form of parental unit featuring permanency 
and promising constant care for the child, has been selected to play 
a key role. The imposition of this standard, however, has not been 
irrelevant to the acknowledged interest in the family as a bond 
holding society together and the "securing point" of its existence.
The same assumptions determine whether the relationship will receive 
society's support or censure, this resulting in discrimination against 
children born out of wedlock. However, this combination of reason 
and tradition in the law is presently at the centre of intense and 
bitter jurisprudential controversy. Drastic changes brought with 
industrialization, the wars and social upheavals recently experienced, 
urbanization, the advent of consumer society and the social revolution 
of the sixties have profoundly changed ways of life and altered 
traditional outlooks, creating a demand for the questioning of traditional 
values. Further, an ever growing consciousness of the rights of the 
child has brought to the forefront the law regulating parental status 
and the necessity of discrimination.
An increased examination of social disorganization by various commentators 
has led to reforms in the substantive rights of both legitimate and 
illegitimate children, this tending to accelerate in recent times. To 
appreciate their value, in respect to illegitimate children, however, 
one must bear in mind that these have been problem orientated reforms, 
weakening to some measure the bastions supporting discrimination.
The important aspect of this process, however, is that it has brought 
the gradual redefinition of the parent-child relationship. The child is 
no longer seen as a continuation of his parents, importance being 
attached to his independent social membership. His welfare and the 
satisfaction of his rights enjoy the express concern of the state
4.
which constantly reinforces its right to intervention in all aspects 
of the parent-child relationship. It was not, however, until the 
very function of parental roles' in the marital family had been questioned 
and the single parent had been credited with the possibility of 
bringing his child up that the importance of the social membership of the 
child started gaining significance for his legal status. The demand 
appeared for a new equilibrium securing complete recognition of the 
child’b rights irrespective of the parental relationship that had 
produced them. This has been recognised as a basic fairness to the 
child whose rights have to be equal at a social level. In comparison, 
therefore, with what was done in past decades, it seems that the 
situation calls for a complete reversal of the objectives to be achieved, 
with a view to removing the traces of a vanished past and to bringing 
law into harmony with contemporary reality.
This change of principle also affects the role of adoption. As a 
method creating a complete relationship between a strange child and a 
parent it retains its value as a radical alternative to dysfunctional 
natural relations. Its scope, however, has been extended by seeing it 
as a respectable way of covering up illegitimacy and legalizing the 
position of children joining families which had been reconstituted by 
new marriages. It can be readily appreciated from the foregoing that 
it is necessary to restore the method to its primary function in 
accordance with the new dimension given to the child's status and the 
concepts and needs of our time.
The tasks undertaken by the study among other reasons determined also the
selection of the systems to be considered. Both have been informed 
by Roman law principles and therefore share certain similarities.
5.
On the other hand Scots law has developed largelyæ acommon law system 
and thus is more responsive to contemporary needs. In this respect 
it is of great help in revealing various stages of policy development 
in relation to natural parenthood and at the same time presenting 
positive information helping to overcome the inherent conservatism of the 
law making process. A fine example of this is in terms of the fears 
expressed over the attribution of succession rights to the natural child 
and the fact that in the 15 years of their operation they have not raised 
any substantial difficulties. Mother example is the significant 
step made by the Children A:t 1975 which recognises the importance of 
the natural parents, irrespective of the family status of the child.
The Act considers it to be in the child's best interests and thus as 
his first claim and right to grow up with its own natural parents where 
continuous care can be maintained and biological and psychological 
bonding develop simultaneously. Cbnsequently, any form of intervention 
has been given the aim to restore the child to his family unless the 
latter is impossible. Also in terms of adoption, unlike Greek law 
which has a long tradition and is influenced by this, Scots law is 
distinguished by its purity and clarity of purposes, largely by virtue 
of its recency. The two laws, therefore, provide an interesting basis 
for comparison.
The primary task of the present study therefore will be to survey the 
laws of Scotland and Greece establishing the nature of relationship 
with the natural parents and testing them in the light of present 
social conditions. This is carried out in the first part of the study, 
which also examines proposals for reform in relation to the evidence 
obtained from this assessment and in line with the new dimension 
given to the child's interests in its social membership.
In the second part the institution of adoption is considered as a 
means to secure the importance attached to parents for the development 
of a child by a relationship of the proper calibre. Emphasis is 
placed on the fact that adoption must remain a mechanism of last 
resort, and its aims and scope are defined accordingly, as well as on 
its position as a measure lacking a practical alternative of the 
same standard, this having a particular significance for the 
qualifying conditions of the adopter.
The coexistence in the law of two methods of establishing parenthood is 
not without problems and requires careful definition as to the scope of 
their application. It is of importance to prevent the existence of 
adoption from being prejudicial to the rights vested in the blood tie 
with the natural parents, as well as to prevent the emphasis on the 
natural relationship from running counter to the importance of the 
parents for the daily care of the child. The problem is connected to 
a fundamental issue in current legislation on children : protective
intervention as against protective prevention, which is a highly contested 
matter among legal and other commentators. It must be recognised 
that to establish a boundary between the two is extremely difficult 
for the legally orientated person, since the leap from natural to 
artificial paternity involves a variety of other measures which, though 
legally recognised, operate within the framework of the welfare 
services and have an application according to the circumstances of 
each case. The issue, however, has received some attention in an 
attempt to assign a central meaning to the principles that should govern 
the orientation of the child's status.
^  may be understood from the foregoing, the study is inextricably
involved with law, which is treated by the traditional comparative 
legal method discussing systems concurrently and examining them 
issue by issue. At the same time attention is paid to not 
obscuring important relationships in the interaction of independent 
issues within each system. By the terms of reference, however,
consideration is given to non-legal material in an effort to trace 
and formulate an idea of the present social context. This process 
has not always been troublefree since it has revealed the lack of a 
collective and systematic approach to the wide range of factors 
relevant to the central issue and therefore, in a number of cases, a 
failure to offer any coherent basis for legal activity. Also, 
bearing in mind the difference in perspectives and aims, caution needs 
to be employed in the use of these materials.
Where existing law and practices are concerned the aim will be to avoid 
interfering with legislation if it is found to be responsive to the 
demands that emerge. In addition, where a need for change appears, 
attention will be given to whether the matter can be resolved by 
interpretation and, if not, to whether the need can be accommodated 
within an already existing practice. In-the belief that the making of 
detailed recommendations is not a task that can appropriately be 
handled by an individual work, I shall refrain from doing so where 
major changes are required. Instead, there will be offered an 
examination of possible solutions or contributions relative to the 
problem, analysing these on their merits and assessing their suitability. 
The main legal material used will be Chse and Statutory law in respect 
of Scotland and the Positive law along with precedents in respect of 
Greece. Also, extensive use will be made of commentaries in respect 
of each system. Where it appears that there is no Scottish precedent
it will be necessary to illustrate the arguments by reference to 
English material, for while it is appreciated that the two legal 
systems are distinct they appear, in the main, to have developed 
their approaches in parallel.
P A R T  O N E
THE ACQUISITION OF RIGHTS AND DUTIES 
THROUGH BLOOD RELATIONSHIP
I N T R O D U C T I O N
This section is concerned with the creation of a legal relationship 
between a parent and his child with reference to the blood relation 
existing between them. Universally, biological parenthood is 
treated as the source of the recognition of legal links between a 
parent and his natural offspring. This is, then, expected to have 
had a considerable influence on the formation of the relevant laws 
of Scotland and Greece. On the other hand, from the very distinction 
between legitimate and illegitimate children, it becomes obvious 
that the two countries do not readily accord the same status to any child 
which,by reason of its birth, is submitted to their jurisdiction. A 
child which seeks to acquire legal rights from his parents can be faced 
with various forms of recognition, mainly generated from rules referring 
to the conditions of his birth or to his acknowledgement by the parent.
A fundamental question would be, therefore, what kinds of recognition 
- if different - the two countries have accorded to their children and 
what conditions have to be satisfied in each case.
Moreover, as long as the concern of this study is to assess the 
satisfaction of children's rights in Scotland and Greece, it is of 
primary importance to reassess, in the context of the present 
section, possible aspects of discrimination in the acquisition of a 
different legal relation with the parent. Thus, attention is 
directed towards the legal obstacles,whether they be of absolute 
character or not, which generate the discrimination, and whether it 
is justifiable to preserve them any longer. Particularly, in
respect of the illegitimate child this field of the present law 
contains a number of anomalies and it is not doubted that reform is 
necessary. It is suspected that on the basis of a trivial morality
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is maintained one of the most severe forms of neglect and dis­
crimination against this class of children, which attributes an 
inhuman and irrational aspect to the law. Therefore, in view of the 
social as well as the legal importance of the matter the raison d* 
etre of any discriminatory aspects of the law will be commented on 
as widely as possible and certain suggestions for reform will be 
made.
Prima facie, relevant to this section are the "semi-legitimate" 
children created by divorce and/or remarriage of the custodian 
parent. It is assumed that certain provisions are laid down to 
preserve unaltered the privileges enjoyed by the child in relation to 
both of his natural parents but one cannot, however, ignore the fact 
that, whatever the protection is, certain differences may exist 
between them and their legal equals in the new family. However, 
since the matter relates more to the operation of rights, it will 
be more appropriately dealt with if discussed along with the child's 
substantive rights in the relevant part of this study. The marriage
may also open another dimension in the child's rights, mainly ariging 
from the relationship of affinity. However, what concerns the
present study are possible legal rights and duties that may directly 
bind the spouse and the child. Therefore, the existing provisions 
- if any - will be examined from the angle of their operation within 
the step-relationship and not within the wide scope of the affinity 
kinship in the part dealing with the child's substantive rights.
The area of the law which relates to the above questions is mainly 
that of stipulations in the positive law. Nevertheless, it is 
expected that certain aspects of procedure may play an important role 
in the subject. Accordingly, besides a review of the substantive
11
law the rules of procedure will be given coverage as long as it 
indicates any discrimination concerning protection for the legal 
status of the child.
The possible legal stages in the child's life are best revealed 
by describing: first, the situations whereby the child obtains
the status of legitimacy either by reference to the marriage of the 
parents or by an acknowledgement; second, the relation with each 
parent in illegitimacy and the methods available for improving 
defects in the relationship by means of affiliation.
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C H A P T E R  O N E
ESTABLISHMENT OF A COMPLETE RELATION WITH BOTH PARENTS
A. LEGITIMACY
I. Principal approaches in the two laws
By legal definition, under Scots and Greek law, a child born to a
married couple has complete legal relationship with his parents.
This is to say, a fully-fledged membership of the family of both
parents generated from the fact that either its conception or its
birth took place within marriage. The long standing maxim of the
civil law "mater semper certa est etiam si vulgo conceperit: pater
vero id est, quem nuptiae demonstrant"^ appears to have an indis-
pensible application in both jurisdictions for the creation of the
relationship. Thus, maternity is ascertained through birth, a
fact which may be easily proved by ordinary means of evidence while
paternity, since it is rather difficult to prove, comes into existence
by legal fiat. The husband is presumed to recognise in advance,
2
as his own, the children born to his wife.
However, because maternity is traced through birth, while paternity 
is presumed as that of the husband, the legitimate status of the 
child becomes a purely legal construct. Each law may, therefore, 
utilize different considerations in terms of its inception and 
extinction. Thus, it is expected that the concept of legitimacy 
may not simply rely on the fact that, at the time of birth, the 
mother was married. It may be related to a number of particular 
presumptions, like the presumption of intercourse, conception 
resulting of that intercourse and the period of gestation, according 
to the rules of law and morality dominating each particular system.
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Consequently, there may be a different approach, if the circumstances 
of the conception of the child do not make it legally or morally 
clear that the husband is the father. For instance, if the child 
is born shortly after marriage so that it could not have been conceived 
within marriage. Obviously, the mother, at that time, was neither 
legally nor morally bound to have intercourse with the person with 
whom later she effected a marriage. But even with conception within 
marriage, fatherhood is by no means certain. The high incidents 
of adultery make an absolute assumption to be unreal and arbitrary.
It is necessary, therefore, to examine when and upon what conditions 
procreation by the husband is considered probable so that the child 
would be deemed legitimate. In relation to the legal conceptualism 
of legitimacy, the legal existence and the legal validity of the 
marriage of the parents may give rise to different approaches in 
each law. For example, marriage which does not have a formal 
foundation in each law is not sufficient for raising the presumption 
for the husband. Furthermore, even if it has a legal subsistence 
but with certain defects it may raise a presumption against the 
husband though this will depend on the nature of the defect.
Once legitimacy has been established, the implications of the 
presumption become of great importance for the child. Earlier, it was 
implied that paternity is not certain but is normalDy presumed for 
the husband, because of the probability which exists that he is the 
father. In relation to this probability, each law can insist on 
accepting his paternity and normally will not require its attestation. 
This practice, presumably, manifests years of experience and is rooted 
in the very nature of marriage. Actually, the stability and nature 
of the relation universally opens the way for the legislature
14
to take for granted certain facts and to credit married parents 
with a complete set of rights and duties in relation to their 
children. As a matter of fact, this de jure acquiescence to the rela­
tionship is transferred passively in the prevailing opinion of 
society. However, such assumptions are helpful as long as they 
are true. But, if the husband disputes his paternity, should the 
presumption remain in force and, if not, by what means should it 
be overruled? This is a double-edged question so far as, in the
way the presumption is raised nowadays, it may offer clear protection 
for the child's interests. Also, in point of simple justice towards 
a legitimated child, there maybe a strong reason for protecting the 
status. On the other hand, if the husband has doubts as to his 
paternity, he will hesitate to comply with his duties. In connection 
with the above hypothesis, it is expected that provision is made in 
each system for the disavowal of paternity. Of particular interest
are the means sufficient in each law to overturn the presumption, 
as well as the persons entitled to take the action. Also of 
significance are other interests underlying this protection of the 
child.
II. The scope of the presumption for children conceived or born in 
wedlock.
In this case, in conferring legitimacy, both jurisdictions are 
primarily concerned with conception of the child within the marital 
life of the parents. Nonetheless, failing conception, if birth 
occurred within wedlock, this, under certain circumstances, may have 
the same effects. Hence, in Scots law, a child born to a married 
woman "if born sufficiently long after the marriage or sufficiently
15
soon after its termination, that it could have been conceived
in wedlock, is presumed begotten by her husband and, therefore,
legitimate".^ Similarly, articles 1465 and 1455 of the Greek
civil code presume the child conceived during the mother's
marriage as the natural offspring of the husband, if born no less than
180 days from the date of its celebration or within 300 days of 
4
its termination.
A child born after the termination or dissolution of the marriage is
considered illegitimate in both laws, if it could not have been
conceived in wedlock. Thus, in Scotland, a child born beyond 10
5
months after the dissolution of the marriage is illegitimate.
Nonetheless, the period may be shortened or extended in specific
circumstances.^ In Greece, according to article 1470, a child born
later than 300 days from the termination of marriage is illegitimate,
and no evidence or admission of paternity could alter the status of 
7
the child.
Furthermore, both laws coincide in raising a presumption on behalf
of a child conceived before and born after marriage. Such presumption
is readily available to cover any pre-marital conception, but,
depending on the circumstances, it may be considered weaker or
stronger than the brocard pater est quem nuptiae demonstrant. Particularly,
because paternity is presumed otherwise than by conception in marriage,
the presumption may derive its enforcement from evidence tending to
prove pre-marital intercourse between the parties, or knowledge of
the pregnancy of the wife before marriage. On the other hand, when
marriage took place at an advanced stage of pregnancy, paternity of
the husband may prove irresistible.
16
Under Scots law, the presumption pater est quem nuptiae demonstrant
applies exclusively to a child who could have been conceived in
marriage. For a pre-nuptial conception, there is a presumption
hominis et facti different in character and strength, but in its
effects as powerful as the presumption raised in nuptial conceptions.^
This presumption is raised ipso facto in any pre-nuptial conception,
whether it is obvious or not that the husband is the father.
However, the law has been developed in so far as the presumption
can be successfully invoked as much on account of explicit evidence
indicating that conception could have been occasioned by the man
who subsequently married the mother, as by inference from the conduct
of the husband, after discovering the pregnancy of his wife. This
9
is illustrated by Gardner v. Gardner , where it was held that the 
presumption applied in the case of a man who had arranged to marry a 
woman to his knowledge pregnant and where there had been opportunities 
of pre-marital intercourse between them. Both knowledge of the 
pregnancy and pre-marital intercourse had to be sufficiently proven.
The ratio of the case was applied and developed in a number of
subsequent cases. Thus, in Reid v. Mill,^^ it was held that, besides
great intimacy, great familiarity followed by marriage raises a 
presumption as to the paternity of a child almost as strong as if it 
were born justo tempore. And this may hold, even though intercourse
11
was not admitted or proven beyond reasonable doubt. In Kerrs v. Lindsay 
the marriage itself raised a strong presumption against the husband.
In this case, the husband knew of the conception beforehand, and 
intercourse with the defender (other than the husband), approximately 
at the date of conception, was admitted and corroborated. The 
defender had confessed to a witness that he suspected himself to be 
the father, while familiarities with the husband were proven after 
the probable date of conception. However, the fact that he had
17
married the woman was viewed "as an attempt to do his best to repair
12a wrong he had done" to her. In subsequent decisions this
approach was extended, so that the presumption stands as long as
the husband, knowing or not of the pregnancy, takes no action to
13disclaim the child when he has grounds for suspicion.
In Greek law, for a child who could not have been conceived in wedlock,
there is a readily available legal fiction of legitimacy which is
transformed to an almost irresistible presumption if the husband
admits paternity or if it is so proven against him. According
to article 1468 "a child born in less than 180 days from the date of
marriage is deemed legitimate, unless the husband within three months
from the date he first obtained knowledge of the birth, controverts his
paternity with a declarator notified to the registrar of births". The
right of the husband, however, is revoked and the presumption covering
the child becomes irresistible if birth was connected to circumstances
converging to establish his fatherhood. Specifically, a declarator
against the presumption of article 1468 "is precluded and, if
submitted, fails to affect the status of the child, if (1) the husband
knew of the pregnancy of his wife before the marriage; (2) it
appeared in the registration report that he himself or a specially
appointed representative attended the delivery without raising any
objection; (3) it was proven that he had had extramarital
intercourse with his wife at the relevant time; (4) the husband
14
acknowledged in whatever manner the born child".
Apparently, the grounds just mentioned operate on the same spectrum 
of proof as in Scots law and have the same effect on the presumption. 
However, in Greek law, if there is one of the afore-mentioned grounds, 
this is sufficient to abolish the right of the husband to declare
18
the child illegitimate.
If the child is born before the date of marriage, neither law raises
a strong presumption against the husband. The fact that delivery
had occurred shortly before marriage, or that paternity had not
been admitted to date has not been treated, in either law, as
15
evidence converging to indicate the husband as a father. There
is, however, one exception under Scots law which should be mentioned 
here, to wit, if the child is born prematurely and because of that 
prematurity the wedding, which had been arranged for a certain 
date, had taken place after the birth. In this case, the child
is covered under the presumption applying to ante nuptial conceptions.
There may be conflict within the presumption, if a woman, who is
widowed or divorced or whose marriage has been annulled, remarries
while pregnant. In such a case, under Scots law, a declaration of
paternity may be needed if there is no paternity otherwise admitted 
17or disclaimed. In Greek law, if the mother remarries within
9 months of the termination of the former marriage, in violation of 
the relevant prohibition - provided that neither husband disputes 
their paternity - article 1467 assumes the child to be that of her 
former husband, 'if it were born within the first 270 days, while, 
if born after, is deemed legitimate of the present one. The 
presumption is rebuttable and evidence providing the contrary could 
establish or rebut paternity for either party.
A matter which calls for attention, in the present section, is the way 
the two countries deal with the period of gestation. The point is 
examined not only for the completeness of the present discussion but
19
because of its deterministic appearance in the operation of the 
presumption. Besides, it is contested whether the presumption of 
gestation should constitute a rule of law or should be permitted 
to fluctuate in the light of medical evidence.
In the first place, both laws adhere to a legal presumption of
conception ranging, in Scotland, from six to ten months, and in
19
Greece, from 180 to 300 days prior to birth. However, according
to the prevailing opinion in Greece, the presumption is irresistible
20
and evidence tending to extend or reduce the period is inadmissible.
On the other hand in Scotland, the problem has been treated more
realistically. Thus, without departing from the prescribed period
of gestation, it is admissible to prove that the period of gestation
21could exceed the ten months. As Walker and Walker point out
"while the courts are regarded as having judicial knowledge of the
normal period of gestation, the question of whether a clearly
abnormal period is a possible one is decided in each case in the
light of medical evidence led and the maturity or otherwise of the
child at birth. When the period diverges largely from the normal,
22
the burden of proving . . . illegitimacy is more easily discharged'.'.
The case may be rather uncommon but the fact that Scots law envisages 
the possibility of correction from the normal àegreé development 
of the child is to its credit, because it indicates an interest to 
sustain true relationships. A good example would be the case 
where conception had occurred the day before a husband's fatal 
accident and when gestation exceeded the normal period. The child 
would have been regarded illegitimate in circumstances whereby the 
kinship with the father's relatives would be of paramount importante 
for the child.
20
The last but decisive aspect determining the scope of the presumption 
is the marriage between the parents. It has been quite obvious from 
the analysis on the merits of the presumption that almost every aspect 
of the legitimate status of children under Scots and Greek law is 
founded bÿ reference to the marriage of the parents. There are a 
number of questions to be answered in respect of this strong 
association of legitimacy with marriage and the topic will be opened 
again. However, the aspect which is to be examined now concerns 
the legal validity of the marriage of the parents and whether certain 
defects in the marriage are permissible in the attribution of 
legitimacy.
Under Scots law, the marriage of the parents raises the presumption,
23
if it is formal and lawful. The irregular marriage does not raise
it, though previously in a marriage by habit and repute this was
possible, if a declarator had been issued by the Court of Session.
In this case, a marriage certificate is available for the registration
of the child. If, otherwise, the marriage of the parents is
defective, the effects of the marriage on the legitimacy of the child
vary according to whether the marriage is void, putative or voidable.
The problem appears to have some cbmplexity because children of a
25
void marriage are not accorded legitimacy . Moreover, some
concessions are made in respect to marriages which possess the status 
of a putative marriage. This is to say a void marriage for which 
at least one party - "honestly though erroneously" - believed that 
they were under no legal impediment to marry and consequently did marry. 
The error of the parties, however, should be one of fact and not of
law in order to be accepted within the limits of bona fides.^^ For
example, if one party entered the marriage in ignorance of the
21
existing marriage of the other party, the children would be
considered legitimate. On the contrary, if he/she entered the
marriage knowing of the bigamy of the other party, while believing
that the new marriage would revoke the previous or that it doesr
not impede the party from marrying again, in this case the children
would be illegitimate. Also, it is an error of law if the party
was aware of the other's insanity and believed that this did not
prevent him/her from entering into marriage with the insane person.
It is a question of fact, on the other hand, if the party entered
the marriage in good faith, ignorant of the insanity. Though a
putative marriage has legitimating effects upon the children,
nonetheless, it is argued that the same marriage may not have this
effect upon all the children. According to Fraser if the child
had been conceived after both of its parents had discovered that their
27
marriage was void, the child would probably be illegitimate.
As to the voidable marriage, it also had legitimating effects. The
case, however, is of little interest because a marriage in Scotland
28is considered voidable only on grounds of impotency.
Greek law has a more pragmatic approach so that any marriage formally 
celebrated according to the stipulations of articles 1367 and 1371 of 
the Greek civil code legitimates the natural issue of the parties
whether it will turn out to be void or voidable. As regards those
marriages, the rule is that, once celebrated, they are regarded as 
valid until declared null by a court. The decision reverses all
the results for the spouses but leaves unaltered the status of the
children. It is irrelevant for the existence of the marriage 
whether the parties had entered the marriage in good or bad faith, 
and this should simply affect the consequences of the marriage upon
22
29the spouses.
The only exception provided to the legitimating effects of a void 
marriage concerns children born or conceived in a marriage void 
on the grounds of incest, if consummated between sj.blings or 
relatives of the same line. Those children, by legal fiction, 
are deemed natural children with the rights of a voluntarily 
acknowledged child. Children of marriages between further collaterals 
are deemed legitimate.
The marriage raises the presumption of legitimacy under both Scots
and Greek law as long as it legally exists. If the parties are
informally separated, the marriage is considered an existing one and
the children born to the wife are presumed begotten by her husband.
But the presumption is not raised if the parties have been judicially
separated a mensa a thoro. The husband, in this case, is not
31
entitled to access to his wife.
Aside from any comments which one could make in respect to the
operation of the presumption within these stages of marriage, - a
matter which is dealt with later in the protection of the child in
legitimacy - there are some points to comment upon, as regards the
void and putative marriage in Scotland and the marital formalities
in Greece. The distinction between void and putative marriage
in Scots law clearly manifests a transmission of the parents' faults
to their children. Indeed as Clive observes in his valuable
analysis on "Void and Voidable Marriages in Scots Law", the sanctions
of void marriages are severe and unfair which nevertheless in the
present state of law "bear most heavily on children and which may
32
penalize the innocent rather than the guilty". Moreover, with
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reference to the functions of the consequences of voidness he finds
them to be less a sanction and more a result of the application of
the general principle in question. Thus, since the sanction has the
purpose to protect that principle the extent to which nullity as a
consequence can be justified depends on the importance accorded the
general principle. Consequently in the instance of bigamy or insanity
maybe there is at present no demand for such downgrading of the principle
of monogamy and the principle that a judicial act requires an element
of mental awareness. Nor is there any need to modify the principles
33in order to prevent hardships. But when the question comes to why
the action is brought by the other spouse, the obvious answer is that
the spouse acts in order to be relieved of an apparent tie when the
relationship ceased to work. It is not brought to punish anyone,
34or to uphold any fundamental principles. Therefore, aside from
the legal justification in holding a marriage ineffective ab initio, 
if there is bad faith among the parties, or if it is done in violation 
of the law, it is possible to alter its consequences so as to prevent 
the unjust consequences to children.
In support of this, one could add that a void marriage has some
semblance of marriage and a public nature. The parties will usually 
have gone through a marriage ceremony and those formalities clearly 
emphasize, after the Marriage (Scotland) Act, 1977, that there is a 
social interest for the marriage to be expressed publicly, i.e. for the 
interests of third parties and society. Thus, in relation to social 
concern for children, it can be argued that it would be more 
appropriate to associate them with the external than the internal 
side of the marriage for the following reasons : the concept of the
putative marriage, in its legal sense, is fictional as long as the 
contract remains defective and is subject to reduction. In this
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context, legitimacy may be considered as a reward for the good 
faith of the innocent party which implies concern rather for the 
marriage than for the child itself. Moreover, both the inception 
and extinction of legitimacy moves from the principles of the 
presumption and depends on the proof and the declarations that the 
parents may present. This correlation, presumably, will turn out 
to be against the child because with its interests are connected 
the interests of the innocent party. The logical course would 
be for the party, liable for the defects of the marriage - in a 
stage where there is no remedy to preserve it - to try to remove the 
burden of its consequences, whatever the consequences would be for 
the child. A way out of these problems, apparently, would be a 
uniform approach to children of both putative and void marriages, 
or as Clive puts it "a desirable change of the law should include - 
an amelioration of the harsh and unfair consequences of nullity 
(i) by providing that children of void marriages shall be legitimate 
and (ii) giving the court power to make suitable financial provision','f/35
As regards Greek law, despite its broad recognition of children of
both void and voidable marriages, illegitimacy becomes highly probable
because of the formalities of marriage. The civil code enunciates
a principle whereby a marriage, which has not been solemnised
according to the religious formalities of the parties, is a non-existent
m a r r i a g e . A  strict rule in article 1367 renders irregular a
marriage where one party is Christian Orthodox, if it is not solenraised
37
according to the rituals of this church and by a canonical priest.
A marriage celebrated according to the lex regi celebrationis, if
38contravening this provision, is irregular. As regards marriages
between persons of different Christian dogmas or of different religions, 
the marriage would be irregular if not celebrated according to the
25
39rituals of each dogma or each religion. In the light of
these restrictions, the possibility of a marriage being considered 
irregular and the children illegitimate is highly probable.
Primarily, there is no provision for legitimizing children 
conceived within the civil marriage of Greek subjects residing abroad. 
But is also restricts marriage to persons belonging to a non-recognised 
religion which could create de facto cohabitation and de jure illegit­
imacy .
Before entering on the legitimation and the protection of legitimacy 
it is necessary to concentrate on some concluding remarks in order 
to clarify some essential principles underlying the inception of 
legitimacy.
For the law of both countries, biological paternity is not the 
fundamental fact sustaining legitimacy. It is a fact, which, if it 
occurred within marriage, confers the status of legitimacy upon the 
child. This is not restricted, however, only to cases where the child 
had been conceived and born in wedlock. Provision is made to be so 
deemed for a child born to a woman who was at the time of conception, 
or at the birth or at any time between, validly married to the father. 
Some distinctions, on the other hand, are observable between a child 
conceived in marriage and a child born in marriage. For the former, 
the brocard pater est quem nuptiae demonstrant provides a resolution 
where there is presumed intercourse between the parties, and conception 
of the child from that intercourse, so that the birth of the child, 
after a period of gestation verifies conception in wedlock. Therefore, 
legitimacy conferred, according to the above presumption, is not a 
result of ascertainment of paternity but it is so presumed because the 
circumstances of the birth of the child comply with the law. The
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presumption is readily enforceable in any nuptial conception and 
normally is not founded on attestation. For a child conceived 
before but born within wedlock, the presumption applies ipso facto 
but appears to be less strong. It has a suspensible application 
until it is verified explicitly or implicitly in the circumstances 
which surround the child's birth. In general it needs admission 
by the husband or evidence implying such acknowledgement. A 
peculiarity noticed in this case is that the marriage is treated as 
evidence of paternity if pregnancy was so obvious so that it could be 
assumed that one of the intentions of the parties was to legitimate 
the child. The more obvious or known is pregnancy, the more it 
manifests itself in such intentions and strengthens the correctness of 
the presumption.
As regards marriage, it is observable that all the interest in both 
jurisdictions is concentrated upon its legal existence. By requiring 
marriage to be valid and lawful concern is directed to securing a 
parental relationship of some permanence. This may imply that there 
is a strong interest, in both countries,in the child living in a 
stable relationship, approved and socially acceptable and operating 
proper rights and duties for the child. This view, however, is 
contradicted by the fact that separation and divorce are more probable 
nowadays. It is also contradicted by the fact that legitimacy is 
conferred on offspring of defective marriages despite the fact that 
most of the latter are irremediably subject to reduction. It should 
be admitted, of course, that the number of legitimate children who 
grow up in the marriage of their parents is high compared with those 
whose parents' marriage have been dissolved or annulled. Nonetheless, 
however, the contradictions in the law demonstrate an absolute legal 
typology of the association of marriage with legitimacy and suggest
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that, besides the interests of the child, the protection of social 
interests is implied. Towards the establishment of this view is 
indicated the distinction between children of void and putative 
marriages in Scotland and between religious and non-religious 
marriages in Greece.
B. LEGITIMATION
The child may acquire the status of person born in wedlock under 
both jurisdictions with the subsequent marriage of the parents after 
its birth. Furthermore, in Greek law, legitimation by a court decree 
is possible and the child acquires the status of legitimacy in relation 
to both parents, although it is not recognised as having been born in 
wedlock. The Scottish equivalent to this method of legitimation is 
per letter principis.^^ Thus, although the cases recorded are rare,^^ 
it is held that the bastard could, perhaps, be legitimated by royal 
letters of legitimation. However, as this does not correspond to the 
usual procedure accessible to the general public, it is beyond the 
scope of the present study and will not be treated here.
A similar method inherited from the Byzantine tradition was present
in Greece with the reinstatement of Byzantine legislation after the
liberation. The Legislative Ordinance of 1926 had advanced the
method to legitimation by an "act of the Ministry of Justice" which
remained in force until its repeal by the civil code in 1940. The
reasoning behind the repeal was that the administrative authority
could not provide sufficient safeguards for an impartial application
of the method and, therefore, it had to be submitted to the judicial 
42sector.
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Currently, Scotland bases its law on legitimation in the Legitimation 
(scotlanc^ Act 1968 which codified and reformed the principles of the 
common law, while Greece treats separately legimation per subsequens 
matrimonium in articles 1556 - 1559 of the Greek civil code and 
legitimation by a court degree in articles 1560 - 1567 of the Greek 
civil code.
In the two jurisdictions variations principally revolve around the 
questions of whether all classes of illegitimate children should be 
legitimated or whether some should be debarred, on account of the 
canonical view requiring no impediment to exist during the child's 
conception; or whether a void or voidable marriage should have a 
legitimating effect. Sufficient resource for any inadequacies 
arising in Greek law comes from the legitimation by a court decree, 
although, in an overall assessment, the method appears to have major 
defects. Moreover, as long as the marriage alone does not raise any 
presumption, the way results may be obtained for a child born to the 
parties is disputed. A problem which may also be confronted, in 
Greek law, regards the legitimation of the child for whom there is 
presumption in operation.
As has been pointed out in the introduction, both jurisdictions 
discriminate against illegitimate children. Therefore, prima facie, 
it appears that legitimation still preserves its original value, in 
so far as the subsequent marriage, coupled with admission of paternity, 
remains a valuable device to establish legally paternal responsibility. 
The same is argued in Greek law, for legitimation by a court decree.
One could perceive, on the other hand, that these remedial measures, 
in the context they operate, mainly re-strengthen the institution 
of marriage and supply reasonable excuses against the enactment of an
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equal status for both legitimate and illegitimate children. One 
should not, for example, ignore the fact that the Canonists offered the 
privileged retroactivity of legitimacy to the child's conception 
while Greek legislation has allowed legitimation by court decree where 
there is an impediment to marriage between the parents and there is 
no issue of any existing marriage.
I. Legitimation per subsequens matrimonium
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1. In Scotland, as Walker points out the Cbmmon law, preserving both
the views of Civil and Chnon law, took the position that a child
born out of wedlock was held legitimated per subsequens matrimonium
if the natural parents were under no legal impediment to marry at
the time the child was conceived and subsequently did marry. The
bar in the Cbmmon law to categories of children being legitimated
derives ultimately from Chnon law, where the doctrine was introduced
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on equitable grounds for children born before and after marriage.
Namely, by legal fiction, the marriage was deemed to have been
fetroactively effective as from the date of the child's conception,
so that the child would be considered as conceived and born
within wedlock. Accordingly, an impediment existing at the time
of the child's conception prevented this fictional retroactivity 
45
taking effect.
In practice, this view was treated cautiously by Scottish courts, due
to the odd situation which could have occurred if the mother married
a third party after the child's birth and, then, having been widowed,
married the father of the child. In fact, the concept of retroactivity
46has been seriously questioned in Kerr v. Martin where the mother's 
illegitimate child could have gained priority over the several 
children of her prior marriage. The court, faced with
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such a situation, took the view that legitimation should be
based simply on considerations of justice and expediency, which
resulted in the first loophole concerning retrospectivity.
Arguably, the decision is inconsistent with any theory giving retro-
47spective effects to the natural parents' marriage.
Moreover, apart from retrospectivity itself, the bar of impediment 
became the object of criticism as failing to fulfill the purposes 
of its enactment. Namely the Scottish Law Commission, in its 
memorandum on legitimation, advocates its removal by reason that 
the survival of this bar cannot be justified on social grounds.
In their view, the bar, mainly originating from the prejudice against 
adulterous intercourse, as weaking the institution of marriage, is 
a misplaced concept. Any marriage during the continuation of which 
the spouse has children by or to a third party is already virtually 
defunct. It is equally idle to suggest that the abolition of the 
bar would lower public morality since it is dubious whether 
consideration for the welfare of possible issue ever deterred 
any adulteror or fornicator. On the contrary, they found that
"it penalises children who themselves are innocent by discriminating 
between them and not only their brothers and sisters conceived in
4 g
marriage but also those who can be legitimated under existing law."
A solution may appear in adoption, although it is rather a paradoxical 
suggestion for reasons discussed below. Firstly, it introduces 
a legal fiction whereby another fiction is considered inconsistent. 
Simultaneously, it is inconsistent from the point of both substantive 
law and justice for a natural parent to be acknowledged as fit and 
proper under the law of adoption but not under the law of legitimacy. 
Secondly, as the Commission itself noted from a practical perspective
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procedure is burdensome and circuitous and points to the
49anomalous and ambivalent attitude in the law.
1 aw
The statute^has alleviated this situation, so that currently,
a child conceived at the time when he parents were under legal
impediment to marry may be legitimated by the subsequent marriage
of the parents. Furthermore, the child is deemed legitimate from
the date of marriage by virtue of section 4 of the Legitimation
^cotland)Act 1968. Hence, where the parents of an illegitimate
child had married each other before the commencement of the Act,^P
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and the child was alive at the date of marriage, as well as the
52
father being domiciled in Scotland, the child was deemed legitimate
5 3as from the commencement of the Act, if the marriage under common
54
law did not effect legitimation. The same applies to the
descendants of the child if it had died before the commencement
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of the Act, as if the bastard had been legitimated from that date.
Along with the remedy for children who could not have been
legitimated previously, section one repeals the common law provisions,
so that if the parents of the illegitimate child did marry after
the commencement of the Act, the father is domiciled in Scotland,
and the child is alive, the marriage legitimates the bastard from
the date of marriage. Marriage for the purpose of the present Act
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includes putative and voidable marriage.
Greece, on the other hand, inherited from the Roman law the
doctrine of legitimation per subsequens matrimonium but effective
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from the date of marriage. In the present law, by virtue of
article 1556 of the Greek civil code, the illegitimate child 
acquires the status of legitimacy with the subsequent marriage of
32
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his parents, if it is alive, from the date of marriage.
The marriage legitimates the child provided it formally exists
even though void or voidable
It should be noted that neither Scots nor Greek law refuses to 
extend legitimation to the legitimate or legitimated descendants 
of the child in question.
2. Although in principle, the method is provided on behalf of
children for whom the presumption of legitimacy does not apply, 
there are still certain categories of illegitimate children excluded.
Thus, under Scots law, the child of incest cannot be legitimated,
50a
but no other children are excluded ab initio. Other instances 
where marriage may fail to affect the status of the child are when 
the parties had entered marriage in bad faith, or if it relates to 
a child for whom a presumption of paternity already exists and there 
is insufficient evidence to rebut it.
In Greek law a more strict approach premised in the impediments to 
marriage prevent the child of adulterous intercourse from being 
legitimated if lhe parents have been convicted for adultery and the 
decision is f i n a l . F u r t h e r ,  complications for this child may 
arise when fae presumption operates for the former husband who has 
an exclusive right to disavow paternity. Thus, although the 
parents may not have been convicted for adultery, the child can 
never be legitimated by the subsequent marriage, if the former 
husband, for whatever reason, refuses to challenge the presumption 
of paternity.
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Other disqualifications as well derive from the impediments of 
incest and differences in religion. The child of incest can
never acquire a complete status, while the illegitimate child born 
to parents of whom the one is Christian and the other of different 
religion can never be benefitted by this form of legitimation 
since the marriage of those parents is prohibited by law.^^
3. As a rule, in both jurisdictions, marriage legitimates any
illegitimate child born to the parents and does so independently
63of the intentions of "he parentis or the consent of the child. The
marriage in itself, however, does not prove the husband's paternity,
nor does it ever give rise to any such presumption for any illegitimate
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child of the mother. Therefore, as an additional precondition,
proof is required that the parties in the marriage are the natural
parents of the child in question. Such proof normally finds
65its place under Scots law in a declarator for legitimation.
Specifically, in accord with the Registration Act 1965 where a
child has been registered as illegitimate, entry may be made in the
Registrar of Corrections as to its legitimation only where such
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legitimation has been founded in a court decree. Moreover,
by virtue of section 20(1)(c) of the same Act, the Registrar General
may, in case of legitimation, authorise re-registration of the birth,
"but not where paternity of the bastard has not been registered,
unless with the sanction of the sheriff on the application of both
parents, or the survivor or on behalf of the legitimated bastard,
after intimation and i n q u i r y " . S u c h  declarator may be
instigated, even after the spouses and the child's death, by his
descendants.^^ Equitably, it is open to proof after the death
of the parties involved that although the mother was married, the
69
child was illegitimate. The proof required for a declarator
of legitimation cannot be assumed to be the same for all instances.
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When it concerns a child for whom a presumption already applies, 
the proof must operate on two levels. In the first place, 
strong proof must be provided to overrule the presumption for 
the former husband as well as proof that the child in question 
is the issue of intercourse with the present one. For the latter, 
as well as for an illegitimate child for whom paternity has not 
been registered relaxation of the evidence as inactions of affiliation 
and aliment could be suggested.
Although in Scots law, as a rule no presumption is raised and
paternity need admission or proof and a declarator of legitimation,
a certain "weak" presumption is held to apply, rooted on the bare
fact that the man had married the woman to his knowledge having
71an illegitimate child. Thus, if the child for any reason
had enjoyed the status of legitimacy by common and unbroken
reputation for a long period, this is not to be taken away if
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there is no evidence to prove the husband as the father.
Greece creates in article 1557 of the Greek civil code an
obligation for the parents to declare the child as their natural
offspring after their marriage by serving a notice to the Registrar
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of the area where the marriage was solemnised. Moreover,
the article states that omission by the parents to declare the
child does not affect a child born to them, while a judicial
admission of paternity concerning the husband of the mother
74operates as declaration of legitimation. The construction of
the article provides that a declaration to the Registrar is
unnecessary if the child has been voluntarily affiliated by the 
75father or if paternity has been judicially established before 
the m a r r i a g e . T h e  child, if the parent has omitted to
35
make such a declaration, may raise an action against the husband
17with the object of proving his paternity. It is suggested
that the conditions of judicial affiliation should apply for such
78an action but free of the time limits of article 1544. Due to
the nature of the action, a petition is permitted to be submitted
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long after the marriage or even by the descendants of the child.
A peculiar retroactivity of the husband/child relation is argued, 
if the husband admits paternity not by declaring the child to the 
Registrar but in a notarial deed or in his will so that such admission 
satisfies the conditions of the voluntary acknowledgement of the 
child. It is suggested that, in this case, rights and duties 
which are included in such acknowledgement take effect retrospectively 
from the date of birth, while legitimation qualifies the operation 
of any right not included in such action.
In Greek law, the declaration by the parents does not need ab initio 
corroboration. Thus, if it is false, it is suggested that it may 
be contested by applying analogically the grounds and procedure in 
use to rebut a voluntary acknowledgement.^^
II. Legitimation by a court decree
In Greece, the status of legitimacy may also be acquired through a 
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court decree by any illegitimate child, with the exception of the 
child of i n c e s t . S u c h  status may be acquired on the application 
of the father or by the child after the father’s death, if legitimation 
per subsequens matrimonium is unlikely. However, such application is 
debarred if the father has any issue by marriage. The relevant 
provision of the Legislative Ordinance 1926 permitted the legitimation 
only with the consent of the child. The civil code overpassed this
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development and re-instated the Justinian law whereby legitimation was
prohibited if this could affect rights of the children of the family or
84
if legitimation per subsequens matrimonium was possible.
1. The court on the request of the father may award a decree if the 
conditions of article 1561 are fulfilled and the application 
concerns his natural c h i l d . P r o o f  of paternity is not normally 
n e e d e d . U n d e r  specific circumstances, however, and because he 
bears exclusively the right to apply, the father may be requested
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to provide proof in order to support the validity of his application.
On the other hand, he does need to prove that marriage between him 
and the natural mother is impossible or difficult to obtain so that 
legitimation of the child per subsequens matrimonium is unlikely.
In addition, he needs to provide evidence that he is without issue 
by marriage.
Particularly, according to article 1551(2) the father is required
to prove that at the date of the hearing, marriage between him and
the mother (natural mother) was impossible due to her death or for
88other "serious reasons". In the first decade following the
introduction of the civil code, the term "serious reason" was
construed as to permit legitimation only on the grounds of objective
impossibility. Thus, unlike Byzantine law, the impossibility of
marriage was assessed exclusively on the existence of legal and/or
de facto impediument, without permitting the parties to prove
personal disagreement or other reasons which made marriage unlikely 
89for them. Consequently, the grounds were satisfied only if
90
the mother had lost the required capacity to contract a marriage,
or if there existed a legal impediment between the parents, or even,
91
if the mother was of unknown residence and could not be traced.
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On the other hand, recently there has been a turn towards subjective
impossibility whereupon the immorality of either party or their
difference in character, so long as it supported a confident
prediction that the marriage between the parents was not likely to
survive, and the court may, in this case, consider the conditions 
92
satisfied.
Prior opportunities to marry cannot invalidate evidence referring
to current impossibility. Nonetheless, if the child was conceived
during a betrothal or after a promise of marriage, the assumed
intentions of the parties to marry may make the establishment of
subjective impossibility rather difficult. Depending on the
circumstances, the court may reluctantly accept personal reasons,
provided those sufficiently reverse the reasons which, in the first
93
place, led the parties to consider marrying each other.
Furthermore, decree may not be granted if the father is with issue 
by marriage at the date of the hearings. Specifically, article
1561(1) debars legitimation of a child if the father has a legitimate 
issue. This has been construed as to include a child born in 
wedlock or a child legitimated per subsequens matrimonium prior to 
the date of hearings. Legitimation, on the other hand, is
permitted if the father is with judicially legitimated issue who
94
have died without leaving legitimate descendants.
2. In addition to the compliance with the above conditions, certain
consents have to be provided. Namely the child in question
95
must give his consent through his legal guardian. He may withhold 
consent but this is subject to the control of the court, which, 
under specific circumstances, may dispense with it on the grounds
38
of abuse of right. Within this legal frame, denial of consent
is considered not justified, where there is only the belief that
legitimation may cause undue hardship to the child or that it may
fail to serve the child's best interests. On the other hand,
the child may withhold consent, if it suspects that the applicant
is not his natural parent, or if it could prove that the parent's
past conduct demonstrates as impossible the development of a
96
parent/child relationship between them.
Moreover, if the legitimating person is married to a third party,
her consent is necessary, unless it is difficult to attain due to
her mental illness or other reasons. As such, the decision
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63/1971 of the Appeal Court of Athens enumerates it as the presumed 
death of the wife or her absence in a place where communication with 
her is thought to be impossible. Denial of consent may constitute
abuse of right if ill-motivated. The same decision provided that
a "simple" denial not supported with serious reasons, or a withholding 
of consent under circumstances of informal separation,are not 
sufficient grounds for dispensing with her consent.
Consent, if formally provided, according to the prevailing opinion
is irrevocable, though it may be invalidated on the grounds of fraud 
98or duress.
Moreover, two interesting provisions of the civil code grant posthumous 
legitimation to the child after the father's death or to the child's 
descendants after the child's death. According to article 1564 of
the Greek civil code the child may apply to be legitimated after the 
father's death, provided the father had named the child as his in 
a will or public document. Legitimation after the death of the 
parent is also subject to the same conditions concerning his legitimate
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descendants, and the marriage between the natural parents.
Thus, if the deceased was with no issue by marriage and at the
date of his death there existed a legal impediment preventing
him and the mother from getting married, the child may, validly,
apply for its legitimation. The death of the parent is
considered as an impediment only if it occurred shortly after
delivery so that the parents had not had the chance to arrange 
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marriage. The consent of the widow of the deceased, according
to the prevailing opinion, is not r e q u i r e d . T h e r e  are,
however, disagreements based on the need to protect her financially,
particularly after the husband's d e a t h . T h e  reason that a
wife's consent is needed is in essence to give her the opportunity
to protect the interests of her marriage, which may be affected
by the legitimation of the child. Such an interest ceases after
the termination of the marriage and remain only in relation to
financial rights upon the estate of the deceased. In addition
to these conditions, the child must have been named by the father
102as his in a will or public document. Specifically, a birth
certificate signed by the father, a notarial deed affiliating the 
child or his application to legitimate it, all are documents that 
satisfy the present conditions. Also a will made before a 
notary affiliating the child, even though later invalidated or 
revoked, still satisfies the requirement of a public document.
On the death of the child, the father under the same conditions may 
apply to legitimate the descendants of the child. The descendants 
themselves, however, do not have the right to apply on the death 
of the father and grandfather. Legitimation is granted, in this
case, only if the descendants or their legal guardian consent to
., T ... .. 103the legitimation.
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When a decree has been issued, the child from that date is
deemed legitimate of the father and other ascendants in the 
104paternal line. An exception to the aforesaid is the
judicial legitimation of the child after the death of his father, 
whereby legitimation retroacts to the date of the death.
Results are also extended to the descendants of the child and 
they are deemed as legitimate grandchildren.
Before ending this section, it is necessary to make some comments 
concerning the treatment of the mother in the course of a judicial 
legitimation, as well as about the protection of the child 
throughout the proceedings. The mother under the present law is 
the person mostly affected in the sense that the relationship 
with her child remains that of illegitimacy whereas the father 
sui generis, after the locitimation, acquires the representation 
of the child and decisive rights in arranging his life through the 
patria potestas. Taking into account that in most cases the 
judicial legitimation would concern children at the age of puberty, 
the concentration of power in the father would be risky at this 
stage of the child's development, since decisions would be taken 
by someone not in close contact with the child. Similarly 
the consequences are unfair to the mother since she would not have 
a sufficient share in the administration of the child's affairs.
It should also be noted that in the case that the father would 
forfeit patria potestas, the right of representation does not 
transmit to the mother.
Furthermore, her involvement in the proceedings is rather minimal; 
the only right allowed her is that she may intervene in the lawsuit 
like any third party with a lawful interest, providing evidence
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against the paternity of the applicant or against compliance 
with the relevant conditions. At the same time it is the case that 
the child may withhold consent to his legitimation if he believes 
that there is no basis for the development of a parent-child 
relationship with the father. The person most likely to have
direct knowledge of thé matter is the mother, and, if she is not 
the appointed guardian, the child could be burdened with a 
paternity which may count against him in the long run. Some 
systems, in order to balance the situation, provide for the consent 
of the mother to be necessary. On the other hand, the 
approach of the Gazi C o m m i t t e e i s  to give a prior right to 
the mother in the guardianship and care of the child, and to consider 
the father as a second alternative. This resolution protects 
the relationship with the mother and also upholds her active 
involvement in the child's life. Irrespective of the remedy
offered by the proposition of the Gazi Committee, whether this 
method should continue to be available depends upon the extent of 
reform needed on illegitimacy. Thus, this subject willdbe 
returned to later in this thesis.
C. THE PROTECTION OF THE CHILD IN A LEGITIMATE PARENT/CHILD 
RELATIONSHIP
This field of law operates on two levels. The first is in the
resistance to the presumption before evidence tending to bastardise
the child and the second is in the kind of parental union regarded
as proper to care for the child.
As has been pointed out earlier, married women are supposed to
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bear children to their husbands, and in the majority of cases 
this is true. However, a small minority remains for whom this 
presumption is invalid, and both the husband and the child have 
a strong interest in removing any legal link between them. If such 
a link were retained it would be an arbitrary one and would be 
regarded with frustration by both parties. On the other hand, 
illegitimate pregnancies, by married women, do not constitute the 
rule but the exception. Also, not every illegal affair results 
in an extramarital conception. The probability, therefore, of
a child being the husband's is regarded as high. This is so 
deeply rooted in the opinion of society that almost every marital 
birth passes unquestioned. Moreover, not every father has an 
interest in his "child". Commonly, in the past one came across
failures to disclaim the child and in the majority of cases this 
was rather due to false claims than to the peculiarity
of the situation. It is expected, therefore, that the presumption 
could be reargued in each law, by contrary proof, showing that the 
child could not be the issue of the husband with the wife. Nonethe­
less, it is presumed that such proof will deviate from the 
ordinary means of evidence and will be confined to clear persuasion 
that the child is illegitimate. Further, peculiarities are 
expected when such proof is directed against the presumption of 
an ante-nuptial conception. Because this presumption derives 
its power from evidence or admission of paternity, the more clearly 
it was demonstrated that the child belonged to the husband, the 
stronger would be the protection of the child. It should be 
noted, ontie other hand, that there is an inconsistency in this 
inference. Conception may have taken place at a time when the 
parents were under no legal obligation as spouses. Thus, the 
possibility of the child having been begotten by another man exists.
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If, therefore, the proof against a presumption is standing 
otherwise than by express admission, i.e. if the husband had 
exposed himself to such an inference by assisting his wife 
during her pregnancy or refusing publicly to repudiate her and 
the child, there is a strong possibility of his conduct being 
motivated by an interest in saving the reputation of his wife and 
his marriage. Any tendency in the law, therefore to treat such 
a presumption as an absolute should be treated with some scepticism 
as regards the interests of the child.
Two important procedural questions go along with the right to 
disavow paternity. One concerns the persons who may challenge 
legitimacy. In this case is it to be restricted to persons 
with a primary interest, as the parents, or to be open to everybody 
who has a lawful interest to protect? Prima facie, it appears 
as an exclusive family right. Nevertheless, it involves matters 
of social interest and under certain circumstances it is expected 
to be open to persons like the public attorney or to relatives of 
the parents to be entitled to challenge the presumption. The 
second question refers to the time and the proceedings suitable 
for such action. Obviously, evidence of the extramarital 
conception of the child is not available in advance in all cases. 
There is, furthermore, a strong reason for precluding such right 
after a certain period. The child may have enjoyed the status for 
a long period, been treated as legitimate in its own family and 
so known to society, which makes the presence of some restrictions 
desirable. Moreover, should the presumption be open to challenge 
in any context or only in .special "status proceedings"? The 
question of legitimacy does not seem to be of a nature permitting
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answer as an incidental question in other than especially provided 
proceedings.
The second section on the protection of legitimacy concerns the kind 
of parental unions within which it is raised. Frequently, the 
impression gained from the law is that the primary reason for raising 
the presumption in marriage is identification of paternity and 
protection of the child. It is widely acclaimed that the nature of 
the institution offers sounder grounds for identifying the father and 
provides a stable and endurable union, which it is believed will protect 
the child as long as this is needed. Nonetheless, it was observed 
that, for raising the presumption, the continuation of the marriage 
was not the primary concern. Only its legality and morality appeared 
to be an important factor. ' Furthermore, from day to day experience, 
one comes across unmarried but cohabiting parents, who serve the 
interests of their child far better than those legally linked by 
marriage. In this context, it is still to be seen whether it is
always necessary to restrict the complete relation only to children 
conceived in marriage or whether there are grounds for it to be 
extended as well to other parent/child relationships.
I. Disavowal and Contestation of Paternity
The disavowal of the child by the mother's husband. In general
both countries allow for the possibility of rebuttal of the
presumption of paternity, but because the position in favour of
legitimacy is very strong, this procedure is admitted only on very
serious and limited grounds, resulting in the impossibility of
the mother's husband being the father of the child. Specifically,
the grounds upon which the presumption may be disproved operate on
two levels covering the areas of physical and factual impossibility.
According to the first, it must be proved that the child could not
109
have been conceived by the husband due to his physical impotency.
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This is a uiwersally accepted ground and finds its resolution in
medical evidence so that there are no specific peculiarities between
the two laws to comment upon. According to the second ground, which
may be revoked if the husband is potent, it is required to prove that
there exists a do facto impossibility of the child having been
conceived by intercourse between the spouses. There is a difference
of approach in this particular point in that Scots law is focused on
the lack of intercourse between the parties and accords less emphasis
to the possibility of access, while Greek law shows a primary interest
110
in access and less in the lack of intercourse. Thus, Scots
law does not insist on proof that access to the wife by the husband
was impossible, but the court has to be satisfied that intercourse
did not take place between the spouses at any time during the period
111in which the child might have been conceived. On the contrary,
in Greek law weight is attached to evidence demonstrating non-access 
112by the husband and,given cohabitation,only under specific
circumstances, illness or proven emotional weakness being among them, will
113proof of the lack of intercourse be admitted. As to the amount
of proof required, both concur in requiring clear and convincing
proof that the child could not have been conceived of the husband.
Neither law, however, pushes to an extreme requiring absolute
impossibility, but proof may not be considered satisfactory if there
is only the bare inference that illegitimacy is more probable than 
114
legitimacy. Particularly, it has been repeatedly held and
±15applied in a considerable number of Scottish cases that there
is no room for approaching the question of legitimacy from a point of 
view of a mere balancing of probabilities. Nor even as a question 
where the ordinary rules of onus of proof alone apply. Similarly, 
the term "obviously impossible" of article 1471 of the Greek civil 
code was met with a similar consideration so that the proof is 
insufficient if not conclusive of the impossibility of the child
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having been conceived of the h u s b a n d . T h u s ,  in both laws,
the presumption cannot be re-argued merely by evidence of the
adultery of the wife, nor by evidence of the parent alone, unless
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sufficiently corroborated in the light of independent evidence.
There are two instances, however, where the rule of direct evidence
is deviated from and the presumption may be rebutted by inference.
In the first, which appears in both Scots and Greek law, the
presumption may be rebutted, if non-access is inferred from evidence
of the unreasonably short pregnancy after the first cohabitation
following the husband's absence, or of unreasonably long pregnancy
after the last cohabitation since his a b s e n c e . T h e  second,
which appears only in Scots law, refers to the case where a married
woman brings an action for affiliation and aliment against a man
other than her husband and, therefore, by inference rebuts the
presumption albeit the husband having had access to her at the relevant 
119time. However, given cohabitation between the spouses, the
standard of proof increases when compared with what is sufficient in
120informal separation. In such cases, sufficient ground may be
121
considered the sterility or necrospermia of the husband or the
122
different race of the child, , while other major deviations in
colour or results of blood tests may not in themselves be adequate
123
to overturn the presumption.
Following the peculiarities of proof, a number of different issues
exist in each law with reference to the evidence admissible in a
declarator of bastardy. While both agree that the parties may call
witnesses, invite other evidence or make use of other statements or
124relevant documents, when it comes to the personal testimony of the
parents, the position alters considerably. It was widely felt in
both jurisdictions that, due to their presumed interest in the ongoing
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litigation, the testimony of the parents is only of relative
credibility. Consequently, parents or other parties with a
personal interest have been normally disqualified as witnesses and the
125
use of secondary evidence was promoted in their stead. For the
latter, however, it was suggested that, if related to the parents,
credit ought to be given to it where it is not connected with the
present action. Thus, in Scots law, "statements of the parents,
made without reference to present or prospective litigation, and
especially if these statements were made under circumstances which
naturally called for e x p l a n a t i o n " a r e  received in evidence but
little credit is given to their statements if made in the prospect
of the present judicial proceedings. However, evidence or testimony,
whatsoever, related to the parents has had a different confrontation
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since the end of the 19th century. In Cole v. Homer it was
held that, in a declarator of bastardy, if the mother is alive, she
128
is the best witness to be examined, while in Burman v . Burman it
was held that the declarations of both spouses, if free from suspicion
concerning their personal conduct, is the best evidence to be received.
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However in Imre v. Mitchell the position altered so that weight 
was attached to the testimony of the parents if confirmed with 
objective evidence. In Greece, on the other hand, due to the nature 
of the litigation, testimony of the parents, still is not admitted. 
However, if the mother has confessed that the child is illegitimate, this 
under certain circumstances may be treated as secondary evidence.
As regards,the presumption raised for an ante-nuptial conception, 
as was discussed above, this is only a prima facie presumption, and 
becomes final with admission or evidence of knowledge of the 
pregnancy or of intercourse between the parents.
For such a case, in Scots law, it is permitted for the husband to
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rebut the presumption with direct evidence tending to prove that
he was ignorant of the pregnancy or that he did not have intercourse
with the mother prior to marriage. Emphasis, however, has been
placed on his knowledge of the pregnancy and, if proven, the
131
presumption becomes almost irresistible. There is also the
possibility of a parent who had falsely acknowledged the child as
his bringing evidence rebutting the presumption on the grounds of 
132his error. Such evidence, however, is met with strong
reluctance in Scots law, especially when there is an express
recognition of the child. A parent who on evidence gives lie to
all his previous conduct is looked upon unfavourably, while, if he
has once acknowledged the child d. s lawful, his testimony cannot
133
afterwards be used to overcome the presumption.
In Greek law, the father may disclaim the child with a simple
declaration^^^ but his right to do so may be extinguished if there is
135prima facie evidence proving him to be the father. Even if
there is no such evidence, the right becomes obsolete if not exercised
within three months of him first receiving information of the birth.
Thus, it is argued that the right does not revive if he omitted to
submit a declaration or acknowledgement of the child even though
in the light of posterior evidence it may appear that he is not
the father. In the latter case, the opinion of Greek jurists
is divided between those supporting the absolute preclusion of any
revival and those who find it possible for the husband to disclaim
the child if he has been the victim of fraud or duress in assuming
137the child as his own. Neither side, however, supports a reclaiming
oh the grounds of essential error. Specifically, supporters of 
the absolute preclusion argue that his right to contest paternity 
should become extinct after the specified period, because it is
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almost impossible to conclusively persuade a reasonable man that
the woman with whom he had extramarital intercourse could not have
had connection with another man. Therefore, it can be presumed, that
the person indicated as the father by the marriage was ready to bear
all the consequences of the pregnancy, or if not, he could have
expressed his negative wish within this p e r i o d . H o w e v e r ,  according
to the second opinion, which seems to be the more reasonable, the
possibility exists of the husband having been victimised and it
would be rather arbitrary to preclude his action if such is the
case. He may have been defrauded in assuming the child as his, or
may have hesitated to disclaim it due to excessive pressure exercised
139by the wife or other relatives. Moreover, even if it is evident
that he knew of the pregnancy, this is not conclusive because he may 
have entered the marriage as a result of his interest in the mother, 
her pregnancy having little effect on him.
Although the rule is that legitimacy should be destroyed as a result
140of judicial proceedings, the status of the child would have been
exposed to considerable risk if the decision is taken in connection 
with other claims which do not reflect the gravity of a decision of 
status and to which other principles of policy apply. Thus, 
proceedings may be introduced in each law, in a principal action, 
or may appear as an intervening lawsuit in any context in which the 
question of paternity is relevant. Moreover, both laws insist on 
treating a declarator of bastardy as the crucial and central question 
which should be decided exclusively on its merits. Hence, when 
the question of paternity is raised, in connection with legal proceedings 
related to the enforcement of a right, or the establishment of a 
claim to property, or the making of an order for the custody and 
maintenance of the child, it would never be decided in conjunction
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with the connected claims but will be the subject of an intervening 
141lawsuit. The only exception to the rule appeared recently in
Scotland where a conclusion for a declarator of bastardy of a child
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was included in an action of divorce. In this precedent,
however, the criterion for such connection was that illegitimacy of 
the child was crucial to both conclusions of the summons, so that the 
pursuer, to succeed in the conclusion of divorce, had to prove the 
child a bastard. Consequently, it cannot be said that the case 
is more one of divorce than one of declarator of bastardy. Moreover, 
it was revealed that while the main reason for preventing connection 
of declarators of bastardy with other claims is the different standards 
of proof required for each case, this cannot be maintained if one is 
connected with an action of divorce. The proof in both cases has to 
be "beyond reasonable doubt" while the nature of evidence admissible 
for each case appears to have a close similarity, so that the course 
of proof will not deviate from the already existing practice.
In relation to the gravity attributed to the proceedings both laws 
restrict the litigants to persons who justify a lawful family interest. 
Although, however, both define the mother and the child as defendants^^^^ 
there are certain differences in the persons who may be regarded 
as appropriate to bear the right. Namely, under Scots law, besides
the husband, the right is allowed to the mother and the child itself,
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or collaterally by any one claiming a lawful interest. In the
instance of the mother, and perhaps of the child, if she is trying
to rebut the presumption by inference, because the child prima facie
belongs to her husband, shé^^^SÀSi^raise an action of affiliation
and aliment against a stranger without his concurrence^^^oreover, action
for a declarator of bastardy has been allowed at the instance of "the
heir-at-law of the husband of the alleged bastard claiming to succeed
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on the failure of a conveyance by the husband to his wife and her
146
heirs, she having predeceased without issue ..."
In Greece, on the other hand, the right is recognised only to the
husband who can initiate proceedings himself or by appointing a
special representative. In the event of his death, the right is
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passed on to his heirs-an-law. If the mother is deceased, the
action must be directed against the child and the mother's heirs
148otherwise it is unacceptable. Neither the mother, nor the child
have any right to contest legitimacy, though it is argued that the
mother should be permitted to raise an action as an heir of the huëband.
Where the husband refuses to contest legitimacy, the mother and the
child may be protected through the principles of the abuse of right,
i.e. if the child had been widely reputed as illegitimate or the
husband's refusal is i l l - m o t i v a t e d . T h i s  approach, however has
been widely disfavoured, because it exposes both mother and child to
the risk of stigmatization, and because the grounds of abuse of right
have such a relative application so that it is only in a few cases
that the mother could have succeeded in establishing the true paternity
of the child. Thus, the Gazi Committee proposed a particular reform
for this article, according to which the right to contest legitimacy
151is extended to the mother, an independent right is given to the
152
child, exercisable for one year after it attains majority. The
same right is extended to its guardian ad litem, with the permission 
152of the court, and to its heirs for six months after the child's 
153death. This proposal has not yet been incorporated into law.
Another difference concerning the procedure refers to the restrictions 
of time imposed for initiating an action for disavowing paternity.




death or even after the death of all parties involved. Greek
law, on the other hand, tends to limit the period so that the child's
status is not at risk for long after birth. Specifically, it
gives the husband one year after obtaining knowledge of the birth to
accomplish the disavowal, and three months to his heirs, if the right
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had not become obsolete during his life.
As a result of a successful disavowal or contestation of paternity,
the child concerned will lose the designation of a person born in
w e d l o c k . M o r e o v e r ,  the child may be designated as adulterous
with further consequences in Greek law. Namely, if in the course of
the hearings intercourse with a specific person is established, the
husband may succeed in obtaining the conviction of his wife and her
alleged paramour. This will impede them from marrying and legitimating 
157the child.
In general, however, in both jurisdictions, the child will lose the 
fullest set of rights and obligations in its relationship with the 
husband. This also will occur in its relationship with the mother 
under Scots law, while in Greek law the child will retain full rights 
and duties in respect of her, subject to minor alterations due to its 
illegitimate s t a t u s . T h e  general inference that one could 
extract from the procedure on rebutting the presumption of paternity
is that the protection of legitimacy as a protection of status has been
satisfactorily achieved in both laws. In particular, the standards 
of proof are high and the evidence admissible is carefully selected, 
so that the risk to the child of losing the designated status on the 
basis of insufficient evidence is eliminated. Moreover, despite 
the fact that the scope of the presumption has remained unchanged one 
should note that its rebuttal has been facilitated in favour of
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determining the real father. And this task is achieved without 
affecting the importance of the presumption which has retained all 
of its original value. Particularly, the weight of proof tends to 
be concentrated on proving whether the child could have been conceived 
after intercourse between the parents, rather than on proving mere 
access to each other. This signifies a more sensitive approach 
towards the issue of paternity and awareness of the adversity, 
which may be caused to the child, if the presumption is maintained 
on the basis of the stereotypes dominating its application. This 
approach appears more emphatically in Scots law. In Greek law, 
however, where access still receives considerable attention some 
major defects are discernible. It is rare, for example, for the 
presumption to be over-ruled in cases where the spouses had taken 
precautions to avoid pregnancy, or in cases where, during the critical 
time, they were on unfamiliar terms so that intercourse between them 
was unlikely. However, this "legal logic" may fail to convince the 
husband of the possibility that the child had been conceived by him 
and, as a result, he may act indifferently towards the child's interests
Moreover, the seriousness with which both jurisdictions confront the 
question of the status is to their credit. Both pay particular 
attention to the establishment of independent proceedings when the 
status appears to be an issue of the ongoing litigation. This pre­
cludes any possibility of exposing the decision of status to the 
influence of other prevailing policies in claims of different nature 
and gravity-
It should be said, on the other hand, that there are instances where 
the resolution of the law may produce a critical situation for the
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child. For example, the absôlutism dominating the presumption of 
antenuptial conception in certain cases may be unreal since 
pregnancy is not the sole motive for getting married. Also, 
in Greek law, the right to rebut the presumption is restricted 
to the husband and his heirs-at-law. To counter balance those 
defects, it should be preferable to apply the presumption in the 
same manner as in other areas, i.e. by adopting a more flexible 
approach towards evidence showing that conception took place by 
the person who married the mother. Also as the Gazi committee rightly 
proposes for Greek law, it should be mandatory to supply the mother 
and the child with a right to contest the status.
II. Marriage and Legitimacy
Although some concern is expressed in the two systems for the 
determination of the true paternity of the child, the situation is 
not clear yet as regards the future position of the legislation 
towards biological parenthood. Apparently, the decline in the 
strength of the praesumptLo juris signifies to a certain extent an 
ideological shift away from the concern for G, stable legal family 
towards a pragmatic approach regarding the paternity of the child. 
On the other hand, marriage remains the controlling element for a 
parent-child relationship. There are sound arguments in favour 
of the association, since the nature of marriage makes it easier to 
identify the parents and additional!/ offers the advantage of a 
more or less permanent unit to bring up the child. However, non- 
compliance with the laws of marriage is a frequent phenomenon which 
in a considerable number of instances results ih.-the birth of a 
child. Irrespective of the birth status of the child in a 
sociological setting, there is an ideological displacement, so that
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paramount consideration is no longer given to the traditional norms
of the family, nor to the alleged father's interest to contest the
presumption. The interest of the child is, increasingly, gaining
independent recognition, which is expressed in its right to challenge
the relation with the mother's husband, but more importantly in the
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attention paid to its established membership in a social setting.
Due to this social concern for the child, extensive reform has been 
carried out to improve the status of children born out of wedlock 
so that, currently, one can sustain the argument that the existence 
of a marriage relationship between'the parents is of very little 
consequence to the rights of the c h i l d , H o w e v e r ,  despite 
the improvements in the children's rights, there still remains a 
substantive difference between the children born in wedlock and 
those born out of wedlock as regards the legal recognition of the 
relationship with the parents. For children born in wedlock 
the relationship with the father is sui. generis enforceable, whereas 
for children born out of wedlock this matter is left to the 
discretion of the individuals involved. In result, many children 
born out of wedlock remain fatherless though it is obvious who 
fathered the child, or it can be easily proved. On this understanding 
it might be fit for family law to recognise a similar degree of 
concern in the case of a child born out of wedlock in order to 
establish the parental relationship.
It should be made clear, in the first place, that the ideological 
shift noticed in the concept of legitimacy has appeared in a rather 
weak form. Neither did it bring any major changes in the content of 
the presumption, nor did it devaluate in any respect the amount 
of proof required to rebut the presumption. It simply changed the 
approach towards legitimacy from a purely moral bneatowards a more
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pragmatic one. Thus this approach may be understood as a result
of the current changes in sociological attitudes, which affected
the construction of the relevant law. For instance the emphasis on
and improvements in the rights of the child may have svung the
pendulum towards concern for the biological relationship. In this
respect such emphasis may be anticipated as aiming to update the
law of legitimacy with other asuects of children's legislation.
However, pressure for change did not arise exclusively from the
importance attributed to children's rights. A change of social
attitudes towards men-women partnerships may have had a considerable
influence upon the concept of legitimacy. Indeed the ever-
increasing phenomenon of unformalized relationships has
attention as much to the rights of the consorts as to the children
born of such relationship. The idea of giving recognition to
children of such unions is not unknown in the two jurisdictions.
Scots law, for instance, in the case of a relatively established
association has adopted a method of giving some kind of immediate
legal recognition by recognising irregular forms of marriage.
Greek law,on the other hand, for a child born to two cohabitees
attributes the status of voluntary acknowledgement whether the
relationship with the father is established as a result of a judicial
160a
order or by an act of the father. Even so, however, it is known 
that there are many different situations comprehended within the 
broad area of unformalized relationships and many result in the birth 
of a child. That child may be attributed to the ex-husband of the 
mother. Equally, however, the male partner may be presumed to 
have fathered a child of his ex-wife and, therefore, to have to pay 
aliment notwithstanding that he has a de iacto family to support. 
Therefore, a thorough examination of the functioning of the presumption 
of legitimacy in the present social context seems essential in order
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to advance any proposals on the desirable content of future 
legislation. To attempt such an analysis,however, presents not 
inconsiderable difficulties since it concerns a background trans­
formation of the man-woman relationship and a policy delegating the 
institutionalisation of children within families formed by marriage.
It involves a wide range of arguments,not altogether distinct, 
which can be identified in terms of morality, social welfare and 
welfare of the child.
a. 1. It is argued that by maintaining the marital family this
serves to uphold moral standards. This element of morality in the 
context of illegitimacy corresponds to values never clearly defined 
and therefore appears with considerable fluidity in its composition. 
Consequently its discussion is not free from difficulties. As
a matter of fact, the correlation between monogamous marriage and 
legitimacy in its moral aspect has been taken for granted for 
centuries. By being a concept surrounded by the dogmatism of religion, 
it rarely became the subject of open debate or was publicly 
challenged in terms of its usefulness or validity. Normally, one 
finds arguments against illegitimacy as a cause of moral decay, 
but rarely a positive opinion explaining why legitimacy served 
morality. Nonetheless, it is not inconsistent to assert that the 
gap between natural and legal parenthood remains unbridgeable and that 
that is mainly due to moral concerns. For example, to advocate 
a pragmatic approach for the parent child relationship often means 
encountering barriers which are rooted in a conditioning, dating 
back hundreds of years and which must be overcome - that 
parenthood in wedlock is the morally proper way for bringing up 
children.
58
The soundness of this argument becomes apparent if one looks at
the way in which the question of legitimacy is confronted in the
judicial setting. The contrast between legitimacy and Illegitimacy
has been treated in moral terms so that the judgement for certain
was "prejudiced" against illegitimacy and contained a bias in
favour of the status attributed through the marriage of the mother..
In Scotland, since the medieval period, this approach appears to be
the fundamental view of the courts on declarators of legitimacy
and bastardy. Thus, it appears to have been well settled at the
time of Erskine, who appraising the proof required to rebut the
presumption, explained that "the favour of marriage is so strong,
and the securing of the point of legitimacy so important to society
that it cannot be defeated but by direct evidence". In the same
context. Lord Patrick in the fifties in Ballantyne v. Douglas^^^
observes that "the presumptio. juris expressed in the maxim (pater est
...) ... is jealously maintained by the law since for many reasons
it is desirable that the legitimacy of children born in lawful wedlock
should not readily be in d o u b t " . A  more child-centrèd view,
though not free from moral elements and aversion towards illegitimacy,
164was held in Imre v. Mitchell. The Lord President, confining 
himself to the child, provides that "the law (of Scotland) has 
always regarded the label of illegitimacy as involving a taint which 
courts will be slow to attach to any child unless the circumstances 
clearly warrant it. For once the label is attached, it will 
almost certainly accompany the child to the grave. It is unnecessary 
to speculate whether this approach is based on considerations of 
public policy or of fairness to the child whose fate in the world 
is being decided at a time when the child is too young to stand up 
for itself." However, more current decisions, without departing 
from this ideological frame, appear to avoid appraising moral views
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165and stick to the presented facts.
In Greece, on the other hand, the plain rule of articles 1465-66 of 
the Civil Code leaves little room for the expression of opinion by 
the judge in lawsuits regarding the status of the child. Nevertheless, 
in the literature, in the construction of the two articles, the moral 
importance of the family, formed by the institution of marriage, 
is extensively appraised as constituting the proper unit to care for 
children. The moral and philosophical arguments in support of the 
connection of a complete status with marriage vary accordingly, but 
the importance lies in the fact that this view is taken unquestion- 
ingly and without any effort to argue on the merits of a different 
family structure.
2. Can, however, this monopolising of the nurture of children
in monogamous marriage have any proper foundation in the religious
teaching? The conclusion drawn to this question by the Church
of England in its interesting study Fatherless by Law is that
such intention in nowhere implied in the Bible and that anyway,
because of the different social conditions a^efleoted in the text,
any effort to get direct guidance from this sourde for the present
will be disappointing. As they state the word "bastard" is
rarely referred to in the old Testament. In one case it is used
to designate a person of mixed rade^^^ a discrimination also
frequently upheld among people in East Mediterranean and especially
between Greeks on citizenship bases. In another case, however,
it is stated that "A bastard shall not enter into the congregation 
169of the Lord" and as the study explains, the context suggests 
that here too the meaning is 'one of mixed race'. However, it is 
possible that it means an 'unattached' person, i.e. one not in
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a proper family setting. If so, it would indicate a feeling that such
a person was not totally 'proper', having a defect in his origin and
status not unlike the physical defects mentioned in the previous verse.
Indeed, it is difficult to decide which of the two explanations is more
171valid, since due to the high mortality rate in infants at the time
172 173and the stigmatization of childlessness, any child was wanted.
Further, as the study observes, there was no strict need for any children
to be born out of wedlock, since there was—no—str-ict need for any
ehi-l-d-ren te -be-b o m  out of—wedleek-, since there was no strict insistence
on monogomy, betrothal was hardly distinguished from marriage and inter­
course with a virgin who was free to marry, if discovered, necessitated 
174marriage.
In the New Testament, the word 'bastard' occurs in Hebrews where it is 
said that if we are not chastened, God is treating us as 'bastards and not 
sons', which according to the study implies weak parental responsibility in 
the case of illegitimacy.Nevertheless, in another instance^^^ Christ 
was characterized as 'born of fornication' which implies attribution of 
stigma if there is a "black mark" in the child's birth.
However, whether this social stigmatization was carried as far as to
determine the parent-child relationship, cannot be answered clearly from
biblical evidence. In complete contrast with the reaction on parental
disobedience to morals, the Old and New Testaments are fruitful of
concern for the fatherless children, and this support is suggested
without distinction to the birth status of the child. A  reasonable
explanation for this connection may be found in the revival of Christianity
in the Hellenic state cities. In such states there was a certain control
upon descent to protect citizenship and at the same time this implied
178certain consequences to the citizenship status of the child. Besides,
Greeks were monogamie and therefore this may be an explanation for
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Christianity adhering to monogamous sacred marriage
and stigmatizing other unions. The former was a well established
institution with specific social purposes so that influence should not
T  ^  ^ 179 be precluded.
In effect, however, monogamy has led to;a great increase in the number 
of illegitimate children who remain fatherless and without parental 
support. On this understanding, as the previously mentioned study 
of the Church of England explains, since someone had to care for 
these children it was not difficult for the economic costs and 
difficulties of care, which were burdensome to the community, to lend 
strength to the moral disapproval which a monogamous or would-be monogamous 
society attached to the means whereby the illegitimate child had come 
into existence. The few texts in the bible putting 'bastards' into a 
class apart could easily be used in support of a policy which 'shamed' 
the illegi.timate child, instead of - if anyone was to be shamed - the 
illegitimate parents.
b. A clearer view may be obtained by examining the practical reasons 
presented for delegating the institutionalization of children within 
the normal or conventional family. Today, such a family has tended 
to be equated with the nuclear family, that is, with parents and 
dependent children in a household of their own. If that family then
is formed by marriage, since marriage conceives a parental legal unit 
of permanence with clearly defined roles, it is claimed that, by 
institutionalizing the child in the family, the child will enjoy 
emotional and material security and therefore its normal development is 
more predictable. The extent to which this is actually so in the second 
half of the twentieth centurey, and if it is not, howowidespread are the 
variations in the form of the parent child relationship will be 
considered in the following pages.
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Married parents, at least in theory, stand for mutual identification 
and reciprocity of feeling to a degree where they felt confident to enter 
a life long union. This is foreseen as having a direct bearing on 
the spouses' attitude towards children of the marriage since, from 
a healthy parental relationship, would stem affection and concern for 
the child. Nevertheless marraige provided the basis for the 
construction of the conventional family model, susceptible to legal 
regulation and assuming what Rapoport et al^^^ have commented on as a 
"Darwinian" fitness of all the elements to one another and to the
183
environment. Hence the conventional family, as Lambert and Streather 
summarize it, has the following elements;
" i. The male head^ of the household, the father, is the sole economic 
provider
ii. The female head of the household, the mother, is the homemaker, 
and responsible for domestic care and the socialization of the 
children. She is a helpmeet to the husband, providing support 
for him in his struggle for the family's survival.
iii. The children are helpless and dependent, vulnerable, and malleable. 
They must be nurtured full-time by the mother (or mother surrogate) 
only, as emotional stability is essential.
iv. The family is a private institution and within it individuals can 
fulfil their most important needs. This fulfilment is based 
on the foundation of the economic income provided by the husband 
(where necessary supplemented by the state). Only when economic 
and material needs have been met do expressions of psychological 
and social needs for love, esteem, self-expression and fulfilment 
emerge within the family.
V. Healthy families produce healthy individuals, who adjust to social 
roles."
63
The effects of a normal family in a psychological context has been
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sufficiently appraised by Soddy who describes :
" In a normal (family) ... the relationships are triangular - mother, 
father and young child. Each parent brings up the child as if it were 
a kind of present to the other parent. The mother encourages the 
child to relate to the father and in so doing herself withdraws a 
little distance from the child. This enables the child to get a little 
distance from his mother, and leaves him free to pick up personality 
contributions from both sides. Both parents contribute to his development, 
his character. In this way the child can achieve a sense of identity 
which is not the same as that of either his mother or his father. He 
gets a bit of both; he is different, unique, and a person in his own 
right." Given normality in the family the fulfilment of parental 
obligations comes as a natural consequence without further need for 
express enforcement since each member identified on the other part of 
his own self.^^^
It is unnecesary to enter on a detailed analysis of the effects of a
healthy family environment for the child since such a task has been
carried out in a number of longitudinal and population studies of child
d e v e l o p m e n t I t  should be noted, however, that these tend to
show that children living in a good environment, whether defined by
material conditions, family size, parental interest or other factors,
are most likely to do well in terms of attainment, adjustment and
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physical development. Inevitably emphasis is placed upon the
parental relationship and in this context marriage appears to have the 
following advantages:
i. The spouses are legally bound in an endurable relationship so that 
they as parents will provide continuous care for their children.
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ii. The nature of the conjugal relation gives rise to an expectation
that each child born to the wife is begotten by the husband. Hence, 
the presumption of paternity,
iii. Given certainty of paternity each parent plays its role from the 
child's birth without need for prior attesting of the biological 
relation.
These elements embody certain assumptions about what a family should be 
to secure the continuation and wellbeing of society and have resulted in 
the formulation of policies prejudicial to illegitimate children. This 
policy is discussed on its merits on the next chapter and here attention 
is paid rather to the reception of status and the diversity of family life 
under present social conditions as signifying whether the advantages claimed 
for the child, if brought up in a legal family, can still be sustained.
Although, in terms of legal prescription, most effort is directed to 
facilitating the reproduction and care of children within families formed 
by marriage, such in fact occur both inside and outside wedlock. Marriage 
hevertheless retains the major share in terms of reproduction and has 
produced the better results in terms of child care, facts recognised 
even by the firmest supporters of the abolition of the status of illegit­
imacy. For example, Alec Samuels recognises the potentialities of
marriage in bringing up children so as to suggest that " ... as an
institution (marriage) should certainly be strongly encouraged and supported
188in every possible way". Also Dr. R. R. Williams (The Bishop of
Leicester) amidst his approval of reform that would "make the best of
a bad job for the sake of the child" feels bound to state that "nothing
can replace those benefits of status, security and love which normal
189
married parents can convey to their children ...".
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In the same fashion the English Law Commission clings to the notion that
only a normal nuclear family can provide a secure, caring background in
which to bring up the child. In their view, the problems of one
parent families are likely to remain a feature of births out of wedlock
since the law can make only a limited contribution for them in the sense
of removing the legal handicaps of the child, thereby avoiding exacerbation
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of factual disadvantages in the child's position.
Whether the high acclaim and success of families formed by marriage is
due to the merits of the institution or to its continuous support is
not entirely clear. The question probably will not be answered
until empirical research has been carried out for the various family patterns
in circumstances showing equal treatment by the state.
However, what really conditions the policy in favour of the marital
family is the assumption that this family is most desirable and real
191and in this respect as Lambert and Streather point out "avoids both 
intellectual and empirical issues and can be morally coercive". The 
traditional family, as created by marriage and legitimacy, can be 
criticized in its legal context for the following reasons.
(a) the reception of the status of legitimacy disregards diversity 
of sex relations and family life;
(b) the law by incorporating the traditional family in a rigid legal
concept fails to comprehend disfunction of the family in the 
social context;
(c) in relation to the previous point the law fails to adjust to
change in the family as a natural consequence of dysfunctional 
aspects of the traditional concept; and
(d) it avoids giving attention to the potential for independent
recognition of the child's rights.
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1. The artificial reception of the child's status has been strongly 
criticized by Professor Clive in his valuable analysis on
aspects of illegitimacy in Scotland. He deplores further support 
of the concept of legitimacy altogether as failing to correspond to 
current social needs. In his view, the concepts of legitimacy and the 
thereby legal family only reflect the old stereotype that legitimacy 
is the common situation where a child has been produced by its married 
parents who undertake the responsibility of bringing it up, while 
illegitimacy is an unfortunate situation where the child was born 
after a casual encounter between a man and the mother who afterwards aban­
dons her and the child to their fate. To counter this image, he 
provides the following examples which illustrate situations comparable 
in both Scotland and Greece.
1. The child of a stable, two-parent family will be illegitimate if
the parents have never married each other. There are many 
children in this position. Socially, they are certainly not 
fatherless. Legally, they are illegitimate.
2 . On the other hand, the child of a casual encounter will be legitimate
if the parents go through a civil (or religious) marriage ceremony, 
even if they never live together and get a divorce as soon as possible 
The bit of paper which is the marriage certificate makes all the 
difference to the child's status, even though it is socially 
meaningless in these circumstances. To put this in another way, if 
the father is willing to assume his responsibilities, the child will 
be legitimate, if the mother says : "I'll marry you, but won't live 
with you", but will be illegitimate if she says "I'll live with 
you but won't marry you". Could anything be more ridiculous?
3, Another situation, which has featured in the law reports illustrates
the artificiality of the concept of illegitimacy. A married 
couple have been separated for years. A divorce is pending. They
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meet by chance, have a few drinks, get sentimental or lustful
and have sexual intercourse. Neither has any intention of resuming
cohabitation. The divorce goes through a few months later. A
child resulting from .that casual encounter would be legitimate. If
the intercourse had taken place shortly after, instead of
shortly before the divorce, the child would have been illegitimate.
On such technicalities do the rights of children depend.
4. A child is born illegitimate. The father goes off to Canada.
Forty years later the father returns for good and marries the
mother. The "child" now in his forties and making his own life
in another part is legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his
parents. Nothing in this factual position has changed but the
magic of the marriage ceremony is so powerful that he suddenly
acquires, not only a new status, but also the obligation to support
1 93
his parents should they become needy.
The above illustrations sustain two fundamental arguments against the con­
cepts of legitimacy (a) it is a technical legal concept perceiving sexual 
relations as based upon an antiquarian stereotype and (b) in consequence 
to the first, the status of the child is established upon an artificial 
presumption unrelated to the actual elements of the family. The 
factors supporting these arguments are mainly confined to the on-going 
disuse of formal marriage by sectors of the population, as a result of 
the emancipation of women and change in sex relations which ultimately 
affects the legal subsistence of the parent-child relationship. In 
this respect, criticism is directed towards the failure of the law to 
come to terms with the current social trends and adopt a more pragmatic 
approach for the status of the child.
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2. As Fiona Stuart observes unformalized cohabitation features as
an indispensable characteristic of modern societies but its formation
nevertheless is governed by different principles and realities. So far
the popular trend is to treat cohabitation as ultimately leading towards
marriage a presumption that can no longer be supported, due to a
radical change in attitudes and social conditions. Until the last
few decades women were totally dependent upon men for support and a
marriage certificate was regarded as a guarantee of financial security.
Therefore, the decision of a woman to assume cohabitation with a man would
not be otherwise than to preclude an intention to live together permanently
195and to consummate the marriage in the near future. In this context
the inducement of devices like the common law marriage in Scotland, 
the legitimation per subsequens matrimonium in both countries, have 
among their aims the purpose of compensating defects in the status of 
the child if born to the parents during the cohabitation period and 
at the same time to decrease the rate of illegitimacy.
This century, however, is characterised by the increasing emancipation of
women along with the increasing popularity of marriage, which seems to
suggest that fewer social and legal restraints and more equality and
freedom for women led to what Titmuss describes as the "process of
democratizing' m a r r i a g e " . T h e  marriage pattern which emerged in this
process became more demanding and less susceptible to compromises from
either of the partners. "We are more inclined now than we used to be"
point out Slater and Woodside, "to demand a capacity for response between
the partners, to look for intellectual and temperamental compatability,
as well as purely material welfare, in addition to the ordinary social
and parental satisfactions. The more we demand in these respects,
the more frequently, perhaps, we shall have to count our failures, but
197also the higher may be our level of achievement". This development
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was further complemented in recent years by sex discrimination
legislation which terminated the financial dominion of men and made it more
possible for women to exploit their involvement in the production process
198
and their earning capacity to the full. A marriage certificate,
therefore, no longer functions as an incentive towards financial security. 
On the contrary, many partners in cohabitation make the conscious 
decision to concentrate on their careers, and in this situation many 
couples, although deeply committed to each other, may see little purpose 
in allowing their relationship to become regulated by the marriage law, 
since career prospects may eventually force them to terminate their 
relationship.
Apart from career prospects, cohabitation features in society for a
variety of other reasons and in very different circumstances. The couple,
although deeply committed to each other, may disapprove of formal marriage
in principle. However, their personal and emotional commitment may be
equal to that found in many marriages. More frequently, however,
this may be due to the religious persuasion of each or both partners.
It is not uncommon to discover the situation where immigrants have
performed marriages according to their national customs and where
this union has been refused recognition as contravening public order.
This is a common occurrence in Greece if either of the partners belongs to
a religious sect which is not recognised or where one of the partners
is Christian and the other of a different religious persuasion. Even if
199they wish to marry their marriage is prohibited. Moreover, the
parties to cohabitation, one or the other, or both, may be married to 
someoie else and cannot obtain a divorce because of laws which make it 
impossible or expensive to end a former marriage, or because there is 
a religious objection to divorce, or merely because the former spouse 
wishes to frustrate the other spouse. Nevertheless, this alternative
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may be classed as a temporary trial period between one marriage and the 
next. Even elderly people incline towards cohabitation since marriage 
would affect their eligibility for pensions. However, the important 
cases, and probably the ones that attract the most controversial arguments, 
are those between persons free to marry. It is submitted that under 
normal circumstances cohabitation for them constitutes a trial period 
during which the parties try to assess whether they are sufficiently 
compatible to make their relationship permanent in the eyes of the law,
but equally may be casual and of short duration, being,perhaps, merely a
^  ^  ' 200 short term convenience.
Increasingly, therefore, cohabitation is becoming either the permanent 
choice of couples who cannot, or are unwilling to,place their 
relationship within the confines of family law, or an experience 
desired by many young partners. Moreover, admittedly such incidents 
are unlikely to decrease and ultimately it is entirely appropriate for the 
law to take some kind of cognisance of them.
So far attention ha s concentrated on children and the internal economic
relations of longer run informal partnerships. It is submitted that
for children of such relationships the law exacerbates the variance in the
reception of the status since the child clearly enjoys the advantages of
a family care, suffering only a legal handicap. Change, therefore, is
201desirable and overdue. As to economic relations it is recognised
that there is a need to regulate them in order to ensure that neither 
of the partners suffers undue hardship. The idea is either to recognise 
certain relationships, which feature a considerable degree of dependency 
by reference to selected grounds and tests leaving a considerable 
amount of judicial discretion to prevent injusticesr or to introduce 
a neutral system which, without giving privileged status to any form of
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cohabitation, would solve the practical problems which arise.
Neither of the propositions goes as far as suggesting assimilation of the
situation of cohabitees to that of a married couple. It is widely felt
2o3
that the two should remain distinct. A third approach adopted by
Susan Blake^^^ deplores the idea of giving considerable cognisance to
cohabitees. Instead she proposes that if the declining popularity of
marriage among sectors of the population " ... is due in part to the law
of marriage rather than to an alteration in moral views, then it may be
that the law of marriage should be changed to stem that decline". This
proposition envisages a quality and quantity of reform to cause a
minimum of change to the status quo in family relations and constitutes
205an aspect of the contemporary legal policy of both countries.
It is unnecessary to become any further involved in discussing the legal 
subsistence of the parental relationship for the following reasons.
(a) Infdrmal relationships whether of long run or short term convenience 
occur in various circumstances and it seems unlikely that they will 
all take a certain form. Inevitably only a limited number of them 
will be recognized. If the recognition precludes any power of 
status for children, this will lead us into repeating the same circle 
of classification and discrimination and nevertheless this will 
undermine the legal ground upon which is founded the presumption
of conception in wedlock.
(b) Evidence on de facto and de jure families shows that the legal 
subsistence of the parental relationship no longer has compelling im­
portance. As indicated in the next chapter, illegitimacy occurs 
both inside and outside wedlock and under a variety of circumstances. 
Therefore attention to the parental relationship will have æ limited 
effect in decreasing the rate of illegitimacy.
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(c) Past experience shows that the introduction of devices facilitating 
the attribution of a status, though useful, has worked on a limited 
scale and not always satisfactorily. The legitimation of the child 
has been a minor reason for the parents to enter into marriage and 
it is unlikely to become a major one, with the current trends in 
sex relations. Besides it is generally accepted that marriages 
entered into primarily for the purpose of ensuring that an expected 
child is not born illegitimate are especially at risk. In a
large proportion of marriages where the wife is young and pregnant 
failure of the marriage is quite probable.
The important points, therefore, concerning the attribution of the status 
of the child are the following. There is a state of flux with regard 
to the factors leading to the construction of man woman relationships.
Such relationships tend to have a personal and individual character from 
which it is difficult to extract general patterns. The main tendency, 
however, for the partners is to seek mutual fulfilment and satisfaction 
and the decision about the futùré^of their relationship is taken on that 
basis. The consideration of the legal position of the child has a lesser 
weight in the decision to form a conjugal relationship.
3. Notwithstanding the artificial attribution of the status the
advantages claimed for the child if born in wedlock largely depend upon
the continuation and stability of the parental marriage per se. The
increasing rates of divorce, separation, as well as the high number of
parents working alone far from the family residence,make it difficult to
207
argue on the basis of actual daily care in the legal family as before. 
Similar factors which lead to the increase of unformalized relationships 
affect the continuation of m a r r i a g e . T h u s  in Scotland, the rate 
of divorce from an annual average of about 2,300 in the early sixties in
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1970 was 4,809 and In 1971, 5041 and in 1972, 5,796 and it is likely
209to continue in the same mode. These figures represent final
judgements of actionsof divorce and to this should be added the
actions refused and those which never came to the court. As the Finer
Committee points out, a considerable number of spouses part without
formality or make their own agreement and nobody can estimate in how many
210
cases this happens. However, the important points are that the
211
higher rates of divorce fall within the first fifteen years of marriage 
and from all judgements those concerning couples with children increased
212
from two thirds in early sixties to three quarters in the early seventies.
A similar picture is obtained from statistical data in Greece against
the total of 2804 divorce actions delivered in 1961, the number reaches
213
3,675 in 1971, 4,517 in 1977 and has a slight drop in 1978 to 4,322.
An increase is noticeable also in the nufnber of cases in which the court 
refused to grant an order. Thus, from about 300 in the early seventies 
the number in 1977 was 552 and 1978, 578. Particularly from the 
marriages dissolved in 1978, 2,847 involved children and the number
214
irvolved in 1,500 orders was 2,290. Also from the total of 4,322
orders 2,511 concerned couples who had been married for less than 15 years. 
Those numbers, however, do not give the actual picture of defective 
parental relationships in Greece. The number could have been even larger 
were couples not prevented from dissolving formally their marriage by the 
unrealistic grounds for divorce under the Greek Civil Code. Namely, 
the Code permits divorce mainly in the instance of "subjective liability 
of the defender". Thus, if for any reason the innocent party does not 
show an interest by raising'the action, divorce cannot be obtained even 
though the separation lasted for a considerable number of years. Due 
to these reasons, Greece faces today the problem of the so-called 'dead 
marriages' which are estimated to exceed 20,000. Moreover, a number
215
74
of couples, approximately double the above figure, live in a compromise
situation, simply sharing the same household and pretending to be
husband and wife.^^^ Proposals to change the law have been presented
and to an extent materialized with a Bill introduced to Parliament for
217
discussion in 1976. Also from the results of a research carried out
218by I.e.A.P. Hellas S.A. in ten Greek cities in March 1977 it appears
that the majority of public opinion would welcome such change. However,
the reaction of the church to such proposals wasrunexpectedly strong (and
in this were involved certain para-religious groups) so that the Eill was
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modified to solve the more acute cases.
4. At the other end of the spectrum it is argued that marriage by its very 
nature provides certainty of paternity, which in relation to the benefits 
claimed for the children of marriage perhaps function to support their immediate 
and indisputable availability. The argument appeared early in juris­
prudence at a time when women were under the absolute authority of men 
and adultery was one of the most severe crimes. Thus it became possible 
to argue realistically in favour of the presumption of legitimacy, to 
compensate for arguments against the stability of the legal family and 
most important, to maintain the impossibility of linking a child born out 
of wedlock with his father. This affected , however, the context of the 
law of legitimacy. It became possible to depart from the idea that a 
complete parent-child relationship is possible only in a permanent union 
and to concentrate upon the formality of the parental relationship. T he 
two jurisdictions have followed the same path, since it has been 
the law in Scotland and Greece that children of certain defective marriages may 
be legitimate.
IS it possible , however, to argue today that marriage would deter either 
of the partners from having an illicit affair, so as to claim certainty
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of paternity with the same authority? "Married women" admits Lord 
220Patrick "do bear children to men other than their husbands, especially 
when they are living apart from them, and the large number of divorces 
thus occasioned which followed the enforced separation of spouses during 
two recent wars shows that the event is not a rare one". Currently, 
relationships in which at least one party is married may be occasioned 
for a variety of reasons and rarely are they aimed at the construction of 
a new family. The emancipation of women, their involvement in the pro­
duction process,has altered the standards of the relationships between 
the two sexes and has decreased the tolerance that either can show 
for an unhappy relationship. Thus a steady increase of adultery, 
it is observed, committed by both sexes makes implausible the 
certainty of paternity in marriage or that marriage in itself eliminates 
the rate of births out of wedlock.
This change of morals affected the current legal policy so that in Scotland
adultery presently is only an evidential basis for divorce. In Greece
where it still constitutes a criminal act invoking six months
imprisonment, public opinion is pressing for change. In fatt the
221
results of the survey carried by I.C.A.P. Hellas shows 54% 6f the
population believes that there are justifiable cases of adultery involving
a married man and 47% believes the same for a married woman. Also
two thirds of those questioned envisaged it as appropriate to remove
all the punitive aspects of the law and treat adultery only as grounds
for divorce. Moreover, there is the tendency in modern legal systems,
but to a lesser extent in the two jurisdictions, to treat conception
in wedlock as only conditionally proving that the husband had fathered




It may be believed, therefore, that marriage in its legal form is 
perceived as the most promising unit to bring up a child and in this 
respect is worthy of support. It is not convincing, however, that support 
should be given to distinguish between the two classes of children and 
discriminate against illegitimates on account of the formality of the 
parental relationship. Today, we have a change in man-woman relation­
ships which increases the number of children who either de facto or de jure 
would be deprived the care of a two parent family. The number of 
divorces and separations show that what is really perceived as essential 
for the children cannot be secured insofar as its materialisation
depends upon the parental relationship which operates upon a different 
basis. Besides de facto family units occupy an even larger part of our 
social life and, in a considerable number of cases, involve children.
Such children cannot be classified other than as de jure illegitimate since 
they enjoy parental care and live under circumstances almost identical 
to families formed by marriage. Also because of the economic independence 
that both male and female aspire to today, the one parent family is far
from being rejected altogether in terms of welfare security for the 
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child. On this understanding the arguments on behalf of the
connection of marriage with a complete status not only seem to have lost 
theLrsignificance but sidestep situations that need attention in favour of 
a superficially neat and attractive legal presumption.
At the other end of the spectrum, humanitarian policies put forward by 
modern societies wish to ameliorate the situation by giving recognition 
to the interests of the child. So far, improvements have been made to 
the substantive rights of the child but,with minor exceptions, they 
have taken place in a piecemeal and pragmatic way and on account of the 
explicit distinction between children born within and out of wedlock. 
Recently, however, attention has concentrated upon the concept of
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"parenthood" as a status independent of legal regulation as to its 
attribution. The concept incorporates elements of the jus naturalis 
and certain elements of the law of legitimacy are summarised in the 
following fundamental principles.
(a) Each child is the product of a man and a woman whom it is 
entitled to know as its parents? and they should be responsible 
for its upbringing.
(b) Just as parenthood in wedlock continues to exist even when the 
relationship that conferred the status has been dissolved, 
parenthood should be a status for life, irrespective of the 
method according to which paternity has been ascertained.
(c) Differences in parental rights and duties should arise not as 
a result of the circumstances of the child's birth, but from 
facts concerning their fulfilment and with the purpose of 
facilitating their operation.
The possibility of applying that concept in the laws of Scotland and 
Greece will be the objective of the following two chapters of the 
present part.
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C H A P T E R  T W O
ILLEGITIMACY
INTRODUCTION
Since both systems delegate the task of socializing children to the legal
family, the problem of the legal position of illegitimate children is
expected to be complex and peculiar. The natural truth expressed in the
maxim "maternity is a matter of fact, whereas paternity is a matter of
opinion",^ applies as well in the case of Scotland and Greece, so that
the natural parent-child relationship has always been in a state of flux.
Unlike legitimate children, illegitimate ones were usually at the centre
of contemporary policies aimed at bolstering marriage and thereby the
creation of the legal family. Ideology, religion and the social realities
in each country have played a decisive role in the formulation of those
policies and consequently in the restrictions in the status of the
2
illegitimate children. With one exception the policy towards 
illegitimacy, in both countries, was that illegitimate children should 
remain inferior in terms of parental rights and duties to legitimate 
or legitimated offspring.
Besides the inherent difficulty of raising any presumption of paternity 
in advance resulted in the distinction between affiliated and non­
affiliated children. This, in fact, is an innate controversy concerning 
illegitimacy and one which still lacks a solution for it is difficult to 
suggest any formula resolving the matter. The consequence for the 
child is the limited status, vested in the affiliation act, to remain in 
legal limbo until paternity be admitted or proven. The child is totally 
dependent on the care and support of the mother, who has usually limited
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resources to cope in a period where the child needs undisturbed attention.
State intervention may provide alternatives to fulfil the vacuum, but
this is usually in an auxiliary form. And it comes into operation
when the rights and duties derived from family law have been fulfilled
inadequately in the particular case. Thus, the burden of providing
for the child is primarily imposed upon the mother, while she may share it later
with the father or the state. Obviously, the prejudice against
illegitimacy has had a considerable influence in the tolerating of this
situation.
Illegitimacy, however, needs special attention since the classification of 
children may prove to be against the social interest. Statistical 
information of the two countries shows that the mte of extra-marital 
conceptions is increasing despite the severe stigmatization and 
consequences of illegitimacy. In such event, the context of the policy 
requires to be re-examined at length since maintaining the distinction 
may be without any practical significance and at the same time cause 
disorder and social inequality. A reform of the law, accompanying 
this review on the policy, will bring legislation close to the social 
reality which jt aims to control.
Secondly, an inferior status for children born out of wedlock exposes 
the child to undue risk at a stage of its life when support for its 
proper nurture is mostly needed. Current legal policies in the two 
countries face the problem through affiliation proceedings, state 
assistance or various other measures ranging from care orders to 
adoption. Affiliation orders are specifically designated to alleviate 
the financial problems of the mother in bringing up the child. The 
support, however, is limited. Thus, fewer mothers try to secure 
assistance from the father and instead they place the child for adoption
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or try to cope with the problems themselves. However, evidence shows 
that most single mothers want to bring up their child themselves and 
give up the idea or place it for adoption when realizing the consequences 
that this could have for both of them. This indicates that the protective 
task of the law dysfunctions in this area, besides, indicating a 
conflict in the current legal policy of the two countries. The policy 
adopted is to support and maintain the natural relations as being 
the appropriate means for bringing up a child. In illegitimacy the 
law leaves such relations to be destroyed.
Third, the interests of the child are gaining increasing recognition 
under the humanitarian policies for children accepted by the two 
countries.^ In relation to this an inferior status for the illegitimaté, 
apart from being incompatible with current social conditions, would 
mean an excessive burden on the social funds in order to achieve equitable 
facilities for all children. The burden alrëady exists and will 
continue to exist under equal status for both classes of children 
until the ascertainment of paternity. However, with higher living 
standards in the current social policy, if the illegitimate child will 
not be linked with his father the expenses for the welfare service will 
be particularly high.
However, on account of this brief review of some basic aspects of 
illegitimacy, the problem which the present study faces cannot be 
simply restricted to the acquisition of rights and duties through a 
paternity action. Obviously, this will be the theme of one of the two 
chapters devoted to illegitimacy, since it is the area which materialises 
the satisfaction of the legal rights of the child in each- country.
Prior attention, however, must be given to a variety of aspects 
related to illegitimacy. Thus,in due course, the policy behind the
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discrimination will be examined as to whether it has any practical 
significance in the sustaining of marriage and legal family and as 
to whether it comprehends the current social conditions and 
interests. At this stage it will be necessary to refer briefly to 
the basic historical stages of the law in each country to illustrate 
problems that may arise from the legal tradition. Also it is a well
known fact that legal continuity predicts success in the suggested
reform. Therefore, it is necessary to align possible proposals with the 
existing legal tradition. This rcnuires an analysis of the basic 
aspects of the policy and a brief description of the factuà.1 background 
of illegitimacy. This will be followed by a reassessment of illegitimacy, 
a review of the international trends for reform and the proposals made 
for Scotland and Greece. Finally, the models for reform will be
examined and will be assessed on their merits.
I. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW
In a brief review of the historical background of the problems of the
legal position of illegitimate children, the following points are noteworthy:
(a) At the outset discrimination against children whose birth did
not fall within the legal family patterns was not unkno^n^in Ancient
Greece though directed more to protect citizenship than the legal 
4
family itself. Thus in Athenian Law the status of children born
in a concubinage or to the marriage between an Athenian and a
foreign woman was restricted to some basic rights. Similarly,
the law of Sparta had discriminative stipulations to preserve
the class of Spartans from the classes of Perioikos (neighbours)
5
and Helots (slaves).
In Roman law, where the legal family received the utmost of its power, 
the illegitimate child was generally ignored. At the outset the
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ancient pagans did not attach importance to the union that produced
the child and therefore it was possible at least theoretically,for
a pater familias to expose any child even of obscure origins within
his family.^ However, with the Roman city consisting of a collection
of families, and the Roman family strictly monogamous, a person who
could not trace a descent through a pater familias had no country
7
name or god, and was not entitled to the protection of the law.
His position, however, was more unfortunate because due to the
concept of agnation, signifying the structure of the legal family
in Rome, the child could have no mother since a woman could legally
have no descendants.^ Later, however, the child became attached
9
to his mother due to the rise of jus naturale. Under this
philosophy write Robbins and Deak,^^ "cognation came to be 
regarded as the natural basis of kinship and the natural basis 
of the family. As such, the law began to accord the cognate 
the right to succession and aliment. But while the natural child 
remained a stranger to its father, all children, whether legitimate 
or illegitimate, became the cognates of their mother. In effect, 
under the cognatic theery, there was no such thing as legitimate 
maternity, for the legitimate child in its relations with its 
mother could not be distinguished from the illegitimate child.
The accordance of any property rights to the illegitimate child 
was thus not the result of any legislation directed towards his 
betterment, but merely the logical and necessary consequences of 
the structure of the Roman Family".
In the Roman Byzantine period this position deteriorated as a result 
of the inducement of religious condemnation of extra-marital relations. 
According to M. Tzouganatou Casparinatou^^ from the time of 
Constantine and onwards the influence of religion was such that
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the illegitimate child remained without protection, ignored, ile. 
in its right to seek out the putative father. Exceptions appeared 
only in the radical legislation of some Emperors like Justinian, 
for instance to be repealed soon after.
It was Constantine who first classified children according to the
union which produced them, and made the child's property right
contingent on the class to which he belonged. In this classificaton
the legal status of the child was interconnected to the legal
formality of parental union. With regard to those born in informal
union, it distinguishes between children of incestuous and adulterous
intercourse on the one hand (d amnaibcoitu) and those born in
concubinage, prostitution, and other forms of illicit unions, on
the other hand (liberis naturales). Constantine also suppressed
the rights of all illegitimate children against the mother except
12
the rights of those children born in concubinage. In his time,
Christian morality actually began to force its way into the family
law and affect the legislation on illegitimacy. Two more
innovations worthy of mention are connected with the name of this
Emperor. Firstly, Constantine introduced to Roman Law the doctrine
of legitimation per subsequens matrimonium. Second, in attempting
to discourage concubinage he forbad the father to make the child
any gifts, a right which the father had previously exercised.
Subsequent emperors, however, permitted the de cujus to give one
twelfth of his property to the liber naturalis but if he had no
legitimate heirs, one quarter could be given. At this period the
illegitimate child had no right of aliment against his father and
13
no right in the succession to his father's property. The
situation changes with Justinian on the Byzantine throne. After 
his triumph over the Church in the 'Stasis of Nika' , the Emperor
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became the indisputable source of legislation and he introduced
remarkable changes in relation to illegitimacy. Confining
his attention to the liberi naturales he increased the portion
the father could give to his natural child. Failing legitimate
issue, he could by will give them half his fortune. Also if the
father had died without a legitimate descendant the natural child
could succeed in the intestate succession to one-sixth of the net
assets otherwise the legitimate heirs, precluding his right had to
aliment the illegitimate child. Surprisingly, there was a reciprocity
recognized in those r i g h t s . H o w e v e r ,  Justinian did not supply
other illegitimate children with rights. The possible explanation
for this preference towards children of concubinage is that the
institution was widespread among the lowest classes which could
not afford the obligations of the marriage. Moreover, concubinage
had a strong resemblance with the institution of marriage at the
time of the Christian era so that it may have been felt that some
14
recognition should be given to those children. "So common
did this become" points out Robbin and Deak, "that the words 
fili or liberi in the testaments of men of a low class were 
regularly construed to include natural children. We may say that 
instead of liberis naturalis being given rights, they were deprived 
of their status of bastards by concubinage being given a judicial 
status. Æ  least as late as 400A3 the church recognised concubinage 
as a status and when in 1530 concubinage was forbidden in all its 
forms, being entirely superceded by marriage, children born in 
such a unioh fell to the condition of other bastards.
(b) Thus a severe attitude to illegitimate children is observed in
Medieval Europe. Under this, every bastard had a right to aliment 
against his father but no succession rights were given to such
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children. The important point onthe other hand, is that the church
as well as family law had invaded the jurisprudence of public 
16 As a result, the child was deemed as a non-existentlaw.
person, barred from public offices, from appearing as a party or
witness in the court, penalities for his death were reduced to
farcical levels and burial was denied him. Moreover, if the child
had died without lawful issue his property escheated to his 
17
Lord. How much of this was due to a clearly religious
influence, it is difficult to assert since a noble bastard suffered 
no disabilities, and was considered as part of the family, and had 
no obligation but to conduct himself like a gentleman.
(c) Early Common law without going as far as to maintain direct
punitive consequences treated the child as filius nullius, depriving
it from any kinship and inheritance rights. The motivation for
this approach derives from the principles of Feudalism and the law
of familial property, while religion had played an important though
18a
not principal rôle. In fact, one could perceive the cooperation
of the two authorities in the sense that feudalism found a basis of
support in religion. In terms of consequences the concept filus nullius
19was carried to its logical extreme. Neither parent had a readily
enforceable right to the custody and guardianship of the child 
while the child could not inherit from the parent nor had it any 
quasi legitimacy as to its mother.
(d) However, as regards Scots law, though primarily a Common law system, 
it developed upon Roman law principles and therefore deviated from 
this approach at an early stage. Thus, although the father was 
refused the right to custody of his natural child, the mother 
has always been recognized as the natural custodian.
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"This right of the mother," maintains Lord President Inglis in
20a
Brand v. Shaws "is purely a personal one, and cannot be insisted 
in after her death by any one named in her will as her 
representative. An application by the mother of an illegitimate 
child for delivery of it to her custody is prima facie a just and 
legal title to its custody, and I am not disposed to throw any 
doubt upon the competency of such an application in .the Sher iff 
Court, where there are no special circumstances which can be 
pleaded against her legal title. The title cannot possibly pass 
to any one else. The mother cannot convey it by deed, either
21
inter vivos or mortis causa". Also in Macpherson v. Leishman
the same judge describes the right of the mother to custody as being
'ho doubt absolute.^ * and states that in all ordinary circumstances it
must be enforced. It seems that the concept of Roman law expressed
in the maxim "mater .semper certa est etiam vulgo conceperit ..."
had had a considerable influence in the formulation of the relation
with the mother under Scots law. Nonetheless, the concept of
filus nullius has always precluded any actual improvements in
this area. Therefore, the consequent development in Scots law on
this point has been a compromise view between the two principles where in
the natural mother-child relationship specific rights were supplied
to the extent of the legitimate relation while in other cases rights
had been in one-sided relationship or ignored altogether. Thus
the right of custody has been supplied along with the obligation
to maintain the child. At a certain stage this was enforced reciprocally
so that the child was bound to support her, if she be in indigent
22 23
circumstances. In Samson v. Davie the principle behind this
was held to be the law of nature as in Roman law. "The natural
obligation between mother and child is as strong whether the child
be legitimate or illegitimate, and therefore, as a legitimate
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child is under an obligation to support its mother, so also must an
24
illegitimate child be under the same obligation". This rule
had been changed soon as inequitable because the child was
deprived of most of the financial benefits that could justify 
25
reciprocity. Moreover, since the introduction of the institution
of adoption in Scots law at the beginning of this century, the
mother was supplied with the right to consent to her child's
adoption^^ Succession rights were never recognised in favour
27
of, or through illegitimacy at Common law and those rights have
28
been one of the latest innovations in the law of Scotland.
Also the child is not deemed a blood relative to its mother nor are
29
different bastards by the same mother in any way connected.
An exception has always been made for the marriage impediment and 
is induced in the Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977 where in marriage 
between persons falling within the forbidden degrees whether through 
consanguinity of affinity is debarred, "even where traced through 
or to any person of illegitimate birth".
On the other hand, in the belation with the father, old Common Scots 
law maintained the Common law approach. The concept of filius 
nullius was taken to its most tolerable limits and the relation
recognised bore little resemblance to a family law relation. "A
31natural father" said Lord Stowe11, "in the language of the law
is only a father by repute of an illegal ... character ..." and 
32Lord Jeffrey comments that "the person so called is he who, from
contact with the mother, is liable in the burdens of paternity
without any of the privileges". Also the Lord Justice Clerk
33(Inglis) in Corrie v. Adair states of the bastard, "Not only 
has he no father, but no proof can give him a father; nothing 
can do that but marriage between his mother and his putative father.
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... the only relation is that the father is to a certain extent, and
under certain conditions, liable to aliment the child". However,
the relation provided could be specified in the following rights
and duties. The father was obliged ex jure naturalis to maintain
the illegitimate child jointly with the mother. He also had the
obligation to compensate the mother to a sum for her inlying
expenses due to d e l i v e r y . T h e  father had no right to custody^^.
However, he could offer to undertake the obligation to provide
aliment in the less burdensome way by taking the child in his
house to maintain it in natura,^^ and in this respect his right
to custody arose entirely in defence against a claim for
aliment. He had no right on the other hand to insist otherwise in
37
an action for custody of the child. Furthermore, the father
of a bastard had no common law right of patria potestas^^ nor
39
any right to the administration of the child's legal affairs.
4oNor were they deemed as blood relatives.
At the end of the nineteenth century, however, some emphasis was
placed upon his natural bond with the child which gave rise to
improvements in the relationship. Lord Watson in Clarke V. Carfjn 
41
Coal Cb points out that the concept of filius nullius although true 
in its legal sense it is untrue on a natural sense. Commenting 
on the implications of the ascertainment of paternity on regarding 
the child as having a mother but not a father, he observes that 
"The phrase is unobjectionable so long as it is only meant to 
express that the maternity of a bastard is, comparatively speaking, 
a matter of certainty, whereas its paternity may be a matter of 
doubt, and in some cases, the father may never be identified. It 
becomes in my opinion mischievous when it is used to convey the 
suggestion that after the father has been ascertained by admission
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or by judicial proof, the natural tie which connects him with the
child is more slender and less enduring than that which binds the
„ 42
child to its mother. As to the pre-code Greek law it is
observable that until the twentieth century the legal position
of the natural child was regulated by pure Roman Byzantine law as
43
it had been developed by the end of the Byzantine empire. The
fact that during the Ottoman occupation the administration of family
law had fallen into the hands of the clergy had suspended any
progress in the matter. However, since 1915, there have appeared
the first drafts of bills aiming at the protection of illegitimate 
44
children which resulted In the most progressive piece of
legislation ever enacted in Greek Family law, the Legislative
Decree of 30.4.1926. This Decree in fact assimilated legitimate
and illegitimate children and provided retroactivity of the rights
45
of the illegitimate child to its birth. This Decree had a
short life of three months and was replaced by the L.D.14/27 July
1926, which provided a relationship with the mother comparable
to that she had with legitimate children and permitted the judicial
and voluntary recognition of paternity. The relationship with the
father in voluntary recognition and its equivalent complete judicial
46
recognition of paternity was that of legitimacy save the following
exceptions. The father was without rights of patria potestas over
the child, nor had he any rights to custody equal to that of the mother,
Moreover, the child's portion on intestacy and his legal rights in
testate succession were half of a legitimate child if the father was
47
with legitimate issue. For a child for which paternity had been
judicially ascertained the same Legislative Decree provided only a




(e) This century, however, marked the law of illegitimacy with various 
and undoubtedly progressive pieces of legislation in both 
countries. In Scotland with the Illegitimate Children Scotland)
Act 1930 the relationship with the father has been improved to 
equalize the duties and rights of bbth natural parents. Namely 
Section 2 of the Act supplies the father with a right to apply 
for custody and removes his right to meet a claim for aliment by 
assuming custody of the child. The same Act in Section one makes 
the father and the mother jointly and severally liable as debtors 
against the claim of the child for aliment. In the area
49
of succession, following the recommendation of Russell Committee
which was designed to elevate the bastard for the purposes of
succession to a parent's estate, from a status inferior to that of 
4.9 a
a legitimate child, the Succession (Scotland) Act 1964 and its
reform, the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act
1968 supplied the illegitimate child with the same rights of
intestate succession to their parents as legitimate children. The
same right is recognised to the parents if the child had died without
50being survived by his own family. In the adoption, though,the
father still suffers a major disability since he has no right to 
veto the adoption of the child, although with the Children's Act 
1975 he has the right to prevent the adoption by applying for 
custody. Also the Adoption (Sederunt) Act 1959 supplied him 
with the right to be heard and his wishes to be taken into account 
for the adoption of the child. Also the father, like the mother, 
has been granted the right to adopt his illegitimate child.
In Greece on the other hand the introduction of the civil code 
brought forward minor modifications in relation to the L.D. of 1926. 
Specifically article 1530 of the Greek Civil Code preserves
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the Reman law principle so that the natural child has the same 
position as a legitimate child, with regard to the mother and 
extends it to relatives in the maternal line.^^ The child 
receives the mother's maiden name but in an effort to integrate 
the child with the step father it permits the husband to give
52
his name to the child if both mother and child agree to this.
In the relationship with the putative father things remained as
53
they, were under the L.D. 1926. An improvement came later with
the permission for the parent to adopt his or her own illegitimate
child. However, the proposals of the Gazi Committee, which
are currently as a Bill before Parliament, supply the natural
mother the right to administer the child's affairs (art. 83 to reform art.
1530) and the same right is supplied to the father who has
voluntarily acknowledged the child, in an auxiliary form, if the
mother has for any reason forfeited her fights. (Art. 85 to reform
article 1537). The same bill brings forward some improvements in
the aliment due to the judicially affiliated child (articles 89-91
to reform articles 1545-6-7). As to the complete judicial
affiliation the committee declined to offer the father the right to
communicate with his child or to administer its affairs if the
mother had forfeited the right. (Article 93 to reform article 1555)
With those developments one can see a trend to improve the 
facilities for the illegitimate child. Modern law no longer 
proceeds upon the assumption that the illegitimate child is filius 
nullius. The child now has rights to support and of inheritance 
from his parents and they in general have rights of custody.
Nevertheless the child remain subject to disabilities since reform 
is stamped by the desire to preserve, unaffected the legal family.
The remaining disabilities relate to rights important for the
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child in his childhood and appear in a varying degree according
to their bearing to the protection of the legal family. Thus,
the right to custody which is exercisable on equal bases among
married parents in respect of the children of the marriage in
illegitimacy is regulated in a manner anticipating no actual
relation between the parents and discriminating against the father.
Specifically the mother is considered to be the natural custodian
of her child. The father on the other hand is supplied with a
right to apply to the court to gain custody of the child but in
awarding custody to him the court will regard the welfare of the
child as first and paramount consideration. There is also the
case of judicial affiliation in Greek law where no such right is
supplied to the father. How far the present derives from the
difficulties in regulating such situations is difficult to answer.
However, as Professor Clive observes the difference would have been
minimal if equal rights were given to both parents providing for
judicial discretion to resolve disputes between the p a r e n t s . W i t h
regard to maintenance unlike legitimacy where there is a reciprocal
right among descendants and ascendants and the father has the
primary reponsibility to maintain the child, in illegitimacy
both parents have to share the expenses according to their means,
taking into account their prior responsibility towards a spouse
or any children of marriage. Also maintenance obligation is
not reciprocal in illegitimacy. The equal responsibility of
the parents in maintaining the child seem to be more in tune with
current conditions and it is suggested that is should extend to
55
legitimate children. As regards reciprocity the matter is
under review in Scotland. However the tendency seems to 
attribute rights to the parents on account of their conduct 
during the child's minority. As regards guardianship neither the
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father, nor the mother has any right to represent the child by 
operation of law. In Scotland the court has to appoint a special 
guardian when the child needs representation while in Greece an 
ad hoc guardian is appointed to represent the child until it 
reaches majority. Succession rights are given to the child more or 
less in substitution to its right to be alimented by the father's 
estate. In Scotland, it can choose between the two while in 
Greece in voluntary acknowledgement the child would secure its 
aliment by succession rights upon the father's estate and in 
judicial affiliation by claiming aliment from the father's heirs. 
Kinship is not recognised whatsoever in illegitimacy, unless 
as an impediment ôf marriage, with the exception of the relationship 
with the mother and the maternal line in Greek law.
II. REVIEW OF THE POLICY AND THE REASONS BEHIND THE DISCRIMINATION 
AGAINST ILLEGITIMACY
Adhering to the position that stability of the legal family is a worthy 
goal, both countries permit discrimination against illegitimate children 
in order to support the institution of marriage and the legal family 
thereby created. The core of the argument is:' that by providing an 
equitable status for both legitimate and illegitimate children marriage 
would cease to be signified as the approved unit for the procreation 
of children. Consequently, the moral importance attached to marriage will 
be diminished and, at the same time, concubinage and other forms of 
illicit relations will be encouraged.
On account of this view, social paternity,as created by birth of the 
child to a man's wife, typically has been viewed as of controlling 
importance in settling the legal status of the child. Reaction to its 
birth starts when social and biological paternity do not coincide in a
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mother's husband. Thus, if the child is of adultery or is born to an un­
married mother, its birth is considered as an act against the marriage 
and the legal family and as such deserving reprobation.
a. To this end ideology and religion have played an important role.
Traditionally human consciousness, in response to the more or less
clearly perceived needs of a particular social context, has viewed
temporary liaisons as a threat to society and thus they frequently
57
were appraised in an ideological context. These philosophical
positions found a suitable outlet in the institution of marriage
and consequently its security was required whatever the sacrifice
might be. Often this was expressed in religious terms. Organised
religion then elevated this opinion to a spiritual level. Christianity,
which concerns both countries in question, following the same path,
considered children born out of a non sanctioned union - today
lawful marriage - as a sin which turned into f l e s h . T h i s  position
proved to be the most inhuman and anti-Christian consideration ever
provided for natural relations, since it maintains discrimination
as a religious gospel. Perhaps too, the classification made
by Justinian, which has carried most weight into modern law, is
based upon religious influence since it distinguishes classes of
illegitimate children according to the degree of sinfulness
involved in their conception. For instance, natural children of
stable concubinage which was a semi-approved union, and natural
children of casual liaisons of single persons enjoyed preferential
treatment in terms of legitimation, recognition and succession rights
over spurious children such as offspring of incestuous, adulterine
and un-natural relationships like the sacreligious children of priests,




It is not completely clear if religion has been the main factor 
in modern society in insisting on birth in lawful marriage. Legal 
family features as the basic social unit from the Classical period 
but the pagan ancients attached less importance to it, concentrating 
their attention upon descent of the same citizenship. Justinian, 
as already mentioned, was prepared to recognise the children of 
concubinage. Obviously, the Christian Church, interested in the 
sanctity of marriage as a religious sacrament, opposed birth in 
unsanctioned unions. However, even until early medieval times 
(perhaps until the Council of Trent) the Catholic Church unlike the 
Orthodox, following St. Paul's dictum "Better they marry than that 
they burn", was prepared to countenance, as marriage in some sense, 
many unions which later were frowned on for lack of formality.
b. Even if religion has not been the decisive factor in regarding
informal family structures as deviant, certainly it has provided
suitable support for feudal attitudes and modern social policy. As
said earlier,in the feudal system bastards of noble origin were not
despised but marriage was regarded honourable. Emphasis was put,
however, on bastardy, for reasons concerning the distribution and
inheritance of land. According to Kiralfy and Poutledge the landed
classes have the desire to conserve their inheritances, particularly
in times where marriages were matters of property and posterity,
and the likelihood of casual liaisons was high; and also because
under the feudal system of forfeitures the lords had a vested
interest in maintaining the disability of the bastard to inherit,
since the land of a man who died without legitimate issue was left 
61to his lord.
Later times have seen the growth of welfare policy in the form of
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religious and charitable institutions to care for needy people
for which was later substituted welfare provision by the State.
Illegitimate children^ because they suffered from lack of parental
recognition and consequently care, attracted most of the charitable
aid to the disadvantage of other needy people and to the economic
burden of the society In this context informal family structures
were deplored as being unstable and unworkable in their social
61a
and economic sense.
c. The leap, however, from an ambiguous, and often problematic, status 
to a stigmatized one tends to be small. The dysfunctions of 
illegitimacy start to attract attention as to its implications on 
the welfare of society. Certain assumptions then start to develop 
about the function of the family in its social setting to take the 
form of what we know today as the conventional family model. This 
model as revealed by Skolnick and Skolnick,^^ embodies the 
following fundamental assumptions.
i. The nuclear family is universal. Any form of extended 
families,and the wider society is simply a combination of 
nuclear families, 
ii. It is the key institution for the survival of society, 
iii. The nuclear family is based on a clear-cut biologically
structured division of labour between male and female, the 
male being the breadwinner and protector and the female the 
housekeeper and emotional mainstay, 
iv. This family structure has the fundamental purpose to socialise 
children - that is to tame their impulses and instil values, 
skills and desires necessary to run the society.
Such assumptions about family-society integrity indicate the degree
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to which a family context elicits society’s support or censure.
Given, therefore, that illegitimacy deviates ’rora those fundamental
assumptions,/from this follows the labelling of both parent and
children. As F erri^^ observes,illegitimacy became "the obvious
target for attack as a causal factor in numerous social and
psychological ills and often the search for explanatory factors
goes no further". Such an approach determines the sociological
treatment illegitimacy receives. By being regarded as deviant
in terms of the existing context, illegitimacy is frequently
negatively evaluated in the literature and negatively sanctioned in
the law, which can be summarised in stigma, exclusion from lineage
and family, economic disadvantages by discrimination in taxation
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rates or in access to social security benefits. It is not
entirely clear if the neglectful, attitude towards illegitimacy
in this transitional period is based upon any empirical assessments
of social conditions, or whether it derives from what are essentially
sociological and political assumptions about the way society should
65work. According to Grace Abbott the latter seems to be the case 
when she writes : "The duty recognised by the state was the one of 
preventing or reducing illegitimacy and the dependency that it created. 
Under the double standard of morals public opinion held the mother 
to be the offender, and the question was assumed to be how women 
could be kept from transgressing the moral and statutory law.
The early legislation was not based on any scientific study of the 
causes of these extra-matrimonial relations even so far as the women 
were concerned. Such a study we now know would have involved 
considerations of such personal factors in the mothers as feeble­
mindedness, ignorance of the biological facts of life, high sexual 
suggestibility, lack of industrial proficiency and personal development, 
It would have revealed the influence of family standards and ideas.
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poverty in the home, and immoral and unsympathetic parents.
Education, early employment and the type of employment, would have 
been discovered to be present in the chain of causes that led to this 
deviation from the legal and social standard. The presence of a 
socially inferior race, the position of women and the community 
attitude towards pre-marital relationships, especially after 
betrothal, would also have been found to influence the illegitimacy 
rate of a nation. Any consideration of these causes indicates 
how futile punishment of the mother would be in most cases and that, 
no matter what policy of prevention the state adopted, there would 
be children born out of wedlock whose needs and rights the state 
should consider. Enlightened selfishness as well as sympathy for the 
innocent victims required a programme for the care of children. But 
reliance was placed on deterrence. Harsh punishments for the mother 
and denial of legal rights to the children were relied upon to reduce 
illegitimacy. To protect the victims of these illegal relationships
would,it was believed, increase the number of illegitimate children."
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This view is further complemented by Kriesberg who argues, "Many 
of the difficulties faced by mothers and children in female headed 
households are not inherent in that family structure. The 
difficulties in part stem from the expectations of others about what 
is normal family, from the socially limited alternatives deemed 
appropriate for women and the specificity of sex roles".
d. Such a view of the social functions of iiie family, appropriately 
termed by Hyan^^ as "the victim blaming ideology", may be held 
responsible for the conservative attitude to change in the family 
law system. As the Finer Committee points out "Most people are 
brought up to think of marriage as central to their personal 
security and to the wellbeing of society. They are therefore quick to
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interpret changes in the institution as threatening evidence of moral
decay. luring the last hundred years, many proposals to ameliorate
the situation of wives and children have been criticised, not as being
bad in themselves but as securing the welfare of individuals by
undermining the integrity of monogamous m a r r i a g e " . S u c h  an
attitude is clearly demonstrated by the social attitude towards reform
aspiring to remove the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate
children altogether. In such cases it is observed that public
opinion, apart from particular concessions that it is prepared to
make on specific rights of the child, becomes more conservative
and defensive in its views. Probably, a vast amount of
background work will be needed to convince society that such
prejudice is unreal and equalization of the two classes of children
will leave unaffected or father benefit the existing social 
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order.
To complement the social-moral perspective it has been argued 
that illegitimacy is a neglected status because both parents and 
children do not make out a case for them in principle. On this 
argument socio-moral views are taken for granted and emphasis is 
placed on the variance between law and illegitimacy. This is to 
say that since the birth of the child took place in a union lacking 
legal formality accordingly it cannot be legally supported. This 
extends to affect as much the establishment of paternity as the 
rights which should flow from the relationship.
As a matter of fact because the mother is under no legal obligation 
to have intercourse exclusively with the alleged father, the 
paternity of the child is regarded as being uncertain. This 
'uncertainty' is the frequently presented argument against proposals
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for improving status with regard to the natural father and proves to 
be a decisive one due to its appearance of realism. However, 
this argument has some validity for propositions suggesting 
raising a presumption of paternity in informal relationships. From 
a point of view of legal deontology it is not appropriate to link 
legally the child with the consort of the mother since intention 
to procreate is not formally expressed as in marriage. This 
does not justify, however, the reluctance of the present legislation 
to respond with confidence to any methods, legal or otherwise, that 
could provide a practical and legally acceptable outlet for the 
problem.
It is partly upon considerations of the uncertainty of paternity 
that are argued for the limited rights of illegitimate children, 
since a complete status is not justified by certainty of paternity
and a limited one prevents excessive hardships in cases of
. . 69ainjustice.
In this context and with the old punitive approach still reflected 
in the law, clearly the concept of first andparamount consideration 
being for the welfare of the child, has not yet invaded this 
area. The policy still aims to protect society against the 
illegitimate child rather than to protect the child as a 
member of the society. Improvements have been made to better the 
position of such children but every improvement has been in line 
with the traditional perspective that illegitimacy should remain ' 
inferior in order to protect the legal family. Accordingly it may 
be appropriate to examine what both children and society have 
experienced in consequence of this policy, and whether it can be 
sufficiently justified in tha present social context.
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III. THE F ACTUAL BACKGROUND
At the centre of this policy is the child who must suffer the 
consequences of labelling and neglect usually with a young mother behind 
him struggling to change the situation. Maybe it is unnecessary to 
this discussion to detail the struggle of those children to cope 
emotionally and materially, as the subject has been exhausted in a 
number of w o r k s . H o w e v e r ,  for the completion of this part, the 
most distinct situations that may result from the discrimination 
against illegitimacy require a brief consideration.
1. A small, though still alarming for the effectiveness of social
71services, number of children die before they are one year old. This 
is mainly due to premature birth resulting from the fact that the mother 
did not seek ante-natal care in time or owing to poverty, did not
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feed herself properly or worked too long or too hard during the pregnancy. 
The assistance given her in the area of family law provides a lump sum 
to cover her aliment and inlying expenses for a small period before 
and after pregnancy. Even so, however, this help rarely comes on time, 
nor does it extend to cover all the necessary expenses involved.
2. Over one fifth of the total number of illegitimate children find 
their way into the controversial process of adoption. This topic is 
discussed on its merits in the second part of this study but it should be 
noted here that the high proportion is due more to the mother realising 
the impossibility of keeping her child than to lack of interest.
In fact, the unsettled and complicated emotional problems that the child 
may have and the lack of certainty that the outcome will be a happy one, 
have persistently forced unmarried mothers to part from their children with 
a view to adoption. Such a solution is considered by them because, 
at least artificially, they can secure a two-parent family and a proper 
home for their child. However, the solution is now considered only by a
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declining number of mothers due to improvements in women's social 
position.
3. A large number of children will be brought up in a two parent family 
whether formed by his natural parents or by one natural parent and his/ 
her spouse. Namely, a number of children, proportionately higher
in urban than in rural areas, will be brought up in unofficial
families formed by both natural parents. These cases, apart from the
emotional strain caused by the legal uncertanty of the relationship ,
73have produced fairly satisfactory results. Some children will be
legitimated per subsequens matrimonium, while others may find a home in 
the family, formed by the mother and a husband other than the father.
In almost all cases of the latter category the mother tries to secure 
a place for the child in the newly formed family and usually succeeds. 
However, the cases vary"whether the child will secure a permanent home 
with them mainly depends on circumstances. There have been cases where 
the man has made it clear to the mother that he will marry her only if 
she will part with her child. In those cases attempts by the mother 
to keep the child have usually been in vain. In a considerable number 
of cases, on the other hand, the husband accepts the child, either 
admiring the mother for her determination and courage in retaining it 
or simply adapting to her wishes. Complications may arise, however, 
when the family produces its own children. This may affect the feelings 
of the husband for the strange child. Also it may be a cause of 
dispute between the spouses in which case the mother may even reject 
the child, feeling that it causes disturbance within her family.
4. A relatively small number find their way to the grandparents' house 
with or without the mother living with them; and a few "a precarious 
and therefore extremely important few" as Wimperis points out, grow up
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with the mothers alone.
When the mother takes the decision to return to her parents for assistance
if they will accept this , it is almost certain that, afta: the first
shock, the situation usually develops fairly naturally. Depending
however, on the age and capacities of the mother, her role may be
substituted by the grandmother. This may prove to be rather risky insofar
as it can cause emotional conflict in the child, who in recognising the
person of his mother, may start wondering why he is receiving maternal
attention from a person other than her. Also it is not advisable for
the child to grow up with the grandparents if the mother's deviance
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of family pattern is due to her troubled childhood.
In these situations, writes Wimperis, "it seems that in returning the
child to the home where its mother grew up disturbed emotionally, one
risks the perpetuation of a social process whereby one generation of
deprived children provides the parents of the next generation of
deprived children". However, as she continued: "But it would be
unkind, as well as unjust, to have this as the last word upon the
grandparents' role. In personal care and in money, they often contribute
more to'the child than its own father may ever do, and this without a
shadow of legal obligation. The desire to help their child and
grandchild often leads middle aged and elderly couples, at a time of life
when they might expect to take things more easily, even when they have
retired and have few financial resources for themselves,to take on the
great burden of making a home for their grandchild, conceived so
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unexpectedly and in such unhappy circumstances."
5. A small proportion of children - difficult to specify in number - 
grow up in the hands of lone mothers. This small proportion, however,
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should not distract attention from the fact that when the total number 
of children in these circumstances are counted up, the number becomes 
significant. It is anticipated that some thousands of children in 
each country live with the mother alone, under circumstances giving 
rise to acute problems for the mother and the child. Dr. Doris Odium com­
menting on these situations points out that for the few who really want 
to keep the baby with them the way is very hard. Both financially and
socially the odds are heavily against and only rarely succeed.
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A detailed account given by Dr. Christine Cooper describes the life of 
those children as follows ; "The child is cared for in constantly 
changing circumstances, being moved about among relatives and friends, 
taken round to different lodgings by the mother, or put in and out of day 
or residential nurseries. He often has periods in the care of the local 
authority's Children's Department, and finally may be removed from his 
mother's care to an institution or foster home. Here his behaviour is 
usually difficult or delinquent, and this may result in further changes 
of care. This unfortunate fate is suffered by many illegitimate children 
and there is an urgent need for steps to be taken to prevent such treatment. 
The mother is usually vacillating in her attitude to the child being 
alternately over-protective and neglectful. He is unable to attach himself 
permanently to his mother or a reliable substitute, and develops into the 
affectionless, delinquent adolescent who, as Bowlby has pointed out, only
too often produces illegitimate children himself and the cycle is
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repeated.
The roots of the troubles of the mother and her child may be largely 
identified in the financial difficulties that she faces rather than in 
her inability to cope with the child. There may be an element of inability 
since usually the child is the first she has had and she is inexperienced 
but mostly the problems are due to the fact that unless she withdraws from
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work she cannot confine herself to bringing up the child. Usually,
she is forced immediately after delivery to go out looking for a job to
maintain herself and the child. To this, if added the fostering fees, that
she usually has to pay to free herself to work the problem becomes
even worse. Actually, foster placements are largely in use by lone
mothers, who treat them as a temporary expedient. Nevertheless, due to
the circumstances, in a number of cases this situation may continue for
a considerable period, certainly until the mother is able to secure the
necessary financial resources. In consequence this situation usually
results in the breakdown of the emotional bond between mother and child
due to lack of contact. Or, in finding the fostering expenses too much
of a strain, it brings about a reduction in the visits of the mother until
finally she disappears altogether abandoning the child to the foster
family. In the latter case, however, the matter may not end so readily
for the mother. After a marriage or a financial settlement suddenly she
may swoop down and take away a puzzled child who has meanwhile settled
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very happily with the foster parents.
6.  Natural children in public care
P or a large number of illegitimate children the alternative of public
care is not an unknown « Many have spent some part of their childhood
in public care while others have remained there from early infancy up to
the age of majority. The reasons vary and may not be entirely due to
discriminatory policies on illegitimacy. But in the majority of cases
the children may be received into care and thus deprived of normal home life,
In the short stay cases children are received into care because of the
mother's temporary inability to deal with the child due to her illness,
imprisonment or eviction from her house, while in thelong stay, she may
have abandoned the child or proved permanently unable to cope with it.
Wim.peris^^ classifies the latter category to the following main groups :
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a. Those who have no homes because the natural parents have died
or deserted them or are destitute or incapacitated. Those are 
received into the care of local authorities in Scotland or of a local 
department of National Aid in Greece.
b. The children who have been removed from their home, either for 
rehabilitative or for preventative purposes. In both cases, usually 
danger to the child's moral and physical development is observed 
either because of its own misbehaviour or because of its home 
conditions, to the extent that it would not be right for it to 
remain in it.
c. Those who have some mental or physical handicap of their own that calls
for institutional care since it is eitherimpossible for them to be kept
in the house or it is difficult for a single working mother to provide 
the attention needed.
ILLEGITIMACY REASSESSED
So far, the development of the law has been examined, the policy behind 
this legislation and the most serious ways where the effects of illegitimacy 
make their presence felt in the child's life. The point which became
clear is that the child itself bears most of the moral blame for its birth 
and suffers all the social and legal consequences for an act for which it 
has no responsibility at all. Also in the previous chapter consideration 
was given to the disfunctions of the conventional family as well as to the 
present state of relationships between the two sexes. The point made 
there was that of the failure of the law to comprehend the current family 
patterns. One dimension not analysed so far, however, concerns the 
relationship between discriminatory policy on the one hand and sexual 
behaviour and the fluctuation of the rates of illegitimacy on the other.
The task of this part then is to determine whether marriage needs any support, 
and whether the deterrence argument had any effects on sexual behaviour.
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and on the rates of illegitimacy in order to formulate a clearer view 
of current conditions and the policy needed. In the next
part it is necessary to consider the international trends in respect 
of illegitimacy and the propositions for reform in Scotland and Greece 
respectively. Finally, models for reform are examined, along with 
certain considerations to be taken into account in the construction of 
these models.
17 . MARRIAGE AND ILLEGITIMACY
The aspect of the policy which, perhaps is most vulnerable to cricitism
concerns the need to support the institution of marriage. Titmuss^
in the fifties pointed out the increasing popularity of marriage, probably
as a result of the removal of social and legal restraints and equality
and freedom for women. The thesis is further confirmed with the
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publication of the P iner Report which describes the increasing popularity 
of marriage as one of the most significant features of recent time. In 
Britain alone, the annual total, from about 253,000 each year at the 
beginning of this century, has risen to 357,000 in 1971 and, though this 
is due to a great extent to the growth of the population, "part of this 
increase reflects also a growing propensity to marry". In actual 
numbers the Committee found that the proportions having married 
before attaining the age of fifty are 95 per cent for males and 96 per cent 
for females. In this respect they feel bound to accept that such 
percentages represent what Professor Grebenik and Miss Rowntree described 
as "as near an approach to practically universal marriage as has been
achieved in this c o u n t r y " . I n  Greece from the census data of 1961 it
appears that celibacy is at medium rate ranging from 5 - 9 % .  The 
statistical data for the population up to the age of 44 shows that 90.5% 
of males and 91.8% of females had been married at least once at this 
ageS4 The percentage, however, could be even higher if the presen t 
marriage law, with its outdated regulations, did not restrain a percentage
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of the population, especially women, from getting matried.^^
The -above numbers show that a minority of about 5 per cent of the 
population have never experienced matrimony. This number, however does 
not correspond to the percentage of the population which may be anticipated 
as a threat to the institution of monogamous marriage, because of a clear 
opposition to its principles. From it, one should deduct the homosexuals, 
persons suffering from ill-health preventing them from undertaking the 
responsibilities of marriage and others under a permanent legal impediment 
like those suffering from insanity or those standing in the agamic ranks 
of clergy. Then, the percentage left is small to be regarded as a potential 
influence on society. Nevertheless as long as this percentage stands with 
beliefs against formal marriage it is illogical for society to expect them 
to change their opinion by imposing severe consequences on illegitimacy.
They may be indifferent to stigma and nevertheless prepared to face the 
legal handicaps in the relationship with thëir children.
Alongside propensity towards marriage there has been a continuing fall
in the average marital age which has some significance since illegitimate
births to a great extent occur between young c o n s o r t s . T h e  mean age of
first marriage in Scotland shows a steady decrease so that from an average
of 27.1 and 24.8 for men and women respectively for theperiod 1946-1950, it
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falls to 24.9 and 22.8 at 1961-1965 and 24.2 and 22.4 for 1971. At the same 
time the proportions of persons having their first marriage under twenty 
increased rapidly. From an average of 2.7 for men and 14.8 for women for the 
period 1946-1950 it increases to 9,5 and 28.5 for 1961-1965 and 12.8 and 31.6 
for 1971.^^^
For Greece, though, there are no tables available showing the same tendency, 
a lowering in the average marital age is expected. At the census of 1961 
it was 28.4 for males and 24.9 for females so that the country
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was classified among those with high rates of first marriage. Due to 
recent changes in life-styles there may be a lowering of about 2 years 
for men though no substantial change may be expected for women.
The increasing popularity of marriage and the fall in the mean age of
marriage are demographic developments of persuasive social importance.
However, they have not attracted extensive study and they are not
fully understood yet. An analysis of the census data of 1961 made by
the Registrar General suggested that the change had affected all
occupational groups in society with a higher proportion among unskilled
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and manual workers. Studies attempting to investigate whether
the change can be attributed to social and economic changes, security
of jobs and incomes conclude that there is no real connection between
90such factors and the decision to marry. Perhaps, behind these
developments there is a change of principle so that financial security,
acquisition of properties or other social class related factors have lost
90a
most of their significance for a decision to marry. However, what 
these numbers do really suggest is that marriage is undertaken in every 
increasing proportions by all sections of society so that to try to 
bolster it further in social opinion is somewhat superfluous.
The popularity of marriage does not necessarily imply that a higher
proportion of children will be brought up in a stable parental family.
The incident of marriage breakdown in the view of the F iner Committee has
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become a major social phenomenon and one which is unlikely to go away.
and this has tended to be equated by social commentators with deterioration
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in the state of health of the family. Behind this has been seen the
twentieth century emphasis on the welfare and happiness of the 
individual, frequently regarded as the cause of family decline and 
deterioration of parental responsibility. Sociologists like 5’ietcher,
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for example, have however strongly argued against those accusations,
rejecting the charges altogether - a position later supported by the
F iner Committee. The Committee declined to accept pathological
situations as the main factors for divorce and nevertheless considered
it to be "unhistorical and socially unrealistic" to interpret
marriage breakdown "merely or exclusively as a concern of social 
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pathology". Later commentators confine the reasons people resort to
divorce or separation to the alteration and increase of standards in the
conjugal relations as such. These have been understood by Lambert 
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and Streather not to be incompatible with the fundamental belief in the
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stability of the family as a system. An analysis given by Eekelaar
indicates factors in the marriage breakdown as including premarital
behaviour, age, economic conditions but he also points out less
conventional and not yet fully understood factors concerning the spouses
themselves. For example, he sees a s a possible factor increased life
expectancy among married women, since birth control and progress in
general medicine has reduced the risks and increased the span of active
life among them. Nevertheless, accompanying the emancipation of women
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and the growth of the 'romantic' conception of marriage, Titmuss and 
98Eekelaar see a heightening of the expectations of each party, in
particular the women, as to the quality of marriage, which makes greater
the probability of disappointment. Personality differences, then,
between the parties occupy a place among the complaints which may
bring about the dissolution of relationships, with personal defects
most prominent and with sexual difficulties and incompatibility still 
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high on the list. The involvement of such factors, of course, does
not point to any kind of pathological situation but nevertheless reveals 
what Lambert and Streather^^^ describe as a "considerable fluidity of the 
composition of families within this system". The increasing risk then 
of the child not being brought up in a two-parent family cannot be
Ill
ignored. On the other hand it should be recognised that couples seeking 
high standards of compatibility are more likely to settle a normal family with 
beneficial implications for the child.
It is important to recognise, however, that as standards increase, this
will affect not only the parents’ partnerships, but also the way the
parental functions are carried out. The standards of child care have
102altered considerably this cehtury. F letcher points out that rather
than the parent being stripped of his functions by policies concerning
child care, more specialized demands are made on the family by a society
which expects a responsible undertaking of far more social commitments.
His child caring role, however, is neither defined nor unlikely to change.
Titmuss^^^ summed up the role of the modern parent as tending to be
"a highly self conscious, self regarding affair to which society
continually adds to the sense of personal"responsibility among parents.
Their tasks are much harder and involve more risks of failure when children
have to be brought up as individual successes in a supposedly mobile,
individualistic society rather than in a traditional and repetitious
society ... More decisions have to be made because there is so much more
to be decided, and as the margin of felt responsibility extend so
104does the scope for anxiety about one's children". F erri sees 
the behaviour, values and attitudes of the present parental generation 
as possibly having little relevance since " ... fluid and diversified 
society needs adults equipped to act in a variety and often changing 
roles".
How far the burdening of parental roles has contributed to marriage
breakdown is difficult to establish. None of the divorce grounds clearly
relates to domestic activities in child care and parental failure has
never been investigated with regard to its bearing on the stability of
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the conjugal relationship. The complexity of the parental role.
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however, indicates that cooperation of the spouses^though essential in 
bringing up the child successfully, is becoming less likely to be 
achieved. To an extent then it may produce a desire to dissolve an 
unhappy relationship if it is causing deterioration in the parent's 
caring attitude, irrespective of the fact that this will result in an 
increase in his responsibilities.
The position of the parent as a divorce attracts particular attention
in disentangling the status of the child from the legal relationship that
produces it. It is accepted that parental concern fluctuates according
to the change in the circumstance of the parent and on account of the
terms in the relationship between the custodian and a^custodian parent.
What really remains unaltered is the very existence of the parent-child
relationship which needs to be regarded and maintained by both parents and
children. Meteyard^^^ in her interesting analysis of the conflicting
importance of the concepts of parenthood and marriage reveals the nature
of parenthood as being a status "independent of legal regulation" which
"continues to exist even when divorce has dissolved a marital relationship".
Nevertheless, she feels bound to stress the importance of giving particular
attention to this aspect since "... the dependence of children either
on their parents or on the community as a whole, is inevitable and tends
to be prolonged rather than the reverse in our technologically advanced
s o c i e t y " . F erri^^^ finds that this dependency occupies most of
the attention of parents with borken homes. In every aspect of parental
involvement and aspirations the results indicate that a majority of
parents in all types of family situations show an interest in their
children's current progress, and concern for their future development
109and success. The analysis also of Murch on justice and welfare 
in divorce points ^ out the anxiety of both parents and children to retain 
their roles and contact after the dissolution of the marriage.
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V ariations occurred only when the relationship had experienced a degree 
of brutality. Specifically, their position in organising access, as 
summed up by the same study indicates that the essence of the relationship 
remains and what is affected is how this will be expressed under the new 
conditions : "... access problems are often symptomatic of a fundamental
dilemma facing divorcing parents. This is how to disengage from the 
broken marriage while preserving a sense of being a parent with a part 
to play in the children's future. Some cannot resolve it and give up their 
parental role, others strike an amicable balance between these conflicting 
demands, and yet others argue and fight. Parenthood normally assumes 
a coalition between spouses. Arrangements about access reflect the way 
the family's social structure is reorganized, how parental responsibilities 
are redefined and new boundaries drawn around the family relationships. 
These adjustments take time. They often proceed by painful trial and 
error before the family as a whole and its individual members can discover 
an acceptable equilibrium.
The attitudes of divorced parents are full of contrasting dimensions 
and need detailed consideration before any guidance is derived from this 
aspect of the relationship for the construction of a different approach 
to the status of the child. However, what is revealed and what has not yet 
attracted particular attention for study, is that aspect of the parent- 
child relationship, perceived to be created and maintained exclusively 
in marriage, can be maintained outside wedlock provided that the biological 
relation is supported with a considerable degree of certainty. The 
possible outcome of such research may be proof that the conjugal 
relationship is not of paramount importante in the development of the 
parent-child relationship. However, this may be of essential importance 
if marriage is primarily perceived and maintained on account of the needs 
of the spouses. Such tendency explicitly appears among the factors
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concerning the dissolution of marriage and earlier in the changes in the 
construction of relationships between the two sexes. Most probably
then other factors predominate, such as the existence of children, 
during the regular marital life. In such a case the rearing of children 
within the family may prove to be considered by each parent primarily as 
a personal obligation in which he may cooperate or receive assistance from 
the other parent.
V . ILLEGITIMACY AND LEGAL POLICY
It is difficult to state with any certainty the extent to which the
stigma against illegitimacy has affected sexual behaviour and the ratio
of births out of wedlock. The norms adopted in legal policy, whether
identified in religious convictions and morality of in child care
and society's protection, aim to impose society's values upon intimate
personal bëhaviour and thus control intercourse outside wedlock. Thus,
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as Louis Blora Cooper explains, it "pre-supposes that ordinary citizens
preface their licit and illicit sexual intercourse with a study of
recondite rules of family law" in order for thé deterrence argument to
be effective. Whether the argument is properly conceived is under
consideration. The conditions and trends concerning extra-marital
relations may be of deep seated social origin and therefore the influence
which legal measures can have will probably be very limited. Nevertheless,
the deterrent argument incorrectly assumes that the responsibility of
the individual towards social norms and his responsibility as a parent are
two elements firmly interlocked and interacting. Characteristically,
112Dr. R. Williams states, "I do not want to suggest that all illegitimate 
pregnancies arise from a merely animal activity, but it is worth saying 
that paternal responsibility is a specially human phenomenon and we shall 
not expect it to develop except in situations which have become character­
istically human. There is a real connection between the institution of
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marriage and the dignity of humanity. The fact that in these all too
common situations the girl is left with a baby is completely in line
with animal life." Such generalizations about the concept of
responsibility have been strongly opposed recently either in principle
or on the bases of evidence obtained from de facto families. "It is
113hard in any event", states Louis Blom Cooper "to justify translating 
moral principles into legal rules where to do so is to inflict scarring 
social wounds on blameless children, simply on the basis of the law's 
discrimination between so-called responsible and irresponsible 
parents." The task in the following pages then is to give a
quantitative analysis of the problem and make some observations about the 
fluctuations of illegitimacy and the factors affecting its rate. Then, 
it is necessary to recall some of the instances that may result in an 
illegitimate conception and assess their causes in relation to the aims of 
legal policy. F inally, the position of the child is to be seen and 
whether it is justifiable to discriminate against him.
a.1 Statistical data in both countries although illustrating clearly
the size of the problem, falls short of providing reliable information
on the effectiveness of the deterrence approach. The rates of
illegitimacy fluctuate in such a way, irrespective of the measures
taken against it and other decreasing factors, so that any information
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they give is rather baffling. Thus, while it might be
expected that factors like the continuous stigmatization, the 
lowering in the marital age, the increasing propensity towards 
marriage in effect would lower the rate, such trends cannot be 
confirmed in either country.
In Scotland, for ihe pre-war period, the illegitimate births used to 
ranee from 4 - 5  per cent per year to reach a peak of nearly 9 per
116
cent during the years of war. A rapid increase is also recorded 
for the years of the F irst World War and the period of the economic 
crisis between the two wars. Since the war, the ratio appears to 
have decreased - as the disturbance in social relationships from 
the emotional tensions of the War and the movement of people start
115to eclipse - and it reaches a minimum of about 4 per cent in 1958.
Since then a regular increase is observed, so as from 4.4 in 1960 
the ratio became 5.8 in 1965, 7.7 in 1970 and 8.5 for the year 1972.^^^ 
F or the year 1977 Clive states the number of illegitimate births 
to be 5.968 and moreover estimates the population of illegitimates 
in Scotland alone to range at about 200,000 and to be likely 
to increase since the rate of illegitimate births increases steadily 
each year. To give then the exact size of the problem in Scotland 
he writes : "Imagine a city the size of Aberdeen, and you have some
idea of the extent of the problem. If the citizens of Aberdeen 
were subjected to special discriminatory laws on succession, 
maintenance, guardianship, parental rights and so on, there would 
be an outcry and immediate reform. Yet, that is the situation we
have in the case of the scattered population of illegitimate
„ 116a 
people".
In Greece, on the other hand, although the problem in terms of 
illegitimate births is comparatively not so acute, it is 
estimated that the rate runs variably to 1.6 - 1.9 per cent of 
all live births per year so that children born illegitimate are about 
1500 -■ 2000 in number each year and the total population of 
illegitimates is about 70,000. Extra-marital conceptions are
117steadily increasing and are put down mainly by illegal abortion.
The ratio before the second world war was about 1.4. The ratio 
during the war and following civil war is presumed to be higher
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than that. Put it is difficult to present any reliable
information since records were not kept in those disturbed times. 
However, the ratio resettles as society starts living normally 
to be 1.5 in 1957 representing 2.630 illegitimate births.
The amount of illegitimate births since then present a drop to 1737 
in 1968, 1725 in 1969, 1067 in 1970 (the lowest ever recorded)
1681 in 1971, 1657 in 1972 and 1574 in 1973 but the ratio remained 
u n a l t e r e d . E x c e p t  in the periods associated with social 
unrest the rate of illegitimacy presents minimal fluctuations and 
small increase. This pattern is not irrelevant of course to long 
term rhythmic fluctuations in general fertility, the availability of 
abortion, the increases in the population, but those explain changes 
in thé rate rather than the causes of illegitimacy per se and its 
occurrence.
a.2 Changes in the madtal status of families brought a corresponding
fall in the number of children in the families. Gill, from
evidence on families in Aberdeen,has shown that the trend from a
five or six towards a one or two child family appears to be firmly 
119established.
Lambert and Streather^^^ on the basis of data from the Central
Statistical office argue the steady fall in the birthrate between
1964 and 1975 to indicate that small families have become the norm,
notwithstanding that predictions based on short-term trends have
proved in thepast to be unreliable. However, the decrease of
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births in wedlock has been explained by Hartley and later by 
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Gill to be partly the cause for the rapid increase of the ratio 
of illegitimate births since the amount of such births presents 
smaller fluctuations. In Greece, as J\van der Tak states,
118
referring to the work ofValaoras, the decline in the fertility
rate (most probably due to abortion) is quite acute not so
much as regards the fall in itself, but mainly because of its
implications on the reproduction of the population. The total
fertility rate per woman from 3.7 in the 1930s decreased to 2.3
in the 1960s which means that parents are just slightly more than
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replacing themselves. Later studies, however, point out a
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probable decrease in the population . Astonishingly, on the
other hand the ratio of illegitimacy follows a same pattern at
times when the ratio of illegitimacy in other countries present
a steady increase. In 1960s and early 1970s when the drop in the
family size and the general fertility became explicit, the ratio
of illegitimacy presents a similar decrease dropping to just over
1,000 in 1970. Since then although it has increased, it nevertheless
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follows closely fluctuations in the general fertility.
a.3 The availability of abortion is also a factor to be taken into
consideration for understanding the ratio of illegitimacy. Both
countries provide for abortion for medical and socio-moral reasons though
in Greece the grounds are more restrictive, so that it can be
argued that abortion is illegal for other than medical reasons.
Scotland for over a decade now has experienced a rather liberal
abortion law with the introduction of the Abortion Act 1967, which
is seen primarily as a result of the movement favouring legislative
intervention to reduce the amount of human suffering, improvement
of the status of women and the concern over the 'population problem'
127than on its bearing upon illegitimacy and its consequences.
However, it must be recognised that the Act facilitates a 
legitimate avenue and a short term solution for illegitimately 
pregnant women to avoid such maternity, a concession that must be
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understood for the children, on account of over-riding importance
128given to the stable legal family. Specifically, abortion
in Scotland today is legal for a confirmed pregnancy if two doctors
agree that continuing the pregnancy would be a greater risk to
the mother's life, or risk to her mental or physical health or
health of her children, than terminating it; or that there is
a serious risk that the baby is abnormal or deformed. To construct
the grounds of risk to the mother's health or her existing children,
housing conditions, state of marriage, number of children, income,
and the nature of changes the child would bring into the mother's 
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lire are to be taken into account.
The flexible grounds for and the availability of abortion under 
the National Health Service undoubtedly are factors contributing 
to the decrease of the amount of illegitimacy. However, to understand 
the extent of this happening in Scotland, one should take into 
consideration other relevant factors. In Scotland, a high proportion 
of the population are Catholic and the Catholic church is against 
abortion. Due to religious convictions, therefore, a propbrtion 
of the population is disposed unfavourably towards abortion.
Besides, the decision to abort is in the hands of medical practitioners, 
They have the duty to interpret the law and apply it in the 
particular case. Consequently, the availability of abortion depends 
on such variables as the doctor's attitudes, how to find two doctors 
to agree and how well the case is presented to them. In fact, the 
fluidity in the composition of the grounds, the absence of any 
publication of precedents of medical interpretation in the light 
of the above variables, makes abortion more a benefit for the 
privileged than a legal right. The proportion of women who are 
refused abortion tend to vary between hospital regions and social
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class. Gill^^^ from his study of trends in Aberdeen suggests 
that in both private and public sectors there is some evidence 
to support the view that women in the upper socio-economic groups, 
who have most to lose by any stigmatisation, are more successful 
in obtaining abortions. They tend to be more verbally skillful 
and capable of presenting their case in a manner most likely to 
invoke the doctor's sympathy ahd hence his acquiescence to 
their request. Women from the lower socio-economic groups on the 
other hand tend to suffer two handicaps. U sually they are 
deficient in this type of role-playing and, further, they may be un­
informed of the possibility of abortion or uncertain about how to 
obtain one.
Relevant to the contribution of abortion in relation to the rate of 
illegitimacy, of course, is access to contraceptive methods. In 
Scotland, where that concern is high, the need for abortion is 
reduced. In 1977, the number of legal abortions was 7,283 showing 
a ratio of 0.71 of women aged between 15 and 44. Approximately 
another thousand women went from Scotland to England to have an 
abortion the same year the number of illegitimate births
was 5,968. These numbers may suggest that contraception is
widely practised in Scotland and could equally suggest, if 
certain drawbacks in the law of abortion were removed and the class 
of related handicaps imposed by religion were disregarded,that the 
illegitimate pregnancies were wanted pregnancies. However, 
under the present circumstances such assumption may be made only to 
a proportion of illegitimate births, which presumably is not low.
In Greece, on the other hand, abortion is available for other than 
medical reasons, if conception resulted from rape, abuse of a
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person incapable of resisting, seduction of a girl less than 15
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years old and incest. No other grounds are provided to prevent
a married or unmarried woman from experiencing hardship from an unwanted
pregnancy. Besides, it should be noticed that family planning
services are rather poor, although frequently the need for their
132development has been urged. As a result, advice on contra­
ception from the public sector is non-existent and illegitimate
133
pregnancies are controlled by illegal abortion. Risatakis
finds illegal abortion to be much more frequent than in many other
countries, and that with the increase of urbanisation it has become
easier for a greater proportion of the population to secure it. She
estimates the number of illegal abortions among married women alone
to be as high as to approximate to 150,000 per year, while 
134
Chatzoglou refers it to be over 300,000 for married and 
unmarried women together. It is difficult to understand why the 
abortion problem has not yet served to stimulate interest in the 
prevention of unwanted pregnancies and the tolerance of the 
state towards illegal abortion. Naturally, one should expect 
preventive measures which involve less risk, like contraception 
which accords more to the permissible attitude towards extra­
marital intercourse. Abortion 1hen œmes to be the last resort mechanism
for alleviating the consequences of unfortunate and often unforseen 
135
pregnancies. For this uncaring policy, however, the state
cannot be held to bear the entire responsibility, in so far as 
the reaction of the church to contraceptive methods and abortion 
has been both strong and influential, though not rational and not 
representative of the present social situation in the country.
b.l Many attempts have been made to uncover the underlying causes of
conbeptions out of wédlock. ■ The story goes back to the implementation
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of the Bastardy clauses of the 1834 Poor Law Amendment Act which 
gave rise to a discussion on the impact and efficacy of the 
deterrence approach. The introduction of registration supplied 
reliable information about the rates and at the same time permitted 
a close observation of the fluctuation and factors behind an unwed 
pregnancy. Theories start to develop explaining the causes 
of illegitimacy primarily concerned with the single mother notwith­
standing that due consideration was given to a married woman 
becoming illegitimately pregnant. Some of the theories attribute
illegitimacy to personality and look at the individual for causal 
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explanations, while others, adopting the social welfare approach,
are more problem o r i e n t a t e d . W i t h  this category of theories
emerges the lenient attitude towards illegitimacy without need of
departing from the dominant value system. The psychiatric theory
of Young in the fifties, concerned with the emotional disturbance
of the unwed mother, provided the basis for her being absurdly
139defined as ill or mentally sick. Welfare theories then shifted
the emphasis to the problematic nature of the circumstances of
i l l e g i t i m a c y . I n  turn, severe stigmatization was in part
abandoned since society became able to offer sympathy and support
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without having to condone the immorality of the sexual activity.
Sociological explanations on the other hand, inquiring into the
norms, attitudes and function of illegitimacy, adopt
historical or anthropological perspective often by observing the
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development of laws and customs in various societies. The
indisputable contribution of these theories is their success in 
bridging a gap in our perspective on illegitimacy. Before the 
appearance of this type of analysis persons becoming illegitimately 
parents and their offspring were regarded as outsiders irrespective 
of the sympathetic or unsympathetic attitude towards the incident.
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With this type of analysis it was confirmed that the causes and other 
factors related to illegitimacy are inherent in the social system 
and in this respect it brought us closer to understanding illegitimacy 
as an indispensable feature of our society and increase our 
acceptance of it.
However, the theories explaining the causes of illegitimacy and
the dependency created, although they widen our knowledge of the
causes of illegitimacy, do not offer particularly successful
explanations nor are any more convincing ones likely to be forth- 
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coming. Nevertheless, illegitimacy, despite stigmatisation,
appears regularly and, in this respect, what is frequently left
without particular consideration is the very validity of the legal
policy. Understanding the causes of illegitimacy is one thing
and they probably will never be comprehended in full depth. But to
try to eliminate these causes and reduce the incidents by
legislative acitivities is quite another. F or centuries now,
human sophistication in response to more of less clearly perceived
social needs identifies in the legal discrimination against
illegitimacy the task of preserving a value system and of
reducing intercourse outside wedlock and illegitimate pregnancies. At
the same time illegitimate births have appeared on a regular basis
in a ratio frequently irrelevant to restrictive attitudes towards
intercourse outside wedlock. Nevertheless, this ratio appears
to be unaffected by factors like propensity towards marriage and
low marital age. On the basis of these findings, given our
inability to explain and understand illegitimacy, recent commentators
tend to accept unwed pregnancies as a phenomenon with longstanding
causes of deep seated social origin, so that punitive legislation
144
and their implementation have only limited effect. Notwithstanding
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such observations, the punitive aspect of the law has been seen
recently by the English Law Commission to be unjustifiable discrimin-
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ation, especially where the child is concerned. The last
comments lead us to question the rationality and necessity of 
legal discrimination within the present social context, to ask 
whether it is justifiable in terms of its effectiveness and what 
will be the advantages, if any, of removing the distinction.
b-2 As indicated earlier, despite contraception and abortion,
5 - 6,000 children in Scotland and 1,500 to 2,000 children in
Greece per year join the class of the unfortunate illegitimate.
Most of the children will be born to unmarried mothers in their
146teens or early adulthood, while a considerable number will
be born to married mothers or, at least, to women who would describe
themselves as married in a census. The majority of those children
will have the status permanently attached to them, either as a
result of the law ( parent's marriaae impeded), or as a result
of defects, legal or otherwise,in the relationship that had produced
them. Others will be under this status only temporarily or not
at all if the mother marries the father, or if the child is
passed off as of the husband’s in an existing or subsequent marriage.
Of the children who remain permanently illegitimate some will live
in a stable de facto family, or will be accepted in the family
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formed by one of the parents and other person. However, the
bast majority of those willibe born to a mother in her adolescent
or early adulthood who at that stage has to cope alone with the
148problems of the child. Such situations are typical in
illegitimacy and may be met in any class of society and in any
geographical area. Such change of patterns have been recently
149 150confirmed by the studies of Illsey and Gill and Gill , who
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from evidence obtained in Scotland show a shift in the 
location of high illegitimacy since the second World War from 
rural areas, which were usually blamed for moral decay, to urban 
areas. At the same time they observe a change in the ratio of 
illegitimacy among social classes. Until then, illegitimacy 
was regarded pre-eminently as a lower class characteristic, 
whereas since the war the higher rates have been recorded among 
middle classes. Probably such trends cannot be clearly supported for 
Greece. Proportionately higher rates may appear in urban areas 
and among the lower classes since they have less access to
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contraceptives and it is rather difficult for them to obtain abortion.
However, the figures of illegitimate births in comparison to inter­
course outside wedlock by both married or unmarried persons is
probably what Teper finds to be in relation to adolescent
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girls "only the tip of the iceberg". People become sexually
active outside marriage for a variety of reasons and under circum­
stances such that it is often difficult to predict and more or 
less difficult to control.
b.3 The case of a married woman traditionally has been seen to be 
relatively simple for hers will usually be an example of an 
unabalanced relationship or of a broken marriage. The same reasons 
may be seen behind the case of a married man committing adultery.
Because of alterations in the relationship of the two sexes a 
radical change is observed in the marital relationship and 
corresponding social attitudes. Both men and women today regard 
marriage primarily as an emotional partnership and have more 
independence and power of choice to admit openly their dissatisfaction
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with a specific marriage and to withdraw if fulfilment is not 
achieved. Correspondingly, a married person is less likely to be 
involved in an extra-marital relationship without just cause.
Whenever he or she does so, it is primarily for the purpose of 
finding the emotional satisfaction lacking in the conjugal 
relationship and therefore the withdrawal from it is more or less 
permanent. Deviations from this pattern are probable in 
marriages primarily entered into for the purpose of acquiring 
property, or as a matter of convenience, or because the marriage 
was arranged and failed to produce love among the partners. In 
the latter case the spouse may tolerate the situation because of 
the social pressure upon him. Because of the different 
incentives there, it is more probable that partners in such 
marriages will be involved in furtive or fleeting extra-marital 
relationships depending on the degree of interest that they still 
have in the reasons that forced them into marriage-
The gradual redefinition of marriage from a consensual to an
emotional partnership has had an impact upon the law and social
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attitudes towards adultery. As Gill observes, the conception of 
marriage as an emotional partnership which evidently "is most 
widely held in middle class groups and in larger urban centres" 
has "weakened". sanctions against extra-marital sexual relations 
notwithstanding that the laws relating to divorce are "still 
somewhat restrictive, thus encouraging consensual unions and hence 
the birth, not merely of illegitimate children, but of illegitimate 
families". The corresponding social attitude is more 
encouraging. Society today seems more ready to justify the 
spouse of a defective marriage who seeks fulfilment in an extra-
154marital affair, unless he or she hypocritically plays a double role.
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The latter mostly invokes social aversion and probably constitutes 
what presently can be described as stigmatisation of adultery. In 
this context, however, it is expressed against the spouse more as a 
concern for his personality than for his act being anticipated 
as a threat for the institution of monogamous marriage and 
the existing status quo. Not many people on the other hand will
label as dishonest the spouse who refuses to preserve a defective
marriage and look forward to finding happiness in another union.
In the light of those changes, the chances for a married woman to
be illegitimately pregnant or for a married man to father
illegitimately a child, are rather high. These circumstances,
however, do not constitute a clear provocation of social morals
except in a few instances. Therefore, we must recognise the need
to make the law more compatible with this conception of marriage
to prevent hardships for both the partners and the children and
avoid further damage to it as an institution. Above all, however,
it is necessary for the punitive aspects of the legislation to
be extinguished since the stigma relating to the act of adultery
apart from being rarely attached to it nowadays, refers to an act of
a parent per se, so that it does not justify legal reaction against 
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the child.
b.4 The case of unmarried consorts is more complex when it results in 
an illegitimate pregnancy mostly because the option of marriage 
is open to them. However, the case now involves a variety of 
issues calling for consideration which ultimately minimises the 
degree of responsibility of the unmarried partners for exposing 
themselves to the risks of an unwed pregnancy. '
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In the first place, the position of youth in society is a 
field in which far-reaching transformations are taking place.
Although education extends over more and more years, dependence of 
the young on their parents has begun to loosen earlier. The involve­
ment of adolescents in social life begins sooner too, and increasingly 
they invade areas which until now were reserved for adults. Maturity 
therefore, seems to set in at an earlier stage than it did before, 
although this has attracted little attention so far. The line 
of demarcation between adolescence and adulthood is confused in 
both society's and parents' eyes and has been more of less 
standardized at a certain age or with educational or marital stages 
on the child's life. Consequently parents fail to follow the 
child's life, to give the proper advice to him when needed and to 
prepare him adequately for involvement with certain aspects of 
life. On the contrary, the widely held parental attitude is 
simply to place prohibitions on the child until such time as they 
find him fit to respond to life. Frequently one hears parents 
say to their children "you are too young to marry" or "at your 
age one must not be involved‘in a love relationship" and in many 
instances such advice happens to be given to an adolescent who has
already experienced more than one relationship and had suffered because
, . . 156of his ignorance.
b.5 Secondly, among the facts that continuously occupy a greater part
in the life of the unmarried person are relationships with
the other sex. Variables here occur according to the age,
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education and family background, but what mostly attracts 
attention is the fact that social forms of such relationships tend 
to be inevitable in the unmarried personb life as more or less the 
natural precursor of marriage. There are three factors to be
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taken into consideration on this matter : the difference between
sexual maturity and social maturity, the changing attitude towards ; 
sex and the impact of the high regard for marriage in increasing the 
incidence of pre marital relations.
15 8As Leslie points out, that some boys and girls display signs 
of sexual arousal in childhood and engage in sexual behaviour 
before puberty are facts now widely accepted. A number of studies 
engaged in observing the sexual development of both boys and girls 
have had surprising results as to both the degree of development 
of early adolescents and the number of them involved in intercourse
before marriage or before majority. The studies of Kinsey on
159 160
sexual behaviour of both males and females should be
mentioned here, especially in relation to his observations on sexual
development. The study for males shows that 57% of adults recalled
sex play before adolescence. For females it was shown to be
27% but 14% had reached an orgasm by the age of 13.^^^ Studies
on teenage sex patterns in U nited States shows that among unmarried
girls of the ages of 15 - 19, 18% of the 15 year olds were sexually
experienced and, by the age of 19, the figures rose to over 55%.^^^
164The study of Teper on the patterns of adolescent pregnancy in
Scotland shows that the rate for unmarried pregnancies among
teenagers more than doubled between 1962 and 1974, since when
it has been stable at about 12 births per 1,000 unmarried women
aged 15 - 19. The contribution of teenagers to illegitimate live
births from a ratio of 22 in 1962 reached 36 in 1975, corresponding
to 2,297 births. Nevertheless, as she shows from 10,400 pregnancies
of teenagers in 1975, 73% represent conceptions outside wedlock
and 41% (2,297 births, 1,935 abortions, 39 still births) were
165
unmarried at the time of the outcome of the pregnancy. Of course.
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those numbers are used as indications as to the degree of 
involvement of adolescents in sexual activities since attempts 
to measure the incidents as such have faced substantial problems and 
as yet remain without proper r e s u l t s . A l t h o u g h ,  however, 
we cannot establish the actual involvement of adolescents in 
sex it is submitted - and this includes Scotland and Greece - to be 
s u b s t a n t i a l . W i t h  reference to pre-marital intercourse in 
general, the ratio may be over 95 for men and over 85 for women^^^ 
if sex liberation in recent years and the propensity towards 
marriage are taken into account. These factors are
discussed below but it should be said here that relaxed attitudes 
towards sex, the recognition of sex as a positive pre-requisite 
for a variable marital relationship and the tendency to avoid 
ill-prepared marriages make it more likely for men and women to 
experience sex before marriage.
With such the probability of unmarried persons having sex , the 
negatives emphasized in socio-parental attitudes tend to ignore 
the risk of an illegitimate pregnancy altogether. Parents usually 
adhere to the stereotype of social maturity and close their eyes 
or refuse to accept the idea that their 15 year old child may become 
a parent. Even if they acknowledge such a possibility 
they tend simply to advise their children not to involve themselves 
in pre-marital relationships. At the same time the child experiences 
sexual arousal and as he comes of age this develops into a positive 
natural expression requiring satisfaction. To eliminate such 
feelings is impossible without interfering with nature. And thus 
the task which the parents refuse to perform is to advise the 
child on how to handle problems in its relationship with the other 
sex, how to use contraception and especially as to what is the
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nature of any relationship, and what impact conception would have 
on its future.
Another factor to be taken into consideration is the changing
attitude of the younger generation towards sex and the conflicting
situations that it produces for young partners. Until
recently, sex was undesirable because of its association with
child bearing and child rearing. In parallel,patterns of
feminine socialisation until the recent past have tended to exacerbate
this situation by preparing the woman almost solely for the wife-mother
role.^^" Since then women have started to gain control over
their fertility and to become involved in social life in ways which
led to newly emerged norms of sexual behaviour. The watershed
is usually regarded as the mid sixties which show a dramatic
increase in intercourse among unmarried persons as a result of
what Hartley^^^ describes as the consequence of the combination
of ethos of individualism, the welfare state, and a mass society
subjected to 'ceaseless sex bombardment'. Liberal changes in
public attitudes towards sex are regarded as the most significant
characteristic of this period, which firstly with reference to the
marital life and secondly with reference to the individual gains
the position of a natural pleasure in which everybody is entitled 
17 1to indulge. Sex education started to feature first with the
media communication and gradually became acceptable as a subject 
to be taught in schools. In addition, as the age of first 
marriage fell, teenagers started to be mixed with their sexually 
experienced peers. This situation perhaps persuaded many young 
people to subdue to a lesser degree their interest in sex, being 
Consequent upon the younger generation's propensity to accept 
the adult generation's definition of sex as pleasurable and enjoy-
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able and to take the view that such pleasures are as applicable to
172the young as they are to the adults.”
b.6 The invasion of sex into social life occurred nevertheless with
remnants of double standards of sexual morality still prevailing. 
Approved intercourse remained restricted to the marital bed and as 
a result society has not yet fully accepted the need for unmarried 
people, i.e. adolescents to have access to contraceptives. This 
increases the risk of conception and probably is one of the main 
reasons for the recent increase in teenage pregnancies. Contra­
ceptive techniques require preparation which creates a conflict since 
the unmarried teenager is not supposed to have intercourse and 
nevertheless he or she has to anticipate the sexual act with some
preparation if the risk of becoming an illegitimate parent is to 
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be avoided. This means that he or she must acknowledge in advance that 
intercourse may take place and admit to it him or herself or to 
someone else who can give proper advice about contraception. Imagining 
now, a young woman in this position, it is easy to assess what 
degree of responsibility she has for not having been prepared for 
the worst. She probably would have to tell her red-faced parent (s)
that she is likely to be at "immoral risk", in order to receive 
any advice. If not the parent, at the best, she may have to have 
the taunting smile, or the puritan aversion of the doctor or the 
chemist to whom she goes for contraception.
The propensity towards marriage and the high standards of the marital 
relationship have not been without impact on relationship norms 
and premarital sexual behaviour. Today, there is an inclination 
among people to consider it unwise to enter the institution of marriage 
without being assured that the relationship will be a viable one.
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The risks anticipated for an unbalanced relationship are not
unreal and have frequently been of paramount concern, i.e. in
174
relation to teenage marriages. Eekelaar refers to the works 
175
of Goode, on the personal histories of 425 divorcee women, of
1V6 177 178
Locke of Burgess and Cottrell and of Terman and makes
the following points on the implications of pre-marital acquaintance
for the success of marriage. Short acquaintance is far more likely
to lead to an unsuccessful marriage than a longer one. Goode's
results show that 70 per cent of the divorcees were engaged less
than six months which supports Locke's earlier results. On the
other hand, Burgess and Cottrell, and Terman showed from random
samples of happily married couples that a far lower percentage had
been engaged for periods of less than three months. Of course,
as Eekdcar points out in respect of those observations, there is
no such thing as an optimum period and everything seems to depend
upon the degree of acquaintance that the partners obtain of each
other. The same author refers to the relatively high degree of
risk if marriage took place under any kind of pressure, e.g. that
of pregnancy. Investigations on the matter shows double risk if
the conception of the child led to the case of a 'shot-gun'
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marriage.
Hence the marked tendency in society today to proceed to term with 
premarital relationships to avoid hasty, ill-prepared marriages, 
has influenced a change of norms and attitudes on the matter. Since
both partners are going to live on equal terms, it is recognised that 
they have the need to assess their character compatibility. Never­
theless, due to the important role of sex in the marital relationship 
an ability to perform skilfully and knowledgeably during intercourse 
has been recognised as a pre-requisite for sexual compatibility.
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in ihese circumstances, it is perhaps not surprising that more and 
more unmarried people are tempted to exploit any aspect of life with 
their partner and obtain as much knowledge as possible about how life 
will be with him or her.^^^
The increase in pre-marital relations has been frequently regarded
as indicating a teenage promiscuity and irresponsible behaviour.
This stereotype is mainly supported on evidence which shows an
increasing incident of intercourse among teenagers and an increasing
rate of illegitimacy. The image conveyed on the other hand by
Kantner and Zelnik^^^ from evidence received in the United States
is that of young girls involved in serious heterosexual relationships.
Half of the girls in the sample said that they had intercourse with
the man they expected to marry and they participated in intercourse
very rarely. 25 per cent of the experienced girls had intercourse
only once or twice and at the time of interview nearly half of the
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girls had not had intercourse for a month. Leslie , upon evidence 
received in 1976, finds girls to be generally unprepared to respond 
to a heterosexual relationship either by being quite ignorant of 
reproduction or by making ineffective use of contraception. Almost 
three quarters had never used contraceptives or used them only 
occasionally and over 65 per cent were unable to answer multiple 
choice questions about the time of greater pregnancy risks. The 
risk of them becoming pregnant, therefore, is obvious. Hence, it may
be argued, the increase in the role of pregnancies among
 ^ 183adolescents.
b. 7 The adjustment of public opinion to those changes in unmarried life 
is slow and, as has been said, dominated by double standards. Sex 
outside marriage remains wrong according to the dominant value
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system and therefore its protection is defective. A more lenient view 
of premarital intercourse and the illegitimacy thereby created, 
emerged as it became explicit that the individual could not be 
entirely responsible for behaviour, the roots of which are inherent 
in human nature and the consequences of which are the outcome of 
social indifference towards the problems of certain sections of the 
population. However, the change is in line with the traditional con­
cept that pre-marital intercourse goes with the mutual intention to
183a
marry and occurs when marriage appeared clearly ahead. If marriage
then did not take place and the child was born illegitimate this was
understood to be a bare accident or misfortune deserving society's 
184
sympathy, which lessened the desire to punish the incident.
Gill^^^ however, finds a class dichotomy in attitudes towards the
mother and her child. Middle and upper class parents resist the
temptation to punish their daughter for her behaviour and prefer to
come to terms with illegitimacy than to force her to legitimate
her position in a hasty marriage. Nevertheless they bring more
pressure on her to release the child for adoption. Lower class
parents on the other hand have a more lenient attitude and although
the unmarried mother will certainly be rebuked, the overall reaction
to her situation is to consider her unlucky. F requently then,
they accept her and the child into the family. This difference may
not be irrelevant to the limited effect that the middle class
value system has upon lower social groups. An important observation
on the other hand made by Christensen^^^ concerning the labelling
of illegitimacy reveals the difference between the success rate
of marriage with pregnant brides and those without them to be less
in a society which attaches less stigma to illegitimacy and extra-
187
marital sexual behaviour. Eekelaar commenting upon this.
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envisages it as a normal expectation since the pressure upon 
unsuited partners to marry in order to "throw the cloak of 
respectability over their pre-marital behaviour" will be less in 
such a society. Such realism, it is submitted is dominant in the 
attitude of younger generation to illegitimacy. in line with their 
desire to make life more realistic they stigmatise less the immorality 
of extra marital intercourse and confine their attention to the 
risk in which the mother involves herself, given the probability 
of conception. This emerges clearly from concern that the relation 
with the father is not legally secured and even if established, 
provides an incomplete status, which may turn out to involve problems 
if he proves to be indifferent towards her and the child.
Within this tendency it is clear that there is a distinction made 
between the quality of the act that the person commits and the 
consequence of the application of the legal rules and sanctions which 
society applies to it. The act in itself is largely accepted by 
that group and they express concern about the situation in which the 
mother and the child may find themselves due to the definition that 
society gives to their position and to the restrictions of resources 
attached to that status. Nevertheless, a clear cut line is explicit 
in the attitude of the younger generation which distinguishes between 
relations with the other sex - tending to accept them as normal - 
and the task of parenthood in respect of which they demonstrate an 
increasing sense of responsibility.
Such approach reflects social realities if one takes into
account that the attitudes of natural fathers in recent years
disprove the stereotype of irresponsibility attached to them, by
showing a growing desire to assert their parental claims over the 
189child. In both countries this desire finds an outlet in
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legislation currently in force empowering the father to claim
custody or prevent his alienation from the child in adoption. The
necessity of such legislation is well confirmed by recent studies
which show that among single parent units the developments in
terms of care arrangements for illegitimate children were from
190fatherlessness rather than towards it. The cycle of familial
claims, however, is not yet complete and probably there is a 
necessity to facilitate their fulfilment, given no basis for dis­
crimination exists. The problems of one parent families stem 
in part from the expectation of others as to what is normal 
family.
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Kriesberg is quite firm in his view that the problems of
single households "are not inherent in that family structure"
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which supports Sprey's earlier assertion that "the absence of
the father can be aggravated, decreased or neutralized due to the 
effects of other conditions such as the availability of funds, 
relatives and community services." Not unjustifiably, therefore 
some quarters concerned with women's rights opposed the option of 
removing the status of illegitimacy altogether as coming "when 
for the first time, a few women are in a position to have children 
alone without poverty or dependence and to take over the functions 
of a marriage - to give children material support and a tolerable
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place in society which does not rely on the patriarchal family."
The belief that the problems derive from anachronistic attitudes and
policies, many of them flowing from a misunderstanding of the ways
194in which the family system changes, is also expressed by Chester 
when observing the impacts of English divorce law in the context 
of European trends. In the light of those observations, it is 
obvious that current attitudes towards illegitimacy, although
138
liberated from a punitive approach and rather sympathetic, leave out
of consideration the impact of the norms attached to policy in
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the development of the problems. As Lambert and Streather 
point out "society is not usually prepared to accept that it can 
actually cause the problems through, for example, stigma, legal 
disabilities and poverty. Rather the causes are attributed to the 
person, who is regarded as problematic, and it is thought that 
there would be no problem if there was no deviation". Perhaps 
this point needs particular attention in our approach to the problem 
since it changes entirely the context and perspectives that must define 
future legal policy.
In conclusion to the above discussion, what became explicit was the need 
to take illegitimacy for what it really is : the product of forces
inherent in human nature which develop consequent upon the current 
social conditions. Accordingly, the function of the law by 
definition is limited. Legal discrimination is still in force 
demonstrating gross ignorance of the background conditions of extra­
marital conceptions and gross negligence in relation to the problems 
created for the mother and her child. The remnants of the old 
punitive approach aiming to protect society against the child instead 
of protecting the child against society are still reflected in the law 
under the face of a sympathetic indifference. Certain points, however, 
arising from the above discussion prove that even this legal 
indifference is no longer justifiable.
Statistical data in both countries confirm the universal pattern that 
the rate of illegitimacy in periods of social stability represents 
a small proportion of births and fluctuates in accordance with 
the population and the general fertility, whatever the legal
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consequences and social attitudes are. Exceptions have been 
recorded only in periods of crises, major social changes, social 
unrest or wars, to settle down as soon as the disturbance has 
passed.
Since marriage is a well settled institution in social opinion
to try to bolster it further seems unnecessary. The majority
of people want to and do get married, with a very tiny minority
t
rejecting it in principle. So far, however, as the latjdr base their 
opinion on socio-philosophical considerations, it seems unrealistic 
for society to expect them to change their opinions by imposing 
severe consequences on illegitimacy. Given the propensity towards 
marriage, the formation of a legal family is in the mainstream of 
the life of people. Therefore, the low ratio of illegitimacy and its 
minimal fluctuations in periods of social stability must be 
understood as a homogeneous inclination towards the family formed 
by marriage, rather than the consequence of any effective deterrence 
by the law.
Almost every person has involved himself in pre-marital relationships 
and among these intercourse has taken place at a rate of about 
90 per centr also, a great proportion of married persons have 
committed adultery at a certain stage of their life. The surprising 
low rate of illegitimacy demonstrates that there is no real danger 
for the socialization of children within the family and real social 
concern for the child to live in a two-parent stable family.
Illegitimate conceptions are largely the product of relationships 
anticipated to be necessary for the institution of marriage. Even 
when such a relationship does not constitute a ’trial period' for
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the partners, the higher standards in the relationship with the other 
sex and the position of sexual intercourse in the life of the individual 
make casual encounters inevitable. To anticipate that the low 
illegitimate reproduction rate is the result of legal deterrence 
on sexual behaviour is rather ambivalent, with parallel use of both 
contraceptive methods and abortion. An unwanted pregnancy can now 
be avoided so that it seems improbable that such fears still 
influence sexual behaviour to any substantial extent.
The age most affected is that of adolescence and early adulthood 
where people are more likely to become involved in those experiences 
unprepared. The double standard of social morality has the most 
adverse consequence upon them since they may be more sensitive to 
the social norms and at the same time feel the need for a 
partnership. An adult without difficulty in such situation will 
give weight to the second whereas the younger and more innocent will 
try to compromise between the two which in a number of cases will 
result in a pregnancy.
While complete extra-marital relations increasingly become part of 
life inadequate consideration is given to the prevention of pregnancies. 
Social opinion, despite the law and its position against the products 
of extra-marital relationships, increasingly gives more credit to 
them and understands them as involving principles and elements that 
are respectable and useful for the future of marriage. U nsanctioned 
unions therefore have become the natural precursor of a first 
marriage or are used as a trial period between a first and second 
marriage, so that to try to control them is unrealistic. With 
the dominant values still reflecting, however, restriction on 
intercourse to the marital bed, contraception has not been
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seriously taken amongst the matters that must concern the social 
policy. However, with adolescents invading the area of sex,which 
needs skilful preparation, the lack of positive policy on contra­
ception has crucial implications for our society.
Due to the social awareness of the difficulties in parental roles
and the concern for the child to be brought up in a secure family,
an illegitimate pregnancy is rarely a wanted pregnancy. Unless
the concern for society is satisfied,the individual will be
reluctant to become involved with child rearing. On the other
hand current social conditions are permissible to unsanctioned
intercourse, while the conception occurs during an act of considerable
pleasure constituting a natural expression of emotional feeling.
The essential contradiction of the legal norms given these conflicting
objectives is only too apparent. What the legal discrimination in
this context really aims at is for "ordinary citizens to preface their
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... intercourse with a study of recondite rules of family law", 
to think of ardto anticipate the consequences and to use contraception 
or preferably to abstain from sexual activities. This is expected 
to be achieved under circumstances of emotional excitement, mutual 
attraction and probably at that stage of the persons' lives when 
they exchange promises of marriage or may be completely unaware of 
the possibility and the implications of a conception. Probably 
it may be expected that the more mature of them will use contraception, 
though this is by no means absolute since the parties may become 
intimate after having alcohol or in a place where contraceptives are 
not available. The younger and more inexperienced, however, 
are more likely to be at risk. Given, on the other hand, that the 
individual is inclined to consider reproduction when the conditions 
have matured, we have to accept that such pregnancies are mostly
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accidental occurrences without any intention to expose a child
to the risk of illegitimacy. Nevertheless it is difficult
to establish an element of deviance from social norms because the
persons concerned may be disposed favourably towards marriage
and due to unexpected complications fail to legitimate their
relationship. Equally, however, the parents may have formed a
stable cohabitation or either or both of them be living a promiscuous
life. As a consequence a child is born. For the former, the legal
discrimination at that time is of little significance. For the
latter, indeed there is a paradoxically romantic misconception of
the deterrence argument, since it is totally illogical to expect
to rehabilitate the irresponsible parent by not imposing
responsibilities for his child on him. However, apart from the
case of the irresponsible man who had intercourse with the mother abusing
her in a moment of weakness, pregnancy may result from a crime
committed against the mother (like rape, seduction, etc.) and in this
case we are faced with the incidents mostly expected in the
present social context.
d. The role of the law.
In the field of illegitimacy it is perhaps even more obvious than
elsewhere that it is impossible to model real life in strict accordance
with abstract ideals by applying legal rules. The role of the law
therefore, must be regarded as much more modest, although law is
undoubtedly by no means unimportant for the development of family
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life in general. Indeed as Eekelaar points out protection must 
be available when the family environment threatens harm to any of 
its members. Individuals also are at risk when a family unit 
disintegrates. "If the law cannot prevent this, it can assist in 
the adjustment which individuals must face". Given that those must
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be the minimal tasks, he envisages the functions of modern family 
law to be "protective and adjustive". By definition, therefore, 
legal discrimination is becoming infelicitous.
Marriage will continue to prevail in social life as a norm of 
well balanced partnership within which the education and care of 
the children would produce the most satisfactory results. The 
existence of this pattern, however, should not preclude the 
possibility of a comprehensive relationship being constituted with 
the parents where a marriage does not exist. On the contrary, 
it must direct ufe to finding a remedy which resembles most closely 
the charactéristits provided in marital situations .
The existing alternatives of legitimatation per subseguens matrimonium,
adoption, fostering and step-parenthood, despite overwhelming
support by the state, prove inadequate to absorb-all illegitimate
children or to remedy the cases where the natural mother is
determined to keep her child. Frequently it is asserted that this
is impossible since the natural fathers usually prove to be
indifferent. In addition, the appearance of extortionate litigations
against persons irrelevant to the child's conception has further
198obstructed the enactment of favourable solutions in this area.
However, the most important factor in there not being significant
198a
progress in this area is the lack of public interest.
So far the duty of the law has been to keep the father from any 
real involvement in the life of his natural child. Besides the need 
to link the child with his father has remained outwith the scope of 
provisions concerning public order. Instead it has always been left 
to the discretion of the individual, who has been motivated for 
personal considerations to bring a paternity action. And even this
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has always been regarded with some circumspection since the 
paternity of the child was considered as a matter of legal 
uncertainty.
The need for express public concern for the relationship with
the parents is probably the area where the law has not yet
experimented. Although it has never been acknowledged by
society that in illegitimacy, like in legitimacy, there is a certain
interest in linking legally the parents with the child, that concern
199is widely expressed by recent commentators. By placing the
rights of the child as foremost in importance, they confine their 
attention to the possibility of enforcing legally a parent-child 
relationship independent of the legal formality in the relationship 
of the parents. As regards the uncertainty of paternity it is 
submitted that that concern may be largely satisfied today with 
advanced methods of blood typing and other scientific safeguards. 
Evidence of cohabitation has shown that this is possible to achieve. 
The same seems to be suggested from evidence obtained from divorced 
parents, the majority of whom show an unaltered concern for their 
children after the dissolution of marriage. Equally it could 
benefit marriage in the sense of democratizing t further since its 
inception would be exclusively <a concern of the partners. Mdition- 
aily , it will eliminate irresponsibility and perhaps to an extent will 
deter some people from not legitimating their relationship to avoid 
the burden of the child since this will no longer make any difference. 
More important, however, in terms of social order, this accroach will 
eliminate the anomalous situations of parentless or deprived 
children so frequent in our society, since parenthood would be 
established in any possible case and the parents would be primarily 
responsible for its needs. This is expected to have a certain
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impact on welfare services since such a process would remove 
some of the burden from them, and therefore they could become more 
effective and improve their standards. Of course, such 
improvements would not extinguish the problem of one parent 
households nor remove the social stigma altogether. It will take 
time for society to adjust in these situations. However, it is 
important for the law to aid and to come to terms with such 
families to protect the child and ensure its wellbeing to the 
greatest possible extent.
7 I. THE STEPS P ORWARD
a. International trends towards illegitimacy.
Many countries have already achieved substantial equality between
legitimate and illegitimate children while others are moving in the
same direction. The country which sets the pace of what is today
regarded as desirable by many civilised countries is most probably
Norway, where early in this century (1915), the child's rights in
relation to both parents ceased to be dependent on the formality
of their relationship. Yet, the rate of births outside wedlock in
that country runs as low as 5 per cent while in the neighbouring
Sweden which retained discrimination until recently, the ratio reached
peaks of 20 per cent.^^^ The law of Arizona was changed to the same
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effect in 1921 and that of Oregon in 1957. New Zealand and all
Australian States, except Western Australia have recently passed 
similar legislation. Particularly Section 3(1) of the Status of 
Children Act 1969 of New Zealand is today recognised as the guiding 
spirit for reform. This section reads as follows:
'E or all purposes of the law of New Zealand the relationship 
between every person and his father and mother shall be 
determined irrespective of whether the father and mother are
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or have been married to each other, and all other 
relationships shall be determined accordingly
France in 1972 enacted a new article in the Code Civil which,
in general, provides that the illegitimate child has the same rights
202
and the same duties as the legitimate child. Similar reform
203was effected in West Germany with the reform of the B.G.B. by the
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N.E.G., and in Portugal. The Austrian parliament enacted a
law in 1970 that gave children substantial equality, with exceptions
205
in the area of inheritance. Since 1968 in the U.S.S. R. the
illegitimate child has had full legal equality under Soviet law;^^^
and the same has been achieved constitutionally by a number of other
207Eastern European countries. In some Latin American countries,
equality has also been achieved through constitutional reform?^^
In particular, Panama's Constitution of 1946 as amended in 1961
provides : "Parents have the same duties with respect to their children
born out of wedlock as towards their children born in wedlock. All
children are equal before the law and they have the same rights of
209
inheritance in intestate succession". Also Uruguay's Constitution
of 1967 contains the provision that : "Parents have the same duties
towards children born outside of wedlock as towards children born 
210
within it".
In Ontario, Canada, a law was passed in respect of the status of 
children in 1978, equalizing the status of illegitimacy with that 
of legitimacy. Reports prepared for four other Canadian Provinces 
recommended abolition of the status of illegitimacy. The report 
concerning the Province of Quebec was published in 1977 and suggested 
reform of the entire Civil Code. In respect of the establishment of 
the parent-child relationship, the report suggested the introduction of
the concept of filiation. For facilitating the proof of paternal
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filiation it retained the presumption of paternity against the mother's 
husband on the basis of birth instead of conception in wedlock. A similar 
presumption is proposed for de facto unions against the man cohabiting with 
the m o t h e r . A  report also favourable to the abolition of any distinction 
between legitimate and illegitimate children was published by the English Law 
commission in 1979.^^^^ The two last mentioned reports, since they are recent 
and one concerns a civil law system while the other a common law, have been 
frequently used as a source of reference in this study.
The trend towards equalisation of the status of children has also been 
facilitated by the Cbuncil of Europe which in its convention of 1975 on the 
legal status of children born out of wedlock suggested that the legal position 
of such children be assimilated to that of legitimacy.
b. Proposals for the two countries
Opinions of jurists and proposals for future reform in each country differs
diametrically: in Scotland there is a strong movement towards the abolition
of illegitimacy altogether, which started with the p^dposals of the Russell
211
Cbmmittee on the Law of Succession. The major premise of the report published
by them states that "Whatever may be said of the parents, the bastard is innocent
of any wrongdoing. To allot him an inferior, or indeed unrecognised, status in
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succession is to punish him for a wrong of which he was not guilty". This
attack on the succession rights was a most effective one, since it struck at the
213
main stronghold of discrimination. Thus, M.E. Meston(1966) with reference to
this Report observes that the law of succession as it stands as " -archaisms
completely inadequate for modern conditions" and "it is with great pleasure,
therefore, that one can welcome the prospect of further improvements ..." on the
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basis of this report. Moreover, E. dive (1979) assessing the current 
situation points that "the remaining legal differences are comparatively unimport- 
and and it would not be a major legal step to sweep them away altogether. Never­
theless, the fact that legal differences are now slight does not mean that there 
is no problem. The very existence of the separate status of illegitimacy is in 
itself a blot on our society and our legal system. Only by removing all remaining
148
legal difference can we get rid of illegitimacy as a legal concept."
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In the same fashion, Fiona St g art reports that due to minimal differences 
between children, especially in cohabitational circumstances "reform is
clearly overdue ... since it is unfair to penalise the child merely by reason
of the circumstances into which he is born". ALso the Scottish Law Commission
in its memorandum on a l i m e n t ^ h a s  proposed that the alimentary obligation 
of the parent towards his illegitimate child should be the same as that 
towards a legitimate child. Nevertheless, the COmmision has the entire law
on illegitimacy under review and its report is expected.
In Greece the gap between legitimate and illegitimate status remains even 
greater due to the innate disfcir^ion between voluntarily affiliated (and the 
so assimilated) children and those for whom paternity has been judicially 
established. Although the former category enjoys a status almost similar to 
that of the legitimate child the second is supplied only with a limited
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right for support, a distinction deplored today by many Greek scholars.
The latter propose a uniform status for every child for whom paternity has
been established, equal to the one existing for the voluntarily affiliated 
218
child. This proposal, however, is not included in the draft submitted
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by the Gazi Cbmmittee. Removing the concept of illegitimacy altogether
is still out of consideration, although the differences between legitimate
and voluntarily affiliated children are minor and there would be no real
problems in sweeping them away. In fact, it is still argued in Greece
that the removal of all the differences between children will involve
220risk to the legal family. Gazis considers the assimilation possible
of illegitimate children to legitimate only when the father has no other
issue. He assets that the assimilation of the two classes of children
brings friction to the legal family, a danger which does not exist for
221the family of a childless father. However, this opinion has to be
rejected for various reasons. Namely, the idea introduces a 
discriminatory distinction between illegitimates
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per se; it re-instates the old-fashioned formula of childlessness
222
which has received much criticism in relation to adoption;
223for such cases there is the ready formula of judicial legitimation;
and finally, the children which will be mostly affected by this
formula are the adulterines which already suffer considerable
224discrimination under Greek law.
F rom the above review of these modern trends it can be seen that 
many countries have achieved equality and that others are tending 
to do so. At the same time, in Scotland there is strong support 
for removing the distinctions, while in Greece, although the 
need to improve the status is recognised, there is still vacillation 
as to whether this should be carried out to the same extent. This 
position is unjustifiable as much on account of the current trends 
in the country as to its legal tradition and its consistency on the 
status of illegitimate children. It was always the law of Greece 
that a child born out of wedlock should be legitimate for the maternal 
line, and, if voluntarily acknowledged or completely judicially 
affiliated, would enjoy the status of a legitimate child in relation 
to the father with only minor restrictions in succession rights and 
guardianship. Therefore, the step forward is a small one and it 
would be a major improvement if the distinctions were removed.
c. The models for reform.
The field of choice in this area contains two principal approaches 
i. abolition of the discriminatory legal consequences of illegitimacy 
by making selective reform in the relevant areas of the law; and 
ii. the radical approach of abolition of the status of illegitimacy 
and all its consequences and placement of the children under a 
uniform law.
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These models are represented in the views of the English Law
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Commission in its working paper on illegitimacy, and since it is
considered as the most current and comprehensive legal work for 
reform on illegitimacy the two models will be discussed in line with 
the Commission^ views on the problem.
(a) Abolition of the adverse consequences of illegitimacy.
According to this model the concepts of legitimacy and illegitimacy
are preserved, but certain steps are taken to remove by reform
the practical and procedural consequences of illegitimacy. In the
view of the Commission this would involve abolition of the
affiliation proceedings and the child would be given a legal
right for support from both of his parents; also he would be
226
capable of succeeding on intestancy as a legitimate child.
Furthermore, the model-■'envisages a selective reform which may be
regarded by many as advantageous in refusing to remove all
discrimination against the natural father. The correctness of
such an approach is further supported by arguing that because of
the wide range of possible factual relationships between the father
on the one hand, and the mother and the child on the other,
it is necessary to restrict certain rights that would extensively
involve the father in the child's life. Thus, if the father
wishes to participate in the child's upbringing, the court, on
account of his welfare, could make the appropriate order. But
if the father has nothing to offer, it would on this view, be wrong
227
to give him rights. For such cases there is a reference
in the paper to the rapist or the father who became so after a
casual encounter with the mother; and it is asserted that
for those parents to be supplied prima facie with rights may
involve risk to the child until such time as the mother initiates 
228proceedings to exclude him. However, as the Commission
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admits, those arguments could not have any real Significance, 
since in practice, such a father would not seek to exercise rights. 
But in the case where he did, the court is bound to override
229
his rights if to do so would be in the child’s best interests.
Obviously, this answer is not entirely satisfactory because
the necessity of taking legal proceedings to divest the father of
his rights may in itself be distressing to the mother - so
much so that it could, for example, affect her decision about placing
the child for adoption, if the result were that the father had
to be made a party to the proceedings. Also, it would be
necessary for the mother to take legal proceedings if she wanted
to secure herself and the child against the risk of intervention
by the father.
However, those arguments have to be balanced against the 
difficulties that may arise in giving a statutory definition 
to the classes of fathers entitled to parental rights. And if 
such a step is taken, a similar rule should apply for specific 
categories of mothers, otherwise such exclusion would 
be arbitrary and unjust. Moreover, statutory exclusion of 
specific fathers may produce unsatisfactory results in particular 
cases. To take, for instance, the father who became so after 
a casual encounter with the mother - nothing precludes his 
showing a genuine interest in the child, notwithstanding the 
fact that he is indifferent towards the mother. Also nothing 
precludes his desire to cooperate with her in the administration 
of the child's affairs. On the other hand, by excluding him,
the protection offered benefits mote the mother who will be able 
to cover up the incident. By this, however, we return to the 
old-fashioned ideas that illegitimacy is a disgrace and
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that intercourse should take place only between married persons.
Nevertheless, the Commission considers possible the imposition
of certain restrictions in relation to the adoption of the child
in specific cases, notwithstanding that this will take effect
by a court order. Also in relation to the birth registration,
if the father wants to enter his name against the mother's
wishes, he should be entitled to do so only if a court order has been
issued upon his request recognising him to be father, or if
he has been ordered to pay maintenance. This, it is believed
will exclude indirectly the father who is without any actual
link with the child. F inally, the Commission considers the
exclusion of the donor df an A.I.D. child in favour of the mother's
. ^  ^ 230husband.
(b) Abolition of the status of illegitimacy.
"It may be" states the Commission "that the biggest discrimination
suffered by a person born out of wedlock is the legal
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characterization of him as illegitimate"; and it seems that
this characterization has survived despite the multilateral 
pressure for rights for illegitimate children. Actually, 
although reform has frequently been initiated against the 
inferiority of the status, the concept of illegitimacy in itself 
rarely became the subject of a reformatory movement. Moreover, 
although discrimination terms of patentai rights has been much 
diminished, the legal charactization of a child as illegitimate 
has preserved its original humiliating form. Accordingly, the 
concept of illegitimacy along with its consequences constitutes the 
second model for reform under consideration by the Commission.
It aspires, beyond the mere assimilation of children, to
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remove the "caste labels which help artificially to preserve
232the social stigma attached to illegitimacy".
In the view of the Commission, "Such change would help to 
improve the position of children born out of wedlock in a way 
in which the mere removal of the remaining legal disabilities 
attached to illegitimacy would not. No change in the law relating 
to illegitimacy would help to improve the economic position of 
a child born out of wedlock insofar as he suffers from being 
the child of a "one-parent family; but an illegitimate child 
suffers a special disadvantage which does not affect the child of 
a widow or divorcee. He has a different status, even if the 
incidents of that status do not differ greatly from those attached 
to the status of a legitimate child; attention is thus
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focussed on the relevancy of the parents' marital status".
Thus, they suggest that the law can help to lessen social 
prejudices by anticipating that the parents' relationship is 
irrelevant to the child's legal position. This view is 
supported by the argument that whatever changes occur, they may 
still fail to secure to the desired extent a normal family unit, 
or to secure support, since the father may not be in a good 
financial position, but at least, it removes "the additional 
hardship of attaching an opprobious description" to the 
child.
In respect of the abolition of the distinction, both parents 
would have equal parental rights and duties unless and until a 
court ordered otherwise. As to the risk involved prior to 
divesting the unsuitable parent of rights, this risk does not 
arise only in relation to children born out of wedlock, and ,
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therefore, should not be allowed to govern the issue. Further^ 
more, probably in most cases the father's position should be 
recognised because he will be making a contribution to the 
child's upbringing either compulsorily or voluntarily.
F urther advantages of this model - apart from removing the
stigmatization - is that it automatically recognises situations
of fact and prevents the mother from taking the decision alone as
to whether the father should have further involvement in the
child's life. The decision shbuld not be entrusted to the
mother alone but should lie within the discretion of the courts,
which are bound to regard the welfare of the child as of first
235
and paramount consideration. An additional reason in favour
of this model is that if the concept of illegitimacy is to be 
retained - as the first model perceives - this necessarily will 
prevent major reform. Namely, if the concept will continue to 
signify the particular class of children, obviously it will 
preserve its present context.
F rom a jurisprudential point of view it will be inconsistent to 
carry out extensive beneficial reform in favour of a class of 
children whose existence at least officially is socially deplored. 
Therefore, having in mind that as a matter of fact those 
situations would need more attention than that of the two 
parent family, at present the most that the law could do would 
be to assimilate legally the two classes on the grounds of equity. 
Any special attention shown beyond that point would strike 
against its dominant values of the law.
In view of the above considerations, the prima facie inference
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is that the additional advantages of removing the concept 
altogether outweigh the disadvantages of giving all fathers 
parental rights. Thus, the abolition of the concept of 
illegitimacy is to be preferred against the approach of 
reforming the disabilities. Hence, there would be no legal 
distinction between the children born to parents who are married 
and those born to unmarried parents. Therefore, the law 
applicable to legitimate children would apply to all children and 
the court would have the discrétion to resolve disputes on 
account of the welfare of the child.
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C H A P T E R  T H R E E
THE ESTABLISHMENT CF PATERNITY
INTRO# CTION
In the present law of the two countries there is no legal concept for 
illegitimate children from which the inference of paternity can be 
drawn. Illegitimate paternity is a matter which cannot be directly 
adduced by any evidence or legal presumption so as to bind the child 
ab initio to its natural father. Thus, prior to formal establishment 
of paternity, the child lacks any legal links with his natural father
and is deemed as no-one's natural offspring.
The paternity of such a child in either jurisdiction is open to admission
or ascertainment according to appropriate legal proceedings. Normally,
under Scots law, this takes effect by an action for affiliation and aliment
notwithstanding that situations of fact enjoy considerable recognition
for specific purposes. Thus, if the father voluntarily undertakes the
obligation of sharing the maintenance of the child with the mother, the
court has to take into account his wishes with regard to the adoption of
the child, his opinion on the child's custody and his intentions, before
2
relinquishing parental rights on behalf of an adoption agency. Such
obligation, on the other hand, is never enforceable in itself andfin
a case of discontinuation of payments, the mother has to bring an action 
for affiliation and aliment. But a findihg in such action is not clearly 
one that declares a status nor does it operate in rem . The child in 
the eyes of the law remains filius nullius, and the finding of paternity 
made in this action cannot be used to enforce rights other than those 
referred to in the petition.^
1
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In Greek law, the relation with the father may be through an act of
voluntary acknowledgement or by a court order. Both operate in rem
4
declare paternity and recognise a status. A relation, evident otherwise 
than by those acts, is refused recognition. Thus, Where a stable 
cohabitation exists among the parents and where the child had been 
publicly and constantly treated as his natural offspring by the father 
or where the father has admitted paternity, those instances are treated 
as evidence admissible in affiliation proceedings but fail to produce 
a recognition of the relation. Moreover, the weak presumption
of paternity, against a man who was alleged, in criminal proceedings, i.e. 
in an action for abandonment in pregnancy, or rape, to have had intercourse 
with the mother at the time conception, is treated as evidence of
5
paternity without in itself providing a declarator of status for the child.
As regards the status provided after the acknowledgement of paternity, 
this section of Greek law is a field beset with variations. For example, 
if the father has voluntarily acknowledged the child, the act confers on 
the child all the rights and duties of a legitimate child in relation to 
the parent himself, save only some exceptions.^ On the other hand, if 
paternity is judicially established, this provides the child with a right 
to support. Moreover, judicial establishment of paternity may confer 
the results of a voluntary acknowledgement for certain classes of 'not so 
very illegitimate children'. The so-called "complete judicial 
acknowledgement" is provided'in favour of children conceived under 
circumstances where the mother was dependent on the alleged father, being 
engaged to or cohabiting with him, or, if conception is the result of
7
rape, seduction, or abduction, for which the alleged father is responsible.
As to the children who can be affiliated, the methods are open to any 
illegitimate child. An indirect restriction, however, more emphatic in
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Greek law, arising from the exceptio plûrium concubentium may prevent 
establishment of paternity in respect of children born to a promiscuous 
mother. However, this restriction emerges rather from the difficulties of 
proving paternity than by reference to the children themselves. This 
brief review of the situation as it stands today reveals that the 
enforcing cause of rights and duties in illegitimacy is the act of 
acknowledgement.
In accordance with the position taken, however, that the status of 
illegitimacy should be abolished altogether, it is important to ensure 
that the relationship with both parents will be available from the child's 
birth. This is necessary in order to achieve satisfactory equality between 
children born in wedlock and those born to unmarried parents. Therefore 
the basis of the status will be the fact of procreation as it is understood 
by the jus naturale, requiring appropriate legal enforcement.^
In the context of this proposal, the concept of "duty of support" which
governed the formul&tion of the current law would cease to have any
significance and would be replaced by the concept of "parenthood", as
9
it operates for a child born in wedlock. This suggests the formulation
of a presumption similar to that governing births in wedlock, or the 
introduction of a procedure which, in a quick but safe way, would establish 
the relationship with the father.
Therefore, in the first place, the role that the welfare of the child 
could have in the formulation of this procedure will be examined. Secondly, 
the possibility of placing reliance on evidence of primary fact will be 
discussed, together with the possibility of formulating a presumption of 
conception for specific cases. Necessarily such evidence, if any, will
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be examined from a point of view of whether it raises any formal 
assumption to deal with the future of the presumption of legitimacy.
Provided that the results obtained from the discussion on the evidence 
df primary fact are not satisfactory, attention would be directed to 
the present methods available for the establishment of paternity, and 
whether frey can be of help, if suitably recast. In the present system, 
we can distinguish two classes of methods
a. those involving voluntary acknowledgement of paternity and
b. those providing establishment of paternity by a court order.
The former category is of particular importance, since it is expected 
that, under an equal status, many parents would act rationally bv 
voluntarily acknowledging their child. It would be necessary, on the 
other hand, to secure formality in those acts, as well as that they be 
carried out under a non-administrative authority. For the second 
category of methods, which have to be retained for the unfortunate 
situations where there is dispute as to the paternity, or where 
the father refuses to acknowledge the child, there are a nuinber of 
points to be considered. At the outset, due to the importance of 
the matter, it is necessary to consider whether the question should 
be treated as an independent issue, and not simply as an incidental 
issue in proceedings aimed at obtaining some other order, i.e. to 
the jurisdiction of what court should the issue be submitted; who 
should be entitled to seek a finding, or declaration, of paternity 
as such; against whom should the action be directed; what should 
be the time limits for raising such an action; and finally, what 
evidence should be admissible under the new principles.
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P RELIMINA Ry; MATTE RS
I. THE ROLE CF THE WEIF ARE CF THE CHILD IN THE E ORMJ LATION Œ  THE 
PROCE# RE.
The core of the concern of the English law Commission relates to the 
welfare of the child. Inevitably, this principle governs part IX,as 
well, of the Working Paper, where the procedure and evidence for the 
establishment of paternity is discussed. However, notwithstanding that 
no attempt has been made to suggest any statutory exclusion of any class 
of fathers from having automatic entitlement to parental rights, never­
theless the Commission considers it possible to nrevent a father, with a 
"wholly unmeritorious case" (e.g. the rapist)fi-nm compelling registration 
of his name by applying the welfare tests. This is restricted to cases 
where such a father is trying to enter his name by means of a unilateral 
declaration. But when there is an actual link with the child by 
a court order, or when he has demonstrated to h^ie court that it was 
appropriate to make a declaration of parentage, the Commission suggests 
awardina the father an unrestricted right to enter his name.^^
On account of this recommendation the prima facie impression is that the 
Commission fails to draw a border-line between the creative cause of 
the status of the child, on the one hand, and the role of the welfare of 
the child in the administration of the rights arising of that status on the 
other hhnd.^^ Entirely properly the welfare principle inspires the sug­
gested reform of illegitimacy and should continue to govern the 
administration of the rights in the parent-child relationship. However, 
when this concerns the establishment of paternity, there are certain 
reasons for deploring the idea of imposing disqualifying conditions for 
certain classes of fathers. First, according to the distinction made
hbout the "duty of support" and the concept of "parenthood", biological
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truth’becomes the decisive factor in the process. Therefore, complete 
equality between the two classes of children would be fictional if not 
provided in the same manner. For instance, when the presumption of paternity 
is raised for a child born in wedlock it is raised and can be rebutted only 
on evidence of paternity or non paternity. Secondly, unrestricted establish­
ment of biological paternity is an inevitable consequence of the idea of 
equal treatment for both sexes. Since, therefore, maternity cannot be subject 
to a priori limitations, the same should be recognised with regard to the 
relationship with the father. Thirdly, establishment of paternity implies 
a family status so that even when there are objections about the character 
of the father it is not appropriate to prejudice the relationship with paternal 
relatives. On this understanding it is observable that the approach of the 
QCmmission in general, presents one major defect and nevertheless follows a 
resolution dimensionally opposite to that adopted by the two jurisdictions.
F irst the Cbmmission fails to suggest any procedure whereby if paternity 
has not yet been established in respect of the child, for imposing a duty on 
the public authorities within a reasonable time after the child’s birth, to 
seek out the father. Such a duty is already imposed on the public authorities 
in Denmark and Norway and, as fke Malmstrom points out, this type of system 
"is still more favourable for the children". In these countries, it is not 
correct to speak only of admissibility of actions for paternity. The purpose
of the legal rules is to promote, through public assistance, either a recog-
12
nition by the father or an action against him. Instead the Cbmmission
leaves the matter to the discretion of theparents or other persons related to 
the child who may accordingly seek out the establishment of the relation 
subject to the condition that this serves the interests of the child. The 
child himself is supplied with an unqualified r i g h t , w h i c h  is of doubtful 
value, because during its minority it will be dependent on the discretion of 
the guardian and by the time the child has the capacity to exercise the right 
himself, paternity may have lost most of its significance for the child's life.
Second, the welfare principle, as it is known in the two jurisdictions, is
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applicable to the administration of specific rights of the relationship.
As such, it has been the centre of contemporary policies and its content is
considered as being in a state of flux, so that it can be easily readjusted
as the policy changes. As regards the principles which are creative of
a family relationship, on the other hand, the two jurisdictions adhere to the
idea that such principles must be endurable and resistant to changes in
society. Namely, Scots law, though a common law system, at an early stage
based the right to seek out the illegitimate father and the obligation of the
14
father to share the expenses with the mother on the jus naturale, and as
such it has been treated as an inalienable right attributed without distinction
15
to any illegitimate birth. The same is seen in the case of Greek law.
As Lasok observes in relation to voluntary recognition of paternity, which 
can also be considered to cover judicial recognition, if the conferred status 
proves to be of a doubtful value, yet it is open to the law to provide a 
corrective and invest the mother or the appropriate public body with a power 
of opposition. UItimately, the court may decide the issue in accordance 
with the well-known formula of the welfare of the child.
This approach should be preserved because it makes the establishment of 
paternity invulnerable to contemporary policies from which illegitimacy has 
suffered considerably in the past. Moreover, it prevents the facilitating 
of a speculative approach towards paternity, which would per se introduce 
discriminations in illegitimacy. A proper solution, on theother hand, in 
respect to the intended reform, one could find in subsection 1 of Section 3 
of the New Zealand Status of Children Act. This reads "For all 
purposes of the Law of New Zealand, the relationship between every person 
and his father and mother shall be determined irrespective of whether 
the father and mother are or have been married to each other, and all 
other relationships shall be determined accordingly". Ths section has 
been criticised as too widely drafted so that it needs restrictive inter­
pretation to prevent absurdity but nevertheless is considered to assimilate
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the lineage by which a relationship is established. Similarly, the
Report on the Revision of Quebec Civil Gbde envisages recognition of 
paternity the natural alternative where the presumption of paternity does 
not apply. Thus, article 269 of the draft reads "If paternity cannot 
be determined by applying the preceding articles, paternal filiation of 
a child may be established by voluntary acknowledgement of paternity or 
by judgement.
II. EVIDENCE OF PRIMARY FACT
a. The idea of giving credit to facts from which the inference of
19
paternity can be drawn is not an unknown one in either jurisdiction.
Traditionally, the marriage of the mother and the alleged father
subsisting at the child's birth has been placed in a special position
in that it is by itself sufficient - although not conclusive -
20
evidence of the husband's paternity of the child. Also, other
facts from which such inference can be drawn (cohabitation, betrothal 
etc.) is frequently given special evidential value. The problem with 
those facts, however, is that, though they include probability of 
paternity, they do not provide for an express admission nor directly 
prove paternity. F Or example, in. a state of cohabitation or betrothal, 
the parties stand in a situation which legally does not contain the 
intention of giving birth to children. Moreover, when the child was 
conceived in circumstances where the mother was in a state of 
dependence upon the alleged father, or as a result of a sexual offence 
upon her, though such is strong evidence for his paternity, it is never­
theless by no means conclusive. In fact, the reliability of the 
evidence varies as much as the relationship of the natural parents.
Before closing the matter, it is necessary to add a few more words 
about the cohabitation, which, prima facie, provides the more suitable
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conditions for raising a presumption of paternity. As a matter of 
fact, cohabitation is treated by many jurisdictions in the same ways 
as marriage. For instance, in Tasmania, if the parties cohabit 
for twelve months prior to birth, or in Ontario, they were involved 
in "a relationship of some permanence", the child born is prima facie 
treated as that of the man with whom the mother was associated 
Also the Quebec Civil Code as revised in 1977 specifies that the 
"de facto consort of the mother of a child born during the de facto
21
union is presumed to be the father." Similarly, the Greek Civil
Code, in article 1555, provides complete judicial recognition for
the child, if the parents were cohabiting at the time of conception,
on the grounds of a strong presumption that, at the relevant time, the
22
mother was^exclusively having intercourse with the putative father.
However, the problem with those situations, as well as others similar, as
raising a presumption of paternity, e.g. if the man had provided
aliment to the child, is that their probative value varies from case
to case. Namely, cohabitation is by no means self-proving like a
marriage, where there is an indisputable fact from which to start
applying the rules of nature. Moreover, any contribution paid for
the child has some weight only when there is no other reasonable
explanation for the man's act. On the other hand, it is disputable
if further evidential value attacher^ to those facts would make a
real contribution to the law, so far as, unless the contrary is
proven, under the present law the court would reach the natural
23
inference that the man in question is the father. Therefore,
taking into account that the value of "a 'prima facie evidence rule'
24
lies in its general applicability without further evidence", and
the wide range of circumstances that may appear in a conception out 
of wedlock, the construction of a rule inferring paternity of that 
child, without furtheroassistance from the law, is almost impossible.
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Hence, it may be inadvisable to go beyond the present methods 
whereby establishment of paternity is provided by means of 
voluntary or judicial recognition.
b. The rule of article 1555 of the Greek Civil Code
Having concluded that paternity of an illegitimate child should be 
established formally by one of the above mentioned methods the 
question that arises in relation to Greek law is whether other primary 
evidence should continue to signify a finding of paternity. Accord­
ing to article 1555 of the Greek Civil Code if the action is 
raised during the father's life time and the conception took place under 
special circumstances assuming acts of intercourse to have taken
place between the parties, the order would have the results of a
25
voluntary acknowledgement. Th^se as stated in article 1555 are :
(a) conception had to have taken place at a time when the parties
25a 26
were formally engaged. (b) if the mother had been rapéd, abducted
or seduced by dishonest means, and the act constitutes liability of
27
the father according to the provisions of the Penal Code. Physical
violence may not be essential to a finding of liability of the alleged
father, not have mitigating circumstances or mental deficiency or othe^
circumstances rendering the crime unpunishable been regarded as
28preventing the application of the article. It is sufficient to
prove the objective characteristics of the act and the order will have
the results of voluntary acknowledgement. (c) If the alleged father
29 30
and mother were living in concubinage during the period of conception,
the father was appointed guardian of the mother, or had her in his
31custody, or the mother was in any way dependent on him. However,
such facts are by no means conclusive as to the defendent being the 
father and, therefore, should not anticipate further search for the real 
father. Moreover, in accord with the view taken that the finding
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of paternity should have a uniform effect, the rule of article 1555 should 
be repeal^^- On ihe oiher hand, spch facts possess evidential value and 
therefore may continue to be treated as strong evidence in applying 
the presumption of conception.
c. The presumption of legitimacy under the new approach towards
parenthood.
The presumption 'pater est qu.em nuptine demonstrant ' necessarily
involves the question of paternity of the child. In this respect
the presumption is a valuable one and should be preserved as a
presumption of paternity. In fact, the experience gained so far
from its operation within marital situations supports the opinion that
the presumption could continue to determine the paternity of the child
31a
without resulting in arbitrary solutions.
With equality for both classes of children, the presumption would
lose its fascinating importance so that the disposition of both
courts and parents towards the paternity of the child would be more
sincere. However, although the presumption would lose part of its 
importance, as regards the attribution of a distinct status, nonetheless, 
it retains all of its value as regards the creation of the parènt-child 
relationship. This seems to suggest that the presumption of paternity 
must be retained in its present form. However, it may be neccessary 
to alter the standards of proof required to rebut the presumption of birth in 
wedlock, unless the same standards are introduced for the protection 
of paternity of a child born out of wedlock. In New Zealand express 
alteration is not introduced. Section 5 of the Status of Children
Act 1969 presumes the child to be the husband's in the "absence of
evidence to the contrary". In relation to this wording, as Turner
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observes, it is not easy to say whether the quantum of proof has been
changed. The absence of any epithet to characterise the evidence needed
(such as cogent) suggests that a slight degree of existence would
suffice. "But it is possible that the courts will not lightly overturn
the common law, in the absence of clear legislative mandate.
Also in Quebec there is no express alteration though the assumption can
be made that,whatever the quantum of proof, it will apply equally
to both children whose status is established by birth and to those who
32
are established by an act of acknowledgement.
However, in relation to the law of Scotland and Greece what differen­
tiates the proof is thther the policy than the facts behind the 
conception of the child. The presumption of conception enjoys strong 
protection because it is felt to be desirable to maintain the status 
of legitimacy, not because it is always true or because the evidence 
present does not illuminate sufficiently the allegation that the child 
is illegitimate. In turn in the context of equality between children 
what really should continue to differentiate the relationship with 
the parents is that unlike the family formed by marriage, the parents 
of a child born out of wedlock do not constitute an autonomous social 
and legal unit. This for certain would continue to have implications 
in the administration of rights which seems to give weight to arguments 
for not decreasing considerably the quantum of proof needed. A fair 
solution may be to maintain the same proof for bitter case, sufficiently 
strong to protect the status presumed or established for the child, 
focussed on the facts of the case and free of policy considerations.
Prima facie this solution has the advantage thd: it would attribute 
weight to the act of acknowledgement by increasing the awareness of 
the parents as to the nature and implications.lof their declaration.
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This may act as a deterrence against fraudulent declarations. Besides 
contestation of disavowal of paternity may lose its great importance 
by imposing the condition that loss of a designate status cannot 
be successful, unless paternity of another man is sufficiently 
indicated. However, whether these recommendations can be realized 
depends on the authority of the methods of acknowledgement and their 
safeguards.
There is one more point which calls for attention in Scots law, the
distinction between putative and void marriage. For the latter, which
fails to raise the presumption of marriage, a more sensible approach
would be to start considering paternity as that of the 'husband'.
As the Commission explains "The invalidity of the marriage does not
cast doubt on the validity of the assumption that the parties actual
cohabitation is "as husband and wife", and it is accordinglypperfectly
proper to draw the same inference as to the paternity of ahy
33children as would be drawn, if the marriage were valid."
THE METHODS
III. VOUNTARY ACKNOWLEDGEMENT CF PATERNITY
The problems with this method of acknowledgement of paternity arise
from the fact that the father himself invokes the presumption of
conception against him. He performs an act probative for a relationship
Thus the questions that first arise are what credit should the
law give to this act on his part as well as how formal this act must 
34
be. Should he be required to produce some confirmatory evidence,
or should a unilateral declaration by the father be sufficient, 
leaving it to the mother, the child or any interested party to 
contest paternity? Whichever approach is followed, acknowledgement 
must be legally formal and must be carried out in a way which would
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reveal, as far as practicable, a biological truth, so that the
relationship it seeks to establish will enjoy a general recognition.^^
Given the need to provide for a formal instrument, should this be
carried out before an administrative authority in contrast to the more
independent judicial authority or public notaries, knowing that
administrative services are in close relation with contemporary policies
and more vulnerable to influence by the government in power? Also,
if it were necessary for the father to produce evidence, which of the
above bodies could give sufficient guarantees for a competent evaluation
of the evidence produced? Answers to the above questions will
determine whether the act of voluntary acknowledgement provides the
necessary safeguards, so far as to be treated as final and effective
erga omnss. There are two more points to raise before commencing the
discussion of voluntary acknowledgement. To achieve complete
equality with children born in wedlock paternity of the child must
be determined shortly after its birth, notwithstanding that ttis must
be also permitted any time, during the pregnancy. The same is dictated by
the interests of the c h i l d . T h u s ,  the procedure that would be adopted
must be speedy, flexible and readily accessible to resolve the matter
quickly and easily, so that the child will not remain fatherless for
long. Moreover, the father^ who must be encouraged to acknowledge the
37child, should not be hampered by a troublesome procedure. Also in
relation to the need for the child not to remain fatherless for long, 
it may be appropriate to impose time limits within which he must 
acknowledge the child. An additional reason for doing so is that in 
case he refuses to comply, it must be possible to raise the action 
of paternity before the evidence becomes obsolete or loses its value.
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A. VOIUNTARY ACKNOWLEDGEMENT UNDER SCOTS LAW : THE EXISTING BACKGROUND
PROPOSITIONS AND COMMENTS
1. Under Scots law voluntary acknowledgement of paternity as it is
understood by many continental systems - by means of an independent 
instrument executed by the father recognizing a legal relationship 
between him and his illegitimate child - does not exist in any clear 
form.
A sort of voluntary admission of paternity may be implied if the 
father willingly assumed for himself the obligation of contributing 
towards the maintenance of the child, but this has only evidential value. 
Thus if he has not made arrangements for future aliment, even though 
he has admitted paternity, the mother must constitute her claim for 
such by a court decree.
A more strong case of voluntary acknowledgement of paternity is
supplied through the tegistration of the child. The law as it
stands after the Registration of Births, Deaths and Marriages (Scotland)
Act 1965 permits entry of the name of a person as the father of the
child on the joint request of the mother and the person acknowledging
himself to be the father. The person cannot be treated as acknowledging
himself to be the father unless he attends personally at the
registration office with the mother and signs the register, in presence
39of the registrar together with her. In a case where information
is supplied by the mother alone, in order for the registrar to enter
the name of the father the mother must produce a declaration stating
that the said person is the father and a statutory declaration by that
40
person acknowledging himself to be the father. The registrar
cannot register the birth of an illegitimate child on information 
supplied by the father alone nor can he ask for his name to be
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entered in the Regiser of Corrections, unless he applies after 
the death of the mother to the Sheriff within twelve months from 
the birth of the child and the Sheriff orders the Registrar General 
after intimation and inquiry to enter the applicants name. There 
are two more cases where the name of the father may be recorded in 
the Register of Corrections if this has not been done at the 
registration of the child's birth. This can be done if a decree 
of paternity has been granted by a competent court, in which case the 
Clerk of the Court must notify the Registrar General of the import 
of the decree, if there has been no appeal on the expiration of the 
time within which an appeal could have been made, or if there has 
been an appeal, on the conclusion of the appellate proceedings. Second, 
it can be done if a declaration by the mother naming the father and a 
statutory declaration by him made within twelve months of the birth 
acknowledging paternity is produced to the Registrar General.
2. For the similar registration system of England the Law Commission 
asserts it has a built-in procedure for acknowledging paternity in
cases where no presumption can be derived from the mother's married
42
status. Consequently, they suggest that the formal adoption
of an independent instrument by legislation will be superfluous and 
insist on the best solution being to ensure that the registration 
system is sufficiently flexible to enable the evidence of paternity 
to be derived from the registrar. Besides they see an instrument 
recording an agreement between the parties as to the child's paternity
as having an evidential value but not as to be given any special
43
status.
Nevertheless, this form of acknowledgement seems to be an important 
procedure for Scotland since from the 5,968 illegitimate live births
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in 1977 the fathers attended the registration and acknowledged
paternity in just under half of those cases and 110 more signed
44
statutory declarations acknowledging paternity. This, if
compared with the 80 decrees of paternity relating to births
registered in Scotland intimated by Sheriff courts to the registration 
45authorities, this form of acknowledgement seems an important and 
indispensable feature for the Scottish law on illegitimacy. However, 
there are some unsatisfactory points related to this procedure 
calling for further attention•
3. In the first place, it is necessary to recognise this form of
acknowledgement as proof in rem . The background on the subject is
not encouraging at all since tie rather recent proposals of the
46Russell Committee reject this view, and there is an extensive 
judicial practice whereby any acknowledgement of finding on 
paternity is treated as an incidental finding for a specific purpose. 
Namely, as Meston points out in view of that Report, the Russell 
Committee envisages that " ... no form of recognition or acknowledgemeht, 
however formal, should amount to conclusive proof of paternity. This 
is because of the danger of fraudulent declarations, either by a man 
of straw who agrees to play the role of father, or by someone with a 
view to sharing in the bastard's estate on the letter's death.
Equally the majority of the Committee rejects the principle that
47
some form of voluntary recognition should be the only proof of paternity "
As regards the unfavourable practice , this refers to the Sheriff
court practice according to Which, on discontinuation of aliment, it 
requires as a rule the craving of the initial writ to contain an 
express conclusion that the defender is the f a t h e r . T h i s  practice 
has two important effects. First, it re-opens the question of 
paternity even though the father had admitted it and the child is so
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registered, which means that no voluntary acknowledgement of paternity 
sustains itself unless confirmed by a Sheriff's order; and 
second, it opens the question of paternity at immaterial times or even 
unfavourably for the child's interests. However, where the parents 
jointly had registered the child and it appears to the registrar that 
there is something untrue about their declaration one solution could 
be to hand the case to the Sheriff who would resolve the matter.
However, such cases are rare and the proposal gives a judicial power 
to an administrative body. Therefore, it is preferable to suggest 
that unless the declaration appears untrue beyond doubt the registrar 
should enter the name of the "father". As regards the real father or 
party claiming an interest to contest such entry, he could bring an 
action for a declarator of paternity or ncn paternity with the 
ancillary conclusion for putting the defender 'father' to silence.
This offers a more balanced approach since a man would rarely accept 
complete responsibility for a child who is not his offspring. If he 
wants to do so there is the alternative of adoption.
Secondly, the registration of the name of the father exclusively 
depends upon the wishes of the mother. This forms an utilitarian 
approach towards the establishment of paternity unacceptable in the 
formulation of natural relations. The father on the refusal of the 
mother to sign the register with him, is left only with the solution 
to seek out the issue of a declarator of his paternity. , This
alternative is incompatible with the view that the voluntary 
acknowledgement of paternity must be facilitated by an easy and trouble- 
free procedure. Moreover, this option may be used by the mother to 
try to force the father to enter a marriage with her. Therefore, it 
would be preferable if the statute were modified so as to permit 
the Registrar General to accept a statory declaration by the father
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alone. The statutory declaration by the father should be treated as
prima facie evidence of that fact and, at the same time would constitute
proof against the person who made it. On receipt of the declaration
the Registrar General could make a preliminary note in the register
and inform the parties interested if they wished to raise objection
to such an entry. Such note would become final constituting proof in
rem if the mother or hie person exercising parental authority over the
child does not raise any such objection within reasonable time, or
raises but fails to disprove the truthfulness of the declaration. If
an objection were raised the case would be sent to the Sheriff, who,
after intimation and enquiry, would ajudicate upon the paternity of the 
49
child. This is suitable in a legal context since the registration 
of the child is an administrative and not a judicial function, so that 
the registrar could act only on the basis of an unchallenged evidence 
of p a t e r n i t y . I f  the case is handed over to the Sheriff the 
person disputing the paternity would bear the butden of proof. This 
is a more balanced approach bearing in mind that no man will accept 
responsibility for a child unless he believes himself to be the father 
and that it is easier for the mother to prove intercourse with 
another man at the relevant time than for the father to prove intercourse 
with a mother who is unwilling to recognise him as the father of her 
child.
F inally, the procedure fails to provide for acknowledgement of paternity 
in advance. This may be partly satisfied if the man signs a statutory 
declaration in advance and the mother produces it along with her 
declaration to the registrar at the time of registration. Supposing, 
however, that a putative father is due to emigrate and the mother, 
in view of his emigration, is reluctant to declare him as the father 
of her unborn child, intending to place it for adoption or to assume
175
for her self exclusive rights over the child. For such cases it 
seems necessary for a statutory declaration made by the father, to 
be accepted and made effective in advance.
B . V QIU NTARY ACKNOWLEDGEMENT CF THE CHILD IN GREEK LAW
1. The present law.
In Greece acknowledgement made by the father is considered as the
primary method by which an illegitimate child gains status vis a vis
his father while judicial acknowledgement is considered as a comple-
52mentary procedure. It is available to any illegitimate child
52a 53
for which there is not a presumption or acknowledgement of paternity
54 55 56
even if the child is unborn stillborn or adopted.
An acknowledgement typically is declared by a notarial deed but may
57
be accomplished on the testament of the father, and it is
irrevocable^^ Acknowledgement cannot be deduced from the mere mention
of the name of the father on the birth certificate, nor from the mention
of his name in a court's decision if he has admitted paternity in
59other than affiliation proceedings. His express intention to
affiliate the child has to be deduced either from a unilateral 
declaration to the notary or from-a clear and convincing mention made 
in his will.^^ Moreover, although the acknowledgement of paternity 
is irrevocable, acknowledgement made in a private testament may be 
later affected either by a holograph will or by a will made before a 
public notary, if it contains an express intention to invalidate the 
previous one on tie point of acknowledgement. It then produces results 
from the date of its publication. However, a will made before a 
notary, which makes acknowledgement of the illegitimate child, cannot 
be revoked on the part that contains acknowledgement of paternity, as 
containing an affiliating declaration.^^
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The voluntary acknowledgement of the child exclusively depends on the
act of the father who exercises a personal inalienable right.
Nevertheless, after his death, presumed death, or incapacitation^^
64
the right transmits to the paternal grandfather. Either of them
must exercise the right in person and his declaration has to be free
of terms and conditions. It is not, therefore, an act susceptible
of representation^^ which prima facie seems to create undue
restrictions of the cases where the method can be used. However, it
is argued that, due to the nature of the act, it has to be carried
out by the father or grandfather himself and in case that the father
is a minor person^^ the law provides sufficient safeguards to protect
him if he has been defrauded in making the declaration^^ In fact,
although acknowledgement is irrevocable, it is generally agreed
that it may be invalidated if made in a state of fraud, error or 
69
duress.
CHALLENGE Œ  THE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
There is no requirement for the affiliating father or grandfather to give
positive proof of the paternity of the child. Nor is the declaration
subject to any corroboration, but held to signify a status till disproved.
Moreover, the mother's or the child's approval for the affiliation is
not legally required. Even if they disapprove of the acknowledgement,
the father or the paternal grandfather effectively recognises the child.
However, the law permits challenge of the acknowledgement by any person
claiming a lawful interest if that person can prove that he who
acknowledged the child is neither the father nor the grandfather of the
child.‘ Persons that could have such interest are named as the
child and his heirs, the mother or any person with an interest connected
72
to the acknowledgement. However, the child and the mother may bring
the action without need to provide proof of their interest, while third
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persons have to prove along with their application possession of a
significant personal, pecuniary, or moral interest justifying their 
73
petition. The proof needed is the same as in the disavowal of
74
paternity of a legitimate child. Proceedings must be initiated in
75the Magistrates' Court of the area of the defender within three
months from the time that the party has been first informed of the
affiliation but no longer than two years from the date of acknowledgement.
Different terms apply when the pursuer is the father or grandfather
himself, contesting the acknowledgement as made under duress, fraud or
error. The period for him to apply is defined up to two years, from the
time he first realized his error, but not longer than twenty years
77after the acknowledgement.
In general the method in its existing form is considered satisfactory 
and fulfils adequately the purposes of acknowledgement. However, there are 
two objections that one could raise concerning the lack of any requirement 
for the father to produce evidence on the truthfulness of his declaration 
and the other the entitlement of the grandfather to acknowledge the child. 
Indeed, although the intention is to provide for a trouble-free procedure 
it is absurd to permit the father to acknowledge the child and recognise 
this acknowledgement proof in rem without providing any proof on the 
truthfulness of his declaration. In order to eliminate this inconsistency 
one could derive valuable information from the revision of the Quebec 
Civil Code and especially from articles 272 and 273. Namely according 
to article 272 "Acknowledgement of paternity or of maternity constitutes 
proof against the person who made it". This is to say thàt acknowledgement
binds only the person who made it for it is "unwise to allow a person
to acquire rights with respect to a child and to obligate the members of 
his family, by merely making an admission. Status of persons comes under 
public order, and no person has the right to create or affect another's
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status by a mere déclaration". However, this acknowledgement
operates in rem if otherwise confirmed. Article 273 reads "Acknowledgement
also constitutes proof as regards third parties if it is indicated on
the act of birth or made by a person who has contributed towards the
maintenance or education of the child. Acknowledgement of paternity
also constitutes proof as regards third parties if the mother declares
it to be truthful; acknowledgement of maternity constitutes proof
as regards third parties if consistent with the attestation of
delivery or if the father declared it to be truthful". The signing by
the father of the act of birth is treated as sufficient corroboration
of the presumed facts since it proves that throughout pregnancy he
believed himself to be the father. Also continuous contribution
towards the child's support is deemed an indication sufficient to
prove the seriousness of an acknowledgement. Finally recognitition
by the other parent also appears to be sufficient corroboration of the
79
truth of any acknowledgement. However, because there is the
possibility for a dispute to exist between the parents, it may be 
advisable to avoid the involvement of the court and to include other 
instances which can corroborate the truth of any acknowledgement and 
especially facts that show that the father publicly and constantly treated 
the child as his.^^
As regards acknowledgement by the grandfather, which seems to be a 
remainder of the extended family in its patriarchic form, this rather 
devalues the credit that should be given to the act of acknowledgement.
‘it is made by a person remote to the circumstances of the child's 
conception. Thus acknowledgement may appear to be more vulnerable to 
attacks because the grandfather can neither produce strong evidence 
nor has the knowledge of the circumstance to disprove contrary evidence. 
Therefore it is preferable that the matter be submitted to the
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decision of the court if the father cannot acknowledge the child.
IV. THE JUDICIAL ESTABLISHMENT Œ  PATERNITY
If the issue of paternity should otherwise be raisedd. then it may have 
to be settled by a court, preferably under a procedure for obtaining 
a declarator of parentage. There are strong grounds for believing 
that if the paternity action should be available, such action should 
be the alternative to use if acknowledgement by the father is not 
provided within reasonable time; and moreover the matter should be 
treated as an independent issue in specifically provided proceedings, 
as opposed to a preliminary issue of incidental consideration in 
proceedings aimed at getting some other order.
The main ground concerns the advantages to the welfare of the child 
if his family lineage is established. In this context it is of 
essential importance for the order to reveal a natural truth and be 
free of considerations on the immediate benefits of the child if 
paternity is established. There are, then, two matters which call 
for attention. To avoid disputes of the parents over custody and 
cognate matters to distract attention from the tie of blood which is 
the main objective of proof, or to influence otherwise the issuing 
of an order and to prevent important evidence of becoming obsolete.
In the first place it is of utmost importance for its long term 
welfare to back the child with a family relationship even though in 
the shortterm it seems inapparopriate to maintain real contact with the 
father. Care and support may be needed and the grandparents in the 
paternal line may be a good alternative. Moreover, future entitlement 
to property - in the country or abroad - may turn on the issue and it 
may be inadequate to the interests of the child to leave the matter t o
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be resolved at the date of distribution. Besides the emotional
importance for the child to have his paternity settled is emphasised.
the English Law Gbmmission argues "The child, or indeed those
claiming to be his parents, may think it emotionally important to have
the issue judicially determined. The right to know the facts about
one's origins is increasingly recognised, and it would be unsatisfactory
if the law provided only artificial means (such as an application for
a nominal award of maintenance) for doing so". Support on this
aspect of the child's welfare, however, does not stop in the views of
the English Law Gbmraission. The need for the child to be secured
by a present father-child relationship and to think of himself as "oart
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of a family continuum" is supported by the Church of England and has 
been the concern of several individuals.^^
In respect of the gravity of those reasons, the widely shared
recommendation among them concerns itself with the need to provide
for an instrument, if paternity is not settled at the child's birth
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or is not voluntarily recognised. The appropriate instrument to serve
that purpose has been considered as the declarator of paternity.
However, the background in Scotland in relation to the force of such 
an order is not promising at all, nor is there a general agreement 
in the literature about the scope of application and immediate effects 
of the order. The views are manifold referring to whether such a 
declarator should be the only judicial method of establishing paternity or 
whether a finding in proceedings aiming at getting some other order 
would have the same effect; and whether is should be available along 
with voluntary acknowledgement or in addition to it, leaving 
reasonable time for the father to acknowledge the child.
The Russell Obmmittee reporting some time ago on the succession rights
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of illegitimate children had examined the possibility for statute 
to provide for a declarator of paternity and such a declarator to 
be proof in rem. However, the Committee retained the concept of
the "half-way" relationship of the affiliation order on the basis that 
permitting a declaiatar weald encourage a purely speculative litigationp 
since it might never have any practical effect; for a father, after a 
declaration of paternity may either not die intestate or divest himself 
of his property in his l i f e t i m e . T h i s  approach of the Committee 
is understandable since they were concerned with successional rights 
which emerge when actual links with the father are of little importance 
to the child. On the other hand, the recommending for a declarator 
of paternity would have certain effects on other rights involved in 
the relationship and moreover would contravene the concept of filius 
nulius which has been the foundation stone of the law on illegitimady. 
However, considering it as an official inquiry into the matter, which 
inevitably would influence future reform, such a low key approach is 
scarcely acceptable. As Meston points out, "the occasions tare 
extremely rare when a parent is prepared to divest himself irrevocably 
of his whole estate or to convert it wholly into heritage". And he 
continues "In any event, it is to be hoped that future legislation 
will prevent such invasion of legal rights. In these circumstances, 
a declarator of paternity during the father's lifetime would be 
very unlikely to be pointless and one might think that, in Scotland 
at least, it should be permitted. Such a declarator would, 
presumably involve a pure question of personal status, and under the 
present law would fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
Court of Session. It would seem, however, that the Sheriff Court 
would be a more appropriate forum.
The view that there is room for a declarator of paternity is also
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shared by the English Law Commission, who, although not considering
it to be the sole way for recognising paternity judicially,
envisage the importance of such an instrument for taking advantage
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of the proper evidence in time. Difficulties in obtaining
evidence are also faced in Scotland following the Law Reform
Miscellaneous Provisions (Scotland) Act 1968 which on the basis of
the recommendations of the Russell Committee gives the illegitimate
child the right to legitim over the father's estate. The Committee
clearly experienced considerable difficulty with the problem of proof
of paternity. As they have noticed, there is much to be said for
hearing evidence while the facts are recent and both parents are alive.
Arguably the best evidence may no longer be available or has lost its
importance since the interpretation put on it may have changed
considerably by that time. Moreover, the parents or other persons
that could be subject to blood tests or to givingjevidence in person
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may have disappeared br be dead, like the putative father, by then.
The time factor, therefore, would operate against the child, and the
later the issue is raised the less successfully it may be so. This
89
concern is also shared by the English Law Commission.
Since evidence, however, has a direct bearing on the force of the 
order, the willingness as well . of the parents to supply the 
evidence is a concern to be satisfied. Thus, the context and time 
in which the issue of paternity is raised is a matter that needs careful 
consideration. For instance if the issue of paternity is involved 
incidentally in proceedings for getting some other order, the position 
of the father towards the issue largely depends on whether he accepts 
the other claim or not. To quote from Samuels "In practice it is 
believed that paternity is comparatively rarely a contested matter 
in affiliation proceedings, the amount of financial provision being
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much more commonly in issue, so the size of the problem of
90establishing paternity is quite small in litigation terms."
The involvement of a disputed matter other than that of paternity 
nuts strain on the father so that he may thus be less willing 
to cooperate. In addition , complete lack of cooperation may be 
expected when the issue is raised after the father's death in the 
instance of his heirs defending claims on the father's estate. The 
same risk, however, is apparent in relation to the mo.ther. Take, 
for instance, a mother who is anxious to retain possession of her child 
and defends an action for declarator of paternity along with a claim 
for custody by the father. It seems likely that, if there is the 
slightest possibility of her losing the child, she will deny intercourse 
with the putative father.
On the other hand, one should not ignore the fact that if the issue
of paternity is treated as an incidental issue in a wide range of
applications to the court (e.g. in custody maintenance, succession
etc), the saving of time and cost is quite considerable and, therefore,
such an approach may be favourably regarded. In fact, this auoroach is
considered as a possible one by the English Law Commission, which
suggests that a finding of paternity in such an action should appear
on the face of the order and, as a substantive decision for the child,
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would be capable of giving rise to an amendment in the register.
Moreover, the Commission suggests that such a finding should be
registered only if the decision enforces immediate rights or obligations.
Also to facilitate future claims by the child it is suggested that
"any reference to a finding of paternity in a case where no substantive
order is made would be ' tantamount to the making of a declaration
of paternity" and the child should be able to get information through
93
its "unrestricted access to the courts for such a purpose."
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The choice between the two alternatives is not an easy one so far as 
the issues that they raise are extremely important. However, there 
are some additional reasons to be considered which may favour the 
idea of independent judicial proceedings.
The primary objective that judicial proceedings need to satisfy 
is to place the illegitimate child in a regular family relation to 
the father and his relatives. This implies a change of principle 
for the future since the more certain the finding the more the order 
will be accepted by the persons concerned and by society. That is 
to say, under the present law fatherhood gives rise only to economic 
consequences and the law does not require biological evidence of paternity. 
Thus, it is sufficient to prove sexual intercourse between the mother 
and the alleged father ata time such that the child might be his. So 
far, however, as it is necessary ^ ^'^decision to operate erga omnes 
the conditions for establishing paternity must be changed and tightened 
It becomes necessary to furnish positive proof that the man indicated 
really is the biological father of the child. It may be no longer
sufficient to show that he might be so. And probably in certain 
cases it will be necessary to push to the extreme by requiring two 
proofs, one positive, sr<ecifying that the man had sexual intercourse 
with the mother such that (and only at a time such that) by'the laws 
of nature he might be the father; one negative,showing that there 
is nothing to suggest that he might hot be the father, or another 
person is indicated as such. Second, it is arguable that there is 
a general social interest in the issue, apart from the already 
mentioned emotional interest of the persons concerned to resolve the 
question of paternity early. Two particular cases illustrate
this aspect. The first concerns tax payers who have a moral right 
to demand that the natural fathers undertake their obligations to
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support their children so that help from the national funds come
only when claims cannot be satisfied from private sources. The second
refers to the interests of the family. For instance, a man who has
had a child out of wedlock and omits to tell his wife about it when
marrying her. Of course, he ought not to be silent about such a
thing, and it is believed that husbands in general do make confessions.
But difficulties would arise if he did not act as he ought. And it
cannot be denied that it causes hardship to the widow if at her
husband's death she has to give up part of the common property to
93a
a child whose existence she did not even suspect. P or that very reason
the approach towards paternity gets another dimension in the light
of which the establishment of paternity ought to prevail over
'temporary considerations as to the welfare of the child". Therefore,
if the establishment of paternity is permitted only under proceedings
directed at getting some other order, this will exclude us from two
important options : first of suggesting that affiliation proceedings
must be the next step to be taken if the father refuses to acknowledge
the child and second of removing the right to initiate proceedings
from the exclusive discretion of the individuals to a public body
which would exercise it on a supplementary basis. This change
of principle, as implying the paternity action to be compulsory, is
submitted to be undesirable as a major invasion tb the privacy and
personality of the individual. The matter has been dealt with by
the Russell Committee which rejected the idea of involvement of public
bodies in investigating illegitimate births on the assumption that
this practice "would not be acceptable to the public opinion" of 
94Britain. On the other hand sucb a proposal is made by the Church
of England where the father did not voluntarily recognise and the
94a
mother failed to bring the action of paternity within six weeks.
In their view there should be provision for the appointment of a
186
guardian ad liter: to bring such proceedings on behalf of the child.
The idea differentiates the interests of the child from that of the
parent and provides for a "statutory protector" of the child who would
bear the responsibility of bringing the action of paternity. This
proposal comes very close to what can be regarded as sui legis
entitlement to parenthood, though not satisfactorily conceived since
they envisage the possibility of laving ft open to the authorities to
take no action in cases where this seems inadvisable to the interests
of the child. This proposal is fu±her discussed by Levin who
supports the view of giving assurance to the child by having his
paternity established notwithstanding that such concern should not
cause undue hardship to the mother by involving the father in her 
95personal life. Professor Clive, on the other hand,clearly supports
the compulsory establishment of paternity irrespective of different
considerations on the interests of the parents. In his opinion,
to make proceedings obligatory and compèl the ; patents'to participate
"might strike some people as an invasion of privacy but the child
has rights too and it seems to me that the child's right to a
father should prevail over the qualms of the adults involved." He
concludes it to be essential that "it should not be left to the
96mothers to get the fathers to the register". Similarly Meteyard
consides it irappropriate to allow a woman to deny to the child a
knowledge of the identity of his father since his role remains
important even though he does not make his presence 'bver-intense "
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in the child's life.
However, this approach, apart from the protection that it offers 
specifically to the child, to the family and to society in general,
involves one more matter which makes its acceptance necessary. So
far as it was suggested that the presumption of paternity against
187
the mother's husband will continue to operate in the same way as
before from the point of view of legal deontology, it is necessary
to secure sui legis the establishment of paternity for the illegitimate
98child, in an early stage of his life. On the basis of this
recommendation we turn, therefore, to examine the particular aspects 
of the paternity action, giving due consideration to the established 
practices in each country.
V . THE EXISTING LAW AND THE Rg OHM NEEDED
A. THE NATURE ANDF ORCE CF THE ORDER AND THE POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES
1. SCOTLAND
Currently under Scots Law it is competent to seek a declarator that
one is the child of a designated father, if this is a fact leaving
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patrimonial consequences or consequences in relation to status. 
Nevertheless, an action for affiliation and aliment is essentially 
of declaratory nature, decree being declaratory of the defender's paternity 
of the c h i l d . H o w e v e r ,  whether this consideration concerns the 
nature of the decree or its practical consequences it is a matter 
strongly disputed. Declarator of paternity is subject to the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the Court of Session and is effective in rem while 
the decree of a sheriff dealing incidentally with an issue of personal 
status such as paternity is res judicata only as between the parties
to the a c t i o n . T o  quote from Lord Blackburn in McDonald v. Ross^^^
"The decree of the Sheriff 'finding' thàt the defender is the father 
of an illegitimate child may not have the same legal effect as attaches 
to a decree of declarator, but the results of the 'finding' may be just 
as far-reaching upon the defender's future as the results of a 
decree of declarator would have been."' However, the majority of
judges in the aforementioned case held that the obligation of the
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father of an illegitimate child to contribute to its aliment "arises
purely ex debito naturali, and the establishment of paternity of the
child in an action of affiliation and aliment .... has ... no legal
consequences of any kind except as between the father and the mother -
to make the former debtor to the latter for ... an equal share of the
child's a l i m e n t . A  similar consideration in Silver v. Walker^^^
describes that "an action for affiliation and aliment is really nothing
more than an action for payment of a debt, and strictly speaking it
is not a declarator of status. The illegitimate child has no
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legal status in any proper sense". As Lord Mackay explains
in the same case, according to the Sheriff Courts (Scotland) Act 1907^^^ 
"a finding of paternity against the defender ... forms an indispensable 
feature of the decree in all actions of affiliation and aliment in 
which the pursuer succeeds," but such finding is prefaced incidentally 
to the pecuniary conclusion of the case,aid isiood for that purpose but 
not declaratory, or judgements in rem
On the other hand, the declaratory essence of the particular action 
had been competently argued by the minority of the judges in McDonald v. 
Ross. "The word status" says Lord ^ands "is a somewhat ambulatory 
one, and in certain aspects an action in regard to the paternity of 
an illegitimate child is not regarded or treated as an action to 
determine status. But such an action has undoubtedly certain elements 
of an action to determine a status. Status in the law of marriage 
and of parent and child is a relative term. It fixes a relationship
between the party concerned and other party - husband and wife, parent 
and child. From this relationship certain rights flow. In the case 
of an illegitimate child, a determination of paternity fixes a 
relationship between the child and the father which endures during 
the joint lives of the father and the child, and transmits against
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the representatives of a deceased f a t h e r . A l s o ,  in the same case
Lord Morison holds it competent to bring a declarator of paternity
of an illegitimate child even though there is no conclusion for aliment.
"The truth" he says "is that the primary purpose of an action of
affiliation is to ascertain the paternity of the child, and the pecuniary
consequences only follow the determination of the question ... The death
of the child in no way alters the character of a decree of
absolvitor which may be pronounced. It would, in my opinion, have been
competent for the pursuer here to have abandoned her claim for inlying
expenses and aliment and insisted only on a judgement on the question
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of paternity raised at the beginning of the initial writ ...".
This particular view today could have a considerable foundation in the
statutory law of the country. Thus it provides for a declarator of
ilO
paternity (the Illegitimate diildren (Scotland) Act, 1930) and
111treats it as the basis of other than alimentary orders. A similar
foundation for rights on the basis of the order can be met also in
112
statutes concerning the custody or adoption of the child.
The important point, therefore, for Scots law is the extension of this 
approach to govern the action of paternity. Namely, the independence 
of an action for affiliation and aliment should be retained, but the 
question of paternity must become the principal issue in the proceedings. 
Moreover, the order should bring into force all rights and duties of 
the relationship but it should be permitted for the court on account 
of the welfare of the child to consider as an ancilliary claim changes 
in the relationship or suspension of a number of rights. However, 
no application should be competently submitted if the issue is a 
claim arising from the relation prior to ascertainment of paternity, 
nor court should have the jurisdiction to treat a man as the father
190
of an illegitimate child adjudicating on a de facto situation, if 
that man has not formally acknowledged the child, or if paternity has 
not been established against him. F inally, the finding of the order should 
be effective as res judicata erga omnes resolving the question of 
paternity once and for all subject only to reclaiming or appeal on evidence 
showing that the particular person is not the father, or indicating 
another person to be so.
2. GREECE
Judicial recognition of paternity in Greek law, as well as issues on
the existence or voidness of a voluntary acknowledgement, is subject to the
113
special procedure of articles 615-622 of the Cbde of CLvil Procedure.
Under the same procedure fall declarator of paternity and declarator of 
114
bastardy. Moreover, it is competent to connect with this claim for
115award of a certain amount in respect of the aliment of the child. However,
entitlement to claim aliment is based on the formal recognition of paternity
115a.
and retroacts to the date of birth. Provided that the decree
of the court finds the defender to be the father the rights and duties
attributed to the relation operate ipso jure, and the father owes aliment
to the child whether he has been ordered to provide or not.^^^ Moreover,
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such a finding operates erga omnes save the exemptions of article 618 -
of the Cbde of CLvil Procedure. Namely, "Decisions rejecting or
accepting ... (c) the acknowledgement of paternity of an illegitimate
child ... are effective in rem, so far as they are subject neither to
cassation nor to rehearing by the supreme c o u r t " . T h u s ,  the
decision declaring paternity, to operate in rem should not only become
final but also irrevocable. The reasoning behind this deviation is
attributed to the fact that litigations of this nature, due to their
importance for public order, should not be exposed to the risk of
119issuing contradictory decisions. However, a strong exemption
191
provided in part 2 of the same article states that "the decision 
is not res judicata for a third party not invited to the hearings 
if he claims for himself a parent or child or patria potestas 
relationship". Therefore, the decision is not res judicata 
for the non invited mother, or child or for a man claiming to be 
the father of the child. However, since the nature of the order 
recognising paternity for the illegitimate child has the same qualities 
as a declarator of paternity, and since it is effective in rem there 
is no alteration to suggest at least for this aspect of the order
B. JJ RISDICTION
Two important matters in relation to jurisdiction to hear applications 
for parentage declarations would need to be decided. P irst, which of 
the courts of each country should exercise jurisdiction, and second, 
in the residence of which of the litigants should such applications 
be competently submitted?
In Scotland such an action would involve a pure question of personal
status, and under the present law presumably would fall within the
120jurisdiction of the Court of Session. However, the court that
exercises jurisdiction upon actions for affiliation and aliment is the
Sheriff Court and it would seem to be the more appropriate forum due
121
to its prolonged experience in the field.
In Greece the action of paternity like others concerning a parent-child
relationship is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the thrœ judge City
122Court (Polymeles Protodikion). Only litigations concerning the
care of the child or access by a non custodian parent are subject to
123
the jurisdiction of the one judge City Court, (Monomeles Protodikion),
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but if connected with one of the litigations concerning the parent-
child relationship may competently be brought before the Magistrates'
_ 124 
Court.
There is no reason for altering this jurisdiction, e.g. by 
transferring proceedings to a higher court or by recognising a special 
jurisdiction to criminal courts adjudicating on a sexual crime committed 
againstthe mother to investigate obiter the paternity of the child.
The paternity action must remain within the civil courts since the 
key question is the existence of a physical relationship between 
the alleged father and the child. The circumstances behind the 
conception count only to their bearing on proof. However, to protect 
the privacy of the individual involved an additional safeguard that 
may be introduced is to hold hearings in camera.
As regards the second question it is generally accepted by both laws
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that the main ground of jurisdiction is the defender's residence.
Nevertheless both provide-for the better protection of the mother and
the child who are in an inferior position - the possibility of bringing
the action in the area where the petitioner r e s i d e s . H o w e v e r ,
127as the Scottish Law Commission admits those provisions "require 
review ... because of the uncertainty as to how the action should 
be categorised for jurisdictional purposes, There have been cases in 
which jurisdiction has been founded on the ground that (a) the child's 
conception was a delict committed in the sheriffdom, and (b) the 
defender has been personally served with the initial writ in the 
sheriffdom. There are sound policy reasons for allowing an action 
to be brought in such circumstances where the father returns to the 
sheriffdom and receives personal service of the summons but the legal 
basis seems unsound and (as happens when the right thing is done for
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the wrong reason) has been questioned on the unexceptional view
128that the action is for debt not debit".
The right recognised to individuals to raise the action should by 
no means extend to determine the progress of the proceedings.
The judge, once the action is raised, should be ex officio obliged 
to take care of the progress of the case. Ihe case may be dismissed
only if the father acknowledges the child.
C. PERSONS ENTITLED TO BRING THE ACTION AND THE DW ENPER
Today due to the peculiarities that appear in actions for affiliation
and aliment attention is focussed upon the mother as the proper person
to bring the action. Nevertheless due to the fact that she is
not tutor of her illegitimate child there is considerable confusion as
to whether she acts on behalf of the child or in her own name. Namely,
under Scots law the mother, in order to obtain a contribution to the
child's aliment, may bring the action against the alleged father.
And it is argued that she has been permitted to do so to avoid
129the inconvenience of appointing a tutor or curator ad litem.
Nevertheless in a number of cases it has been considered that the
mother is the creditor and claims for h e r s e l f . O n  the other hand
it should not be ignored that the right to bring the action has been
also supplied to the child and there are recorded cases where the
child, after the mother's death, has brought the action through his 
131tutor. Furthermore, whenever assistance has been given from
social security funds, statute has supplied the local authority and
the Supplementary Benefit Commission with the same right as the mother
132
to bring the action for affiliation and aliment.
In Greece, according to article 1590 of the Greek Civil Code the mother
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or the child is entitled to bring the action. Each of them has an
133 134independent right justified for the mother by her maternal capacity
135
and for the child by his illegitimate status . No other person 
or body could bring the action unless appointed legal guardian acting 
on behalf of the child.
Obviously in the proposed reform the concern that the action comes to 
satisfy is the establishment of paternity while enforcement or 
administration of rights is an ancilliary question which may or may not 
be included. On account of this change in approach there are 
certain points to be discussed in relation to the persons that should 
be considered eligible to apply.
The question of eligibility must centre around the child, who must 
have an unqualified right to apply. Other possible applicants must 
be considered in terms of the role they may have in its life. In any 
event, because the situations vary and it may be the case that 
paternity has not been established in an early stage the right 
supplied to the child should last for his lifetime. In addition, one 
could treat as eligible the parents or other close relatives of the 
child claiming a lawful interest, whether moral or proprietorial^ as 
well as the welfare authorities or the public prosecutor. However, 
as the bases of their involvement vary,it is necessary to make 
certain comments prior to any decision on eligibility. At the 
outset, because a child under the age of majority is not capable 
of suing in his own name any of the above persons having actual custody 
of the child must be eligible to bring the action within tte .time 
limits specified below. As regards the person claiming to be the 
father it appears that he must be entitled only to acknowledge the 
child. However, if an action is raised and he is not made a party to
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the proceedings such person should be entitled to intervene with
evidence as to his paternity, or to appeal against an order or
act of acknowledgement. As to the right of the mother there are
certain reasons dictating the preservation of her right. In the
first place if the child's paternity is not established she will bear
the whole responsibility for the child and secondly she is the key
person as regards the proof of paternity and her involvement is,
therefore, necessary. Consequently, her right to apply must be
preserved and in any case she must become a party to the proceedings
because she is the most proper person to provide evidence. However,
the right of the mother to raise the action depends on such variables
as her own financial position and her attitude to the natural father.
The danger is that, if for some reason, there is not sufficient
sf^mulus to the mother to take action, then the child may, by default,
137be left without a father recognised by law. Therefore, it is
advisable not to rely exclusively on her for raising the action.
With regard to other relatives the situation is rather less clear.
Their interests vary in degree and content so that one cannot state 
a general rule as to whether they could serve the purpose of the action. 
Also they lack real knowledge of the circumstances of the conception 
and of the degree of the relationship between the defender and the 
mother. Hence, there is no guarantee that reliance could be placed 
on their sustaining a case as pursuers.
Failing the mother, the custodian or the child bringing the action,
the practical alternative is the state. Earlier it was considered 
that paternity actions should be compulsory and as possible bodies 
to exercise the right on behalf of the state were suggested the 
public prosecutor or the welfare services by appointing a tutor 
ad hoc. The office of the public prosecutor is considered preferable
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to the welfare authorities because, from a practical point of view, the 
Public Prosecutor could have easier access to the Register and to the 
agenda of the Court. Also it would prevent disrupting the task of the 
welfare authorities by involving them in a case of pure private 
litigation without need for intervention.
As regards the persons against whom the action should be directed
139the law currently in both countries specifies the father and on his 
death his heirs^^^. In the latter case, however, it would be more 
appropriate if the defenders were made the father's relatives in 
the order of their alimentary obligation towards the child and only 
if such relatives do not exist against the heirs.
However, because the order is of a declaratory nature, it may be 
considered appropriate to provide wider assurance to the litigants or 
other interested persons, when they cannot be served, or, if served, 
when they cannot be expected to take part in the proceedings, even 
if it is desirous for them to attend. Protection is also needed as 
well for the public interest. Thus, it may be necessary to impose 
the duty on the registry of the court to serve notice to the office 
of Public Prosecutor, or to allow him of his own accord to apply for
leave to intervene in the suit where this is considered necessary or
. . 141desirable.
D. TIME LIMITS
The important questions relating to limits are (a) whether the 
alleged father should be given a chance to acknowledge the child and 
consequently whether the mother should be able to initiate proceedings 
prior to the child's birth or shortly after birth and (b) whether 
there should be any upper limit for the rights exercisable by persons
197
other than the child.
The Illegitimate Children (Scotland) Act 1930 adopts the solution
that the mother from the third month prior to delivery and thereafter
may bring an action for affiliation and aliment by producing a
sworn declaration before a justice of the peace or magistrate that
the defender is the father of the child and a certificate by a duly
qualified practitioner that she is pregnant certifying the pregnancy
142
and specifying the probable date of conception. However,
the court cannot issue a declarator of paternity prior to the birth
nor can it receive proof or order any payments, but, if the action is
undefended or if paternity is admitted by the defender, the court
may grant decree for payments in respect to the mother’s inlying
expenses and for periodical sums for the child's aliment, beginning at
143
the date of the birth.
The Greek Civil Code adopts the opposite approach in that, without
precluding the possibility of the action being raised prior to birth
it considers the right to prescribe within five years from the date
144of birth for both mother and child. The position as regards
the right to raise the action prior to birth is unclear and though
some argue that it is permissible for the mother to resolve the matter 
145
prior to birth, others reject the idea either because it is
difficult to specify the probable date of conception prior to birth,
or because the mother as acting ex jure proprio and not on behalf
of her unborn child cannot base the action on the fiction of article 36
14fi
of the Greek Civil Code.
However, delays in raising the action operate against the chances of 
success in establishing paternity and it seems sensible to permit
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the mother to bring the action prior to birth. If the mother's alleg­
ations are reasonably substantiated there is no reason for not 
taking this step. Nevertheless, such a right on the part of the 
mother should not operate against the opportunity of the father 
to acknowledge the child. Therefore it should be necessary for her 
to serve formal notice to the father inquiring whether he intends
to acknowledge the child. If the father omits to proceed the mother
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could competently apply to the court.
On the other hand, it is not in the interest of the child to leave
the right at the discretion of individuals for considerable periods
nor is it fair to leave the matter banging over the alleged father's
head for a long period. Therefore, if the father omits to acknowledge
the child and the mother or the custodian fails to bring the action,
within three months from the date of birth, proceedings should be
initiated by the public prosecutor who would be entitled to
carry out an official investigation in the matter and appoint a curator
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ad hoc to defend the child. These restrictions, of course,
should not apply to the child himself who should be eligible to bring 
the action any time in the light of new evidence as to his parentage.
This resolution is adopted in the belief that the time runs against 
the possibility of establishing paternity to the most adequate extent. 
Thus the Public Prosecutor, on information received from the mother or 
the Registrar that no paternity has been acknowledged, must make 
inquiry in the registry of the court to see if the action has been 
raised. If not, he must initiate proceedings inviting the mother to 
give evidence in such circumstances the mother should be obliged to 
name the possible father or fathers of the child.
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V I PROOF O F PATERNITY IN JJ DICIAL PROCEEDINGS
a. The answer to the question of how paternity is proved could affect
to a great extent the degree to which a finding by the court would
be really accepted. It is strongly believed that the order of the
court can be made genuinely effective or virtually meaningless,
depending on the methods and reliability of proof used for this
purpose. As a matter of fact an allegation of paternity is easily
made, and the finding has serious consequences for both child and
parents. On that very reason the Russell Committee partly based its
proposal that an existing affiliation order should not of itself
be conclusive proof of paternity. They assert that "there are
grounds for supposing that there are cases in which the mother
14Q
successfully selects the man who is the best prospect".
Moreover, the issue is full of emotive factors which may distract 
attention from the real value of the evidence presented. Therefore, 
it is right that considerable care be taken in determining the 
issue. On the other hand, however, due to the variety and peculiarities 
of illegitimate conceptions proof beyond doubt cannot be considered 
a realistic goal. To a certain extent some concessions on the 
degree of proof may appear necessary so far as they do not 
devalue the acceptability of the order.
The problem is a complex one and the formulas suggested vary
accordingly. A Samuels is of the opinion that the issue of
paternity " ... is just one more civil law issue, and there is no
logical reason why the ordinary burden of proof, on balance of
probabilities, should not be applied, and there is no logical reason
for any special rules of evidence, such as corroboration, although
as a practical matter the court should naturally take due account of
15 O'*the presence or absence of corroboratioh'. This view may be con-
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sidered appropriate to rely on so far as there are sufficient 
judicial means facilitating its reversal by the interested parties. 
However, the main objection against this approach is that one would 
arrive at a conclusion on its correctness after the order had been 
made. Moreover, such a conclusion would have a relative value since 
its validity mainly depends on whether the parties had taken advantage 
to reverse the order.
Another approach adopted by Norwegian law suggests that paternity
will not be declared unless a high degree of probability supports
152its determination. The arguments for tightening the conditions
of proof claim that "the imposition of paternal obligation on the 
basis of weak evidence will cause unjust hardship to persons who 
are held liable and will not serve the interests of the child or those
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of society". The high degree of probability exists in
Norwegian law if proof of a positive character is provided showing 
that the defender could be the father, and negative proof, meaning that 
no circumstances are established that make it seem unlikely that he is 
the f a t h e r . N o  other limits are set requiring a prima facie 
case be built on predefined circumstances nor could a defence based on 
the exceptLo plurium decisively prevent the establishment of paternity. 
Particularly, on the basis of ordinary evidence used in civil actions 
reinforced by physiological and scientific evidence, Norwegian courts 
try to investigate whether the person indicated to be the father 
really is-so. Moreover, if the exceptio plurium cannot be overcome 
the court will hold the man against whom there is a substantial 
probability to be the father. This is not to say, of course, that 
the court will pick out the man whose paternity is most probable, 
but apart from the relative preponderance of probability on his paternity, 
in order to hold him as the father, the court must be satisfied on the
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basis of all evidence that there is nothing making it unlikely that he 
IKis the father. The overall impression from this brief description
of the Norwegian approach is that to a certain extent the court appears 
to be overburdened with complex evidence and procedure which is 
time consuming and expensive to operate in many respects. Nevertheless, 
it presents decisive advantages which make it preferable to a simpler 
method. It is flexible enough to treat every possible case while on 
the otherhaid itprevents injustice by employing scientific evidence 
which could destroy any false allegations. It is worthwhile, there­
for^ to examine if it is possible to introduce aspects of this system 
into the two laws.
b. In Scotland and Greece the paternity action relies on the application
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of a presumption of paternity which is raised upon proof of positive 
character showing that the putative father did have intercourse with 
the mother at the time of the child's probable conception. Negative 
proof is admissible for the defence of the alleged father and usually 
takes the form of evidence tending to prove the impossibility of the 
child having been conceived as a result of intercourse with him, or 
to show that another man could have been the father. As well as this 
it is competent in Greek law to bring evidence to prove the mother's 
general immorality. In this case the action will be dismissed.
As to the proof of positive character the pursuer has. the onus of
proving intercourse with the defender at such time that according
to the rules of nature he could have been the father. To establish
her allegation she is permitted to use ordinary evidence applicable
157
to every civil action. To compensate for the scarcity of, or the 
difficulty in obtaining, evidence there - is permitted in such 
an action some relaxation of the rules of e v i d e n c e . M o r e o v e r ,
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the court may in penuria testium make certain inferences on account
159of the conduct of the parties and the whole circumstances of the case. 
Because of this, the establishment of an allegation against a man with 
whom the mother had intercourse may be viewed as too simple. Therefore, 
prima facie it may appear necessary to tighten up the rules of evidence.
On the other hand a fact that should not be ignored is the peculiarities 
of the circumstances of each illegitimate conception, and the individuality 
that characterises the case. Therefore, such a task could not be carried 
out without restricting the instances where a paternity action could 
be brought before in the courts.
The danger of a too readily founded allegation the law could overcome 
by accompanying the proof with evidence of scientific nature which appears 
more independent and reliable and may be trusted by both parties. The 
matter, due to its importance in altering the defensive attitude of the 
possible father, will be discussed later, after considering the present 
means of defence employed by both laws.
c. At present, a person against whom an allegation of paternity is made
may present evidence showing either that he cannot be the father or that 
another person may be so.^^^ In addition in Greece it is
competent to prove the mother's general immorality. A variety
of circumstances have been considered to make it unlikely for an 
objective point of view that the defender is the father. His impotency 
and sterility are r e l e v a n t . M o r e o v e r ,  other circumstances like 
the birth of a child of other race, or the pre-existing pregnancy 
of the mother though by no means conclusive have been viewed as having 
certain significance in the m a t t e r . F o r  instance, 
if the child belongs to a race different from that of the
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parents this may be used in disproving an allegation of conception as 
a result of intercourse with the defendant. Also, if it is possible 
to arrive at some conclusion of the probable date of conception from 
the degree of maturity of the child, proof of intercourse subsequent 
to that believed to have started the child may overcome any allegation 
of impregnation by the defender.
Furthermore, the defender may introduce evidence of acts'of intercourse
between the mother and another man at the probable date of conception
and thus waive the presumption of paternity. When such
intercourse is proven in both laws there is a strong possibility that
the pursuer will fail. For example, in Scots law, if the evidence
indicates that it is equally probable that either of them is the
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father the court has to refuse to make an order. Only if the evidence 
makes it more probable for the defender being the father would the 
pursuer s u c c e e d . O n  the other hand in Greek law there is employed 
the wider concept of 'feerious doubts" whereby the defendant may 
try to prove intercourse with another man in order to create doubts 
on the validity of the pursuer's averments. However, by 
proving intercourse with another man, unlike in Scots law, the case 
will not be dismissed, since the exceptio plurium applies only in .the 
conditions of art 143.gut the court will not resolve the case on
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the basis of probability and it will order further proof to be taken.
If the mother lives a promiscuous life, under Scots law, she cannot
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sue both or all her paramours, nor can she elect which one to sue.'
She must sue the one whom she believes was the father and establish
169his paternity of her child. ' In Greece on the other hand the 
law does not give her the opportunity of presenting evidence and the 
case will be dismissed without review on its merits if the mother has
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been guilty of "notorious misbehavour" The mother's action
will be dismissed on the grounds of notorious misbehaviour if the
court has been satisfied that dt or about the time of the conception
of the child the mother was a common prostitute or was involved
in extra-marital relations without any discretion among various 
171paramours. Presumably, such a defence it is easily justified
and it is not so much designed to punish the mother for her immorality
as to recognise the difficulty of determining which of the men is the 
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father. However, this a priori exclusion is difficult to accept 
and it should be better to give her an opportunity, as in Scots law, 
to adduce evidence against the person who she believes to be the 
father. While, however, it is easy to follow the rationale of the 
second defence, the way the first defence is treated is undoubtedly 
difficult to justify. The fact that the defender may prove inter­
course with another man and that this under Scots law makes his 
paternity less probable, or that in Greece it creates "serious 
doubts" on the pursuers averments, is an outdated approach in terms 
of the implications that this would have for the child and the means 
available today to resolve such matters.
At the outset such a decision is denying a relationship with the
father apart from its implications for the child's welfare as
involving an assumption of the sexual promiscuity of the mother
during the period of conception may serve to remind the child of that
very fact during the whole of its adolescence. This means placing
a severe psychological strain on the child, in which case it be better
not to allow the action at all. The child may find refuge in the
thought that the father had deserted them and it is difficult for him to 
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be traced. In some cases, at least, it may be very clear which
of say two or three men, who had intercourse with the mother prior
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or at the time of conception,is the father. This may be so
because the inherited characteristics of the child points to one man
as the father or because one or two are excluded by blood tests.
The evidence in such a case should no doubt be treated cautiously.
But it is too threatening to the child's welfare and too tolerant
toward irresponsibility to permit a defender to produce two other men
who had intercourse with the woman at the relevant time without making
them parties to the proceedings but simply leaving the pursuer alone
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to establish a new case against them. Before, however, taking a 
final position on the approach that should be established towards 
this commonly used defence it is essential to offer a brief 
review of the position with regard to scientific evidence.
VII GENETIC TESTS
A . BLOO® TESTS
1. There can hardly be any real doubt that the most effective means of
protecting a father from a false claim of paternity and of preventing him* in
a satisfactory degree of collusively disclaiming the child is by
scientific evidence of blood group. It has long been known that
blood exhibits characteristics ~ classifiable into certain groups -
which are transmitted from generation to generation in accordance with
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inviolable laws of heredity. Thus, at the present stage
of medical knowledge, a comparison made between the blood characteristics 
of the father, the mother and the child can clearly establish non­
paternity in all cases where the results of this comparison show a 
biologically impossible constellation of blood types.
Nevertheless, the method may provide affirmative proof of the defender's 
paternity by placing him within the group of possible fathers. If,
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for instance, an allegation is made that the woman at the material time 
had had intercourse only with two men and the blood tests exclude the 
one, the other must be the father.
At the extreme, paternity can be all but determined positively
without the support of other evidence, if very rare genes are found in
the blood of the putative father and the child. It is believed
that with very rare genes "the possibility of coincidence being
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responsible is so remote as to make the odds astronomical".
But, in the last resort, if the genes displayed in the child's
blood, without being very rare, are considered uncommon, the 
probability of paternity may be computed for any given case that 
did not otherwise provide exclusion. The usefulness of such 
computation in estimating the probability of a given person being 
the father has been acknowledged for both children conceived in 
marriage and for those born outside marriage. For instance, 
in S V and W v Official^ Solicitor^^^ for a legitimate child
it was held "that if they, the uncommon genes, were not derived 
from the husband they could only have been derived from one man in
a thousand, then the result of the test would go a long way towards
proving (in the sense of making it more probable than not) that 
the husband was in fact the father because it would be very unlikely 
that the wife had happened to commit adultery with the one man in 
a thousand who could have supplied this uncommon characteristic.
And if it appeared that only one man in a hundred or one man in ten 
could have been the father, if the husband was not, that might 
go some way towards making it probable that the husband was the 
father. Such an inference might not be lightly drawn, but it 
should not be ruled out".^^^ For the determination of illegitimate 
paternity, the opposite course is considered. In Scandinaviay
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for instance, cases where the result did not produce an 
exclusion,or where the weight of very rare genes cannot produce 
a de facto inclusion, are pursued on the basis of a "blood group 
paternity index" according to which the probability of paternity 
is estimated. As Krause explains "that index compares the 
frequency of a given father-mother-chiId blLood constellation in a sample 
of actual fathers with the blood constellation in a sample of non 
fathers and is related to the constellation obtained in the case 
in question. If the resemblance exceeds 95 per cent, the result is 
reported tothe c o u r t " . R e s u l t s  below this percentage are 
considered as circumstantial evidence, but treated as of 
particular value when the relative likelihood of paternity of several 
possible fathers is being compared. Nonetheless, it is not beyond 
expectation thatj by advancing the probability,estimations all but
182
obviate whatever need there once may have been for the exceptio plurium.
It follows from the above brief discussion on blood tests that, for 
specific cases, they provide evidence of high credibility whereas in otiers 
they ■ may only supply, with sufficient indications, a clue to 
who amoh^ the■ fnother's paramours could be the father. Thus, apart 
from their value in confirming or destroying assumptions of paternity 
they can also guide the investigation of the child's paternity 
towards the right direction.
In relation to these valuable characteristics of blood test 
evidence the question to be asked is whether it could have a decisive 
role in the process of proof. The answer to this point cannot 
be an easy one in so far as it depends on a variety of factors 
relating to the current development of the methods, their reliability 
and:.the safeguards employed, as well as on sociolegal speculations
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as to the implications that the imposition of such practice could have 
on the freedom of the individual.
2. At present, in Scotland and Greece, there is no generally expressed
desire to base proof in a paternity action around blood test'evidence.
The main reason for holding this position is that such evidence is
based on research which is always on the move - so that the possibility
of further discovery of development is not to be ruled out.^^^ Thus,
courts without denying the value of blood tests generally have been
somewhat reluctant to accept them unconditionally as conclusive
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proof, i.e. if they' contradict customary evidence. However,
the prima facie impression of the uncertainty and flux of the present 
state of knowledge of blood analysis, alters considerably if one makes 
a distinction between discoveries that will overturn present theory 
on blood tests and discoveries that will make them more reliable.
In this respect the latter seems more likely to occur since the present 
knowledge is based on years of intensive research under high 
laboratory standards.^  ® ^
Nevertheless, while in the use of blood tests as positive proof of 
paternity, scientists accept the relative credibility of this evidence 
at present, when it comes to the point of affirmative prodf, they 
claim that the chances of error are almost non-existent. The
position of both countries towards such use of blood tests is that
evidence so obtained indicates, but never provides complete proof of
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non-paternity. Particularly, in Sproat v. McGibney a note
appended to the interlocutor of the appellant decision the 
Sheriff upheld the opinion of the sheriff substitute, who had preferred 
the non-medical evidence, points out that in the present state of 
medical knowledge as to blood groupings and their relevance in
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relation to questions of heredity, it would be highly dangerous for 
a Court of law to prefer that evidence to all the remaining 
evidence in an action of affiliation. This is especially so 
when for a considerable period during the pregnancy of the pursuer the 
defender believed that he was the father of the child and where he 
has led no evidence whatsoever to point to any other man being the 
father". And the note continues : "Accordingly, in my view, the 
law of Scotland for thepresent is that where there is non-medical 
evidence in an action of affiliation and aliment which does not corrob­
orate the medical evidence the medical evidence of blood tests per
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se is not enough to exclude paternity". The rationale for
precluding exclusion of paternity on blood tests rests on the 
consideration that they cannot be accepted "as infallible or as of 
absolute reliability", but stop short of a standard of infallibility.^^® 
Thus, in the aforementioned case, on an unfortunate comparison between 
finger print and blood test evidence the exceedingly rigid view 
was expressed that "without the taking of much care and the 
exclusion of artefacts, evidence of blood tests cannot be demonstrated 
and applied with the unrelenting reliability of the finger print
system with, among other excellences, its visual aids and ascription
189of digital impressions to the actual person involved."
The position in Greece is almost identical. According to Tousis 
the courts cannot go further than accepting blood test evidence 
as judicial presumptions. , This is mainly due to the state of 
flux in our knowledge about its methods. Moreover, she argues 
that the judge is not obliged to accept the conclusion of experts 
and he has as much right as the doctors have to mistrust 
scientific inventions. This position is complemented
by Michaelidis Nouàros who further argues that apart from its
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acceptance as judicial presumptions blood test evidence should be
treated as "a presumption of particularly high probative importance",
191that could throw serious doubts on the paternity of the child.
However, by no means in Greek law can blood test evidence overturn
a contrary inference from non-medical evidence, nor could medical
evidence itself constitute a case if not supplemented by non-medical 
l92
evidence.
The conditions under which blood tests are carried out in the two 
countries are not irrelevant to this position and it is necessary 
to comment upon the matter since it seems the most significant 
aspect of the reliability of the tests.
Unfortunately, blood test evidence, unlike the finger print system, 
can never supply the court with first hand unelaborated knowledge of 
the relation between the blood of the child and that of the parents. 
It has to rely on doctors to take the samples, make the necessary 
analysis and report to'.the court. This process involves the 
risk of impersonation of the parties involved, as well as the risk 
of tests being carried out by practitioners who are not duly 
qualified in the field, or do not offer the necessary guarantee of 
impartiality required by the judicial process. Such risks are 
not precluded in either country since there is no meticulous system 
of identification to secure that the parties in court are the 
parties who attended for examination. Nor is it facilitated by 
a service operating according to a uniform procedure for every 
case, which would employ complex and advanced types of blood 
analysis with a highly developed safety factor that would assure 
accuracy of the results they report. The latter defect is the
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most crucial so that it would be better not to admit blood tests into 
evidence at all than to admit unreliable evidence under the guise 
of scientific truth.
Scandinavian countries, in order to minimize those dangers, 
provide a centralized blood typing facility with high safety 
standards comprising specialization and close supervision over 
highly skilled laboratory personnel; 'blind' double testing 
of samples with careful, independent rechecking by a third person 
of any discrepancies that are reported, careful maintenance 
and daily testing of testing agents and tight control over the 
identification of samples and over other clerical aspects of the 
testing and reporting process. In addition, they operate 
efficiently with the courts with a standardized routine in the 
process of sample taking, laboratory analysis and report to the court.
F or the latter they provide a comprehensive and understandable form
for the medically inexperienced judge, which reveals any possible hint
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as to the paternity of the child. The system operates so
successfully that according to Krause "The courts rely heavily on the 
medical evidence" and "The reputation for accuracy of the laboratories
is such that the parties and their lawyers usually rest their case with
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the medical evidence".
Given that the necessary safeguards have been provided, the issue that 
the use of blood tests raises is whether questions of paternity should 
continue to be answered by means of human reasoning or whether we 
should adhere to those facts indicated by nature. In other words 
what weight is to be ascribed to this evidence, especially when it 
conflicts with customary evidence.
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Prima facie a well balanced decision, whether assisted or not by
blood tests, may enjoy due respect as much by the individuals
concerned as by society as a whole. But it may still fall short of
convincing everybody, because the involvement of the human factors
exposes the decision to the risks of misjudgement and does not
deter the parents'fran presenting fraudulent evidence. Thus, as a
matter of basic fairness to both child and parents, it is desirable
tetin every case which may cast doubt upon the paternity of a
child, a full investigation should be made before any decision be
given in order to avoid the slightest ambiguity in the matter.
With blood test evidence in use that concern may be largely
satisfied. However, in certain cases, the result might be that the
child was proven not to be that of a particular person even though
believed to be so according to human reasoning on facts presented.
If blood tests are properly carried out the possibility of deviation
is very remote and the chance of error is less significant than that
attached to the testimony of witness. However, as Ross points out,
the knowledge of this possibility will impress itself with special
force on the mind of the judge. "The judge often believes -
rightly or wrongly - that he can estimate the credibility of
witnesses by observing their demeanour and appearance. There often
arises in him, as the result of the proceedings before him, a
strong conviction as to the true story behind the tales. Even if
the judge, using his brains, knows, in theory, that there are
sources of error in the formulation of this conviction, this
knowledge does not affect his feeling of certitude in the
same way as the exactly calculated risk of error admitted in the 
195
biological proof. Indeed in Imre v. Mitchell Lord Russell
states : "If, however, the blood test evidence cannot properly
be regarded as inadmissible, the question still remains whether
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it is sufficient, of itself, to negate the strong inference of
paternity in favour of the second defender (the father) which is
196supported by the other circumstances disclosed in the evidence.
Similarly in Sproat v. McGibney the sheriff found it difficult 
to accept a contrary inference from medical evidence since in the 
preceeding period the defendant presented himself as the father of 
the child. In this case, however, there was a justifiable
suspicion of impersonation of the defendant in the sample taken
197
so as to question the validity of blood tests per se. To take
the hypothesis, on the other hand, that the child is born to a 
mother under circumstances of cohabitation, in a state of dependency 
or after a criminal act against her but the child is not that of the 
man indicated by these circumstances: in this case, there is, however,
an obvious inference as to fatherhood and it is quite natural for a 
number of mothers to try to establish paternity on these more 
convenient grounds. The question that requires consideration, 
therefore, is whether it should be permissible for such plausible facts 
to preclude any further effort towards seeking out the biological 
father or whether the old approach to proof should be replaced 
by a system not involving judgements^ of value.
The issue may have controversial implications for both the child 
and the mother. The person who is indicated as the father may have 
been prepared to accept the child as his and with the blood tests 
he is precluded hrcm doing so. Also, the child may be linked with a 
father with whom it is impossible to develop any real relationship.
For the mother, after the disclosure of her commitment to another 
man, the result may be to bring about the breakdown of her long­
term relationship with, at the same time paternity being proved
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against a person who shows little concern for her and the child.
On the other hand, the question that remains open is whether the person 
associated with the mother, who can be held as the father on the basis 
of ordinary evidence, is really convinced that he had fathered the 
child or superficially accepts it to be so because of his feelings 
for the mother. What then would be the endurability of the parent 
child relationship^ That person may try to disclaim the child as 
soon as his relationship with the mother breaksdown or the real father 
would try to contest paternity on his behalf. The child himself 
may sooner or later try to trace his origins. It is necessary, 
therefore, to look favourably upon a neutral decision excluding a
subjective estimation of the evidence. As Omrod, J., put it in
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Re L " ... questions relating totthe welfare and upbringing
of the child should be based as far as possible on facts, and that 
decisions relating to peoples' lives should not be confused by 
the artificial results of the application of legal presumptions ...
In this context blood test is the proper solution since they invest
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the decision with a high degree of legal certainty, presumably 
higher than that afforded by other means of proof
This change of principle implies a change of the hitherto accepted 
belief that the disadvantages of paternity that are not coherent 
with the reasoning of society outweight the desirability of seeking 
the real f a t h e r . S h o u l d  society, however, accept readily 
an order issued exclusively on blood testsevidence? That order 
would be based upon a piece of paper issued from a laboratory, 
processed in an unknown way and to an extent unconceivable to 
most people. Thus, it may be appropriate to support the order 
with customary evidence since ti would have the same effect 
æ  on-the judge in creating a feeling of certitude in society.
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This is not, of course, to suggest an individualizing estimation 
of the evidence. Blood tests would amount to independent and 
absolute proof and the judge would be obliged to search for the 
facts that can substantiate the finding. Having reached this
position the point that requires consideration is whether the 
court would have the discretion to order blood tests or whether 
they could do so only with the consènt of the parties to the 
litigation and, if the former, whether there is a need to make 
submission to blood tests compulsory in every case.
The question of testing against the will of an adult party as 
well as the right of a child unable rationally to consent have been 
the focal points of intense and bitter litigation in jurisprudence.
It has been considered that to carry a test upon an unconsenting person 
would amouht to an assault against‘tie 'inviolabibtyof the human body'
and nevertheless that such a stipulation contradicts the principle
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of impartiality of the judge. Thus, presently, there does
not appear to be any power in the courts hearing paternity cases 
in either country, to order the parties to submit blood tests. This 
step can be taken only on the request of one of the litigants with 
the consent of the others. Nonetheless, an unreasonable refusal 
to submit to a blood test may lead to the drawing of an unfavourable 
evidential inference where that party is concerned
However, whatever are the theoretical considerations for not 
compelling the parties to undergo blood tests, a point to be 
secured is the availability of this evidence, due to its importance 
in the action. Unless, therefore, the law is changed, the court is 
denied access to the best evidence. This induces an undue discrimination 
against children born out of wedlock because it omits to facilitate their
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right to a father, as does the presumption of paternity for 
children born in marriage
As to whether blood tests should or should not be used in every 
action prima facie,as this step involves expenses for the parties, such 
an approach should be avoided, unless the state undertakes the 
initial cost. If the parties are to continue to bear the 
expenses the need to be satisfied is for the implementation of 
legislation empowering the use -of blood tests whenever this appears 
necessary to serve the ends of justice. This could reasonably 
be achieved either by empowering the court to order blood tests 
in every litigation in which doubts are cast on the paternity by 
the preliminary investigation, or at the request of either party.
In the latter case it must be obligatory for the court to accede 
to such a request.
The final problem to be considered is who could submit such a request
in respect of the child. One person that could appropriately
be considered is the curator ad litem of the child. However, as
the decision of requiring or not blood tests has serious implications
for the child, concern has been expressed as to whether that person
could competently serve this p u r p o s e . A n o t h e r  person is the
mother, though again it is doubtful whether her personal interest
in the litigation would always coincide with the general interest in
finding the true father. A third approach adopted in England
empowers the court to take the decision for the child. The basis
of this approach is that two difficulties in particular are avoided
when the courts take the decision. In the first place the curator
is spared a decision which is clearly too important to be taken by
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someone only casually involved, and secondly, the question is
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avoided of the curator of the child having to participate in a decision 
that would have a permanent effect on the status of the child, a role in 
principle limited to parents or to persons exercising parental 
authority and the courts. Due to its advantages, therefore, this approach 
deserves positive consideration in relation to opinions holding competent 
the mother or the curator ad litem.
B. OTHER METHODS
Blood testing is not the only method used to achieve certainty as to the 
paternity of the child. Other methods are being experimented with to 
complement blood test evidence though one, which is the duration of 
pregnancy, has long been in use along with ordinary evidence. Apart from 
the former, other such methods are anthropological investigation and even 
lie detector tests undertaken in countries with a criminal law approach 
to the incident of illegitimacy.
1. The duration of pregnancy. The probative value of the duration of
a particular pregnancy in relation to proven acts of intercourse has
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been discussed elsewhere in this study. However, with regard to a
birth out of wedlock, this method is of significant importance in
determining the probable date of conception and consequently in confining
investigation to the person or persons with whom the mother had had
intercourse at the particular time.^^^ Greece solves this problem
by specifying a definite time limit, in that a period of gestation
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may range from the 300th to the 18th day prior to birth, while
Scotland operates a lower framework in that an act of intercourse, outwith 
those limits, may be held to have resulted in a particular pregnancy.
It may be necessary, however, upon proof of intercourse with more 
then one man, for a more specific time of conception to be
218
determined by correlation with information as to the child's weight,
length and other details showing whether the pregnancy was normal,
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short or long. In this respect such information may supplement
blood tests if the latter has not shown exclusion of all but one of 
the mother's paramours and in the preliminary investigation may indicate 
the persons for whom tests might be carried out.
2. Anthropological investigation. A new method and, therefore, not
well tested in terms of its validity in determining paternity is the use
of data concerning inheritable characteristics. Anong scientists the
method is regarded as promising so that according to Tester, "the data
at the disposal of the physical anthropologist contains sufficient
information to determine in 19 out of 20 cases, at a level of three
sigma significance (99.73 plus probability) whether a given individual
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is the parent of a child in question". The method is based on
comparing a set of some 70 heritable traits, measurements and other 
213
factors . However, the value of those tests is currently disputed
214
by many scientists, but some countries admit those tests as a
215
supplement to inconclusive blood tests.
3. Lie detector tests. The tests are used in a few jurisdictions in the
United States but elsewhere this method in general is disregarded or
considered as valueless. A particular study in the States carried out
by Arthur and Reid^^^ claims startling conclusions concerning the
veracity of parties and witnesses in paternity proceedings, but
unfortunately this study omits to bring directly in issue the accuracy
217
of the results of the lie detector test. Nevertheless, other
countries, mainly European, clearly distrust the usefulness of those
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and Family Breakdown, pp 211-215. Mr. Justice Scarman in The Human Rights 
of those born out of Wedlock, pp 1-5, i.e. p 4, 5. Malmstrom, A. 
"Children's Welfare in Family Law" (1957) 1 Scandinavian Studies in Law
123-136; Church of England, Fatherless by Law, Chapter 4.
200. Krause, "The Creation of Relationships" op. cit. p.9, 10-11.
Arnholm "The New Norwegian Legislation", op cit. p.12. which records a
decrease from 6-7 per cent in the 1930s to about 4 per cent in the 1950s.
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201a. Sackville, R. and Lanter A. "The Disabilities of Illegitimate Children
in Australia : A preliminary analysis" in (1970) 44, Australian Law Journal
5 - 1 3 ,  51-64 S.P. no 74, par 3.17 pp 29, 30; Clive, "Aspects
of Illegitimacy", op. cit. p.236; Eekelaar, Family Law and Social 
Policy, p.263, for details on the New Zealand Act pp 263-265.
202. Tzouganatou Gasparinatou, The Judicial Recognition of Paternity, p.17,
382-3.
203. ibid. p. 16, for details on the reform, pp 374-7.
204. ibid. p.16.
205. Krause, The Creation of Relationships, p. 11 and note 46.
206. ibid. p. 12
207. ibid, P.11 and notes (51) and (52).
208. Bolivia (art. 195) Guatemala (art. 86(2)), Uraguay, Panama, Equador (art.89) 
in Krause, "The Creation of Relationships", op. cit. p.11.
209. Art. 58, as anended in 1961: In Krause supra p.11.
210. Art. 42, in Krause, supra, p.11.
211. Civil Code Revision Office, Report on the Quebec Civil Code, Vol 2.
(Quebec : Editeur official, 1977). Vol II, par.I, p.118.
212. W.P. no 74, 1979.
213. Clive, "Aspects of Illegitimacy, op. cit. p.236.
214. Cmnid. 3051. There is, however, strong opposition i.e. from legal
quarters. See Meston, "Bastards in the Law of Succession", op. cit. 203.
215. ibid, p.19.
216. "Bastards in the Law of Succession", op. cit. pp 197-8.
217. "Aspects of Illegitimacy", op. cit. 234, see also conclusion in 
p.237.
218. Stuart, "Cohabitation : the legal consequences", op. cit. p.52.
219. Memorandum No 22, proposition no 6, par. 2.18, pp 12-3.
220. Tzouganatou Gasparinatou, The Judicial Recognition of Paternity, p 11,20,21.
Michaelidis Nouaros "The Reformation of Family Law", op. cit. p.122.
Kostaras "About the Reform needed to be Introduced", p.317, A. Gazis, "The 
Necessary Reform of the Family Law" (1976), 23 No V. 102 5,
221. See supra in Nouaros, Kostaras and Gazis. Nouaros, however, suggests
the following improvements in the position of illegitimate children.
He proposes reciprocity in alimentary claims and succession: the
aliment for the judicially recognised child to be analogous to the social
position of both parents which removes the class dichotomy dominating the 
aliment due, with extension of the period that the mother should receive
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aliment if she became unemployed due to pregnancy or ante or post natal 
illness; The repealing of article 1463 par. 2. so that the child will 
become a relative to the father: the reform of and making more realistic
the exceptio plurium concubentium.
222. See articles 82-93 of the Bill.
223. Nouaros, "The Reformation of Family Law", op cit. p.123.
Gazis, "The Necessary Reform of Family Law", op. cit. p.1029.
224. Gazis, ibid. He suggests a reformed reenactment of the art. 27(2) of 
the L.D. 14.7.1926 so that the child to be judicially legitimated after 
the death of the father is subject to the following conditions :
The father was single at the time of conception, was cohabiting with the 
mother to whom he has given a promise of marriage, and had died or has
been incapacitated before the submission of the application or the
celebration of marriage.
225. See infra chapter 5.
226. See supra chapter 1 subchapter B
227. See supra for conditions in note 143 and article 1363 of the Greek Civil
Code.
228. W.P. No 74 , pars. 3.8 - 3.16 pp
229. ibid. par. 3.8, p.23
230. ibid. par. 3.9, pp 23-24.
231. ibid. par. 3.11, p.25.
232. id.
233. ibid. p.3.12 and 3.13, pp 25-7.
234. ibid. par 2.10, p.13.
235. ibid. par. 3.14, p.27.
236. ibid par 3.15,' p.27.
237. ibid. par. 3.15 p. 28
238. ibid. par . 3.16 pp 28-29.
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CHAPTER 3
1. Smith, T.B. A Short Commentary on the Law of Scotland , (Edinburgh 1962), 
p.369.
2. Adoption of Children (Scotland) Act, 1959 sect. 8(C); Sect. 18 (7) of 
the Adoption (Scotland) Act 1978. Section 2(1) of the Illegitimate 
Children (Scotland) Act 1930. See also infra in chapters 6 and 7.
3. Silver v. Walker, 1938 S, C. 595; see also infra on judicial recognition 
of paternity.
4. Art. 618 of the Gbde of CLvil Procedure. See also Tzouganatou 
Gasparinatou, The Judicial Recognition of Paternity, p.215, 259-261,
326-327; Tousis, Family Law, Vol. B, pp 145-146, 164.
5. %)peal Cburt of Athens 2613/ 1970, Acmen 25, 143; 1109/1970. Armen,
24 : 191, AP 146/1951, FEN 17 : 520.
6. Art. 1537 of the Greek Civil Gbde.
7. c.f. Art 1555 with 1545 of the Greek CLvil Gbde.
8. As Lord Justice-Clerk (Inglis) provides in Cbrrie v. Adair (1860 22 D. 897)
the obligation of the father to aliment his child arises "entirely
ex jure naturali and is one of those natural obligations to which the 
municipal law of this country has seen proper to give legal effect ..." 
p.900. In Greece this has been the matter of a dispute among scholars
i.e. with regard to the creative or probative nature of the act of 
acknowledgement. Peculiarities of the rights and duties in illegitimacy
led a number of scholars to accept the order as creative of a relationship.
Cburts with an uninterrupted continuity of decision have acknowledged
the recognizant nature of the order primarily of the blood tie existing 
between the parent and child. For detailed discussion, see Tzouganatou 
Gasparinatou, The Judicial Recognition of Paternity, pp 210-217, and 
authorities cited there. As Lasok D ., "The Legal Status of the Putative 
F ather" (1968) 17 International Gbmp. Law Quarterly 634 observes with 
reference to continental systems (which also applies to the two jurisdictions) 
with recognition of paternity " ... the biological link or the tie of
blood is given a legal significance. In other words it becomes the main
objective of proof", p.644. The same element is the hidden objective
of a declarator of paternity or bastardy with the distinction that the
marital status of the parents differentiates the legal force of the order.
9. This implies a change of principle so that the act establishing paternity
will have the same consequence as a marriage certificate in relation to 
the paternity of the child; see also Meteyard, 'Parenthood v. Marriage) 
op. cit.; For the opinion of the Chtirch of England on the matter see 
Fatherless by Law, par. 46, p.23.
10. W.P. No 74, par. 9.18, 9.19, pp 113-4.
11. For the significance of such distinction see Lasok, "The Legal Status
of the Putative F ather", op. cit. pp644-5.
12. Malmstrom "Children's Welfare in family law", op. cit. p.132.
13. W.P. no 74, Proposition no 54 and par. 9.40-9.41, pp 126-7.
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14. See supra note 8.
15. The exceptio plurium concubentium must not be seen as a de jure 
alienation of the right since neither of the mother's paramours is debarred 
from acknowledging the child. It rather points to the impossibility
of establishing the paternity of the child.
16.' Lasok, "The Status of the Putative F ather", op. cit. p.646. He 
nevertheless provides a general distinction between factual physical 
relations and legal relations which mighty though need not, be comprised 
in a notion of parental authority or custody. The former as indicated 
is the right of the citizen, the latter depends on social policy, p.648.
17. Neville Turner, J. Improving the lot of children born outside marriage - 
a comparison of three recent reforms ; England, New Zealand and West 
Germany, (London : National Qbuncil for One Parent F amilies, 1973), pp 4-5.
18. C. C. R.O. Report on the Quebec Civil Cbde, Vol I, p. 107 and Vol. II 
part 1, p.186.
19. Roy V . Purman 1958, S.C. 334; Art. 1555 of the Greek CLvil Cbde.
20. See supra in Chapter one.
20a. See W.P. no 74, par. 9.12, p.109.
21. Article 266 of the Draft of the Quebec Civil Cbde.
22. Roilos (-Koumantos), F amily Law, art. 1555 (12) p.396.
Tzouganatou Gasparinatou, The Judicial Recognition of Paternity pp 87-90; 
AP 648/ 1970, No V 19:169. Though cohabitation in itself does not have 
any legal status for the consorts or the child the regular share of 
the same dwellings by the consorts as a result of the existence of a stable 
relationship between them invoked the results of the complete judicial 
recognition for the child. AP 173/1962 (Plerum) No V , 15 887, Appeal
Cburt of Athens 133/ 1970 Armen. 24 : 444 : Cbntra Balls, F amily Law, 
para 168; ^  13/1933, Themis, 44 : 156, supporting continuous uninterrupted
cohabitation.
23. W.P. No 74, par 9.12, 9.13, pp 108-110.
24. ibid. p. 109.
25. The results of voluntary acknowledgement do not rest ipso jure in the
order on proof of any of the special circumstances referred to in the
Cbde but have to be declared in the decision of the court. Tzouganatou- 
Gasparinatou, The Judicial Recognition of Paternity, pp 273-4.
25a. A betrothal in existence, not later consummated AP 268/ 1966, No. V . 14 : 1132
26. In the previous law simple promises of marriage were sufficient (art. 15
of the L.D. 14.7.19260 The CLvil Cbde had tightened up the conditions
requiring formal engagement producing fiscal effects according to articles 
1346-1369 of the Greek CLvil Cbde. AP_912/197^V ol B, 21, 352. This
is to say promise of marriage by persons having legal capacity of marrying, 
consent of the parties and lack of -marriage impediment. Tzouganatou 
Gasparinatou, The Judicial Recognition of Paternity, pp 57-59.
27. Articles 336, 327, 328 and 339 of the Penal Obde.
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28. See for detailed analysis in Tzouganatou Gasparinatou, The Judicial
Recognition of Paternity, pp 62-79.
29. See supra and note 22,
30. According to article 1465 (2) of the Greek CLvil Gbde. It may not be
essential for the mother to cohabit with the father or to be dependent 
on him throughout the entire period of the probable date of conception 
(300 - 180 days prior to birth) -Roilos (-Koumantos),'F amily Law, 1555 (3) 
p.397. Scientific evidence proving the duration of a particular pregnancy 
may be relevant in deciding whether conception took place in cohabitation, 
or other states of dependency.
31. Acts. 1601, legal guardian; 1599 testamentary guardian; Guardian ad hoc
1602, 1662, Also the co-guardian of article 1597, the substitute guardian 
1606, of the temporary guardian 1603(2) and the guardian of the interdicted
(1686). Custody under article 1524 of the Greek Civil Cbde, or 1628, 1629,
1663 (custodian appointed by the court) and 1503, 1505, 1806 on divorce
or separation. Dependency according to Michaelidis Nouaros, Family Law,
ÇJ niversity Textbook) par. 203, p.288, must be understood to be legal, 
financial or personal, on a person having power over the mother or legal 
or moral influence. It is irrelevant if the mother agreed or consented 
to the act due to the increased responsibilities and the moral nature 
of the duties of the custodian or guardian. See Tzouganatou Gasparinatou, 
The Judicial Recognition of Paternity, pp 82-3.
31a. See WP. no 74, par. 9.9 - 9.11, pp 107-8. Similarly the draft of the 
Quebec C. C. see art 266.
31b. Neville Turner, Improving the Lot of Children, op cit. p.24.
32. Article 276 reads as follows ; "Any means of evidence which can establish
that the husband or the de facto consort is not the father of the child 
is admissible", and article 288 "Any means of evidence is admissible
to contest an action concerning filiation".
33. W.P. No 74, p.108 See also supra in Chapter 1.
34. The method of acknowledging a family relationship by unilateral declaration
without the cooperation of the public authority is unknown to the two 
jurisdictions. The status of persons comes under public order so that
the act needs to be of a public nature (see comments on art. 272 of the 
Quebec C. C. Report on the Quebec CLvil Cbde, op. cit. V ol II, (1) ppl86-7.) 
According tothe definition given by Gblin, A. (La Protection de la 
descendance illégitime" in Revue Trimestrielle -(1902), p 272) voluntary 
acknowledgement is the formal legal declaration according to which the 
acknowledging father declares the child to be his from an extra marital 
relationship as well as that he wishes the legal consequences related to 
the act of acknowledgement to become effective in the relationship. This 
approach seems to prevail in F rench and Belgian Jurisprudence while in 
Italy it is seen as a "confession" of paternity. see Roilos (-Koumantos)
F amily Law, 1532 (4) p.311. As the legal basis to provide parental rights 
and obligations is also seen by Lasok "The Legal Status of the Putative 
Father", op. cit. p. 646.
35. The problem faced here is the counterpart of that with evidence of 
primary fact. The issue there was how to sustain formality of the 
relationship in order to draw an inference of paternity by applying the 
presumption of conception. With the act of acknowledgement the father 
invokes the presumption against him and what is left in doubt is whether he
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had actually had intercourse with the mother at the relevant time.
36. See "The Illegitimate Child, 1969 S.L.T., 93; CLive "Aspects of 
Illegitimacy", pp 236-7.
37. Lasok, "The Legal Status of the Putative Father", op. cit. p 646.
In his view acknowledgement in modern practice serves as the less painful 
and certainly more effective alternative to affiliation proceedings. The
method has been much favoured by the Church of England 0* atherless by Law,
Chapter 4, i.e.par 36), and has been suggested by a number of current
commentators concerned with the abolition of the status of illegitimacy in
common law jurisdictions, see for example, Samuels, "Abolish Illegitimacy" 
op. cit. p.133; Levin "Reforming the Illegitimacy Laws", op cit. p.37.
38. Oncken's J.F . v. Reimers (1892) 19 R.519. Robbie v . Dawes, 1924 S.C. 749.
39. Walker, Principles of Scottish Private Law, p.320.
40. "Registration of Births etc. : A modern code" 1965 S.L.T. 197, pp 198-9.
41. ibid. p.199.
42. W.P. no 74, par 9.14 p.Ill; the same approach is adopted in the draft 
of the Quebec Civil Cbde, c.f. articles 266 and 282.
43. W.P. no 74, par. 9.24 p.117
44. dive, "Aspects of Illegitimacy", op. cit. p.236.
45. ibid. p.236.
46. Qnnd. 3051, par. 42, 43.
47. Meston "Bastards in the Law of Succession", op cit. p.199. For
criticism on the difficulties and the recommendations made by the 
Committee for the proof of paternity see Sackville and Lanter, "The 
DLsabilities of Illegitimate Children in Australia", op. cit. pp60-l.
48. See for example for discontinuation of aliment, MacKenzie v. Scott 1980 
S.L.T. (Notes) 9. Supplementary Benefit Commission v. Black 1968 S.L.T.
(ah Ct) 90; For the Sheriff Cburt practice see Sheriff Cburts (Scotland) Act, 
(1907), Sched. I rule 82. McDonald v. Ross, 1929 S.C. 240; Silver v .
Walker, 1938 S.C. 595; See also infra under 17 and V .
49. See for a similar approach in Samuels, "Abolish illegitimacy", op cit.
p.133; also Levin "Reforming the illegitimacy laws", op cit. p.37.
50. See W.P. no 74, par. 9.14, p llO.
51. See Levin "Reforming the Illegitimacy Laws, p.37.
Objections against this proposal are manifold, mainly arising from concern 
for the mother. See Deech, "The Reform of Illegitimacy Law" p 103;
Hayes, M. "Reports of Cbmraittees - Law Cbmmission Working Paper No 74 : 
Illegitimacy" (1980) 43 Modern Law Review, 299-306. See also N. C.U .M.C.
The Human Rights of Those Born out of Wedlock, per Dr. Olive Stone pp 57-8, 
also anonymous per p. 63.
Further objections have been expressed by the Russell Cbmmittee ( Cnnd 3051) over 
fears fbr fraudulent declarations by men to establish a claim against 
the property of the child.
52. According to the Statistics of Justice, for the year 1978 there were
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submitted 52 petitions for judicial recognition of paternity of which 
the court accepted 31, p.27, table 9. Voluntary acknowledgement of 
paternity was also recognised in the pre-code law. Article 7 of the 
L.D. 1926 provided that "The illegitimate child may be acknowledged by 
his father, and if he is dead, or lacks capacity due to incurable mental 
illness, by the parental grandfather".
52a. Opinion of Attorney General of 6^1966, No.V . 14 : 455; Opinion of
Public Prosecutor of Magistrates of Thessaloniki 5/1971, No.V . 20 : 142;
City Court of Athens, 5034^1946, Themis 57: 365; Roilos (-Koumantos),
F amily Law, 1532 (5), p 312; Spyridakis, Civil Qbde,V ol 4, 1532 (3) 
and 1540 (1).
53. See City Oburt of Athens 5034/1946, Themis 57: 365 and comments by 
M. Arsenis in this decision.
54. Tousis, Family Law, V olV , p.144 and note (4). Roilos (-Koumantos),
F amily Law, 1532 (6), pp 312-3.
55. Roilos (-Koumantos), F amily Law, 1532 (6), p.314. contra Michaelidis
Nouaros, Family Law, University Textbook), p.281. Balls, F amily Law, 
par. 161, 5.
56. Roilos (-Koumantos) F amily Law, 1532 (6), p.312.
57. Art. 1533 of the Greek Civil Cbde. The reasons for requiring formality
according to Roilos (-Koumantos), (ibid 1533/7a, pp 319-20) are to 
invest "major guarantees" in the act, to provide the child with safer 
proof as well as to be distinguished from judicial or extra judicial 
admissions by the father which have only evidential value.
58. Art. 1534 (2) of the Greek Civil Cbde, Tousis, F amily Law,V ol B p.149,
and note (20).
59. V allindas. Family Law, pp 154-5; Roilos (-Koumantos), F amily Law, 1533
(7) p.320.
60. There is no need for the use of formal expressions in the acknowledging
deed or will. However the intention to acknowledge the child must be explicit 
AP loV 1958, Neon Dikaion 14: 457; AP 132^1974 No. V 23:859; Roilos 
(-Koumantos), F amily Law, 1533, (8) (a).
61. Tousis, F amily Law, Vol B p 149. Michaelidis Nouaros, F amily Law 
CJniversity Textbook), p.283.
62. There is no restriction on the right of the father to acknowledge the
child nor does its exercise depend upon any terms or conditions. His wife's 
consent is not needed when he is married : j^peal Gburt of Thessaloniki
187/1957, No. V , 5:683; nor is acceptance of acknowledgement by the child 
necessary : 103/ 1958 E.E.N. 25 : 601; AP 1329/1974 Norn. V . 23 : 859. In
accord with the view that paternal acknowledgement merely declares and
does not create paternity, voluntary acknowledgement, by being free of 
terms and conditions, presents characteristics inherent to the presumption 
of conception in marriage. It differs, however, in the sense that in 
legitimacy the cause for raising thepresumption pre-dates birth (marriage 
certificate) whereas in acknowledgement it is developed later.
63. The incapacitation required is in its factual sense. Therefore, the
right transmits to the paternal grandfather even though the father has 
not been formally incapacitated : Spyridakis, Civil OOde V ol 4, 1532 (5)
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Roilos (-Koumantos) , F amily Law, 1532 (10) p317; Tousis, Family Law,
Vol B, p. 143 and note 1(b).
64. The grounds are inclusive. Thus analogy is prohibited-Spyridakis,
Civil Cbde, 1532, (6).
55. Article 1534 of the Greek Civil Code.
66. Tousis, F amily Law, V ol. B, p.143.
57. ibid.Vol B, p.148; Roilos (-Koumantos), F amily Law, 1534, (6), p.322.
68. ibid. 1534 (6), (7), pp 322-324.
69. Vallindas, F amily Law, p 185; Balls, Family Law, para 161 (7);
City Gburt of Karditsa 6/1976, E.E.N. 43 : 496. j^peal Gburt of 
Thessaloniki 336/1937, E.E.N. 4 : 793.
70. See supra in note 62; Also Tousis, F amily Law,V ol B, p 145, 147.
71. Art. 1535 of the Greek Civil Cbde.
72. %peal Gburt of Athens 236/1949 E.E.N. 17 : lOl; Tousis,F amily Law
Vol. B. pp 150-1.
73. Spyridakis, Civil Cbde, 1535 (1); Roilos (-Koumantos), F amily Law,
1535 (9), p.325.
74. The contestant has to prove that intercourse between the acknowledging
father and the mother did not take place at the probable date of
conception. The use of blood tests is admissible. See Michaelidis 
Nouaros "The proof of paternity using blood test, according to our law". 
(1966), 22, E.E.N. 289. Also F aramanos, G. "The analysis of blood as 
evidence in civil litigations", (1964) 12, No.V. 65-70. For the 
objectives of proof in general see Tousis, F amily Law, V ol B, pp 152-3.
75. Under the same procedure as in disavowal of paternity of articles 615-622 of
the Cbde of Civil procedure. See Chapter 1 C. supra.
76. Article 1536 of the Greek Civil Obde.
77. Article 127 of the Greek Civil Code.
78. See C.C.R.O. Report on the Quebec Civil Obde Vol II, Part 1, pp 186-7.
79. ibid. p.187.
80. This can be evidence showing uninterrupted possession of status upon any 
adequate combination of facts indicating the truthfulness of the 
acknowledged relationship, i.e. the presentation of the child to the 
paternal relatives; evidence indicating involvement of the father in less 
serious aspects of the child's life (visits to his school, hospital, etc.)
81. W.P. no 74, par. 9.33 pp 122-3.
82. F atherless by Law, Chapter 2, i.e. pars. 16, 17, pp 8-10.
83. See per Lord Scarman, per L. Blom Gboper and Dr. R. Williams, in
The human rights of those born out of wedlock, p.3. 47-8, 52-56
respectively; "The Illegitimate Child" op. cit. p.93.
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Law, 228.; Samuels "Abolish illegitimacy", op cit. p.133; Levin, 
"Reforming the Illegitimacy Laws" op. cit., p.38; Meteyard, "Parenthood 
V. Marriage", op. cit. p.208.
84. See for example supra Samuels, p.133- Levin, p.37.
85. Qnnd. 3051 par 36-44, i.e. par 40; See for discussion Meston "Bastards 
in the Law of Succession", op cit. p.199.
86. ibid, p.199
87. W.P. No 64, p.9.33, p.122.
88. Meston "Bastards in the Law of Succession", op. cit. p.199.
89. W.P. No. 74, pars. 9.33-9.38, pp 122-125,
90. "Abolish Illegitimacy", op. cit. p.132.
91. W.P. no 74, par. 2.27, pp 118-9.
92. ibid. par 9.28, p.119 and 9.40 p.126.
93. ibid. par. 9.28, p.119
93a. The point was first raised by Acnhol, "Parent and Children", op.cit. 
p.16 and is further discussed by Deech, "The Reform of Illegitimacy 
Law", op. cit. p.102 in relation to the position of the wife in 
selected cases.
94. Qnnd 3051 par. 41; See also Meston "Bastards in the law of succession" 
op. cit. p.199.
94a. F atherless by law, par 56, pp 27.28.
95 "Reforming the Illegitimacy Laws", op. cit. pp 38-39.
96. "Aspects of Illegitimacy", op. cit. p.237.
97. "Parenthood v. Marriage", op. cit. pp 208-9. i.e. p 209.
98. See also comments by Deech, "The reform of illegitimacy law", op. cit. 
pp 103-4.
99. Macaulay v. Hussain 1966 S.C.204 ; Grant v. Cbuntess of Seafield 1926
SC 274, p.290; D. Walker, The Law of Civil Remedies in Scotland, 
(Edinburgh : Green and Son Ltd. 1974), p.120.
100. Walker, Civil Remedies, p.121.
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President Clyde, p.312.
102. 1928. S.C. 240 at p.249.
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104. 1938 S.C. 595.
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107. Per Lord MacKay at p.598-9. See also Turnbull v. Wilsons and 
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108. Per Lord Sands, p.248. Underlining mine.
109. Per Lord Morrison, p.252.
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effort to resolve the matter has been attempted by Section 11 of the
Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provision) (Scotland) Act 1968, though not
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ADOPTION
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I N T R O D U C T O R Y  C O N S I D E R A T I O N S
Adoption as it is understood in the present law is the publicly
approved irrevocable transfer of a child from one legal family, which
failed to serve its welfare, to another. In this respect it is a
mixed institution that features characteristics of both family law and
social policy. From a historical point of view, however, the
institution is not a modern one but rather one which has undergone
a transformation in its purposes. In fact, adoption was well known
in ancient Greece and in Roman law as a device to produce descendants,
initially for the purposes of ancestor worship and later to provide
heirs. In the so-called despotic form the institution was transmitted
into civil legislation of the pgth century^ and was subsequently made part
of the Greek civil code. With the introduction of Legislative Decree
3245/1966 the objectives of the institution were changed for adoptions
concerning persons below the age of 18. Adoption ceased to be
exclusively a matter of private law but took on strong elements of
social policy so that today it comes to be viewed as a device to help
childless couples to children andrmore, parentless children to parents.
The current Legislative Decree 610/1970, which replaced the Decree of
1966, operates in line with this philanthropic approach. In Scotland,
on the other hand, as in many Common Law jurisdictions, legal adoption
2
was unavailable until early in this century. It was first introduced
with the Adoption of Children (Scotland) Act of 1930 aiming to fill the 
gap left by the lack of parental care provision in the welfare network. 
Theinitial purpose, therefore, was to serve the interests of the child 
and, within this basic frame weie enacted the subsequent 1958 Act and the 
1978 Adoption(Scotland)Act, currently in force.
However, adoption is regarded today as a device for creating parenthood
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under circumstances advancing the welfare of the child which
requires careful consideration in relation to the concept of legal
family as well as to that of natural parenthood. For a number of
reasons, some explained in the previous chapters, the two jurisdictions
consider it appropriate to delegate the bulk of the responsibility
for the upbringing of the child to his natural parents. It is suggested
that the welfare of the child is best secured within his own nuclear
family if it is a happy and stable one. within the wider natural
family too, there may be a strong bond which it is better to preserve.^
But some natural parents, it is clear, will refuse to exercise the
rights and concomitant obligations arising from the relationship,
while other persons will, for a number of reasons, be only too anxious
to assume them. In such circumstances, with adoption, the legal
relationship with the natural parents is replaced by that with the
adopters and the child is treated henceforth, for most purposes, as if
4
he had been born to the adoptive parents. However, from regarding
the relationship with the natural paœrts ae irremediably broken or as 
non-existent to the vesting of the rights in a stranger is a long 
process with crucial implications for both sets of parents and 
the child, with a number of questions to be answered. For instance
to what extent has it been made certain that it is impossible to 
ascertain the natural father before placing a child born out of wedlock 
for adoption, or to what extent has the survival of the natural 
relationship been assessed before the decision to alienate the child 
from his natural parents has been taken.
Furthermore, neither current law nor practice preclude by definition 
the adoption of one's own child. Nevertheless, it is suggested that 
adoption by a parent of his or her own child may not in some 
circumstances be appropriate, at least from the child's point of view, 
or even tha^ in general, adoption is not appropriate for a parent's
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own child. Indeed as a device capable of creating situations
equivalent either to that of the legal family, or^in terms of the
parent-child relationship, to that of legitimacy, adoption has often
been abused in order to remedy the odd consequences of illegitimacy.
In fact where illegitimacy was a problem adoption was frequently
suggested to be the proper solution. This however merely emphasise the
irregularity of the parents/, union to a point where the damage
to the case of illegitimates may be considerable either in depriving
the child of any link with the other natural parent or in distracting
attention from the demand for equality by offering a compromise as an
alternative.^ Moreover, adoption has been used as a remedy for
the consequences of a breakdown of marriage and to integrate the child
in a newly formed family. In such circumstances, without disputing
the fact that in a number of cases adoption has offered a valuable
service to the children, it is argued that in others it has functioned
mainly to bolster the concept of the legal family, whenever biological
parenthood has failed to do so. However, it is necessary to recognise
adoption for what it is, namely "an artificial and legal relationships
not to read into it something of the nature of a real substitute for a
7
natural relationship'.' Probably this is the strength and not the
weakness of adoption for "there is a growing acceptance that bringing 
up children by adoption is basically different from bringing up natural 
children'.'^
The tentative conclusion, then, is that adoption should not be used 
as a compromise solution to a demand for reform in certain areas of 
family law, nor should it be used, unless strictly necessary, to alienate 
the rights of the ex-spouse or Of the natural parent in order to produce 
traditional family circumstances for the child.
Why then is there a need to maintain such a radical institution with
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the objective of creating artificial parenthood. In fact, there are many
different forms of child care comprehended with the broad area of
child welfare measures but none of them provide a cure for problems
remediable in family circumstances. In a broad sense, the problems
regarded as remediable by adoption can be classified under the term
"factual parental failure in his duties towards the child". In this
context adoption should be distinguished from a pure institution of
family law and should be placed among the welfare measures aiming
to provide a family therapy for a certain problem as Fisher puts
it "as a social service for the child only where there is no other
9
viable actual or legal family relationship". In respect of this
broad definition of the scope of adoption the fact that becomes clear is 
that one should deal with adoption on a flexible basis both in itself and 
also in relation to the wider more comprehensive social service of which 
adoption forms only a part. Indeed the need for adoption under welfare
policy emerges from the belief that the family is the most adequate way
to care for the child whose parents had failed to do so, unless that child 
presents particular difficulties requiring therapy of a different nature “ 
tamely, guardianship, custody, fostering, or commitment to a residential 
establishment. These are measures aimed at providing therapy where a 
child's problems are classified as temporary. Adoption, in this
context, poses an exceptional solution because^by integrating the 
child in a new familyy it removes the child permanently from his troubled 
environment and at the same time places it within a context designed 
to provide care and maintenance for life. To fulfil the latter 
purpose adoption presents certain distinct advantages notwithstanding 
that it has certain disadvantages as well.
In the first place adoption has the advantage of being a radical 
solution cutting off any tie with the natural family and creating a new 
artificial tie between adopters and adoptee as if the child was born to
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them in marriage. Second, it provides the option of choosing 
the parents of the child and the circumstances in which the child 
will be brought up. Third, it is a family institution and as such 
it is subject to all measures provided for the family by family law, 
notwithstanding that as an institution which involves minor persons it 
is susceptible to welfare considerations and intervention by the state. 
In the latter context adoption is accessible to additional patronage 
by the welfare authorities and can be financially subsidised or granted 
certain official facilities and in general can have the active 
support of the state for the broad protection of the child.
On the other hand, so far as adoption features irrevocable transfer from 
one family to another, it involves dangers in the case of unsuccessful 
placement, being a measure without practical alternative of the same 
standard. Consequently the child may have to return to its earlier 
misfortune and, most probably, pass through the same procedure for a 
new placement.
Moreover, adoption has crucial implications for two sets of parents.
The natural parents will suffer the emotional strain of being deprived 
of their child, while the adoptive family will have to readjust their 
lives and accept an increase in responsibilities to accommodate the 
new member of the family. However, the most significant drawback to
be noted arises from a practice prominent in the past and still open 
to revival. Traditionally adoption has functioned to provide
children for the childless, this having a considerable effect on the 
choice of children that could be placed. Adoptive parents usually 
applied for adoption in the interests of completing their family, 
either because they were childless, or had just one child, and 
accordingly came to be selective about the background of the child.
Until recently it was possible to satisfy such selectiveness because
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illegitimate children , as the main source of adoptees, were placed
from infancy and, therefore, as unshaped by environment. But with
the recent legislative improvement and with the prospect of
assimilation of all classes of children, many potential adopters may
not be provided with this option. On the contrary, the institution
may come to cater for placements that require greater skill, for
example in facilitating the placement of children from very troubled
backgrounds for whose rehabilitation today in family circumstances it
is almost impossible to provide. Therefore, although the concern
of the adopters to complete their family provides them with an
interest in having the child, special care must be taken to assess
12
such adopters against persons with more altruistic interests.
Having considered the need for and the advantages and disadvantages of 
adoption, it is time to turn to the children that the institution should 
benefit.
As a matter of fact the law of the two countries does not generally
contain any provisions specifying the categories of persons to whom
preference should be given when adoption is contemplated. Prima facie
they seem to permit the adoption of any child if that child falls
13
within the age limits However, an indirect restriction is
posed in Section 6 of the Act and by article 2(1) of the Decree 
which requires that any adoption should serve the welfare of the child. 
Among the factors then to be taken into consideration is whether his 
welfare could be better served if ties with the natural family were 
preserved. In this context it is difficult to enumerate 
instances but broadly speaking one might confine adoption to 
cases where there is danger to or maladjustment of the child's welfare 
either because there is no natural family to care for it or.
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though one exists, it is beyond any hope of protecting the child.
On this basis, adoption may be considered in cases where the treatment
of the child by its parents is socially disapproved of and the problem
14is susceptible to remedy in family patterns. Such circumstances
may apply as much to children living in a two-parent family as to 
children born out of wedlock, orphans, neglected or abandoned children 
and in general to any child living in unsettled conditions under a 
legal or other status and whose case can be better served by adoption. 
And similarly, the welfare of ex-inmates of residential establishments 
can be facilitated if placed with persons qualified to help them to 
return to normal life. The same applies to handicapped children if 
placed with patient persons who have the time and willingness to care 
for them.
In view of the tasks of the institution of adoption in creating a 
functioning parent-child relationship on the basis of promoting the 
welfare of the child, the concern of this section is an analytical 
survey of the legal and other procedural aspects of this area of the 
law. This will employ four chapters. In the first, the historical 
development of the law and of policy toward the child in adoption 
will be considered; in the second the qualifications for and 
conditions of adoption; in the third the consents required; and 
in the fourth the procedural aspects and the effects of the placement.
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C H A P T E R  F O U R
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW AND THE WELFARE OF THE CHILD
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
I. Adoption in ancient Greece
Traces of adoption as an institution creating blood ties between strangers
can be found in the Homeric period, as well as in many legal systems of
the ancient world.^ It was a well recognised practice in countries
of the Near East and the Mediterranean and probably the Greeks borrowed
it from there. Colquhoun in his study A Summary of Roman Law suspects
the country of origin to be Egypt because "many Grecian customs may be
traced (back) to Egypt" so that "it is not impossible that adoption may
2
also be of Egyptian origin" On the contrary, Isaeus in the Estate of 
Menecles makes a statement which implies that adoption was well known 
and practised from anterior periods in "Barbarian" countries and that 
the Hellenic practice was influenced by them.^ However, taking into
4
account the facts that evidence confirms its existence in such countries
but that there is no evidence to prove either Colquhoun's hypothesis
or Isaeus' assertion it will therefore remain uncertain what social
purpose and needs adoption came to fulfil in the first place. Colquhoun's
hypothesis is, perhaps, supported by an instance of advanced mode of
5
adoption from the Old Testament where the child was surrendered to a 
childless person with the cooperation of secular and religious authorities 
(also essential elements of adoption in Greece). Eaually , one cannot 
deny that the origins of Hellenic religious customs are also present in 
other Mediterranean countries, and can be seen as a mixture of elements 
from various neighbouring peoples.
However, although the origins of the institution are lost in time there
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is reliable written evidence that it flourished in Ancient Greece. 
Apart from Isaeus, Demosthenes^ left evidence of provisions vested in 
Athenian adoption laws, mostly enacted by Solon. Spinellis and 
Sachor-Landaii refer to Aristotle, who mentions the law of adoption
7
drafted by Philolaos for the inhabitants of Thebes, Herodotus
discussed Spartan adoption practices^ and Isocrates referred to those 
9
of Aegina. Moreover, they refer to the Cretan Law of Gortys
as regulating conditions of a d o p t i o n . T h e  same authors also
state that the main reason for adoption flourishing in Ancient Greece
was that "the various states made it mandatory so that childless
families would not disappear and along with them the income derived
12from their taxation". However, irrespective of whether or not
adoption has been facilitated within the context of state policy, there 
is evidence of the types and conditions of adoption in Ancient Greece 
which shows clearly a concern to fulfil the needs of the individual 
involved.
Early evidence concerning the practice of adoption in the Athenian
state describes the objective of the institution as aiming to fulfil
the needs of the childless, either in ^deviating the childlessness as
such or in providing the continuation of the family line. Thus, it
was permitted for an Athenian citizen to adopt a male or female child
solely as a consolation for the misfortune of not having issue of his
own body. In this context, childlessness was a prerequisite and the
child was integrated within the family of the adopter, placed in his 
13agnatic line. Adoption also vested natural rights and obligations
and the child was deemed as issue of the marriage of the adopter and
submitted to his potestas. The child could inherit from the father
and the latter was barred from prejudicing the rights in succession of 
14
the child. Only occasionally however would a man adopt a woman
as his daughter, because this would not in itself directly provide a
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person properly qualified to perform the family rites. The normal
practice concerned the adoption of male children^^ by an adopter
"being of sound mind, ... in his life time, or by will contingently
17
on none being born after his death, or if born, dying under age".
The stimulus behind this practice was to prevent the family from 
becoming extinct for the want of male heirs who would worship their 
ancestors and pray to the Hephestious Gods. In such adoptions most 
probably a sacred ceremony was performed where the adoptee entered the 
sacred rites of the adoptive family.
It is worth pointing out that each objective of adoption had its own 
value in the Athenian society despite the fact that writers usually 
emphasize the need to prevent the agnatic line from becoming extinct.
Most probably this is explained in terms of a failure to distinguish 
between the norms of the Athenian family and the patriarchic norms 
that governed the Hellenic family of anterior times. Indeed, religious 
beliefs and their concomitant patriarchic tendencies, though present 
in the Athenian family, were not of primary concern and adoption was 
focussed, to a great extent, on alleviating the emotional strains of 
childlessness. This is sufficiently supported by the fact that the 
law permitted the adoption of females as well as males. In the 
Hereditary Portion of Menecles Isaeus describes adoption as the only
19
refuge from "loneliness, and consolation in the life" of the childless.
II. Adoption in the Roman Law
Adoption was transmitted from Greece to the Romans where it acquired 
a more integrated development. During the Republic, private religious 
law strongly favoured the existence of children in families. As 
Colquhoun states "the private sacred rights inherent in Roman families 
..., were always jealously preserved by each succeeding generation"; 
moreover "The decemviral law, too, enjoined their preservation sacra
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privata perpétua memento, and persons were seriously blamed who allowed
or caused them to be lost".^^ However, because pure religious
beliefs did not remain the only motive for submitting a child to an
alien family, the institution required also to fulfil the practical
21needs of Roman society. Thus the transfer of parental authority
from one person to another was possible in two distinctive modes -
adrogation and adoption - with different procedures, status and results;
the use of either mode was dependent on the interests of the adopter,
providing the relevant conditions were satisfied. Therefore, a
person who wanted to continue his agnatic line had to adopt a person
22
who was sui juris, following a procedure before the comitia calata
where both the intending father and son were open to interrogation.
The procedure required the cooperation of a religious body
as well to determine whether in all circumstances the proposed
23
adrogation would be lawful and justifiable. The next steps in
the procedure were the creation of the patrias potestas by order of 
the people (populi auctoritate) and the renunciation (detestation) by 
the adrogatus of his erstwhile sacra and acceptance of those of the new 
family.
The effects of adrogation was topfee ihe adrogatus and his family under
potestas of adrogator. This extended to his property also, like a
succession inter vivos. However, certain liabilities of the adrogatus
25
were retained if burdening his own property. The rank and
privileges of the new family were vested in the person of the adrogatus 
if he passed from a plebeian to a patrician gens, but he would lose part 
of them if he passed from a patrician to a plebeian one.
On the other hand, adoption strictu sensu was an institution where the 
transfer of a person alieni juris was effected, from one potestas to 
another under private law procedure. Though its origins are not clear
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it existed in the Republic^^ and Thomas places it in a later period 
27
than adrogation. However, if the Hellenic system was transferred
to Rome the formula may have been retained in the same context, namely 
to provide a child and an heir without reference to further purposes 
concerning metaphysical devotions. Thus, it was applicable to both 
sexes and extended even to somebody having issue of his body.
The procedure was informal and could be performed in three ways; at 
home by the Quiritian law of ownership; by testament and officially 
before the competent authority.
The cardinal aim of adoption was to provide an heir and transfer
authority from one person to another in instances where obligations
to continue the existence of the family were of secondary concern.
Therefore, though the child was treated as a natural one, adoption
affected only himself, and, if he had children, these remained in the
29
potestas of his natural father unless they were adopted as well. In 
all other respects, the child was deemed born to the adoptive parent 
in lawful marriage and could inherit through him and add to his own 
name that of the a d o p t e r . T h e  adoptee remained cognatically related 
to his previous family and succeeded only cognatically to the estate 
of his natural family.
A number of formalities and concomitant conditions were settled for 
adrogation and adoption. Firstly, in adrogation only Roman citizens 
could participate either as adrogatus or adrogator because only they 
could appear before the comitia calata. Moreover, the adrogator had 
to be over sixty years of age and married without children of his own. 
Marriage was necessary to discourage celibacy and the age limit was 
essential as till then one could have had children. Women and 
pupils were excluded from the proceedings as well as deaf and dumb
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persons, because of their inability to understand the procedure.
Adoption itself was less formal and followed the procedure of 
requiring the adopter to be potentially capable of begetting an issue
32
and old enough to be father of the child but not necessarily married. 
Adoption in the status of grandchild was also permitted, provided 
there was the necessary age gap of two adolescences.
Changes for either mode of adoption were introduced in practice at
the Republican and early Imperial periods lasting until the days of
Justinian who considerably altered the form of adoption. Firstly, by
the end of the 1st century. Galba introduced the adrogation per scriptum 
33principis, which removed the technical bar preventing adrogation of
impubes, and w o m e n . I n  the new procedure the adrogatus did not have
to attend the comitia so by the time of AntonindsPius, the adoption of
an impubes was permitted subject to numerous safeguards for the child's 
35interest. Maybe this period should be seen as a decisive stage
in evolving a policy towards c h i l d r e n . I n d e e d  at this time there 
is also to be seen the first defeat of absolute parental authority in 
order to protect the child. The state assumed power to deny any
placement unless it served the interest of the child by requiring
"a strLhgent inquiry to be made into the advantages of adrogation for
37 it
the boy". , Furthermore, Antoninus Pius, in order to protect the
property of those adrogated, provided that the adrogator must give an
assurance of restoring the property that the child brought with him to
thoseentitled, if the adrogatus died while still impubes, and, moreover,
he extended this to the instance of his being disinherited or
emancipated without just cause, in which event the adrogatus was
entitled to claim his own property and k of the adrogator's estate.
Adrogation of women also became possible per scriptum principis, though
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it was not common in pagan times, as they could only prolong the family 
for one generation. However, after the period of Antoninus Pius, it 
became a recognised practice.
In the course of time the material needs became regarded as more
important than religious beliefs and this resulted in the adoption of
persons without submitting to the potestas of the adopter but simply
39by undertaking rights and obligations of the natural child. With
these changes adoption by a woman became possible, in the first
40
place to alleviate the loss of her own children and later by the Novel
41
17 of Leo, without restrictions save that she satisfied the conditions.
An innovation introduced at that time by Justinus was the prohibition
of adoption by the natural parent of his child born to a concubine.
42
This was confirmed by Justinian in his Novels.
Another important enactment concerned the age difference between adopter
and adoptee. Namely, in relation to the maxim "adoption imitates
nature", an age difference of a full adolescence, that is to say
18 years, was required, as it would be un-natural for the son to be
43approximate!^ the age of, or to be older than the father. This was
laid down in this mode by Justinus, though incidence of its abuse was
known in earlier times when Claudius was adopted by a plebian younger
44
than himself, in direct violation of the existing usage.
In the Justinian period two types of adoption were formulated in an 
attempt to promote in-family adoptions. However, there is some 
suspicion that Justinian introduced these changes to override the 
inconvenience of children found without succession rights in the agnatic 
line, because they left the natural family and afterwards were
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emancipated by the adopter. These types of adoption had
different effects with regard to whether or not the persons’involved
46were blood relatives or strangers. Therefore, when a child was
given for adoption to an ascendant in the paternal or maternal line,
this was considered adoption with full effects and resulted in a
complete relationship (adoptio plena), while, when the adopter was a
stranger, the adoption had limited effects involving succession
47
rights (adoptio minus plena). In the first instance the child was
removed from his parents' home and authority was submitted to that of 
the adopter. He/she was then deemed as his legitimate descendant 
with natural parent-child reciprocal rights and obligations. The 
second type, without affecting status with the natural family, provided 
an intestate heir for the adopter. The child remained in its natural 
home under the authority of the natural parents and had succession 
rights and the compulsory portion in their estate.
Ill. The Post Byzantine period and the rise of the new state
Adoption as advanced by Justinian remained in Greece till the end of 
48the 19th century. However, because the practice of private law under
the Ottoman occupation was submitted to the clergy, who proved to be
keen in preserving the Byzantine tradition, adoption in this form was
soon outdated. A reform, attempted by the decree of 1874,affected
the conditions and procedure in some measure but failed to make any
major innovations. As a result formal adoption was replaced by de
facto placements in the form of permanent fostering or child caring
contracts. The first, mainly developed in customary law, provided
an obligation for the child to respect the quasi-adopter (psychogonea),
to offer his services to him and for the parent to maintain the child
49
and establish him or her financially. The second was closer to do
facto adoption and could be effected with a formal "child caring contract"
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containing a promise of aliment and an irrevocable donation post-mortem.
IV. End of Nineteenth and beginning of Twentieth Centuries 
The ccdificatLon of the nineteenth and twentieth century followed a 
narrow path by simplifying the Justinian legislation and unifying it 
into one system with characteristics of adrogation and adoption minus 
plena. In Greece the first attempt to establish a uniform practice
was made with the Law 2310 which recognised the similar rights and 
reciprocity in interstate succession for either mode of adoption and
51
restricted the relationship to the persons of the adopter and adoptee.
The drafters of the civil code planned a similar framework but placed
emphasis on the institution of adrogation,as regards the qualifications
and conditions, and on adoption minus plena, as regards the results
of the adoption. For the latter, however, they introduced two distinct
modifications: (a) certain rights and duties in relation to the
natural family remained in force side by side with, or alternatively
52
to, the rights of the adopter; (b) reciprocity in intestate succession
between adopter and adoptee was repealed but it was retained in
53
relation to the natural family. Otherwise, they kept a high age
limit for the adopter reduced from 60 (as it was in adrogation) to
50 years of age,^^ as well as childlessness^^ as a necessary prerequisite
of the applicant. Other distinct characteristics of adoption in the
civil code are the prohibition against prejudicing the rights of the
adoptee by applying for a second adoption,although it was permitted
57
to adopt more than one child in the same order, and the prohibition
against someone adopting his own natural c h i l d . T h e r e  are also 
no restrictions as to the age of the adoptee. One could competently 
apply for the adoption of an adult provided that one satisfies the
59
conditions and that one is older than the adoptee by a full adolescence.
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The rise of the welfare policy in relation to adoption in Scotland 
and Greece in the twentieth century.
As in many common law jurisdictions the institution of adoption was not
60
recognised in Scots law though de facto adoptions were very common.
The basic characteristic of those placements was thah whatever the 
solemnity in the agreement handing the child to another person, it was 
always open to a parent to reclaim the c h i l d . L e g a l  force in 
placements was first given with the Adoption (Scotland) Act, 1930 which 
was at the time regarded rightly as a basic innovation in the law.
As Fisher points out it was enacted only after a considerable struggle. 
Fears were expressed about the possibility of finding far more parents 
anxious to get rid of children by way of adoption than persons prepared 
to adopt them. This, though, was a consistertmisjudgement as the 
facts later demonstrated.^^ In fact, it was not until after two
Committees, the initial one in 1920 and the second in 1925, had reported
64favourably on legal adoption that adoption was legalized by statute. 
Indeed in M.O. Stone's words " ... legal adoption in this country
provides an example which must be unusual, if not quite unparalleled 
of the complete failure of authority, executive and legislative, no less 
than judicial, to gauge the force and direction of social pressures.
For this the judges must bear the initial responsibility, since it was 
they who persistently upheld the inalienability of parents' rights, 
however neglectful or incapable of parental duties parents might have 
proved".
However, whatever the basis of the struggle, the important point about 
the enactment is that the modern concept of adoption was incorpor­
ated in the Act. Following the well established approach in custody 
cases directed towards the welfare of the child, provision was made so
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that no adoption order could be granted unless serving the welfare
of the child, which had to be of first and paramount consideration.
Clearly such stipulation could prevent any undue alienation of parental
rights. Because of this balanced setting of the institution within the
welfare network no significant changes were made to adoption legislation
for a considerable time, even taking into account those suggested by
66
the Hurst Committee reporting some twenty five years later.
The Adoption Act of 1958,^^ the Adoption (Sederunt) Act 1959,^^ the
Adoption Act 1964,^^ and the Adoption Act 1968,^^ followed a similar
pattern. Nevertheless, the present Adoption '(Scotland) Act, 1978, a
71result of the proposals of the Houghton Committee, made a considerable
number of important innovations which will be dealt with in the following
chapters. The innovative attempts of this Act should perhaps come
as no surprise for recent years have seen the enactment of reforming
legislation affecting the legal position of children to a major extent
and are no doubt part of the impetus of an increasing desire to safeguard
72and promote the welfare of the child.
In Greece, on the other hand, the stipulations of the civil code were
inherently inadequate to manipulate adoption as a welfare device in
the service of children. The reasons were manifold - relating to
the historical objectives of the institution, the conditions prevailing
at the time of the preparatory works and the concept of the family that
the drafters had in mind. Agni Rousopoulou in her article "The reform
73under consideration for the law of adoption" expresses the opinion
that,during the preparation of the civil code, the drafters had in mind
a close agricultural family so that they impregnated ' the law with the
duty to consolidate the childless, as well as with precautions against the
74
exploitation of young labourers by way of adoption.
75
A similar view seems to be supported by Daes, while
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G. Michaelidis Nouaros, without disregarding the ideas contained in
the relevant articles, in a more pragmatic analysis, stresses both
the impossibility of the drafters forecasting such needs, as well as
the necessity for the adoption law as provided in the civil code for
the more general needs - present and future - of the Greek society.
Therefore, he regards the stipulations of the civil code as a useful
77
part of the legislation, worthy of preservation, a view which is
78also shared by Agni Rousopoulou . Admitting , on the other hand,
the inadequacy of the civil code to implement adoption as a social
service, he explains the causes as lying in the mixed origin of the
legislation on adoption, which resulted from fundamentally different
concerns than the welfare of the child. As a solution he suggests
the enactment of a decree to be in parallel force with the civil code
79aimed at governing the adoption of minor persons. The appreciation
expressed by Nouaros was shared by many Greek jurists^^ so that by the 
early sixties it had matured into the idea of reforming the adoption 
law and directing it towards the welfare of the child. The only 
point that caused some disagreement was whether the task should be 
carried out by substantial reform of the civil code or by an independent 
decree. The second opinion prevailed and the law 4532/1966 passed
through parliament for non-emancipated adoptees below 18 years of age.
It should be noted,however, that the Scottish history is repealed 
in Greece as regards the struggle to pass the law. In 1959 the Ministry 
of Justice appointed a committee to reform the law on adoption but its 
proposals did not come to anything. It was only after the International 
Convention on Adoption af the Council of Europe that a new committee 
was appointed which drafted the Legislative Decree 4532/1966.^^ This 
Decree now has been reformed and consolidated by the Legislative 
Decree 610/1970 which brought in a considerable number of changes.
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V. The Basic Characteristics and Structure of the Law In the Two 
Countries.
What characterises the law in both countries today is an effort to take 
proper advantage of the option in the law of adoption to choose the 
parents of the child both by avoiding undue risks in the placement 
and minimising the sacrifice to the rights of the natural parents.
To this end, the Adoption (Scotland) Act 1978 in the first part deals 
with the Adoption service in its narrow and in its broad sense. Thus 
Sections 1 - 5  and 8 - 1 1  deal with various aspects of the operation 
and functions of adoption services while Section 6 makes provision so 
that no decision would be taken without giving first consideration to 
the welfare of the child. At the same time. Section 7 provides for 
taking into account the wishes of parents as to the religious upbringing 
of the child. Part II of the Act relates to the adoption orders 
themselves. It starts by defining the adoption order and the period 
that the child has to stay with the adopters prior to adoption and 
continues with the qualifications and conditions for married and 
single applicants. This part also refers to the consent of the parents, 
relinquishment procedure, transfer of parental rights from one adoption 
agency to another, the notice that has to be served to the local 
authority, the reports that have to be prepared, restrictions on the 
making of an adoption order, as well as interim orders and the care of
the child on the refusal of an adoption order. Part III of the
Act refers to the care and protection of children awaiting adoption.
Thus, there is provision against removing the child if adoption has 
been agreed or parental rights have been relinquished or if the applicant 
has provided a home for the child for the past five years, as, also, 
for the return of the child, if it has been taken away in breach of
the above conditions. Moreover, this part provides for the return of
children placed for adoption by adoption agencies and specifies
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the conditions for return if the child has not been placed for 
adoption. One of the most important aspects of this part is 
the definition of "protected children" and the local authority's 
duty to secure the wellbeing of those children, to take care in 
removing them from unsuitable surroundings, the duties of persons 
caring for protected children to notify the local authority of change 
in their address, and finally offences and miscellaneous provisions 
related to protected children. Part IV relates to the status
of adopted children by giving the meaning of Adoption order' and stating 
the status of an adopted child. Within this section are contained 
stipulations concerning the citizenship of the child, the pensions 
payable to children, insurance, the effects of the order on succession 
and inter vivos deeds, and miscellaneous provisions relating to status. 
Part V covers the registration and revocation of adoption orders and 
conventional adoption orders, deals with the Adopted Children Register, 
the revocation of an order made in respect of the natural parent of 
a child born out of wedlock if legitimated per subsequens matrimonium, 
the annulment of overseas adoptions and supplementary provisions. 
Finally, part VI contains miscellaneous and supplementary provisions 
concerning adoption of children abroad, penal provisions, evidence 
of agreement and consent, specifies the competent courts,the proceedings 
for special hearings, the offic^ of the curator ad litem and reporting 
officer, the service of notices and other procedural aspects.
In Greece, regulations concerning the adoption of minors are stated 
in the Legislative Decree 610/1970 and in the Royal Decree 795/1970, 
while those aspects of positive law and procedure not included there 
are to be found by reference to the civil code and te cede of civil 
procedure. In the first place, in relation to the adoption 
service, article one of the Royal Decree 795/1970 in paragraph one 
prescribes the institutions entitled to act as agencies for adoption
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within Greek territory and the bodies that should cooperate in 
adoptions abroad. Paragraphs 3 and 4 cf !the same article relate to
aspects of the decision making process of those services, namely 
whether they should provide the applicant with the certificate of 
suitability and the basic structure of the certificate. In artidle 
2 of the said decree there is provision for a welfare investigation 
for applicants residing abroad and article 3 specifies the bodies that should 
perform the follow up reports on the wellbeing of such children.
Article 4 makes provision for maintaining a General Confidential Register 
in the Ministry of Justice, for annual reports that should be submitted 
by adoption agencies to the Ministry, as well as for supplementary 
provisions concerning the availability of personnel in bodies 
operating as adoption agencies.
In relation to qualifications and conditions, the procedure and the 
results of adoption are those provided by Legislative Decree 610/1970.
In the first part it deals with the prerequisites of adoption by 
stating the conditions of the welfare of the child, the age of the 
adopter, the conditions of childlessness and exceptions from the rule, 
provides for the possibility of applying for further adoption while the 
previous is still in force, the conditions of the age difference 
between adopter and adoptee and for the consent of the spouse for a 
single married applicant. The second part of the decree relates
to procedures preserving the application of the relevant part of 
the civil code but supplementing it with provisions for the cooperation 
of an adoption agency in the welfare investigation, the conditions for 
giving parental consent and dispensing with consent. Also the same 
part deals with the relinquishment procedure and aspects of the 
confidentiality of adoption. In part three the results of the order 
are stated. These are mainly as in the civil code, save the changes are 
that the court can order additional measures for the benefit of the
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child and even dissolve the adoption if it is in the child's interest; 
and that the adopter cannot bring an action for dissolution of 
adoption before the child is sixteen years of age. Part four deals 
with adoptions where the applicant is a foreign subject and 
part five provides penal provisions for protecting the service of 
adoption and the wellbeing of adopted children. Finally, in the
sixth part there are supplementary provisions concerning reform of 
articles of the civil code and the codfe of civil procedure related to 
adoption, as well as reform of the nationality law and the law on 
registration deeds.
B. THE WELFARE OF THE CHILD
It has already been indicated that the question of the child's welfare 
is inextricably involved by law in any adoption order and that this 
question is the decisive one irrespective of the formal qualifications 
of the applicant. Both Section 6 of the Act and article 2(1) of the 
Decree impose a general duty on anybody involved to promote the welfare 
of the child. Thus the Act prescribes that "In reaching any decision 
relating to the adoption of a child, a court or adoption agency shall 
have regard to all the circumstances, first consideration being given 
to the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of the child throughout 
his childhood and shall so far as practicable ascertain the wishes 
and feelings of the child regarding the decision and give due consideration 
to them, having regard to his age and understanding". In the same 
spirit the Decree provides that "Adoption is allowed only when it 
serves the best interests of the adoptee". In its construction, the
circumstances of the case are taken into consideration notwithstanding 
that priority should be given to the welfare of the child.
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The dimension given to the process of adoption by those provisions 
makes the decision a complex affair. At the outset adoption as 
a welfare measure is an institution submitted to societal interests 
in their wide and narrow context. Thus it has to produce an 
outcome satisfactory to the general public, notwithstanding that it has 
also to reflect a beneficial arrangement for the long term welfare 
of the child without doing unreasonable sacrifice to the interests of 
the two sets of parents. This means that a chain of decisions be taken 
on the balance of a child centred process and yet conduce to the 
long term welfare of society. The involvement of the latter has a 
particular significance in the decision. The society's
interest stands in the middle of any decision to differentiate 
assessment, and nevertheless imposesâts own standards which several 
times will coincide with the interests of each parent, but in quite 
a few , depending on the circumstances, stress or diminish their 
significance. This complex aspect of welfare will be dealt with in 
terms of its principles in the following pages while specific references 
concerning its effects for the construction of the law will be found 
in subsequent chapters.
I. The welfare of the child in its relation to the interests of society.
The major premise that one could perceive from the institution of
adoption defines it as an alternative constructive and preventative
plan which society offers, primarily to substitute for the care and
security expected from a natural parent to his child and,secondly, to
82
preclude disorganisation in the life of each individual concerned.
The same premise is observable, either explicit or implicit whenever 
child welfare is emphasized as important.. Undoubtedly, it will result 
in society's own interest. Thus the social concern in adoption could 
be understood in terms of saving the next generation of children from
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a similar predicament and ensuring that they will be brought up
sharing the approved social values. Society then has invested part
of its existence adoption, so that "each time the cycle of a
grossly inadequate parent-child relationship is broken, society
stands to gain a parent capable of becoming an adequate parent for
83children of the future". For that very reason the interests
of the child may to an extent outweigh that of the parents, whether 
the two conflict or not.
II. The priority of the welfare of the child
On account of the wide implications of the welfare of the child, due 
care is taken to secure priority for his interests and their 
satisfaction in the best possible way.
Priority is provided in the Adoption (Scotland) Act, 1978, by
requiring "first consideration" to be given to the welfare of the child
in the sense of being considered not first in order but as the most
important consideration. This thesis was advanced by Lord Simon of
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Glaisdale in A and B (petrs.) who puts the consideration of the 
child's welfare as follows: "The test whether the refusal to a given
consent is unreasonable is an objective one, to be made in the light
of all the circumstances of the case (some of which may not be within
the knowledge of the party refusing consent). Although the welfare 
of the child is not the sole consideration, it is a factor of great 
importance, because a reasonable parent attaches great weight to what 
is best for his child. On the other hand, although the test is 
objective the court is not entitled simply to substitute its own view 
for that of the natural parent in question.
The process from the 1958 Acl7 where the welfare of the child was
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regarded as of first and paramount consideration - as it was and is in 
custody disputes - to the dictum of this case and its statutory 
envisaging as being of first importance but not as necessarily 
over-riding all other considerations, involves a wide range of 
arguments worthy of receiving some attention.
One of the noticeable inadequacies of the former law was its failure
to provide positive guidance on the weight to be given to the child's
interests when reaching decisions which might ultimately lead to his
adoption. The Adoption Act of 1958 was silent on the importance
that had to be attached to welfare but merely stated that the court in
deciding whether to make the order has to be satisfied that it would
be for his welfare. Consequently it was left to the courts to try
to solve that vexed problem and indeed judicial decisions played a
crucial part in the present enactment. The courts were conscious
of the irrevocable nature of adoption and of the need to balance
the different interests involved. Thus, in contrast with the tentative
view taken by the Houghton Committee in their Working Papers, that in
interprétation by the courts of "unreasonably" in relation to the
withholding of consent, to resolve conflict in adoption, "the welfare
of the child should be the paramount consideration"^^ subsequent
decisions have given to the parents a right to veto adoption, even
if adoption was shown to be for the welfare of the child. They
had derogated from this privilege only in cases where the parents by
blameworthy conduct had deprived themselves of the 'right' to such 
87a right. Characteristically, Lord Simon in the above mentioned
case,quoting Lord Hailsham of St. Marylebone L.C. in Re. W, points 
out that "Two reasonable parents can perfectly come to opposite 
conclusions on the same set of facts without forfeiting their title 
to be regarded as reasonable. The question in any given case is
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whether a parental veto comes within the band of possible reasonable
decisions and not whether it is right or mistaken. Not every
reasonable exercise of judgement is right, and not every mistaken
exercise of judgement is unreasonable. There is a band of decisions
within which no court should seek to replace the individual's judgement
with his own. The primacy of the natural parent's right is thus 
88vindicated." On a narrow construction of this opinion, however,
the approach that cùuld have been formulated was that of taking the 
welfare of the child into account indirectly, by looking at the matter 
from the point of view of the parent, and regarding such a view as 
a matter of great importance. The fact that is ignordd by such a 
construction, however, is that thé purpose of the provision was simply 
to counterbalance considerations of paramouncy in the child's welfare 
which had given purely speculative consideration to the child's welfare 
and caused undue sacrifice to the natural parents' rights. Moreover, 
such construction, to a great extent, bases considerations of unreason­
ability on the parents ' opinion which considerably diminishes the social 
purpose of adoption. In its turn, the Houghton Committee in their
Report had no criticisms of the general spirit embodies in the
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decisions. Re W and A and B (Petrs) but nevertheless felt obliged
to fix a uniform statutory approach towards welfare to avoid uncertainty
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instead of leaving the matter to the discretion of the courts. To
their reasoning the welfare of the child was of "such importance that
the duty of the court to give it first consideration should be embodied
91in the statute law". It is believed that in settling on the term
"first consideration" they made a compromise between the view that in 
adoption cases, as in custody, the child's interests should be paramount
and the conflicting view of the parents' rights as held in Re W and
92 93
A and ^  (petrs). Another view advanced by Sevan and Parry speculates
that the test of first consideration is a compromise between the
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government's original proposal requiring "full account" to be
taken of the need to safeguard and promote the child's welfare and the
view that as in custody and guardianship matters, his welfare should
94be the "first and paramount consideration". The suggestion of the
government, however, is considered to be meaningless because the courts 
are bound to take into account every relevant fact in order to protect 
the child. In the opinion of the House of Lords "To invite the 
courts or adoption agencies simply to take full account of the need 
to safeguard and promote the welfare of the child is doing no 
more than to remind the courts that they are not to forget that
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the welfare of the child is one of the issues that they are considering." 
However, the essential reason provided for the rejection of the para- 
mountcy test was the irrevocability of the order, this justifying 
special weight being given to the interests of the natural parent.
"We have come to the conclusion (it is stated in the report) that, 
if the child's welfare were declared to be paramount, the test 
of whether the mother was withholding consent unreasonably could 
not remain. The choice, therefore, appears to lie between two 
approaches. The first approach is along the lines of the House 
of Lords' decision in Re W , retaining the existing grounds for 
dispensing with consent but taking account of the long-term welfare 
of the child in deciding whether the mother is acting unreasonably.
The second approach would be to abandon the existing grounds for 
dispensing with consent, including the unreasonableness test, and 
to give the courts a general power to dispense with parental consent 
to adoption if they were satisfied that to dn so t.tqu"' d b^^^ for the long­
term welfare of the child, this being the first and paramount 
96consideration." They rejected the second mentioned approach and
concluded "We think that the law should recognise that there are a 
number of interests to be considered and put the interests of the child
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first among them. It seems to us that the objective reasonableness 
of the mother is an appropriate test, and that in deciding whether 
she is withholding consent unreasonably the court should take into 
account all the circumstances, first consideration being given to
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the effect of her decision on the long term welfare of the child"
The enactment of this recommendation was generally welcomed as 
giving a good guide to balancing the conflicting interests. Nonethe­
less it has not passed without objections and it has been suggested
that on a logical construction of the section the attempt has failed
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and paramountcy prevails. A. B. Wilkinson, who puts forward this 
argument, finds that according to the section there should be "a scale 
of interests among which the child's interest regarded from the stand­
point of the need to safeguard and promote its welfare throughout 
childhood, will be ranked first in the sense of being given greater 
weight than any other single interest but not necessarily greater weight 
than the other interests considered together - to give it greater
weight than the combined other interests would of course be to make 
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it paramount." Later referring to the three kinds of interests
(child, natural parents and adoptive parents) he observes that the 
interests of the two sets of parents are necessarily opposed and if 
greater weight is given to the child's interest than to either of the 
other two interests then the decision must go in the direction which 
the child's interest indicates and that will be so no matter how much 
weight is attached to either of the other two interests provided always 
it is less than that attached to the child's. Finding the context
of this arithmetml calculus inevitably involved for the proper 
construction of the section he concludes that the welfare of the child 
becomes paramount and suggests,as an alternative solution to this 
conclusion, abandoning altogether the scale of interests the Committee 
and Lord Simon of Glaisdale had postulated. Such solution then, according
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to him, inevitably will deprive the term "first consideration" of any 
real meaning and it becomes no more than an exhortation to attach 
importance to the child's interests.
However, aside from any objections as to the capacity of a logical
construction to meet the social purposes intended by the legislature
this approach omits to take into consideration two important factors
that courts have to consider before making any decision. First
the widely acknowledged importance of natural relationships in the
life of the child, the preservation of which the court has to consider
somehow or other, and second, that the placement itself necessarily has
to satisfy the interests of the child, otherwise it would not have
been considered in the first place. Therefore in a direct
comparison between the two sets of parents in almost every case the
welfare of the child would dictate adoption and of course in this setting
it becomes paramount. Such direct comparison however by no means
is emphasized in an Act which provides the alternative of custody to
prevent alienation from the natural relationship. And it should be
mentioned here that a claim for custody enjoys prior consideration
in relation to the application for adoption and may successfully
challenge the application on the basis of inferior standards to those
offered by the applicants. Consequently one should not read into the
wording of section 6 a classification of and challenge to interests
but two independent decisions, one concerning the situation with the
natural parents and one with the adopters, which, if brought together,
100Xa)
constitute the basis for the adoption order. This thesis is further 
discussed in relation to consent and here attention should be directed 
only towards themeaning of the term "first consideration". In fact 
the term is intended to regulate the relation between the welfare of 
the child and the legal position of the rights of the natural parents 
on the one hand and to assess the offer made by the adopters in
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relation to the particular child on the other hand. It is, 
therefore, a basis given to the court to oppose the legally powerful 
parental rights whenever it is satisfied on the evidence before it that 
the relationship with the parents either has no factual existence or, 
if existing, if further maintained would irretrievably damage the 
welfare of the child in the long run. Given that the court has 
reached this conclusion the term first consideration in relation to the 
applicants should be seen as empowering the court to overcome a duly 
qualified application in terms of legal conditions and family 
circumstances, if it thinks that the welfare of the particular child 
would be properly served by this.. That I think, appears to have been 
the intention of the Houghton Committee when it accepted that 
bringing up a natural child is quite different from bringing up an 
adopted one and when it submitted any adoption application to the 
challenge of a custody claim. Also the same spirit seems to be 
adopted by Lord Simon in A and (petrs), when charaterising the test 
as an objective one, and by Lord Hailsham in Re W , in the 
considerations that he offers on the band of reasonable decisions.
As regards Greece, on the other hand, according to article 1578 of the 
Greek Civil Code the court could authorise the adoption if the legal 
requirements have been complied with and if satisfied that on the 
evidence presented on the moral■ and financial position of the adopter 
the adoption would benefit the adoptee. This provision, however, 
like the entire system of adoption in the Greek civil code is proven 
to correspond inadequately with the modern concepts concerning the 
satisfaction of the best interests of the child. Welfare investigation 
was restricted to the persons legally affected by the delation - the 
adopter and the child - without giving any consideration to the family 
and the surroundings which the child had to leave. In addition, the
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standards applied in the moral investigation were low, so that unless 
the applicant had run directly counter to principal social values, 
his or her application could meet the requirements of article 1578 of 
the Greek civil code. The crucial defect of the article, however, 
is that it omits to take into consideration the causes of the placement. 
Therefore, it was possible for a child to find its way to adoption, 
given the consent of the parent or guardian, without any investigation 
as to the necessity of cutting him off from his natural parents.
Presently, in view of the more general wording of article 2 (1) of 
the L.D. and the new system it has introduced, the court undoubtedly 
is in a better position to protect the adoptive child. However, as 
is commonly done in avdim jurisdictions, the legislature provides 
the court and the social agencies only with general guidance and then 
leaves it to them as enforcers of the law to secure that this sound 
but vague provision does not become a dead letter.
The area of choice left to the courts and agencies is exceptionally 
wide. Article 2(1) of the L.D. under the wording "adoption is 
allowed whenever it is in the interests of the adoptee" concentrates 
the weight of the decision on the welfare of the child and its 
collateral societal welfare but no other indication is given as to the 
criteria to be apgüad in assessing whether a decision will redound 
in the interest of the adoptee or not. However, the article so 
far has been construed according to teleologjcal methods of interpretation 
and the courts have come to the conclusion that full consideration 
should be given to all the circumstances of the case so far as the 
purpose of adoption cannot be served unless it is proven that the 
child is parentless or in the hands of unfit parents and that the 
adopters can meet adequately the needs of the c h i l d . F r o m  the 
point of view of legal methodology such conclusion is possible
252
inductively by applying the argumentum a contrario since the
wording of the article does not formally preclude other considerations 
from being taken into account.
Indeed, as regards the real weight attached to the welfare of the
child the situation is rather obscure. The basis on which consideration
is given to the child's welfare resembles the second approach
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suggested by the Houghton Committee to the extent that the court 
has to be satisfied that adoption would be for the long term welfare 
of the child, but the test of paramountcy is not legally established. On the 
other hand, from decisions taken in the battlefield between the right 
of a parent to veto adoption and the welfare of the child the certain 
conclusion is that the welfare is of overriding importance. No other 
indication is given as to what will be its weight when conflicting with the 
interests of the natural parent, or of the adopters. In order to 
indicate what this may be I offer a brief review of the principal areas 
of the Legislative Decree and of some decisions where the court has 
dispensed with parental consent.
In the first place prior to consent the social work department has 
to communicate with the parents and carry out an investigation of 
their circumstances and their reasons for giving or not giving consent. 
However, the concern shown for the parents'interests presents certain 
peculiarities because adoption does not result in a complete severance 
of the ties of the child with his natural family and at the same time 
the grounds provided for dispensing with parental consent are rather 
limited. For the former, it can be said that the contrast between
the conflicting interests is not that acute, because, to the damage 
of the order, rights and duties of the natural parents are retained 
as a second alternative if the order fails, and the parents are provided 
with a right to access to their "ex-child", unless this is taken away
253
by the court. The court has the discretion to take the initiative
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of removing the right having regard to the circumstances of the case, 
or on the application of the adopter or the procurator fiscal as an 
ancillary claim to the application or thereafter, if communication 
with the parents can be damaging to the c h i l d . T h e  court forms 
its opinion after investigating the character, morality and other 
circumstances of the natural p a r e n t s . F o r  the latter,on the 
other hand, despite the broadening of the power of the court to dispense 
with consent in relation to the grounds of Greek civil code, alienability 
of parental rights is restricted to circumstances where the relationship 
lacks a factual existence^^^ and to circumstances where the parent 
abusively withholds consent for a child boarded in a social institution 
whare^there are grounds justifying his forf^ting parental a u t h o r i t y .
Those provisions imply that there is conflict between the interests of 
the parents and that of the child; in fact, that of the parents 
would not need substantive consideration since the order is not irrevocable 
and does not extinguish parent rights altogether. Also, by the time 
the court would have power to dispense with consent the parent would 
have been proven unfit beyond doubt. The latter seems to be confirmed 
by the rationale mentioned in the Introductory Report of the Legislative 
Decree for introducing the grounds of abusively withholding consent.
In practice, they assert, quite often mothers refuse to consent for un­
reasonable, selfish or neurotic reasons and they mention the case of 
a mother who refused to give her consent, yet who attempted to strangle 
her child almost every time she visited him in the institution. There 
is also mention of a case of another mother who did not consent to
her child's adoption because she wanted him to suffer as much as she 
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had in her life. Given the guidelines in the report and the
peculiar grounds for dispensing with parental consent the allowances 
in respect of the rights of the parents to withhold consent indicates
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that paramountcy to the child's interests does not apply. Nevertheless, 
one could expect the welfare to be of paramount consideration 
because with the reserve of ties with the natural parents adoption 
resembles a more: advanced form of fostering than adoption in a 
current social setting.
On the other hand, in a decision given immediately after the
enactment of the L.D.4532/1966 the welfare of the child was held to 
be the decisive criterion for both dispensing with parental consent 
and declaring the child adopted. Also in another case, where the 
grounds of "abusively withholding consent" had a clear application, 
the court dispensed with the consent of a mother who had left her child 
for the four years since his birth in social institutions because of 
her financial and social difficulties. The child was left there 
with the purpose of adoption and the mother had confirmed her intentions 
three months prior to the hearings. On refusing to appear and give
her consent the court found that she had withheld consent abusively 
because a reasonable parent in her position would have taken into
consideration the interests of the child. The important point,
however, in this decision is the obiter dictum of the court, connecting 
the welfare of the child with the social interests. Adoption, held
the court "is not a private contract, it is a matter which interests 
the whole society and has the purpose, not to provide childless couples 
with descendents, but to serve the interests of the adoptee, i.e. those
left in nurseries and other social foundations, by securing on their
behalf the possibility of being brought up within a healthy family
environment." The ratio_____ decidendi of these decisions
approximates the welfare of the child to the notion of being of "first 
consideration". If in conflict with the interests of the parents, 
it will prevail over them even though the parents have not been
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culpable in conduct. Furthermore it will be considered in relation 
to the long term welfare of the child and social welfare
III. The content of the "welfare of the child".
Although what is best in the interests of the child's welfare will
clearly depend on the relevant circumstances, it is possible to discern
certain aspects of welfare which have been regarded as important.
Article 9(1) of the Législative Decree 610/70 defined those aspects in
order to give a general guideline to the social services on the areas
where they must place emphasis. A similar selection of important
aspects of the welfare in respect of Scots law is provided in the Adoption
of Children (Sederunt) Act 1959 in Section l(iii) and Section 5 which
specify the matters to be investigated by the curator ad litem. From
the provision cited in the laws, for reasons of convenience, general
areas such as health and physical welfare, morality, happiness,
psychological welfare, material welfare, religious Welfare and finally
other aspects of importance for the specific child, have been extracted 
112for discussion. Before proceeding, it must be noted, however,
that while a particular application may be disqualified in the applicant 
falls below the median standard in one aspect, such failure cannot 
be compensated for by rising above it in another.
The facts of a particular placement are infinitely variable so the 
aspects discussed below are often overlapping and interlocking. As 
Professor E. Clive points out "The concept of welfare cannot be reduced 
to neat mutually exclusive categories and sub-categories. It is a 
question of fact and degree, to be resolved in the end of the day by 
a value judgement which will be more or less difficult according to 
the circumstances.
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First, as regards health and physical welfare, these more than anything
else stand out to be observed by the judge and personnel of the social
services and are of great concern since the order may involve a child
114
who lacks a strong resistance to illness or physical dangers. Particularly 
Section 1 of the Act of Sederunt provides that "There shall be lodged 
along with the petition itself:- (iii) A medical certificate as to the 
health of the petitioner or each of the joint petitioners, except 
where the petitioner or one of the joint petitioners is a parent of the 
child," and in Section 6 (o) "The considerations arising from the 
difference in age between the petitioner and the child if such difference 
is less than the normal difference in age between parents and their 
children", also in 6 (p) "... on the ability of the petitioner to bring
up the child."
In the L.D. article 9(1) requires close investigation to be carried out 
as to "health" and "his abilility to bring the child up properly".
In accordance with those provisions a person seeking to adopt the child 
should himself possess health not tainted by illness andshould not be 
accustomed to habits or ways of life that would expose the physical 
welfare of the child to risk. As such, one could mention ungovernable 
temper, alcoholism, drug addiction, indolence and indifference and, in 
general, inadequacy in dealing with life's affairs, as well as inadequacy 
in meeting the child's physical needs. The same should extend to the 
non-applicant spouse or other members of the household so far as 
contact with them will be influental on the child, or if success in the 
"physical" side of adoption partly rests on their cooperation.
Second, attention should be given to the morality and character of
the applicant to secure the child's moral welfare. This matter, though
always a prominent consideration, presently assumes paramount importance
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for the order. The applicant enters into the criteria of the child's
education which is a prominent base for deciding the placement and
in this respect his moral character counts more than ever. Probably
this aspect of the welfare will be significant if to satisfy the
order there is "the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of the
child throughout his childhood"; and the need to rear the child 
115properly. Therefore, Section 5(f) and (p) of the Act of Sederunt
require investigation as to whether the petitioner understands that the 
order "will render him responsible for the ... upbringing of the child" 
and on "such questions or matters, including an assessment of the 
petitioner's personality and, where appropriate, that of the child, 
as having a bearing on the mutual suitability of the petitioner 
and the child for the relationship created by adoption, ...". Also 
article 9(1) of the L.D. asked for a close assessment of the "character" 
(ethos) of the applicant, and his "ability to bring the child up 
properly" (in terms of moral qualifications).
However, it should be noted that to assign a central meaning to this 
matter is most inappropriate because relevant values vary between 
social classes and places and also because the importance of such 
qualifications vary from placement to placement. In general, a 
person may be considered unfit if he or she is or poor morality or it 
is suspected that the general education of the child would be exposed 
to risk by "evil" teaching or corruption. However, the task that the 
court has to perform consists of a multilateral assessment of values 
existing in the family inter se as well as of the reputation that the 
applicants have in their society. Thus factors that articulate 
a view on the stability of the applicant's marriage, their reputation 
as a couple, their faithfulness, should be taken into account besides 
acts that imply personal unfitness to have custody of a child.
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For the latter one could specify acts which could warrant deprivation 
of custody or forfeiture of parental authority, like convictions for 
criminal acts, dishonesty, cruelty to children, drug addiction, 
immoderate drinking, which manifest irresponsibility, as well as 
either of them indulging in such acts as are considered repugnant and 
abhorrent to the feelings of society.
As to religious persuasions, as a matter of character and morality this 
does not seem to have any particular significance for the placement. 
Where it is ascertained that there is no moral danger for the child, 
the involvement of religious persuasions becomes of secondary concern, 
even when the natural parents want to give some importance to the 
matter. The Act of Sederunt in Section 6 (n) requires investigation 
of the petitioner's religious persuasions while in Section 7 of the 
Adoption (Scotland) Act 1978 it is stated that "An adoption agency shall 
in placing a child for adoption have regard (so far as is practicable) 
to any wishes of the child's parents and guardians as to the religious 
upbringing of the child". Greek law on the other hand is silent on
the matter with the exception of interstate adoptions. Article 14 of 
the L.D. provides that the children are to be given to families of 
Greek descent and where there are no such families preferably to 
families having the same religion as the a d o p t e e . G i v e n ,  
however, that nearly all Greek subjects belong to the same religion 
there is no real need to enforce legally such consideration, though 
as made explicit by the law on interstate adoptions such intention 
exists. It is, therefore, at the discretion of the courts in both 
countries to take religion into account and they may be bound to do so 
if adoption concerns a child of age of understanding who had become 
accustomed to a certain religion, and changes of religious values 
would disturb the normal development of his character.
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In relation to personality and morality of the applicant the court 
may experience considerable difficulty if the assessment concerns 
the adoption of a step child. If the spouse is rejected as unfit 
and there are no grounds to deprive the natural parent from having 
the care of the child this may have odd consequences, as much to 
the marriage as to the child himself. On the one hand, it reflects 
a disapproval of that union to care for that child and may operate 
as a warning to the natural parent to prevent involvement of the 
otter party in the upbringing of the child. It may also make the 
parent sceptical about his or her choice of partner. On the other 
hand the child will be deprived of the legal security which both parents 
are ready to offer, while as a matter of fact he will remain with 
them. The problem could become even greater if the natural parent 
is a mother responsible for the child's maintenance who had given up 
her job on marriage. Therefore, the court should seize every 
opportunity of avoiding such confusion or disturbance by making a 
custody order and in the last resort if there is a need for the child 
to be adopted, to award an order provided that the natural parent 
is capable of controlling the situation.
A third aspect which assumes prominence where physical and moral 
welfare have been secured, is the happiness and psychological welfare 
of the child. In Section 6 (p) of the Act of Sederunt . concern is 
expressed for "the mutual suitability" of the parent and child and 
this concern is manifested by the law in various ways. Section 6 of 
the 1978 Act provides that the court and agency " ... shall so far as 
practicable ascertain the wishes and feelings of the child regarding 
the decision and give due consideration to them, having regard to his 
age and understanding". To the same end Section 6 (p) of the Act of 
Sederunt makes a duty of the curator ad litem "The ascertainment.
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so far as is practicable, of the wishes and feelings of the child,
regarding the proposed adoption". Nevertheless, a similar
investigation is required as to the reasons that the petitioner wishes 
117to adopt the child, on "Particulars of all members of the petitioner's 
household and their relationship (if any) to the petitioner", and "why, 
in the case of a petition by one of two spouses the other spouse does 
not join in the petition".
Article 9(1) of the Greek Legislative Decree requires investigation 
of the possibility of "adjustment of the child within the adoptive 
family", "the reasons why the applicant wishes the adoption" and 
his "family circumstances". This manifold manifestation of the
weight attached to these criteria indicates the crucial importance, 
but also the complexity, that the psychological settlement of the 
child may have. Circumstances in the adoptive family, though good,
may not be appropriate for the happiness of a specific child. The 
child, on the other hand, may suffer disturbance not curable in 
family patterns or may have been well established with his natural 
parents and unhappiness, however acute, may be transient or may even 
increase if the child is removed for adoption. Because of its 
complexity, therefore, the investigation is not a task to be carried 
out by the agency or the court alone. The cooperation of medical 
personnel experienced in the field may be thought necessary since 
such matters are not always open to immediate observation.
Wealth and material welfare are of secondary concern today though 
treated as significant when affecting other aspects of the welfare. 
Section 6(e) of the Act of Sederunt requires.investigation on "whether 
the means and status of the petitioner an such as to enable him 
to maintain and bring up the child suitably, and what right or interest
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in property the child has"; Section 6(f) on whether he "understands 
... that the order ... will render him responsible for the maintenance 
... of the child" and Section 5(c) on the "particulars of the 
accommodation in the petitioner's home and the condition of the home". 
Similarly, article 9(1) of the Greek L.D. mentions among the matters 
that should be taken into account "the family circumstances and the 
property of the applicant".
In respect to this aspect of welfare either as a reason:for placing 
the child for adoption or for deciding the suitability of specific 
applicants, the role of financial assistance to the family plays an 
important role. It is unlikely in a system where there are sufficient 
housing facilities and assistance to parentsuwho bring up children, 
for a court to be forced to ignore the wishes of a non-blameworthy 
parent because he cannot provide sufficiently for his child. Even 
more, it will avoid the creation of friction between the two sets of 
parents, because if adoption is granted largely on that ground, it 
almost certainly would not be enough to convince the natural parents 
of their unsuitability. On the other hand as regards the adopter 
it would not be proper to exclude suitable couples by reason of their 
low income. However, given that we are not at a stage where each
family has a sufficient income to maintain its children the factor of 
wealth retains some importance in the overall assessment of welfare.
But it is not any concern of the courts today that the child become 
richer by the order. Provided that the applicant can guarantee reasonable 
maintenance of the child, wealth is taken into consideration only for 
its bearing on other aspects of the child's welfare, e.g. if the order 
concerns a child who participates in many recreational activities or 
is so intelligent that it is certain he will undergo higher education, 
the court would have to take into consideration whether the applicant
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could meet the expenses involved. It also has to see if any wealth
conflicts other welfare criteria, eg, if it comes from suspicious 
sources, or if there is a risk of deterioration and the child is likely 
to be deprived of essential needs.
The final aspect that signifies the welfare of the child is the
importance of the interests of both parents in adoption. The
thesis advanced on custody by Professor Sarpe is that the best interests
of the child can only be adequately realized by considering the interests
of all parties involved has a fundamental involvement also in
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taking any decision for adoption. By law, the court requires to have 
regard for all the circumstances of the case and should not under- 
emphasize the interests of the parents, for example, if this is likely 
to cause social disorganization. For this purpose there is
distinguishable in the law a positive protection for the natural parents 
and the applicants through the right to consent, to be notified, to be 
protected if they have fostered the child for a certain period, to keep 
their identity secret., and to have their wishes taken into consideration. 
The former is dealt with elsewhere in this study, while the latter 
will be considered below.
In practice the most complex part of an adoption decision is to realise 
the weight of the wishes of the parents, to assess their truthfulness 
and predict the parental reaction if the adoption order comes into 
conflict with parental wishes. Normally, there is a disharmony between 
reason and emotion, not only in cases where the court had dispensed 
with parental consent but also where the parent was forced to act 
"reasonably" and consent for the child's benefit. For instance, in 
the case of a parent who experiences poverty or, due to his/her age 
and understanding,cam± correspond properly to the needs of the child
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and acts reasonably after being convinced that the child will be better
if adopted it is preferable to avoid adoption for two reasons (a) he or
she will experience distress and (b) the future of the placement is
unpredictable. In time, if the parent improves his situation,
he may regret that he became "reasonable" and decided "out of love"
for the child, to agree to the adoption. Most probably he will try
to secure the child's return, and the earlier in the process the
improvement, the worse his reaction and stress will be, when realizing
the ineffectiveness of such efforts. This situation would be further
aggravated if the court had dispensed with consent under circumstances
where the parent was in real difficulties but still had genuine
feelings for the child. On the contrary, for an indifferent parent,
such decision will act beneficially because it will remove the burden
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created by the child.
Therefore, to realise the wishes and feelings of the natural parent is a
complex task and difficult to comprehend at length. Whatever weight is
given to them, the solution will be far from pleasant for the parents.
The blood ties may have been excluded to an extent by the state intervention,
but are emotionally still alive, causing complications and inner conflict
121in the parents' lives. Therefore, if adoption is going to have the
function of preserving society without destroying itsipresent structure, 
one should attempt first to facilitate the preservation of the natural 
relationship'. By choosing the "easy way" of adoption, without exhausting 
all other alternatives, society will solve one of its problems at the 
probable cost of creating another.
Concern for the interests of the adoptive parents, on the other hand, 
is equally great because successful adoption depends upon them. Both 
laws insist on consideration being given to the reasons why they want 
to adopt, with the purpose of ascertaining their intentions towards
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the child and of making sure whether they seek the fulfilment of
certain emotions in adoption and if proper to coordinate them with
those of the child. In this respect, herewith, the courts in many
cases may be forced to make a compromise between the old and the
new objectives of adoption provided that this will not affect the
priority of the child's interests. But between purely emotional
motivation and aiming to leave an heir, or to complete a family,
the first should be looked upon favourably without of course precluding
the possibility that a childless couple, who primarily seek to accomplish
a family might not bring the child up properly. However, the
important point is to secure for the adopters satisfaction and
happiness since this has a direct bearing on the child. Therefore,
their wishes and feelings must be taken into consideration as far 
122as possible.'
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C H A P T E R  F I V E
QUALIFICATIONS AND CONDITIONS 
INTRODUCTION
Domicile, residence, age and marital status have been the legal 
conditions governing eligibility to adopt. Additionally, in 
Greece there is the condition of childlessness as revised by the 
L.D.610/70. With the exception of domicile these conditions have 
also been relevant in determining the eligibility of the adoptee.
Both the 1978 Act and the L.D. 610/1970 make changes with regard to 
each, mostly with the purpose of increasing the judicial and 
administrative flexibility of courts and agencies. Nevertheless, 
with respect to Scotland, the Act does not alter the rule that, 
apart from a joint adoption by a married couple, only one person is 
allowed to adopt, but it does impose certain restrictions on adoption by 
a married person, natural parents, relatives and step-parents. The 
Greek Legislative decree, on the other hand, adheres to adoption by 
a sole applicant notwithstanding that, by tightening up the welfare 
investigation, a single applicant qualifies only with difficulty for 
the adoption of a child below the age of majority.
I. CONDITIONS FOR THE ADOPTIVE CHILD
With regard to the eligibility of the child to be adopted, both laws
re-enact the limitations that it must be under the age of 18^ (hot to
2
be exceeded by the date of the hearing) and must not be or have been
married, since parental authority is not exercisable over a
3
forisfamiliated child. In addition, the law has set down lower
limits, making the child eligible for adoption. Thus, in Scotland, 
when the child is to be adopted by a parent, step-parent or a relative
266
or it is placed for adoption by an agency, it must be at least 19 weeks
old and, in any other case one year old, before an adoption order is
4
made. In Greece, a direct limit is not provided but a parent
cannot give consent unless the child is 3 months old.^ This makes 
foundlings or abandoned children eligible for adoption from their 
birth.
Further restrictions on the eligibility of the child are imposed in
terms of its age difference with the applicant, and in Greece in
terms of its adoptive status. In conformity with the brocard
"adoptio naturam imitatur" Scots law requires the existence of an
age difference to make the relation appear normal,^ while Greek law
specifies the difference as no less than 18 years, unless the
applicant is the spouse of the parent in which case an age difference
7
of 15 years is considered sufficient. It is also stipulated
in Art. 5(2) of the L.D. 610/1970 that â child who is the subject of
an existing valid order cannot be re-adopted by another person for
the duration of the order except by the spouse under the same or
posterior proceedings.^ In Scotland on the other hand the child
can be given for further adoption provided the consent of the adoptive 
9
parent is given.
The basis of the conditions concerning eligibility of the child is 
rooted in modern adoption policy. The child cannot be adopted unless 
such time has elapsed as is considered necessary to assess whether 
the natural relation is preservable or not. Moreover it excludes 
children who cannot be subjected to parental control by reason of 
age or legal status. This is done bedause adoption is expected to 
have an impact in the rehabilitation and nurture of the child. The 
trust placed in this direction upon the adopters is such that almost
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all aspects of the child's life are subject to their discretion.
The only reservation is that, whenever adoption fails, there is
the power either to revoke it (in Greece) or to place the child for a
new adoption (in Scotland).
II. DOMICILE OF THE ADOPTER.
Under the former law a person applying to a Scottish court for a
national adoption must have been domiciled in Scotland or England.
The rule is extended to include domicile in any part of the United
Kingdom or in the Channel Islands or the Isle of Man for a single
applicant^^ or at least for the one of the spouses in the case of a 
12married couple. In Greece for a national adoption the applicant
must be a Greek subject. Domicile itself does not qualify a forèign
subject residing in Greece to apply, thus avoiding the restrictions
13
on removal of the child. A Greek national, however, who resides
abroad is subject to no Such restrictions.
III.. THE AGE OF THE APPLICANT
This condition has undergone a variety of changes, these being 
articulated by changes in the aims of the institution as well as by 
changes in the concept of maturity. It can be observed that in 
both systems the minimum eligible age in exceptional circumstances 
coincides with majority and is settled far above the age of marriage 
or of fertility.
(a) The process of the establishment of the present age limits has
been one beset by various stipulations and philosophies. In
Scotland, the limiting factor of age in terms of eligibility
appears with the introduction of the institution in 1930. It was
confined to 25 years of age provided that the application concerned
14
a child 21 years younger. But causa cognitio it was "lawful
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for the court, if it thinks fit, to make the order notwithstanding
that the applicant is less than twenty one years older" when "the
applicant or one or other of the joint applicants and the child
are within the prohibited degrees of c o n s a n g u i n i t y ^ ^ T h e
Adoption Act of 1958 annunciated more complex arrangements whereby
a natural parent could adopt his natural child without restrictions
as regards age. In the case of a relative, applying alone or
jointly with the other spouse, each had to attain the age of 21.
For a sole applicant, stranger to the child, the limit was kept
to 25 years while in the case of a joint application with the other
17
spouse the one had to be 25 and the other at least 21.
Unlike Scots law where age Idimits were as low as the age of
majority, Greek Civil Code retained the severe limits of adrogation
without room for causa cognitio. Article 1568 fixed the minimum
age for the adoptive parent at 50 on the rationale that at this
age the chances of someone producing his own children are minimal.
The Committee appointed by the Ministry of Justice in 1959 to reform
adoption law had envisaged the preservation of those limits, while
empowering the court to lower the limit in specific circumstances.^^
A second committee appointed after the Hague Convention in 1963
proposed in its draft the age of 35 years, which was later promulgated 
19
as law 4532/1966.
The relatively low age limits adopted by Scots law are understandable
if one takes into consideration the fact that,, from its introduction,
20
legal adoption was directed at the welfare of the child, while
arbitrary criteria, like childlessness, as a ground for adoption,
21wfere generally deplored. The concern was how to secure fit
persons to care for the child and to make the relationship appear
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as normal as possible. In this respect age limits had to be the
lowest acceptable for social parenthood. Nevertheless, a preferential
treatment of the parents and relatives arose from the need to
provide illegitimate children with a status but also from the
fact that professional assessment of the suitability of the adopters
was considered unnecessary to or was rarely involved in these
adoptions. With the improvements in the status of those children
such need was minimized so that at the reporting of the Houghton
Committee, the situation was mature enough to permit alteration of 
22
the policy. Thus, the Committee placed weight on the social
service side of adoption and thereto adoptions by relatives merely
change the legal nature of an existing factual relationship. Such
practice, therefore, could cause erosion in the aims of the
institution, not withstanding that it tolerated the exclusion of
parehts from any relation with their children by reason of adoption
23
by the other parent. Within this ideological shift the limit
of 25 years was replaced with the age of 21 for both relatives
and non relatives subject to professional assessment of their 
24
suitability. The rationale offered for the further lowering
is that the age of 25 was an obstacle to considering some suitable
couples while the proposed age would "give the opportunity of
25
testing the strength of teenage marriage".
In Greece, as said, the age limit in the civil code was 50 to 
ensure the childlessness of the applicant. The rationale , however, 
was soon at the centre of severe criticism as misconceiving the 
relevancy of age to childlessness as well as for overlooking the 
implications of the limit for both the adoptions performed, and the 
children in need of adoption. Indeed this age as an assurance 
of permanent childlessness, is not trustworthy, insofar as 
infertility normally appears a decade above and below for men
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and women respectively. In addition, the existence of permanent 
barrenness can be medically proven so that it is not necessary 
for somebody to wait until this age. There is some suspicion
therefore, although it was never explicitly or implicitly admitted 
by anybody, that the civil code was overly concerned with the 
possibility of legitimate or legitimated children. Thus, it took 
the extreme position in order to preclude the chance of the adopter 
having children by a second marriage. Of course, the implications 
of such extremism was severe because a person df that age could 
rarely act properly as parent of an infant and the scarcity of 
adopters was such that Greece because a source of export of children. 
The civil code, without distinction, permits adoption of minors and 
adults so that persons over fifty could lawfully apply under a simple 
procedure for 1he adoption of a child. G. Michaelidis Nouaros, 
expressing his objection to this, points out that the limit would 
be rational if the code excluded the adoption of minors; but rearing 
children demands rigorous physical and psychological powers and a 
long life span, which cannot be satisfied by persons over fifty 
who usually turn to adoption expecting the affection of the adoptee. ^ 
In consequence the number of Greek applicants could not absorb the 
children available and many children found their way to be 
adopted abroad. This possibility was facilitated by article 23 of 
the Greek Civil Code (Private International Law Section) which 
provides that "The substantial conditions of adoption are regulated 
by the law of the nationality of each party". Thus, foreign 
applicants qualifying under their own law were eligible to adopt a 
child in Greece without being of fifty years of age. The occurrence 
of the phenomenon was frequent because many used to take advantage 
of the provision to avoid trouble with the natural family or because 
of the waiting list in their own country and the child was taken
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abroad without any substantive investigation on the circumstances
27
of the placement. '
(b) The complex provisions of the Adoption Act 1958 and the rather
high limit of age of the L.D.4532/1966 have been repealed. The 
law as it stands today in Scotland after the 1978 Act is that in 
all cases the applicant or joint applicants must be at least 21, 
and in Greece after the L.D.610/1970 the applicant has to be 30
28
and in exceptional circumstances 21 which is the age of majority.
It is important to notice that for the first time in Scotland an 
age limit is imposed on the natural parent as a prospective 
adopter, and that Greek law has retained exceptions to the age limit 
if there is a good serious reason. Specifically for the latter, 
article 3 of the L.D. indicates as such reason the loss of any hope 
of the applicant'having children of his own or if the applicant 
wishes to adopt the child of the spouse. Both laws do not spell 
out any maximum age but it is left to the consideration of the
29
court when it adjudicates on the suitability of the applicant.
Between the legal stipulations of each system one may observe a 
basic difference which is the preservation of a rather high limit 
in Greek law as well as some similarities concerning the structural 
approach to eligible age, and the legal or other qualifications 
expected by the applicant of that age.
In the first place the difference in the age limit is due to 
a different approach to the personal status of the applicant.
Unlike many modern systems which adheres to adoption by a couple irres­
pective of their having children or not, Greek law goes in the 
opposite direction. Thus the law still preserves childlessness
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as a prerequisite and overall inclines to adoptions by a sole 
applicant. In this context the high age limit has the double 
limitation of testing childlessness and nevertheless, since the care 
of the child is at least legally entrusted upon a sole applicant 
(single or married), of setting an age limit assuming more 
experience. In support of this came the exceptions in age 
provided in the L.D. Article 3 envisages as good reasons the 
"applicant losing the chance of having his own children and the 
adoption of a step child". Both circumstances imply marriage 
and shared responsibility between two persons so that excessive 
demand for experience became unnecessary, and creates the circumstances 
for the condition of childlessness.
However, it is relevant to mention here that the two examples 
mentioned are indicative and reasons of equal importance may 
permit an exception. Ps such, the physical feebleness of the 
woman could be relevant, making it difficult for her to bear a 
child, the existence of a hereditary disease in either spouse, 
suspected danger to the health of the wife if she became pregnant 
or to the child itself. Also although the wording of the article 
implies that such reasons must exist in the person of the applicant 
the variety of possible cases requires a more flexible interpretation 
to realise the spirit of the law. If, for example, an adult 
husband, of a wife below the age of majority who is physically 
unable to bear children applies and receives a favourable report and 
the application is rejected because he himself is capable of 
producing children, such interpretation would be excessively severe.
It would be more appropriate therefore to evaluate such reason 
with regards to the couple themselves.
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As regards step-children whose adoption should be permitted under
this provison these must be the legitimate, legitimated or adopted
children of the other spouse, or the illegitimate child of the
wife.^^ With regards to an illegitimate child of the hhsband
prima facie it should be included in this category. However,
as explained earlier the relation with the father, if not reformed,
has such a variety that this category should be included only
for voluntarily affiliated children because only these fathers have
31a right to custody of their children.
In the second place, it can be seen that neither law specifies any 
other qualifications in relation to age. The matter is entirely 
left to professional assessment and the discretion of the courts. 
Nevertheless, however, the age limits as provided give a different 
image of adoptive parenthood than that for biological parenthood. 
Neither of the two laws envisages, in any instance, the eligible 
age of marriage, nor does it permit a person without legal capacity 
to become an adoptive parent.
This is explainable in terms of the reservations that societies in
general have against teenage marriages and the parents'responsibilities
on adoption. The Latey Report (the Report of the Qbinmittee on the Age of
Majority provides the following aphorism in its criticism of teenage
marriages; " ... make the wrong contract and you suffer for a
year or two and perhaps make an adult trader miserable for a few
months - make a wrong marriage and you may suffer for a lifetime
32
and spoil the lives of your children after you". A similar
view is expressed by Professor Rood de Boer in pointing out that in 
Western societies with the purpose of protecting their children peoole 
take the position that they should not themselves bear children
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before having a carefree life without responsibilities and without
33
having the necessary experience to plan their future properly.
The matter did not escape the attention of the Houghton committee which 
when the evidence before them indicated a high rate of breakdown 
of teenage marriages revised their proposition that majority 
should be the age of eligibility.
An alternative considered was to permit adoption to couples
who have been married for a time sufficient to prove stability of 
34
their marriage. This solution, however, presents the defect
that it hampers professional assessment. The circumstances vary 
from case to case and the survivability of the marriage remains 
open to question irrespective of its léngth. Moreover with this 
solution applicants who have been married for the specified period 
would have a special claim to be considered suitable, whether their 
marriage is in danger or not, since by law that marriage is deemed 
stable.
The remaining alternative was to specify the minimum eligible age
and leave the coutt to fotmulate its own views on the evidence
presented. The Committee found, however, that its initial proposal
on the 18th year (the age of majority) "is a young age at which to
face up to all the implications of taking responsibility for
someone else's child. A minimum age of 21 would ensure that teenage
marriages which appear more vulnerable would have been tested by
time. We, therefore, recommend that a minimum age for adopters
should be retained and that it should be the age of 21 for both
35
husband and wife in all cases".
A similar argument may also be considered valid for the limits
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settled in Greek law. Apart from the reasons stated for the 
high limit of thirty years, in cases where the law permits 
exceptions those do not go beyond the limit of 21st year (although 
the age of marriage starts from 14 and 18 for girls and boys 
respectively given parental consent). The matter has not 
been specifically considered in respect of adoption but criticisms 
on the issue in the law of marriage have presented reservations 
of equal importance.
The issue of age is not irrelevant to the function of parenthood 
as it has been formulated with the recent shift towards the social 
side of adoption. All liabilities of the parent in respect of 
a strange child with the ofder are vested to the adopter and he is 
rendered exclusively responsible for the upbringing, maintenance 
and representation of the child. In his duties he is expected 
to respond in a manner serving the welfare of the child. Therefore, 
the two lave have selected an age which assumes ability to understand 
the nature and purpose of the order cn the part of the adopter, 
as well as indicating he will be reliable in fulfilling his duties.
IV. THE STATUS OF THE APPLICANT
The eligible age, as settled in both systems, is a condition made
basically on assessments concerning the personal status of the applicant.
Among them the marital status of..the applicant plays the most important
role since this signifies whether a complete family unit will care
37
for the child or not. The approach of law appears to be different 
towards this question.
The present Act, unlike its predecessor the 1958 Act, no longer permits 
adoption in favour of one of the spouses if they are living together
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with the consent of the other spouse. The change, which was not 
recorameided l:ythe Houghton Committee, is designed to encourage joint 
applications. On the other hand, section 15 makes it possible 
for a single person or, in specific instances,for one spouse alone 
to adopt a child.
For the single applicant such instances are not specified but as 
the Committee explains it is a concession made in favour of parents 
with illegitimate children because it is evident that in certain cases 
such adoption will be beneficial to the child. For a married 
applicant it is permitted on the other hand in strictly restricted
circumstances, namely those which under the former law were grounds
38for dispensing with the other 'spouse's consent.
As regards Greek law, although this theoretically deals only with
individual adoptions, it nevertheless implicitly envisages marriage as
39
a qualification sine qua non for the applicant;- Setting the
eligible age at 30 is done on two accounts. At this age a person 
normally has made up his mind about marriage and, if not, is neither 
likely to consider adoption, nor, if he did, to qualify under the welfare 
requirements. In respect of the latter it must be said that the 
policy adopted by many countries is also followed in Greece. Adoption 
is seen as a form of care emerging from the participation of the 
community in the problems of children when arising from lack of parenthood 
and curable in family circumstances. The position firmly kept in both 
introductory reports is that the real need of children is to become 
members of a complete family which can look after their growth and 
education in a manner beneficial to them.^^ Nevertheless, article 9(1) 
makes explicit this purpose because it practically requires a self 
efficient household to care for the child.
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This conclusion is further supported by the fact that Greek law permits 
exceptions from the age limit under circumstances that clearly imply 
the existence of a marriage between the applicants. However,
Greek law differs from Scots law in that it does not show a due concern 
for the child becoming legally the child of both spouses. This may 
turn out to be a considerable défect for the placement, if for any
41
reason the non-applicant spouse changes his position towards the child.
Nevertheless, that it is still permissible for an unmarried applicant 
to adopt, must not be considered as having a diluting effect on the 
aims of adoption. The preservation of this freedom is tight, consid­
ering that its exercise could cover circumstances where the order would 
seem to be exceptionally beneficial for the child.
That sole applications should continue to be allowed appears to be 
also the view of the Houghton Committee. Evidence to them had shown 
that adoptions by a sole natural parent, had in many instances
42
beneficial results to the child, other than improving its legal status.
Moreover, cases where the applicant (a single person) has de facto
cared for a child over some time and is willing to adopt it, could be
regarded as similarly beneficial too it. In such cases, whenever
it corresponds with the welfare requirements, the legitimation of the
de facto relationship certainly secures the interests of the child and,
if the child is settled with the applicant, prevents undue emotional 
43disturbance. Furthermore, this particular category of applicants
is worthy of preservation in view of its clear intentions towards 
the child. The single person normally proceeds to an adoption from 
the desire to care for an individual child, whereas, with married 
applicants, the motives are mixed and usually concerned with childlessness,
278
The inference, therefore, is that adoptions by an unmarried person, 
although inferior in terms of financial and custodial guarantees, need 
not be discontinued if there is sufficient ad hoc evidence that the 
interests of the child will be properly served. But, insofar as in 
such cases there’is no possiblity of turning to the other spouse in 
the event of unexpected changes of circumstances or negligence, it is 
important that courts take all available precautions before making 
an award to an unmarried applicant.
V. ADOPTION BY A MARRIED APPLICANT ALONE
A. Earlier in Scots law the possibility for a married person to
adopt alone under exceptional circumstances was referred to. The 
court, to consider such applications, has to be satisfied that
i. the other spouse cannot be found or
ii. the spouses have separated and are living apairt and the
separation is likely to be permanent or
iii. the other spouse is by reason of ill health, whether physical
or mental, incàpablebôf making an application for an adoption 
44
order.
In the first and second instances most probably mature separation 
is presumed between the couple so that either theyrshare nothing 
in common or the circumstances are such that preclude reunion of 
the spouses.
1. Namely, in the case of an applicant whose spouse cannot be
found there is no specific precedent in order to understand
what weight had been given to the intentions df the party to 
cease from living with the applicant. If applied by analogy with 
those decided for a parent, who cannot be found,to give consent.
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the criterion for deciding for the spouse would be to declare
him missing if all reasonable steps to trace him had been taken
45and these had not produced any results. But in the cases
of the applicant, it is important that the court make an 
effort to understand from the circumstances of the disappearance 
the intention of the missing party and whether reunion is 
probable since both must be taken into consideration for the 
welfare of the child.
2. On the other hand, the concept of being separated and living
apart is well known in matrimonial causes and decisions thereon 
are relevant by analogy. For the particular case, however, 
the court must take three factors into account before 
deciding whether the separation is that required by law :
i. whether the separation involves fiscal effects,
ii. whether it is supported with evidence proving permanency, 
and
iii. where the couple are actually living apart.
For the first condition, any legally recognised form of
separation, from the informal to the most formal, would seem 
46
to be sufficient. The condition, however is interlocked
with the other two. Therefore only a judicially separated
couple may satisfy the conditions since they are deemed not
to be living together. But even so due to the absence of
express definition in statute, it may be that there is a
47
rebutable presumption to that effect. Thus, it is
possible that the parties are separated in the physical sense 
but still living together and vice versa. For example,
the husband's work may require him to be away for long periods 
at a time, or the couple may have separated in the physical sense
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but may still be living under the same roof. The possible 
cases seem rather confusing for an understanding of whether 
the couple is living apart and whether the separation is 
a permanent one.
As regards the third condition,nEhglish courts have made a
distinction with regard to such spouses, holding that spouêes
are living apart when they cease to share the same services
48
even under the same roof. Despite the fact that these
cases refer to divorce, Freeman suggests that "There is
no reason why this test should not be applicable here, though
it is doubtful whether an adoption order ought to be made in
such circumstances, bearing in mind that the welfare of the
49
child is the first consideration." Indeed such difficulty
exists bearing in mind that the function of the provision is 
to ensure that the separation is mature enough to have enabled 
the couple to cease sharing the same dwelling, with each 
settled into his own household. This would enable the agency 
to assess the environment where the child would be received 
and to ensure that no direct contact between the child,-the 
adopting parent and the other spouse, with whom relations may 
be tense, would be such as to disturb the child emotionally.
Also separation has to be permanent. A way out of this 
problem^it is suggestèdyiâ a close inquiry into the circumstances 
However, this would be meaningless and against the condition 
of Section 14 ofthe Act if not carried into proof that the 
parties are unwilling to reconcile, on the basis of objective 
evidence, or that the parties have proceeded to a stage in 
divorce proceedings such as tha .issuing of a divorce order.
50
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3. Finally, the circumstances of incapacity are limited by the
1978 Act only to the instances of ill health, physical or mental.
According to Bevan and Parry the ground relates to joining in
the application for, rather than agreeing to, an adoption
order. Thus it applies to instances where the spouses are
physically separated, i.e. because the one is in hospital and
cannot be said that they have separated and are living apart in
the legal sense, as well as when the spouses are living 
51
together.
The provision has been criticized as introducing a "strange
anomaly" in the Act because it-permits someone with an
incapacitated spouse to apply, irrespective of whether they
live together or not, while it fails to do the same for someone
52with a spouse in good health. The criticism, however,
cannot sustain because the ground provides a concession against 
the policy that adoption should be promoted amon§ joint 
applicants. It aims to meet the rare case where the one spouse 
applies to adopt a child fostered out in the family, or his or 
her natural offspring, while the other being unable to understand 
the nature of the order or being unable to perform parental 
duties has to remain out of matters. It is then left with the 
court to consider, whenever a spouse suffering ill health lives 
with the applicant, if the circumstances of the family are 
conducive to the child's welfare and take the necessary precautions 
to avoid unexpected complications.^^
In respect to adoption by a married person alone, it is
suggested that if the other spouse recovers of reappears
and cohabitation is resumed after an order is made, the couple
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should apply for a joint adoption order.
B . In Greece, as explained earlier, the policy is that the child
should be placed within a family. Cbnsequently, marriage becomes 
a qualifying prerequisite for the applicant notwithstanding that 
the law adheres to adoptions by a sole applicant. On this basis 
the involvement of the couple in adoption is governed by different 
principles. Namely, according to article 6 of the L.D. 61C/1970 
"A married person cannot adopt without the consent of the other 
spouse, which must be provided in the form of a notarial deed or 
with a declaration before the court at the hearing of adoption.
The court, nevertheless, may allow the adoption order without that 
consent in the instance of overt prolonged separation of the 
spouses, as well as when due to mental illness or other serious 
reason the agreement of the other spouse is unattainable".
The conditions for the spouse to apply without the consent of the
other are similar to those permitting the married applicant to apply
alone under Scots law. Thus, with respect to mental illness it
has been provided that a judicial deed incapacitating the spouse is
not needed, but it is sufficient if the spouse presents evidence
proving inability of the other either to understand or participate 
55in the adoption. Similarly for a good reason in the
circumstances the decision 386/1964 of the Acios Pagos held consent
unnecessary if the spouse is of unknown residence and cannot be 
56traced back. Furthermore it may be argued that such reason
exists when the spouses are physically separated because the
57
other is undergoing long term hospital treatment. Furthermore, 
in respect of the evident prolonged separation of the spouses 
this may be either formal or informal, and should exist
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at the date the application is made. However, this ground is of 
particular significance because it is one of the rare instances 
where Greek law recognises de facto separation.
Relevant to the above grounds is whether the court can dispense with 
consent on the grounds of abuse of right if the spouse withholds 
consent unreasonably. Answer to this question, however, should 
be given after considering the reasons for requiring the consent 
of the spouse and its significance for the welfare of the child.
One rationale of consent being necessary is that the spouse's
rights and duties and marital relationship with the applicant will
59
be decisively affected by the adoption order. It would be
arbitrary, therefore, if one party created such a legal relationship 
without the approval of the other p a r t y . A  different approach, 
more coherent with':the welfare ideal, without underestimating 
the importance of the spouse's rights, envisages consent as a need 
emerging from the role that the other spouse would have in the 
relationship created. Namely it aims to secure that the spouse 
undertakes the obligations of a step parent and that, if the order 
is made he or she will serve and promote the welfare of the child.
Thus, consent, apart from its function to protect the interests of 
the spouse, expresses the spouse's intentions towards the proposed 
a d o p t i o n . T h i s  is not of course to say that he or she undertakes a 
direct ■'Obligation towards the adoptee, but only incurs one indiredtly 
through the conjugal relationship with the applicantsspouse.^^
In relation to the different approaches on consent there is also 
disagreement as to whether consent should take precedence over 
any hearings as well as to its consequence for the order if proved
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to be defective. For applications submitted under the civil
code procedure, supporters of the contractual or mixed theories
on adoption^^ because of their concern with the interests of the
spouse, had viewed consent as a subjective prerequisite exercisable
by and on behalf of the spouse. In this context, consent not
given prior to hearingsrscould be provided at any stage of the
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first instance proceedings or before the appeal court. The
opposite approach sees consent as a constitutive element for the
qualifications of the application that should exist before any
discussion on the merits and as revocable only before the first 
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hearings. On the first basis an order awarded without a legally
effective consent is voidable. The spouse, whose rights have been 
affected by the order is entitled to bring an action to overrule 
the order. The voidability of the order is remedied if the spouse 
had died without brinqiig a petition seeking for the adoption to be 
declared void.^^ In adoordance with the second approach an order
granted with neither consent nor its dispensation is void as lacking 
one of its constitutive e l e m e n t s . R e a s o n s  justifying exemptions 
or the dispensing with consent are subject to the judgement of the
court and any erroneous judgement does not entail voidness of
^  68 adoption.
In relation then to the conditions for consent in the Legislative
Decree 610/1970 there are certain observations to be made for
existing theory. If consent is necessary in order to
protect the rights of the other spouse in separation where those rights
are still operative the article dispeices wLlhlhe need of having the
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consent of the spouse. Moreover, a similar exclusion is provided
for the mentally ill spouse although in accord to this approach his 
rights need far more protection. Especially for this case, it should
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be noted that the L.D. treats consent as an exclusively personal
matter so that a mentally ill spouse cannot be represented in
the consent by his g u a r d i a n . I r r e s p e c t i v e  of the conditions
of the article, if consent could be provided at any stage of the
proceedings, as the theory asserts, nevertheless it must be
considered revocable within the same time limits if the spouse can
provide irrebuttable evidence on change of the circumstances
justifying him in withholding consent. However, according to
the clear sense of article 1575 of the Greek civil code any
agreement given to or for adoption should be free of terms and
conditions and can be revoked only prior to any hearings if given
with a notarial deed, while it is irrevocable if given before the
court. In accord with the above consideration it should be said
that the rationale for requiring consent of the spouse for
adoptions under the Legislative Decree 510/1970 relates more to the
participation of the non applicant spouse and should be treated
not as a mere agreement but as an undertaking of certain responsibilities
A spouse who ceased cohabitation or is incapable of performing parental
duties is unlikely to undertake responsibilities and as such is
excluded.
In relation then to the case where the court is asked to dispense
with the consent of the spouse on the grounds of abuse of right,
in view of the need to protect the spouses' rights thislhas' been
considered' possible only if the spouse withheld consent without 
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just reason. Given on the other hand the importance attached
to the welfare of the child in the L.D., it seems rather unwise 
to take such a step because the spouse is going to have an active 
role in the future of the placement. However, for the rare case 
where the spouses have been separated without this separation 
existing for long, but it being unlikely that cohabitation will
286
resume, it should be permissible for the court to dispense 
with consent on the grounds of abuse of right.
VI. CHILDLES SNES S
The two systems treat the matter of childlessness in entirely different
ways. In Scots law where there has been a significant reduction in legal
prescription on eligibility such matters are left unregulated. However,
despite the fact that the 1958 Act disregarded childlessness as a
prerequisite for adoption this did not prevent some agencies from
preserving the rule in their own constitution or fefusing to place
children with prospective adopters who already had children of their
own. This approach has been first attacked by the Hurst Committee
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which found such regulations to be u n f o r t u n a t e w h i l e  the Houghton
Committee took a firmer line, by recommending that such rules and practice
be altogether rejected. No express prohibition, however, is embodied
in the 1978 Act but in the Committee's view the exclusion of couples
with children of their own is an arbitrary criterion; each case
should be considered on its merits, from the point of view of whether
adoption is likely to be for the child's welfare, and that agencies
and courts should not themselves attempt to formulate rigid rules on
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what constitutes suitability, or unsuitability to adopt.
In Greek law, childlessness is a well preserved condition of eligibility,
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present in the pre-code and civil code law and reappearing in the 
75
L.D. 4532/1966 and 610/1970. In relation to the latter, article 2(2)
states as a sine qua non prerequisite for a competent application the
lack of legitimate descent for the applicant. This includes the
legitimate or legitimated child of the applicant,and their descendants
77
or the descendants of an adoptive child born after his adoption.
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Having an adoptive child no longer prevents further adoption by the
78
parent as it used to . under the civil code and the L.D. 4532/1966.
A child given for adoption is still deemed as the legitimate offspring
of its natural parents, insofar as adoption neither extinguishes the
79
relationship with the natural family nor their rights and duties 
altogether. A stillborn child prevents adoption^^ while a child 
born out of wedlock according to the clear sense of article 2T(2) does 
not debar adoption, even if there is voluntary affiliation, where the
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rights and duties with the parent approximates to that of legitimacy.
As to the legitimate child who is presumed dead the Magistrates’ Court 
of loannina in its decision 89/1947^^ refused to grant an order, 
stating that a mere ignorance of the child's whereabouts should not 
allow its parents to proceed to an adoption unless decree declaring the 
child legally dead has been issued. However, this might constitute 
serious reason for the conditions of article 4 of the L.D. 610/1970 (infra).
With this provison the L.D. remains within the traditional conception 
of the interests of the adoptive child as being in conflict with 
the interests of children of theLàpplicant; and thereto holds the 
extreme'.-position being concerned not only with the interests of the nuclear 
family but with that of the entire descent. Indeed as the raison d'etre 
of requiring childlessness is presented the need to prevent prejudices 
inherent in families with natural and adoptive children. The opinion 
was and somehow remains that the position of the adoptee is precarious 
and inferior to that of the natural child. Recent studies, however, 
reject this argument, inclining to the view that such frictions, whenever 
they exist, are of minor importance or not sufficient to prevent 
placements in families with children of their own. Their common 
observation is that problems are exclusively created by the parents and 
that this is not beyond remedy because they can easily learn to create
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warmth and emotional understanding in their families. A second
argument views childlessness as a need to protect succession and 
alimentary rights of the legitimate descendant. The argument enjoyed 
remarkable attention by Greek scholars and seems to be the decisive 
one taking into account that childlessness includes the entire descent 
of the parents which has a little to do with his nuclear f a m i l y . A g a i n s t  
this argument, however, one could state that such rights are not 
absolute and the parent has the discretion to prejudice them, i.e. by 
appointing the child to its legal portion in the estate.
The hollowness of the arguments then was appreciated by the Cbmmittee of
the Ministry of Justice which in line with the provisions of the
European convention, suggested apart from a lowering in the eligible
87age, abolition of childlessness altogether. The Legislature had
partly rejected this proposal, reinstating childlessness. This must be
viewed with some scepticism since at the age of 30 childlessness cannot
be secured as a permanent condition. Spinellis and Shachor-Landau in
respect to the enactment assert that " Although it may be argued that a
childless couple will prove kinder towards an adopted child, there
being no possibility of discrimination between natural and adopted
children, this is not inspired merely by the interests of the child. The
provision rather savours of the old idea that an adoption comes
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essentially to fulfill the interests of the adopting parents." This 
conception of the condition seems to express well the ideology behind 
childlessness since the arguments in favour of its preservation are 
not within the bounds of the interests of the child. To argue on 
the other hand for the abolition of childlessness from Greek law is not an 
easy task to perform since it cannot be supported with empirical 
evidence. Long term fostering has never been seriously practised with 
families with children on their own and Greece remains among the
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few countries which have never experimented with the coexistence of natural 
and adoptive children in the family. Unfortunately Such experiment 
is not in prospect because the present Decree fails to provide for the 
child to have his home with the applicant prior to the order, when the 
weight of such ambivalent arguments could be easily clarified.
VII. EXCEPTIONS FROM THE REQUIREMENT OF CHILDLESSNESS
The formula has been partly relaxed by article 4 of the L.D.610/1970.
According to this the court may waive the condition (childlessness) and 
permit the adoption of one only child to a parent having a legitimate 
descendant if the descendant suffers from an incurable disease or there 
is a serious reason to consider the adoption notwithstanding that^equal consid­
eration should be given to the interests of.the natural child. The 
article is a modified version of article 4 of the draft of the L.D. 4532 
which was introduced under the pressure of the European Convention.
It is a pragmatic provision aiming to conciliate the opposite approaches
of the Committee and Parliament and as such lacks any empirical and
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theoretical justification. The article in its present form
corresponds to two cases of different orientation. The first, like 
childlessness, emphasises the interests of the parent, permitting 
him to adopt when his descendant suffers an incurable disease. The 
second is aimed to legitimate de facto relations in cases where the child 
has been cared for for some time by the applicant and they are willing 
to give legal effect to their relationship. Both are shbject to the 
conditions that the parent may apply for the adoption of one only child 
and that the interest of the legitimate descendant will be respected 
with equal consideration.
The conditions for the prospective adopter to apply having a severely
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ill child prescribe (i) the existence of one only descendant, (ii)
who suffers from an incurable disease (iii) so severely that either
there is no hope for him to survive or the illness or handicap is
of the nature precluding him from taking part in social life. This
interpretation is given in accord with the condition of childlessness
and presumes a situation whereas the applicant has been substantially
90
deprived of the j oy of having a child. Moreover, according to the letter 
of the law, an applicant with more than one sick child is excluded. 
However, from a teleological point of view, because he stands in the 
same state of deprivation, it seems appropriate to permit him to apply 
if that adoption would preclude dangers for the welfare of either child.
The second exception waives the requirement of childlessness when there 
exists a serious reason compelling the adoption of the child. Such 
qualifying reasons have been indicated as the adoption of a neglected,
abandoned or orphaned child fostered over some time by the applicant's
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family;, and has the purpose of legitimating a de facto relationship.^
An opinion expressed by G. Michaelidis Nouaros gives nevertheless
another dimension to the meaning of the term 'Serious reason". According
to him the court may authorise adoption by someone who already has a
legitimate Offspring if that person wishes to adopt a child of the other 
92spouse. This approach is undoubtedly of value for a parentless
child. In general, however, this suggestion is subject to the 
reservations expressed for adoptions by relatives since such a step 
would eradicate substantially the relationship with the other natural 
parent and his relatives, without altering the factual circumstances of 
the child.
Petitions submitted under the conditions of article 4 of the L.D. are 
subject to the restriction that the application should concern the 
adoption of one only child. This is stated to secure the important
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end that the inclusion of another child will not place too great
a burden on the family. The manner, however, of so doing is rather
unsuccessful. Maybe there is an acceptable rationale justifying
the restrictions for applicants with a sick child, i.e. if that child
needs intensive care, but nevertheless it imposes undue restrictions
on the flexibility of courts and agencies to assess situations.
To take for instance the case where a whole family unit has been cared
by the applicants, with this restriction the children must either
separate or await' a childless adopter to adopt them. Thus various
questions arise in respect of the children's future. In the first
place they may have become part of the caring family and suffer
considerable distress if removed, and even if we take for granted that
children are quite flexible in adjusting themselves to new situations,
it is difficult to predict if they will fit happily in theinewefamily.
On the other hand, to separate them is most undesirable since as ,
has been pointed out, children,and especially parentless ones,
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learn brotherhood in its ultimate meaning in childhood. The condition
therefore, is incompatible with the concept of the welfare of the child 
and like childlessness savours of the old ideas when adoption^intended 
to console. the childlessness of the applicant.
Aside from the misplacement of the exemptions in the modern concept of 
adoption, there is a particular difficulty in making welfare assessments 
under those circumstances. Article 4 of the L.D. imposes the duty 
on the court to have due consideration to the interests of the natural 
child. In relation, therefore, to the welfare of the adoptive child 
the line appears to be either that adoption is permitted whenever none 
of the children is to be in àn inferior position and below the acceptable 
standards, or that it is permitted when it leaves unaffected major 
interests of the legitimate descendant. The situation is complicated
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in terms of legal and social arguments and unfortunately is scarcely 
discussed in Greek Jurisprudence. The choice of the first may result 
in a concession to the progressive nature of the process of adoption while 
choice of the second may cause undue deterioration of the interests of 
the natural child.
In German jurisprudence the line taken for the similar situation is
that a parent with natural children can adopt insofar as adoption does
not contravene major interests of the natural child, either presently
or in the near future. Proprietorial rights of natural children
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are not of decisive consideration. If we apply the same consideration
in Greek law there are still some dilemmas in choosing the first or the
second approach for maintaining a fair situation in the rest of the
substantive rights for either child. A general proposition made by
Nouaros seems to incline to mutual concessions and balance between the
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two welfares under consideration. This, however, is easy to achieve
when adoption concerns a child fostered by a family with healthy 
children. On the other hand to assess aspects of the welfare with 
a family having a sick child or even to try to predict what care would 
the adoptee receive within this family is most difficult. Unexpected 
problems should always be taken into account. The mother's time may 
be restricted by complications in the health of the child. She may, 
for example, be forced to stay at the hospital at a time while the 
child is attending. And, aside from the question of time, the maintenance 
and emotional affection needed for either child seems to be in the same 
state of danger. Parents normally are not reluctant to spend money
in order to try to cure their sick child and it is not unknown in such 
circumstances for families to spend their entire resources to this end. 
Moreover, the situation of the sick child may attract the greatest 
attention of the mother to him feo that the adoptee may feel emotionally
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deprived. To this should be added the observation made by the
committee appointed by the Ministry of Justice that due to the intensive
life in such families the adoptive child may have to offer more than
the necessary services in the adoptive family and may be considerably
96deprived of play-time.
The above observations make the decision of which line to take rather 
difficult, or in any case not of such broadness as to give a 
satisfactory solution to ïnoet cates. The coexistence of the children 
in the family should not result in devaluation of either child's 
interests. Therefore, the first line seems to cover reasonably 
well cases where health complications for the natural child are 
predictable. If, however, deterioration in his health is to be 
expected the court is bound a priori to refuse consideration unless the 
means and position of the parents can secure permanency of the 
satisfaction of the welfare of the adoptee. Inevitably economic 
factors come to have an important role as well as the employment 
situation of the mother - which thus discriminates against the lower 
middle and working classes.
The approach requiring preservation of the major interests of the
natural child, on the other hand, starts from the position of his
rights and considers whether or not there is room for adoption without
96a
in the long term damaging any of those rights. This approach, apart 
from the fact that it leads to the same discrimination against the 
parents, fails to give any guidance on what must be the relationship 
between the rights of the natural child and that of the adoptee. Prima 
facie the court may be justified in granting an order if this will 
result to the interest of the adoptive child, irrespective of the better 
nature of rights preserved on behalf of the natural child. This, 
however, produces a discriminatory situation within the family. If
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on the other hand, the aim is to maintain a balance, to what extent 
would the rights of either child diminish in the case of complications 
and are such risks permissible at times when the number of adopters 
available is far greater than the number of children awaiting adoption?
Whatever the method applied, this will not resolve the problems of such
placements. There would always be outstanding the uncertainty for the
adjustibility and for after-effects in the placement, for both parents
and children. Parents with a seriously ill child have learnt to deal
with the problems considered and may find it difficult to adjust
themselves to the needs of a normal child. They are in an inferior
position even to inexperienced parents because the latter can be more
flexible to this end. Their position can be seen as even harder if
it is taken into account that they have to cope with the rdles of nurse
and parent at the same time. Moreover, rearing the child besides their
own, they may have emotional conflicts as far as the child will stand
as a constant reminder of their inability to give birth to a normal
child. Dr. Iris Knight in her study on placements in families with
handicapped children points to the realisation by the parent that they
must turn to another to produce a normal child for their family.
This is a shock to them of uncertain duration which has occasionally
resulted in the failing of the adoption. Even in brief shocks
emotional complexities may determine the future of adoption with
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traumas to themselves and the adoptee.
As to the children themselves, they pass through so many stages 
as they grow up that it is almost impossible to assess effects on 
their character. It is suspected, however, that a child who is 
physically limited but with a normal intelligence may suffer from 
distress as he watches the introduced child do all the things that
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he has been unable to do. With the consequent feelings of failure 
which may create mutual antipathies. Moreover, the adoptive child may 
be disturbed by his brother's incapacities if he is warm and loving.
The emotional disturbance may be worse if the natural child's illness 
results in death.
The inference from the analysis on the exception in article 4 of the 
law 610/70 is-feat placements in families with a seriously ill child are 
rather critical and of unpredictable consequence. Without disregarding 
the need for finding a remedy for the problem of these parents the 
radical and irrevocable effects of adoption may be argued to render 
adoption inappropriate for such situations. However, if it appears in 
the court's opinion that there are enough safeguards for the interests 
of both children it would still be preferable for the order to be 
granted only if a sufficient probationary period has occurred prior to 
adoption. As to the children who have been cared for by families 
who wish to adopt them, the conditions of the article are inadequate 
to meet situations where it is evident that the family is getting on 
without problems. The condition restricting the number of adoptees
to one, motivated by the same reasons as the requirement of childless­
ness, turns the article to a circumstantial remedy, leaving out of 
consideration the adoption of family units. The major disadvantage 
of the article, however, is that it is a confirmation of the requirement 
of childlessness, out dated in relation to current purposes of the law 
610/70 and as such worthy of repeal.
VIII ADOPTION OF CHILDREN BY PARENTS OR RELATIVES
A rather controversial matter in both legal systems is the adoption of 
the child by his parent alone or jointly with his or her spouse and 
the adoption of children by other relatives. The recent trend in 
adoption figures in Scotland suggests'that the number of adoptions by
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parents and step-parents has increased and is likely to continue
to increase and that adoptions by a parent alone though declining
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are still considerable in number. Furthermore, in Greece,
though there are no figures to prove it, a similar situation should be
expected since the Committee appointed by the Ministry of Justice to
reform the law advocates such adoptions as suitable means to improve
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the legal position of the children. Obviously adoption by
relatives is fundamentally different from adoptions by non relatives 
and it is sufficiently clear that the law as it stands in the two 
countries today is more focussed on meeting the particular difficulties 
arising from the placement of the child with strangers than on the 
creation of a relationship in its legal sense. The latter constitutes 
only one aspect of the entire process but in this category of adoptions 
it becomes the one,aexclusive task. The practice of such adoptions 
started from the very distinction between legitimate and illegitimate 
children and the new family era in the life of the child with the 
marriage or rematriage of the custodian parent. Many parents in order 
to create a relationship equivalent to that of legitimacy or to 
integrate the child within the new family started adopting their children. 
Not astonishingly such practice is suggested by the European Convention 
on Adoption which states that "if adoption improves the legal position 
of a child a person shall not be prohibited by law from adopting his 
own child born out of w e d l o c k . A s  a result of this adoption, 
the relationship with the other natural parent will become extinct and 
be recreated in respect of the other, the applicant exclusively or 
jointly with his/her spouse, although there may have been no real need 
for altering the faily circumstances under which the child lived.
On the other hand, adoption by relativessneed not necessarily be 
harmful to the child. Indeed the possible classification of the 
adoptive types attract varying difficulties. The circumstances vary 
from case to case as well as the effect of the order on the child's
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rights, so that no general rules can be laid down. Thus, in the follow­
ing pages there will be offered an analysis of adoption by a parent 
alone, a parent and steprparent and by other relatives when it 
concerns an illegitimate and legitimate child. In respect of 
illegitimate children, specific reference will be made to the 
circumstances as they will be transformed if any discrimination is 
removed.
Adoption by a parent alone
1. In Scotland, although the law never was explicit in the point, it
is submitted that the reason for permitting such adoptions is
mainly to improve the legal position of illegitimate children.
The natural child did not count in law as a member of either its
father's or its mother's family, who had no responsibility towards
it. So the child's position was legally safeguarded only if its
mother or father or one of the family adopted it.^^^ To this
end the Acts of 1930 and 1958 permitted adoptions by a parent alone
notwithstanding any restriction on their age and the older was
usually awarded without questioning their suitability. In
addition the 1958 Act first introduced the concept of complete
severance of natural ties and attention was paid to the fact that
the mother would not be left alone to maintain the child by providing
that where a single mother adopted her illegitimate child the
adoption could not supersede any decree of affiliation and aliment
or any agreement whereby the father had undertaken to make payments
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for the child's benefit.
This kind of adoption indeed was needed at â time when the rights 
of custody and aliment in respect to illegitimate children were 
statutorily introduced but not yet fully developed, while succession 
rights were not yet recognised. Since then, however, the law has
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been rapidly developed and today it could be said with
confidence that the defects of the relationship with natural parents
are such that the benefit to the child if adopted need, not outweigh
the disadvantages of the extinction of the relation with the other
parent. In this train of thought, the Houghton Committee
considered adoption by natural parentsalone unnecessary and not to
be encouraged. On this view adoption neither confers upon the
mother rights and responsibilities towards the child which she did
not have before nor any upon the father except an automatic right to
the child's c u s t o d y . A s  to the stigma of illegitimacy as
they explain, prima facie, the adoptive relationship will alleviate
the worries of the single mother in that in future when dealing
with affairs of her child she would not have to admit to his
illegitimate birth at any time. However, for the mother adoption
cannot alter the facts that she was unmarried when the child was
born, and that he was born illegitimate, a fact well-known to
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people in her neighbourhood. As to the use of adoption to
exclude the harmful interference of the other parent in the child's
life the Committee insisted that custody was the appropriate means
of settling disputes between the parents and recommended use of
adoption only in exceptional circumstances. The adherence to
custody nevertheless accords to their view that adoption could be
emotionally damaging in the long run as an attempt to hide the
105facts instead of informing the child of his origins.
By placing emphasis, therefore, on the undesirability of excluding 
the otler parent, the Act imposes restrictions on the mother or 
father applying alone. Thus an application by a mother or father 
is only possible where the court is satisfied that (a) the other 
natural parent is dead or cannot be found or (b) there is some
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other reason justifying the exclusion of the other natural parent.
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This is submitted as applying to both legitimate and illegitimate 
children, but as indicated mainly refers to the latter. It is 
highly unlikely that a parent alone will apply to adopt his or her 
legitimate child since he will be able to rely on his rights on the 
death of the other spouse. In circumstances other than death, 
for instance, if the other spouse cannot be found the conditions 
for dispensing with the parent consent on that ground should be 
complied with.^^^ As to some other reason justifying the exclusion 
of the other parent it is submitted that must be a reason relating 
to the child's welfare and section 15(2) primarily contemplates 
the circumstances which would justify dispensing with the other 
parent's agreement. However, in respect to the cooperation of the 
parents in performing parental duties there may be some ground 
for permitting adoption to the parent only if the other has 
persistently or seriously ill-treated the child. Even so, however 
the chances of awarding an order to the one parent in respect of 
a legitimate child are minimal. If the parent applies after 
being separated from the other spouse, since the Act encourages 
parent and other relatives to seek custody the court will expect 
the mother to rely on this right and so may refuse the order.
In illegitimacy on the other hand applications under the present
section could be more easily sustained. For instance the mother
may want to sever links with the father because it would be in the
child's interest to restrain him from his repeated and allegedly
vexatious applications for custody or, because of the mother's
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disappearance, the father wants to adopt the child. However,
in the view of Houghton Committee abandonment or rejection by the 
natural father should not be regarded as sufficient reason for 
allowing the mother to adopt lalone.^^^ There is something
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unsatisfactory about this reasoning on the point that abandonment 
would seem to be just as good a reason for cutting off the legal 
links with the other parent. However, taking into account thht 
in illegitimacy the relationship with the parent is not ipso jure 
operative the ground of abandonment may be artificially created 
by the mother's omission to make the father aware of the child's 
existence, or even by her refusal to cooperate in finding the 
father _ thus the need to introduce steps to ascertain paternity 
before considering abandonment.
The entire subsection, nevertheless, has been challenged as to
its necessity. It is suggested that it should be possible to
deal with single-parents adoptions by using the concept of the welfare
of the child in its relation to the grounds for dispensing with parental
consent, without having a special provision. The key question
assuming the consent of the other parent is unnecessary, or is
given, or is dispensed with, is really whether it is in the chi Id:'s
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interests to replace the natural relationship by an adoptive one.
2. In Greek law on the other hand the adoption of illegitimate children
was prohibited until recently. Article 1559 of the Greek civil
code (no longer in force for adoption of minors or infants) states
that "The parents cannot adopt their illegitimater.child. " The
justification presented for the prohibition was that the fictional
means of adoption is not the proper way for restoring natural 
112relations,. This, although in principle correct, nevertheless
113reflects a desire to keep the Roman-Byzantine tradition, and is an
echo of the hostile attitudes of the 19th century against
■ 1 -, . 114illegitimacy.
The article is not the result of the work of the drafters of the
301
civil cocfebutwasimposed in the final version of the code by
the revising committee and accordingly lacks any record defining its 
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scope and meaning. Furthermore, its vague form was of little
help to its interpretation since the article does not make any 
distinction between affiliated and non affiliated children.
One opinion has argued that the prohibition refers to those who 
were affiliated because only with those children is the natural 
relationship established, while the other goes further in 
asserting that what matters is the biological relationship and not 
the legal, so the prohibition refers to both categories.
The L.D. 510/70 removed this prohibition. Article 2(3) states 
that "adoption of an illegitimate child by his natural parent is 
permitted, without the restrictions of article 4, save the 
provisions of articles 1530 to 1557 of the civil code". This 
is to say that the parent who wishes to adopt his illegitimate child 
can still apply, irrespective of being childless or not, and for the 
adoption of more than one child, provided that the application 
concerns his illegitimate offspring. Nevertheless, such an 
order should not prejudice any rights and duties arising from the 
natural relationship or by any act of acknowledgement or legitimation.
As submitted in the introductory report, this article is an affirmative 
permission to resolve problems of interpretation that appeared in 
the LD. 4532/1955. The initial purpose of the drafters of the 
first Decree was to permit adoption of illegitimate children and 
therefore they omitted to reinstate the prohibition of article 1559 
of the Greek civil code. Thus in accord with article 1 of the
aforementioned decree which states that no article of the civil 
code should apply for adoptions of minors unless specifically
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mentioned and with the lack of specific prohibition in the Decree,
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it was intended to be possible for someone to adopt his own child.
The lack of specific mention, however, caused confusion as to 
interpretation which the later article seeks to resolve. But even 
in its present form the article is beset in a different context 
with all the problems that appear in the civil code. For instance 
should it be permitted for someone to adopt his illegitimate child 
even though he has not formally acknowledged it, or should formal 
acknowledgement always be needed? Prima facie the purpose 
of the article is to remove discrimination and provide a wider 
assurance on behalf of illegitimate children. As such, therefore 
it must have a wide application to cover all cases. But because 
adoption by parents is given privileged treatment, to avoid abuse 
it must be necessary to provide proof of paternity either by means 
of an affiliation order, or by producing strong evidence of 
paternity - sufficient, for example, for the issuing of an order 
on the paternity of the applicant. The order on the other hand 
should not prejudice rights arising from the natural relation. 
Therefore, the parent must be free to proceed to a formal 
acknowledgement after an order is made.
Although not explicitly stated, it is submitted that the provision
applies to the mother as well as the father. Admittedly, it
primarily affects the latter. It is highly unlikdly that the
natural mother alone will want to adopt her illegitimate child.
In terms of legal status, the relationship, though regarded as
illegitimate, nevertheless links the mother with the child with
all rights and obligations as if it was born to her in lawful
w e d l o c k . T h e  order then contributes nothing but to confer
automatically the right of guardianship over the child to the 
119mother. But, in any event, under article 1662 of Greek civil
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code, on her request, the court may appoint her guardian of the child 
if she is a fit person. In this respect similar criteria will 
apply as in article 9(1) of the L.D. 610/1970. Even this need, 
however, will become obsolete, if the BiHof tie Gazi' Committee 
becomes law, since it suggests giving to the mother the right to 
exercise parental authority over hèr child.
It remains, therefore, to see whether it should be permissible for
her to apply in order to conceal the illegitimate birth of the child
and avoid stigmatization. The Committee of the Ministry of Justice
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envisages such a need and particularly G. Michaelidis Nouaros is
of the opinion that "such adoptions could ultimately be
advantageous for the child particularly by virtue of the fact of the
effect of conferring on the child the status of an adopted child,
a status almost the same as that of a legitimate child, without
122
revealing to the public the child's illegitimate birth.' This
suggestion at first sight seems to remove a number of problematic 
circumstances from the mother-child relationship. On the other 
hand it remains questionable whether this can be achieved in 
practice or whether the advantages of adoption could outweigh 
the disadvantages of hiding from the child the truth about his 
origins.
In the first place the question is whether there is a real need
for providing for such adoptions in Greece. A study made in the
123
late sixties by the "Infant's Centre Mitera" has shown that
from 53 cases studied only 20 mothers were determined to keep their
children while the others had either lost real interest in the child
124or had failed to plan realistically for its future. Obviously
in respect of the first twenty the provision had nothing to add to
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the policy to assist mothers to retain their children. For the 
remaining thirty three the study does not indicate whether they 
decided to give up rearing the child themselves because of social 
stigmatization or because of financial difficulties or indifference 
towards the child. Risataki in her study on health and 
Welfare services, points out that the factor of stigma is a 
great problem for : the unmarried mother in Greece and undoubtedly 
she will be rejected by and alienated from those who ought to help 
her without thinking twice. Especially in most provincial areas 
there is little chance of her being given assistance by her
125
parents and she may be forced to leave her home and'"village.
D. Maganoitou, however, puts the problem in a different context,
126
in a report carried out by the journal "Epikaera". Without
underestimating the effect that the stigma has on the unmarried mother
in Greece she is of the opinion that this is not the decisive factor
for her to part with her child. The difficulties for the mother
mainly lie in how to handle the daily care of the child and in
127
financial problems. A similar view is shared by people
interviewed in the same report, emphasis being placed upon the fact
that the mother is left without help at a time when emotional links
128
with her child have just started to take a real form.
Inevitably the question to be considered is whether adoption could 
in itself alter the attitude towards the mother and create a 
different understanding. Unfortunately, the observation made by 
the Houghton Committee in the same context in Britain seems to 
remove any such hope. The mother was unmarried when the child was 
born and it was born illegitimate. Thus if the stigma is the 
decisive cause, the illegitimate birth of the child will remain 
a well known fact unless the mother moves into another area.
Otherwise adoption will help her only in dealing with public
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services or people away from her own surroundings. As well as this 
the Houghton Committee had pointed out that to hide the facts of the 
birth is more likely in the long run to cause damage to the child 
than be of any real help. Finally, it should be added that to 
engage in such a measure in Greek law, where the child is deemed 
legitimate in his relationship with the mother, without other end 
than that of avoiding stigmatization points more to the defects of 
policy towards single mothers than to any improvement in the 
situation.
As regards the illegitimate father, as discussed elsewhere, the 
Greek law distinguishes between judicial affiliation and voluntary 
and full judicial affiliation with different rights and duties 
for each case. Therefore, adoption may either improve the status 
or alter it basically for each case. In this respect alterations 
and improvements that adoption may introduce in each case 
should be first examined,e.g. the future of the aliment due by 
the father and the effects which adoption may have on the relation 
with the mother.
The voluntarily and completely judicially affiliated child according
to the clear sense of article 1537 of the Greek civil code unless
the contrary is provided in the law, has the rights and obligations
of a legitimate child. A contrary provision is that of article
1660 which provides that the illegitimate child is subject to
guardianship under a guardian appointed by the court. The court
may appoint the father guardian on his request. In this context
the only alteration in parental rights to be considered is that of
129
patria potestas' which the child lacked as illegitimate. As
to custody and succession rights, with adoption the parent has an
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automatic right to custody^^^ and the child doubles his portion 
in intestacy and its legal portion in intestate succession.
In respect to patria potestas it should be noticed that the
concept has been severely criticized and it is due to be abolished
in Greek law. Particularly in the Bill prepared by the Gazi
Committee in article 53 it is proposed that the doctrine be replaced
by parental care, a right to be exercised by both parents which
includes representation of the child, custody and administration 
132of his property. The Committee also propose in article 82 that
the illegitimate mother should have the parental care of her child.
The same right applies to the voluntary affiliating father, whenever
the mother has forfeited the right or is incapable of performing
her duties, but it excludes the father from any right to
133the illegitimate child's property. This, in fact, is the
main distinction between guardianship and patria. potestas under 
the civil code, the latter being a right never conferred on a 
guardian. However, the Gazi Committee in article 97 propose that 
with adoption the "parental care will be conferred on the adoptive 
parent but should by no means revive to the natural parents, in 
the case that the parent forfeits his right'.' . The natural parent 
retains only the right to have custody of the child." According to 
the Bill, therefore, the mother will lose the right of parental 
care. The same would happen, however, under the civil code and 
the relationship with the mother will be severely restricted. On 
the other hand the alterations that the order would make in cases 
of voluntary acknowledgement of paternity axe to submit the child 
to the care and control of the father and double its hereditary 
portion. This can otherwise be achieved under guardianship 
legislation and by making a proper will. In the case of a father 
to whom paternity had been "completely judicially" established
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the only change that the order will make in relation to the Bill is
134to give the father a right to parental care.
The situation is different as regards the relation of a father
and his illegitimate child when paternity has been judicially
established. The child neither is a relative of the father in
legal terms nor acquires any rights, apart from an alimentary
claim. For this situation no substantive change is proposed in
the Bill. Therefore, if such a child is adopted by its father
135
the order will improve its status to a considerable extent.
However, the force of two points which give a totally different 
view on the value of adoption in those circumstances should not be 
underestimated. Judicial ascertainment of paternity does not 
preclude the right of the father to proceed to affiliate the 
child voluntarily. Also, establishment of paternity by a 
judicial order follows a dispute either because the putative 
father doubts his paternity or because, as a result of disagreement 
with the mother, he had refused to acknowledge the child. In both 
cases, therefore, his fitness to care for the particular child should 
not be treated in isolation from the background circumstances in order 
to establish whether the father has changed his feelings for and 
attitude to the child. Evidence on the matter is difficult 
to obtain and therefore the ambivalent character of such applications 
would outstand problematically for the court. Therefore, it 
would be better were an order awarded to this father only in 
exceptional circumstances and after extensive welfare investigation.
Joint Adoption by a parent and step-parent
Within this area are included: adoption by a natural mother and her
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husband in Scotland; adoptions by natural father and his wife in
Scotland and Greece; adoption of a legitimate child by one parent and
his or her spouse in Scotland. Further, in the case of Greece it
includes the adoption of an illegitimate child by its mother's
husband, and the adoption of any legitimate or legitimated or adopted
child by the spouse of the existing parent. This peculiar
distinction arises from the fact that in Scottish law, a step-parent c
cannot share parental rights with the natural parent by adopting the
child. Instead, it is necessary for the rights of the natural parent
to be relinquished and revested equally between them.^^^ In Greece
on the other hand, it is possible for the spouse to adopt alone
the legitimate child of the other without this having any effect on
the other's rights. The same applies if the order concerns the natural
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child of the mother but not that of the father.
This kind of adoption represents a high proportion of the adoptions
involving biological parents in both countries and mostly it is used
138
by the mother of an illegitimate child and her husband. The
reasons however, behind such adoptions are for the child to be 
completely accepted into the new family unit, to change the child's 
name and birth certificate and the step parent to acquire jointly 
with the parent full legal rights and obligations in respect of the 
child. But though there is a positive advantage to the child in 
being adopted under these circumstances since it is reunited with 
normal family life, such considerations arise in quite different 
contexts for each country and raise a number of crucial questions 
to be answered.
In Scots law, where rights of the natural parent become extinct such 
adoption cuts the child off from one side of his natural family.
This has the consequence that natural parents, grandparents and
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other relatives cease to be legally related to the child, and the
right of the parent to have access to its child falls before right
of custody of the adoptive parents. Such situations have grown in
number and there have been recorded instances where adoption was used
by one parent as an instrument to alienate the child from the other.
Scottish courts were aware of the fact and always made a close inquiry
into the necessity of severing the ties with the natural relatives
which resulted in a variety of decisions either refusing or
139granting the order. In the view of the Houghton Committee on the
other hand, extinguishing the child's link with one half of his own
family was inappropriate and could be d a m a g i n g . A p a r t  from the fact
that, in principle, they opposed adoptions which did not create a new
family relationship, they felt that, if adoption were used in this way,
it might conceal from the child the reality of his family background
and that this in itself could be particularly harmful. This was
considered as-'sufficient reason for depreciating adoption of
legitimate and illegitimate children by the parent and step-parent and
instead recommending extension of guardianship law to enable step-
141parents to be appointed guardians of the child. By offering this
alternative parental rights would in many respects be successfully
conferred upon step parents but, as they themselves admit such do
not amount to being recognised in law as the child's parent, an aim
achieved by the single step of adoption instead by taking a number of 
142
separate steps. Also in the crucial question of illegitimate
children, where the benefits are obvious, the Houghton Committee felt
that the guardianship solution would also be appropriate. Thus,
without wishing to prohibit adoption of step children they recommended
that both in the case of legitimate and illegitimate children, their
adoption should only be considered in exceptbnaL circumstances and
143
when guardianship had not been thought appropriate.
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Thfe Act gives effect to their recommendation in Section 14(1) which 
empowers the court to consider the application as one for custody 
under Section 53 (1) of the Children Act. It should be admitted, 
however, that this does not offer an attractive alternative where 
the status of the child is concerned because such orders can be 
varied, the step-parent can discharge his duties and the child does 
not receive the family name. Moreover, from a point of material" 
rights, the child can only demand aliment as far as it is accepted 
as a child of the family.
In Greek law, on the other hand, adoption by a parent and step-parent 
seems to be particularly beneficial in many cases because of the less 
stringent effects of the adoption order. Without affecting the 
rights of the child in relation to the other parent, it places the 
child as a member of the family. However, this inevitably raises 
questions of custody of the child when the other parent is showing 
concern for it - a matter that has to be taken into consideration 
before granting an adoption order in respect of the child.
The preferential treatment for adoption by step parents in Greek law
144
was discussed elsewhere and the present text examines only certain
peculiarities which may arise in cases of divorce or dissolution of
the marriage where the child has been adopted by the spouse. In this
case, unless the order has been revoked, the ordinary divorce proceedings
9-PPly and custody may be awarded to either of the natural or the adoptive
parents. If, however, either of the natural parents remarries and the
new step-parent wishes to adopt the child he cannot apply if the order 
145remains in force. On the other hand, the adoptive parent's
spouse is entitled to adopt the child which appears to be an unjustifiable
discrimination. Therefore, in these circumstances there needs to be




Adoption by other relatives
The main objection against adoption by other relatives is that the
adoptive relationship in this context essentially differs from and
distorts the underlying natural relationship. Chre by non-parental
relatives is a natural incident of the wider family relationship of
which the parent-child unit is only a part. Therefore, guardianship
is considered a viable solution because it retains the relations
as they are. If the child is adopted by relatives, on the other hand,
the real circumstances are hidden from him and if later discovered may
be even more damaging than other forms of adoption. The child may
suddenly realise that his "father" is his grandfather and his older
147
"sister" his mother.
Possible advantages to the child from adoption by relatives must, 
however, be recognised (as in adoption by parents) in certain cases 
- for example, where the child is an orphan in respect of both 
parents - and it is not suggested that such adoptions should be 
p r o h i b i t e d . B u t  again, the court hearing the application 
should first consider whether guardianship would be more appropriate 
in all the circumstances.
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C H A P T E R  B I X  
PARENTAL AGREEMENT (CONSENT)^
Although there is a variation in the strength of the adoptive 
relation between Scottish law and Greek law, both involve severance 
of the ties with the natural family and placing of the child into 
the adopter's family. Both, therefore, adhere to the principle that 
termination of the natural relation will be possible only with parental 
consent. In cases where parental rights are vested in a person other 
than the parent, the law requires the consent of that person and may 
also ask for the consent of the child itself, after it has reached a 
certain age. On specific grounds, however, the laws empower the 
courts to take the critical step of dispensing with parental consent. 
The grounds making consent unnecessary are :
(a) when the parent has formally lost parental authority, or
(b) when the circumstances demonstrate his unsuitability as a 
parent, or
(c) when he has abandoned the child.
Both laws also deal with the question of when effective consent may 
be given and provide for a relinquishment procedure in which consent 
is secured in advance on behalf of an adoption agency.
Apart from the legal consideration consent has also to be seen as 
a key opening the way to a new family status. Therefore, the conduct 
of the parties, and the circumstances under which consent was provided, 
taken in relation to what, in each country, the order is expected to 
achieve, determine to an extent the welfare of the child as well as
(In the present text the terms 'consent' and 'agreement' 
are used interchangeably as is the case in most of the 
literature. However, 'consent' is more appropriately 
related to the earlier law and 'agreement' to the later.)
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the future of the order. It comes as no surprise that many parents 
who gave their consent under adverse conditions, later regret the loss 
of the child and try to obtain it back. Judicial records show 
instances where parents regret giving their personal consent or, 
although fully aware of their inability to cope with the child, 
refuse to respect the court's decision to dispense with their consent 
and try either to reverse the order or otherwise to destroy the 
relation. The law takes certain precautions to prevent the occurrence 
of conflicts but it is still open to question whether the legal 
provisions are effective by themselves to cope with the problem.
It is also pertinent to inquire as to what light the rules relating 
to consent throw on the strength and value attributed to the natural 
relationship, and what changes should be brought forward in respect of 
consent of the natural parents. In each system there is a diversity 
of view concerning the basis on which the welfare of the child is to 
be determined.
A. AGREEMENT OF THE PARENT AND/OR GUARDIAN
I. Legal Provisions
According to Section 16(1) of the Adoption (Scotland)Act 1978 whenever 
the child has not been freed for adoption, an adoption order cannot be 
made unlesscthe court is satisfied that each parent or guardian of 
the child
i. freely and with full understanding of what is involved, agreed 
unconditionally to the making of the adoption order (whether or 
not he knows the identity of the applicants), or
ii. his agreement to the making of the adoption order should be 
dispensed with on a ground specified in subsection (2).
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In Greece, if a child's parentage has been established on both sides,
both parents must consent to the adoption, unless deceased or
otherwise unable to consent. Article 157 7 (2) of the Greek civil
code as modified by article 11(a), (b) of the Legislative Decree 610/70
formally prescribes that - "the consent, given before the court or
a reporter judge, of both parents is necessary, or of one of them if
the consent of the other is unattainable due to mental illness or
other reason."^ For the unattainable consent the Legislative Decree
provides thatcthetcoUrt'itself must decide that such consent is 
2
unattainable. The same applies when the consent of both parents is
3
unattainable while they are alive. But unlike Scots law, the
guardian's consent (whenever appointed) is not needed. His consent
is only required if there is no parent alive to consent to the child's 
4
adoption.
The law as stated above calls for comments on the following matters.
In the first place there is the question of when ardhow an effective 
consent is provided. Second, to whom the law refers as parents in 
respect of the natural procreators of the child and of what should be 
the position if the distinction between children born in wedlock and 
those born out of wedlock is removed. In this context it is of 
importance to consider the position of the mother's husband, if the 
presumption of conception operates against him. In addition, there are 
the matters of when a guardian's consent is needed and what the 
position is when parental rights have been assumed in respect of a 
local authority in Scotland and a social institution in Greece.
II. When and how an effective agreement can be provided.
One of the major problems faced by the law of both countries is how to 
secure consent to represent a mature decision of the parent so that 
temporising or regrets or revocations be reduced to a minimum. For
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example, both systems prohibit a mother from validly agreeing to adoption
prior to the birth or within the period following immediately after
the birth. The idea is that the mother cannot fully appreciate the
gravity of her decision until the child has arrived or she has recovered
5
from the immediate stress of the birth. Countervailing to this
comes the argument that a required delay in the surrender of the child 
will aggravate the psychological difficulty experienced by the mother ,^  
and, indeed, may prevent a successful placement. Actually the attachment 
of the parent to the child is a common fear for the future of the place­
ment, especially among adoptive parents and as a result they may tend
7to adopt children from institutions or in their infancy. Similar 
arguments have been mustered in connection with the question of 
revocation of consent. The systems make all possible effort to 
reduce altogether such instances but actually disallow revocation only 
in a few cases.
In Scots law, section 16(1) cftheAdoption (Scotland)Act 1978, envisages 
effective the consent of the parent or guardian when he agrees 
freely and with full understanding of what is involved generally and 
unconditionally to the making of an adoption order. The consent of 
the parent or guardian must be freely given and not obtained through 
improper pressure or fraud, and after making the parent aware of 
information not only about the legal consequences of adoption but also 
"all the information he/she may require about the character and 
circumstances of the adopters and their home, short of information, 
which may disclose their identity", if the latter is so requested by 
the applicants.^ However, though for the validity of consent, the
9
knowledge of the identify of the applicants is irrelevant it seems 
important for the parent to give consent with future circumstances of 
the child's life in mind insofar as it will help his understanding of
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"what is i n v o l v e d " . I t  is no longer possible for the parent to 
insert a condition as to the child's religious persuasion. However, 
according to section 7 of the Act, the agency may have regard to such 
requirements if it appears as a wish of the parent as far as 
practicable. This section in fact replaces section 4(2) of the 
Adoption Act 1958 following the recommendation of the Houghton Committee. 
The Committee felt that making such a condition should cease to be 
possible because
(a) there was no way of making adopters fulfill undertakings given;
(b) the law might turn against the real interests of the child by 
unduly restricting the choice of the adopters^ and
(c) because, in principle, this contravenes the complete severance of 
the legal relationship.^^
Agreement must be operative at the time of making the order. In this
type of case any agreement signified earlier may be withdrawn right up
to the last minute, subject to the power of the courts to dispense 
12with it. Where the parent or guardian does not attend the hearings,
documentary evidence of consent is admissible as follows. A written
document signed before the Reporting Officer must be issued
signifying the consent and the identity of the parent by naming him
13or by a serial number. The document may be executed prior to or
after the commencement of the proceedings and if attested is admissible
14without further proof of signature.
Where the document signifies the consent of the mother, it is not 
admissible unless the child was at least six weeks old when it was 
executed. Similarly, consent orally provided by the mother is in­
effective if given less than six weeks after the child's b i r t h . T h e  
object of this rule is to prevent the risk of the mother succumbing 
to any pressure, financial or otherwise, and allow adoption before
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she has recovered from the stress of childbirth,
In Greek law, article 1577 of the Greek civil code^^ requires the
consent of the parents to be given in person before a court of competent
jurisdiction or when they want to secure secreCy of their identity
17
in a separate session of the court or before the rapporteur.
Behind this rule is the need for the court to obtain first hand
knowledge of whether the consent of the parents is given freely
and they are aware of the gravity of the order. This, however, can
be relatively readily achieved because the parent whatever his age
or circumstance undertakes alone the overall responsibility, unless
there is a sign of mental illness. The guardian's consent is not
needed besides that of the parent nor is the curator's agreement
required for an effective consent by an adolescent p a r e n t . T h e s e
precautions are necessary because adoption is performed by a judicial
order and as such appeals for consent given under illegal pressure,
19fraud or error are inadmissible. Moreover, like Scots law, the
parent is entitled to receive information about the applicants insofar 
as they do not contravene the required secrecy. An exemption provided 
by article 10(2) of the Legislative Decree, however, permits the 
parent to give written consent in exceptional circumstances. According 
to this the consent is validly given if executed by a notarial 
deed signifying parental consent, provided that,it concerns a parent 
living abroad or under a temporary impediment of whomv consent cannot be 
dispensed with. For example, a parent undergoing a hospital
cure or serving in a remote area who cannot leave his post is 
entitled to this facility.
Also Greek law tries to assure that the mother's consent is not given
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in haste and without a full opportunity to consider the implications 
of adoption. This is attempted by giving no legal effect to consent 
executed prior to the child's birth and less than 3 months after the 
birth.
22Consent must be free of terms and conditions ^ otherwise it is
invalid. Also Greek law is indifferent to the question of religion
with the exception of interstate adoptions where it is advisable for
children to be given to families of Greek descent and, where there are
no such families, preferably to families having the same religion 
33as the adoptee.
III. The consenting parent
a. In Scots law, the consent of each parent of a child born in
24
wedlock is always required. The same is recognised on behalf
of the adoptive parents with regard to any further adoption of 
25
the child. For an illegitimate child the consent required
is that of the m o t h e r , a n d  even when the mother is herself a
27
minor, it is still her agreement that must be provided. In
such a case, the mother herself may need the protection of a
guardian ad litem but her agreement is validly given even without 
28this protection.
29The definition of the parent under the 1978 Act does not include 
the putative father^^ even if he seeks custody of the child, but 
he is named as consenting guardian^^ if he has been awarded
custody bÿ ànordèf under the Illegitimate Children (Scotlahd) Act
32 33
1930, or the Guardianship of Minors Act 1971. His right, however,
to apply for custody, while an application for adoption is pending,
has been reinforced, besides his right to be heard in the adoption
hearings. The Reporting Officer has a duty to invite the
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putative father to appear and be heard in the adoption
proceedings, if he is liable to contribute to the child's main-
34tenance under a court order or agreement. But notwithstanding
formal links with the child, if the Reporting Officer learns
of the existence of the father he must inform the court as to the
existence of such a person and whether he wishes to be heard by the
court, so that the court may consider whether to give the father
35notice of the application. No obligation, however, is imposed
so far on the Reporting Officer or the court to seek out the 
father of an illegitimate child. The concern of the Houghton 
Committee merely confined to encouraging the involvement of the 
putative father in the planning of the child's future and, 
therefore, where he had been concerned in the child's upbringing 
and maintenance the Committee recommended that he should be made 
a respondent in the proceedings.^^
These duties of the Reporting Officer have also a particular 
significance in making the father aware of his right to apply for 
custody while an application for adoption is pending, but their 
major importance is in the relinquishment procedure. According 
to section 18 of the Adoption (Scotland) Act 1978 no child will 
be freed for adoption unless the court is satisfied that the person 
claiming to be the father of the child - not being guardian - has 
no intention of applying for custody or, if he did apply, that 
that application would be likely to be refused. The section may 
be seen as aiming to prevent any drastic challenge to the agency's 
rights, because they would be opposed by the custody order, but 
nonetheless provide an early consideration of the father's position. 
Contact with the father is secured at an early stage and, more 
important, the court has ex officio to investigate his
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intentions and see whether a successful application by him 
seems likely.
It is to be said here, however, that neither the invitation to 
attend the hearings nor the right to apply for custody vests in 
the father any right to veto adoption. Therefore, the upshot 
of his application may be that he may not be able to convince the 
court that his having custody would be in the interests of the 
child's welfare, even though had he been the father of a legitimate 
child in the same circumstances, his agreement could not have been 
dispensed with.
In Greece if a child's parentage has been established on bothisides,
both parents must consent to the adoption, unless deceased or
37
otherwise unable to consent. If the father is dead, the
mother alone consents to the adoption and she does not need the
38
agreement of the family council. The consent of the parent is
39required even if he himself is a minor person or has forfeited
40parental rights and duties,. unless the child has been in the
41
care of a social institution, or the withholding of parental
42consent constitutes an abuse of right. No right to consent
is recognised on behalf of an adoptive parent and for further
43
adoption the consent of the natural parent is needed.
44
In the case of an illegitimate child, besides the mother, only a 
father with whom parenthood has been "voluntarily" or "fully 
judicially" established need give his c o n s e n t . I f  fatherhood 
has been "judicially" established, the father's consent is not 
needed. As in Scots law, the status conferred on the relation
is limited and a putative father is deprived of any consenting
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authority. Even if he is appointed guardian of his natural
child/ provided that the mother is alive, his consent to the
47
child's adoption is not required. But a family right is
recognised on his behalf, justifying an invitation to attend
and b.e heard in the hearings and his views must be taken into
48
account in evaluating the welfare of the child.
In respect to the provisions of the 1978 Act it can be'seen that
under Scots law the putative father has no real right to be
involved in the child's future unless he is able to obtain
custody. If, as his duty, he has responded to financial or
property obligations in respect of his child and maintains human
relations only, then he is entitled merely to have a weak say or to
contest the application by applying for custody. This approach
of the committee, though an improvement, is not satisfactory.
First, it is submitted in the report that fathers should be
identified in all possible cases, a recommendation of equivocal
nature since it is not clear how much pressure the Committee thinks
49
ought to be put on the mother to reveal the name of the father.
Also it is recommended that a putative father who is known should 
always be notified of the relinquishment proceedings.^^ But 
then it rests upon the agency to appraise the court of the father's 
position which, in turn has the discretion to decide whether he 
should be notified of:the proceedings. This would seem to 
involve an unbalanced assessment of the circumstances of the natural 
father particularly as regards the participation of the agency, 
which is an incompetent body to appraise such matters. The 
adoption agency is a specialized body of administrative nature having 
the purpose, in cooperation with other social services, to assess 
and report on the facts. The agency cannot assess any matter 
referring to the orientation of the child's status, nor has it any
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right to prejudice this orientation. In the particular
circumstances the natural relation has certain legal effects that
count for the child. The agency therefore, can report only if
the relationship has been given effect, so that its involvement
cannot start unless the claim to ensure the relation with the father
is legally safeguarded. In respect to the latter, the claim presently
is channelled through the mother who has the discretion whether or
not to reveal the identity of the father. She also keeps the
contact with the adoption agency and it is her story and circumstances
that will signify the agency's report. In this context the Committee
seem to support the perpetuation of the view that the mother has
the one or the other way been victimised in her relation with the
father and treats the matter as if she has all right on her side.
Thereto the circumstances vary and it seems urgust that the putative
father should have rights so greatly inferior to hers. Furthermore,
as the English Law Commission points oug even when it is decided
that the father should be heard his position before the court is
usually a weak one, primarily because in the past it has been
felt that the advantages to an illegitimate child of losing the status
and stigma of bastardy outweigh any disadvantage of losing all
51legal links with his natural father. And there is reason to
believe that a similar assessment on this matter could be made in 
respect to the distribution of justice in any coutry which 
distinguishes between children born in wedlock and those born out 
of wedlock, so as to perpetuate the, somehow, arbitrary exercise 
of justice, when the question at hand is the loss of the status 
of legitimacy.
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The present law, however) is not without its supporters. Hayes 
for instance believes that the protection offered to the natural 
relationship thereby gives adequate recognition to the father
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without prejudicing the welfare of the child. In practice, she
asserts, the rights of the natural father requires legal recognition
first when the mother applies jointly with her husband and second
when the child is placed with strangers. For the former,case
the court can only make an adoption order where it is
satisfied that adoption would better promote and safeguard the
welfare of the child than would an order making the child's
stepfather his custodian. And it seems that courts will be more
inclined to custodianship than adoption as has happened in the
analogous situations of divorce. For the latter case Hayes accepts
as sufficient protection for the father his right to apply for
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custody or to be heard in adoption proceedings. However, the
observations made in this particular part of the article anticipate 
the right of the mother in making known the identity of the 
father as an absolute one and in this respect fails to comprehend 
that this right is outweighed by the far superior right of the 
child to a father.
In Greek law, similar problems may be faced in cases where 
paternity has not been established yet, or if it has, links the 
child and the father with the limited status recognized in 
judicial establishment of paternity. For the former both 
problems arise since there is nothing to prevent the mother placing 
the child for adoption prior to giving the father any chance to 
acknowledge the child and, as in the latter, it is not certain 
what weight a court should place upon the wishes and feelings of a 
person naming himself as the father of the child. Perhaps his 
position in relation to the putative father in Scotland is superior 
in the sense that he can acquire effective rights by means of 
an act of voluntary acknowledgement but it is far inferior if he 
is not formally linked with the child, and the father is unlikely
i24
to succeed in an objection to the proposed adoption. Therefore, 
the outstanding problems for Greek law are whether the child should 
be placed for adoption before any : efforts are made to identify the 
father, and, further, if the father's right to consent to adoption 
should be recognized for the case of judicial establishment of 
paternity.
The problems faced today in both jurisdictions are interconnected 
to the reform of illegitimacy and therefore will be discussed 
along with the arguments raised on whether the father of a child 
born out of wedlock should be given the right to consent to his 
adoption.
In the first place, in respect to the need to identify the 
father prior to making an order, in the chapter dealing with 
the reform of illegitimacy there are proposed specific time limits 
for taking the step to establish paternity. It must be considered 
whether those limits should be exhausted before any adoption order 
is made.
In practice, there may be a number of problems for doing so.
For example, the child may linger in an institution or with foster
parents while the father is traced, and delay is a crucial
factor which has a direct bearing on the process of bonding the
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child with the adoptive parents. Moreover, the delay may be
particularly damaging to the mother if she has no chance of keeping 
the child and had decided to part with it from its birth. Perhaps 
she would vacillate about her decision and at the very end 
still have to give it away if the efforts to trace the father had 
been in vain. Thereto legal systems with advanced procedure on
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the establishment of paternity, like Denmark for instance, do 
not restrict her right to give the child for adoption straight
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away without any particular obligation to consider the father.
However, without underestimating the difficult position of the 
mother and the dangers for the child this resolution is not the 
more satisfactory one, if one takes into account the implications 
there may be in the long run for both mother and child. Would 
she regret her decision or could adoption have been avoided if 
paternity had been established. In fact there is an undue 
prejudice to the rights of the child in this process and it may be 
more advisable to explore the alternative of the paternity action 
before taking the step of an adoption order. To a large extent, 
of course, the effectiveness of this rule depends on what 
obligations would be imposed on the father in respect of the mother 
and her child, and on what assistance has been given to her in the 
meantime. The comprehensive service described ah operating in Denmark, 
comprising trained social workers, lawyers, psychiatrists and 
gynaecologists assisting the mother throughout the pregnancy 
and the paternity suit, along with financial aid at that time, may 
be a suitable solution. The results of the procedure there are 
quite astonishing because in over a half of the cases paternity 
is voluntarily admitted and it is seldom (about 8%) that paternity 
is not established. Also only 2-3% of unmarried mothers give 
their children away for adoption.
As to the point whether the putative father should be given a 
right to consent to the child's adoption this has received 
considerable attention with the prospect of removing the distinctions 
on illegitimacy. The views vary and the arguments mainly express
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concern about the conduct of the father. Clive for instance believes
that to require the father's agreement to be obtained or formally
dispensed with in all cases, could make life difficult for adoption
agencies. Therefore, he suggests as a solution that his agreement
only be required if he appeared on the register of births, but to
provide that his view could be taken into account in other cases
if he chose to come forward. If he is interested enough :to
acknowledge the child, his agreement would have to be obtained or
dispensed with. Otherwise he would only have a right to be heard
if he cared to come forward but there would be no obligation on
57
the adoption agency to seek him out. Also Turner regards it
as a necessity to give a consenting right to the father who has
acknowledged the child as if the child was born to him in marriage.
For the rest, he-envisages the need to take the best possible
steps to ensure that notice of the proposed adoption is served on
the putative father, or all possible putative fathers of a child
59born outside marriage. Both views are given in consideration
that complete equality with the fathers of legitimate children would 
not be feasible without compelling every unmarried mother to 
reveal the identity of the f a t h e r . A l s o  both views are in 
line with the solution given in Greece in relation to the voluntary 
and judicial establishment of paternity, which is in itself, 
not entirely satisfactory.
The English Law Commission has been more radical in the matter.
With the abolition of the status of illegitimacy they envisage the 
father as one of the child's natural guardians (as if under the 
present circumstances it was born to him in lawful wedlock) 
whose agreement should be required unless there are grounds to 
dispense with it^ Above all, the Commission disfavoured any
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departure from the principle that a man should not be deprived
of his rights without being given a chance to be heard. In
their report nevertheless, the Commission tentatively takes the
view that deviations from the principle may be allowable in
extreme circumstances, but in this step due consideration
should be given to the interests of the father. Namely, they
anticipate the need to make available a procedure under which an
application to dispense with a father's agreement could be made
ex parte without any attempt to serve notice on him.^^ For the
views of the Commission fear was expressed that the involvement
of the father will cause delay and may deter mothers from even
placing the child for a d o p t i o n . T h e  problem of the delay
was dealt with earlier and the observations made there are also
relevant to this aspect of the proceedings. As to whether
this will deter mothers from placing the children for adoption
the Commission suggests that under the relinquishment procedure
the question of parental agreement would be resolved early and
64before a placement is made.
In conclusion, therefore, it should be said that the described 
involvement of the putative father in adoption proceedings, without 
prejudicing the welfare of the child, opens the way for his real 
involvement in the child's life. The views of' the Commission 
are in line as much with the need for complete equality between 
children as with the purpose of adoption being to fulfill the 
exclusive needs arising from parental failure and not needs of 
status. Therefore it is the approach that should be looked at
in reforming the law on illegitimacy.
b. The consent of the mother's husband as such is not required but
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the consent of the father of a legitimate child is and 
difficulty may arise if the wife alleges her husband not to be 
the father of the child, while he is so deemed by law. From a 
legal point of view, he is the father and his consent is needed, 
unless the presumption has been successfully overcome by evidence 
to the contrary. Such evidence may be produced in a main hearing 
or in an intervening lawsuit, and may be brought by either parent 
in Scotland, while in Greece it is a power that is in the process 
of being recognized to the mother. If It is exercised under normal 
conditions there is nothing to fear,but if the mother brings 
such allegations in terms of the process of consent, the matter 
becomes rather complicated. For instance, in the case of a 
mother willing to place the child for adoption and an unwilling 
husband a degree of suspicion must attach to either party's 
allegation as to the child being of the husband or not. There is 
also the position of the natural father to be considered if the 
child is illegitimate. On the other hand, the alternative of 
giving custody to the husband is not a solution in this case so 
long as he continues to live with the mother of the child. There 
are also difficulties for the court in how to handle the problem.
For instance would it be appropriate for a court hearing on adoption 
to deal with the mother^e averments or should the consent of the 
husband be asked for? Moreover, should the husband be informed
early of his wife's adultery?
In Greece, as the law stands, the court, prior to any judicial
admission of the extra-marital conception of the child, has to
consider the position ofthe father as the only person entitled to
65
bring a declarator of bastardy. The mother cannot raise any
objection and defend the action with evidence or oath unless
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acting as an heir of ahdeceased husband, a case in which his consent 
obviously is not needed. Nor can the court consider ex officio 
the status of the child before strong evidence has been led by the 
m o t h e r . I f  the husband, despite the wife's allegations, 
insists on his paternity, the court has to ask his consent, but 
if he raises an objection or brings an action for a declarator of 
bastardy, the hearings are suspended until the issue of a decision 
on the child's status. This position will alter considerably 
when the mother is granted the right to bastardize the child^^ and 
the situation will then, to a greater extent, resemble that in 
Scotland today. Therefore, the following discussion in respect 
of Scots law will be valid for Greek law unless otherwise indicated.
As the Houghton Committee admits, previous judicial confrontation of
the question of the child's status by British courts, on hearings
in adoption, had not been unanimous in approach. Many courts
accepted evidence of non-access presented by the mother while
others insisted on the husband's consent and, notwithstanding,
considered it their duty to inform the husband of his wife's
a d u l t e r y . A c c o r d i n g l y  the Committee being of the view tha1) if
paternity appears to be in doubt, the matter must and should be
solved by the court of adoption made an effort to consolidate the
different practices of various courts in a uniform procedure,
looking at the problem from a substantive point of view. In
this respect they felt it to be essential both to prevent the
danger of allowing a mother to bastardise her child without
supporting evidence and to restrain the husband from becoming
69
obstructive to the child's adoption. Before entering any
discussion on the merits of the proposed procedure it should be 
mentioned here that although Scottish courts were rarely faced
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with such question, the matter has a direct bearing on the 1978 
Act. The Act is not explicitly concerned with the issue of 
paternity in adoption. However, it adheres to the legal definition 
of the term parent and nevertheless emphasises the need to look 
upon facts oh paternity from a substantive point of view which 
materializes the recommendation of the Houghton Committee 
that such matters should be resolved by the court of adoption.
At the outset the Committee distinguished between relinquishment
procedure and hearings on a specific adoption and provided a method
of confrontation for the wife's allegations mainly applicable to
the f i r s t . A v e r m e n t s  provided on a specific adoption are
left to be resolved with a declarator of bastardÿ, probably because
the risk of collusion is higher there than where the rights are
being transferred to an adoption agency. The fact that the mother
may have information about the personality and family of the adopters,
which reduces the strain of being deprived of the child,may well
be a motive to use illegal means if the husband stands as a barrier
to the adoption and she is unwilling or unable to keep the child.
Another fact,not to be ignored, is that when a mother reveals the
extra-marital conception of the child under such circumstances a
disagreement between the couple as regards the future of the child
is probable. Thus, a degree of falsification is to be suspected
in the evidence and a chance should be given to her husband to
collect and present his own. In this respect the interval between
the application to free the child for adoption and the order
provides this opportunity. Also because the rights are vested




As the relinquishment procedure, the Committee, in the first place 
without departing from the law, advised the courts to accept 
applications joined in by the husband if he remained the father before
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the law. However, they considered applications by the wife alone,
concessively acceptable, only when she adduced evidence against
73his paternity. While the adoption agency must specify in the
report that the paternity of the child is disputed, the
Committee suggested no information should be passed to the husband 
until the evidence presented by the wife had been corroborated.^^
The court should order the wife to attend the hearings and, on the 
basis of the evidence presented,consider whether it was satisfactorily 
proven that the husband was not the father and need not be involved.
The Committee, in recommending initial exclusion of the husband,
was mindful of the fact that there had been a number of cases
where the requirement of agreement had produced endless delays in
tracing the husband and harmful effects when he was traced. Thus
they suggested the husband should not be involved at the preliminary
stage of the proceedings, leaving it to the discretion of the
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court to bring him in if not satisfied of non-access. For the
particular recommendations it can be said that there had been 
the case in Scots law where the issue of paternity was raised and 
resolved in the process of adoption without any involvement of the 
husband in the light of decisive evidence proving the illegitimate 
status of the child. And it can be argued that there is no
reason for courts to depart from this practice under similar 
circumstances insofar as the time factor is very important when 
a placement has been decided. Further it may prevent undue 
strain among the spouses, e.g. if the birth of the child had not 
determined the future of their marriage.
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However, the crucial problems in relation to the recommended
procedure lie on the weight that hhould be given to the wife's
evidence, which affects the amount of proof required to rebut the
presumption. The suggestion is that the court, after considering
independent evidence besides that of the wife should, on the
balance of probabilities, issue an interlocutor for the paternity 
77of the child. Indeed this recommendation begs the real
question: What degree of importance is to be attached to the
presumption pater est qu em nuptiae demonstrant when the issue 
of paternity is raised in adoption proceedings? There may be 
a degree of devaluation of the presumption before the obvious 
advantages of the placement. The relationship with the persons 
who by law are deemed to be the parents appears irretrievably 
broken down so that prima facie there seems no need to maintain it, 
one way or the other. However, the matter is far more
complicated and there are a number of points to be looked at 
before reaching any conclusion. An obvious cause for concern 
is whether the evidence by the mother would be unprejudiced or 
whether she would try to make things easy for herself. Also whether 
the decision would be unbiased to the question of paternity.
As it appears from the recommendationsof the Committee there is 
the possibility of the case being resolved without any involvement 
by the husband, which increases the danger of the child being given 
for adoption if the mother's evidence is convincing, even though 
the husband is the father. There is an argument that there is 
less risk of perjurel evidence being presented in a declarator of 
bastardy but this is questionable when there is the possibility
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that the hidden intention of the mother is to give up the child.
The Committee, aware of the danger, recommended that preference
79and weight should be given to independent evidence. Although
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this suggestion’ has been looked upon favourably in Scots law^^
nevertheless, independent evidencehasnaerdecisively supported
a declarator of bastardy if failing to provide conclusive
proof of the paternity of the child. For instance in the case
A and A (Pets)^^ the court in the light of independent evidence,
held the child to be illegitimate, because it wasproven that the
husband was serving abroad at tiieprobable time of conception. On
82the other hand, in Ballantyne v. Douglas case the court, in
an informal separation of two years duration upheld the presumptio
juris considering possible access by the husband, even though on
the evidence presented legitimacy was less probable than 
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illegitimacy. Cases like the former could be resolved in
the manner suggested by the Committee but when the facts show 
illegitimacy more probable thah legitimacy or do not preclude any 
risk of falsification the presence of the husband seems important 
early in the proceedings. The reason being that courts usually 
feel uneasy when faced with the possibility of perjury as suspected 
in one-sided evidence. In addition, one party's evidence though 
itself not convincing, may gain stature in the light of facts 
and arguments presented by the other party.
84Ballantyne v. Douglas along with Imre v. Mitchell highlight 
the above aspects of the procedure. Mareover, they show both 
the extent to which Scottish courts are prepared to make a 
concession in the face of circumstances which obviously better 
the child's interest and what should be suspected in a case, 
where the further aim of the contender may be other than bastardy 
itself.
In Ballantyne V, Douglas the advantage to the child if
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declared illegitimate was considerably higher than if the 
presumption were sustained. The mother had made use of the part 
of the register provided for married women, not claiming the 
husband to be the father of the child and then brought an 
action of affiliation and aliment against a man with whom she had 
proved to have had intercourse at the relevant time. On account 
of the evidence presented, illegitimacy was highly probable but 
it failed to convince the court because without the husband's 
evidence paternity could not be indisputable. As a matter of 
fact however, it was not in the interest of the child to maintain 
the presumption because illegitimacy was almost certain, the 
husband had neither provided aliment, nor maintained any human 
relations with the child nor appeared to have any intention to 
maintain it, in the future. Also the illegitimate status of
the child was confirmed by the mother's conduct. However, the 
court although there was an advantage to the child if declared 
illegitimate refused to take his welfare into account in its 
judgement. If the same standards apply analogically when the 
further object is the adoption of the child any risks to the rights 
of the child emerging from his birth in wedlock would be 
considerably eliminated.
Indeed the circumstances of Imre v. Mitchell highlights the 
dangers that may appear whenever the purpose behind bringing a 
petition is other than that of a finding of bastardy itself.
Imre with the object of circumventing a decree of custody for 
her daughter, brought an action against Mitchell, her former 
husband, in which it was concluded for declarator that the child 
was a bastard on averments that she had intercourse with another
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man at the relevant time and not with Mitchell and for a decree 
putting him in silence from asserting paternity of the child.
The child was legitimized "per subsequens matrimonium” shortly 
after its birth and entrusted to Mitchell's custody when the 
couple was divorced on the grounds of Imre"s adultery. The 
Lord Ordinary granted decree in the pursuer's favour but in the 
reclaiming motion by Mitchell the court recalled the interlocutor 
of the Lord Ordinary and assoilized the defender Mitchell. The 
story of the pursuer in the above case, namely that she had had 
intercourse with another man (a Pole) at the relevant time, 
and that she left custody undefended because she was in an 
unsettled stage of her relationship with her next husband Imre, 
and that she presented the child to Mitchell because he insisted 
in marrying her and readily accepted the expected child, was 
believable and sufficiently supported with evidence. Her evidence 
had the power to reduce the possibility of error on paternity of
the Pole, while, for her as a person it was made clear that
she could have used Mitchell to sdlve the problem created for her 
by the birth of the child. On the other hand, Mitchell's 
evidence was sufficient to prove that he had had intercourse with 
her at the relevant time but could not clearly argue that he 
was the father. From the point of probabilities, however,
the balance was against him being the father. Against him was
also the welfare of the child. He was a bachelor and his sister 
had the actual custody of the child, while the mother, in her 
new marriage, was living a normal life and her husband appeared 
to have genuine feelings for the child and supported his wife's 
petition. In fact the mother could provide a normal environment 
which was lacking on'the father's side.^^
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However, on appeal, the credit given to the pursuer's explanations,
in the first place, was overtaken by the confinement to the
87
salient facts, from an objective point of view. Facts like
the presentation of the child to Mitchell as his own and having
registered and baptized it as his own, the undefended decree of
custody which the pursuer tolerated unreduced since 1951, and the
fact that the pursuer could not establish some honest and
convincing explanation which could have justified her having
falsely acknowledged the child, appeared to the court as strong
evidence that the man, when married under such circumstances, had
believed that he was the parent of the child. Moreover, the
court felt that he must have known the connections with the
mother at such time, that she who was to his knowledge with child
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when he married her might have been with child by him. On
account of this, the court upheld legitimation of the child per
subsequens matrimonium and required direct proof against the
presumptions, a matter which could not be sufficiently met by the
pursuer's evidence. Without any underemphasizing of her misconduct at
the time of conception, it was felt by the court to have been
sufficient evidence against her, if the issue had been adultery,
while, inappropriately, it lacked the heavy proof required when
89the presumption stands.
In respect of the above discussion it can be said that in terms 
of existing law as well as in terms of the proposed reform on 
illegitimacy the procedure suggested by the committee must undergo 
a number of changes. In the first place the Committee had in 
mind a speedy procedure which is desirable in the adoption 
process. On the other hand, balancing of probabilities never 
was incorporated within the methods used in Scots law to evaluate
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evidence on issues of paternity. Similarly evidence of the
nature of an oath, a sworn declaration or affidavit, accepted
90as sufficient by the Committee may under these circumstances
not be sufficient in Scots law. From a statement made in
Imre v. Mitchell, it appears that such evidence could be of
application only to cases where paternity has not yet been
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admitted by the conduct of the husband. And so far there is
no reason to depart from either of the above principles of proof 
in Scots law. Therefore, it becomes doubtful whether the 
Committee’s primary objective of establishing a speedy and 
flexible procedure would achieve real success under Scdts law.
Nevertheless, it may appear to be an utopian ideal to try to 
maintain arguments delaying the dissolution of a relationship which 
is near its end. However, as soon as it opens the way which may 
assist in the child's welfare, this step becomes imperative. 
Normally, as may be suspected, in a considerable number of cases 
mothers will take advantage of the procedure either if there is 
a dispute between her and her husband about the child's adoption 
or they are living apart and she wants to be released from her 
duties as a parent. Whatever the case may be the suggestion of 
excluding the husband may turn out to be against the child's 
interests. If the husband disagrees, either as a father or step 
father, with the rights over the child being relinquished, he may 
do so out of affectionate feelings for the child and, therefore, 
the alternative of giving custody to him should be considered.
In any case a matter of significant importance is the true 
paternity of the child. Under Section 18 of the Adoption (Scotland) 
Act 1978, the court has an obligation to consider the position of
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the natural parent. And if the relationship with the father of 
children born out of wedlock is to be altered this parent would 
have a right to give agreement to the child's adoption. For 
that reason it is important that the decision of the court in the 
relinquishment procedure must reveal the true paternity of the 
child. This is not satisfactorily secured if the mother, who is 
apparently unwilling to retain any sort of obligation towards 
the child, is given the right to invite and present evidence 
alone. It is of essential importance for the court to get the 
utmost information about the case, so that the presence of the 
husband and the presentation of his own evidence may give dimension 
to the facts presented. Thus, the suggestion of the Committee 
that if the husband claimed paternity and agreed that the child
should be adopted a fresh application by both parents and the
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agency could be made fetters the court from carrying out any
investigation of the true paternity of the child. Such claims by 
the husband normally follow after certain evidence on the 
illegitimacy of the child has been presented. Therefore, it may 
be more appropriate to determine the future steps in relation
to such evidence. It is possible to question the validity of the
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husband's declaration and derive some idea as to whether there 
is any collusion on the averments of either side. Normally 
no mother seeks to bastardise her child without good reason and 
of her evidence, in the first instance, it ban be assumed that 
either the child is illegitimate and the position of the natural 
parent has to be considered, or that the child is legitimate 
and the husband disagrees to the adoption. The conduct of the 
husband in the second instance therefore may be explained as an 
alternative to ease things for his wife. For example, perhaps his 
wife has convinced him to agree to the child's adoption, in
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which case there are grounds for examining whether he could 
carry on the care of the child alone. On the other hand, if 
the child is illegitimate, he may be acting so as to rule out 
the prospect of a successful appplication for custody by the 
natural father, which would mean his wife retaining certain liabil­
ities for the child. Therefore, it is necessary to secure a more 
independent approach towards the question of paternity if it is 
raised under such circumstances and, particularly, to ensure that 
if any averments in relation to the status of the child are 
brought forward they will be given a detailed examination in the 
light of the evidence of all possible parties.
c. In Scotland, the local authority which has assumed parental rights 
over the child, and in Greece, the social institution which has 
the care of the child are not parents for either the purpose of 
the Scottish Act or the Legislative Decree respectively. According 
to Section 74(3) of the Children Act 1975, which replaces section 16 
of the Social Work Scotland Act 1968, the local authority or 
voluntary organization has no right to consent to or refuse to 
consent to an order freeing the child for adoption or to the 
child's adoption. Also a contrario from article 11 of the 
Legislative Decree 610/70, it appears that the exercise of 
parental rights by a social institution does not include consent 
to the child's adoption in Greece.
IV. CONSENT OF THE GUARDIAN
As has been said before, the consent of the guardian of the child is 
always required besides that of the parent under Scots law, while 
such need ceases before a consenting parent in Greece. For the purpose 
of the Adoption (Scotland) Act 1978, however, the person appointed by
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deed or will in accordance with the provisions of Guardianship~of
Infants Acts 1886 and 1925 or the Guardianship of Minors Act 1971
or by a court of competent jurisdiction is defined to the guardian 
94of the child. The father of an illegitimate child is also deemed
of the same authority when he has custody of the child by virtue 
of an order under section 9 of the Guardianship of Minors Act 1971,
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o runder section 2 of the Illegitimate Children (Scotland) Act 1930. 
The definition given is confined to persons having the legal custody 
of the child and excludes anyone exercising those rights under a 
care order.
In Greek law, a guardian is defined the person appointed to exercise
96 97 98
parental authority over the child, by a court deed or in the will
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of the deceased parent, or ipso jure. Greek law, like Scots law, 
distinguishes between a care ofder and guardianship and excludes from 
the right to consent persons having only the actual custody of the child.
As mentioned above, a major difference between Greek and Scots law as 
regards the need of the guardian's consent is that in Greece, his consent 
is not required when there is a parent alive. In this respect Scots 
law is more concerned with parental rights while Greek law concentrates 
on the natural relationship. This is rather unrealistic, especially when 
the parent has forfeited parental rights or the adolescent mother of an 
illegitimate child is asked to take alone the weight of the decision.
The help of an independent consenter in such circumstances would prevent 
immature decisions or decisions against the best interests of the child.
B. DISPENSING WITH PARENTAL AGREEMENT
The great majority of adoptions are obviously performed with parental 
agreement. The court may be asked, however, to dispense with parental
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agreement either in a hearing on a specific adoption or in the 
relinquishment procedure, if a parent's rights have been terminated 
or are considered as improperly exercised according to applicable 
provisions of the law. The law does not provide clear distinction 
between the right of a parent to refuse agreement and the power of the 
court to dispense with it. It rather indicates, in general 
provisions, situations where agreement of the parent is refused 
contrary to the interests of the child, and on account of the circumstances 
of the case, permits the court to decide whether parental agreement is 
no longer needed. Insofar, however, as the main purpose of 
requiring the agreement of the parent is to ensure that his rights 
have not been arbitrarily destroyed, instances where the law permits 
dispensation with his agreement are contrasted with what is considered 
as appropriate exercise of parental rights.
I. Legal Requirements
The Adoption Scotland Act 1978 in section 16(2) provides that the 
adoption may be awarded without parental agreement if the parent or 
guardian :
a). cannot be found of is incapable of giving agreement;
b) is withholding his agreement unreasonably;
c) has persistently failed without reasonable cause to discharge 
parental duties in relation to the child;
d) has abandoned or neglected the child;
e) has persistently ill-treated the child;
f) has seriously ill-treated the child and because of the ill treatment 
the rehabilitation of the child within the household of the parent 
or guardian is unlikely.
In Greek law parental consent may be dispensed with if there exists
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a) permanent mental incapacity or other serious reason on the part 
of either or both parents or
b) if the child is of unknown parentage or a foundling^^^ and, finally,
c) when the parent of a child, received into the carecf a social 
institution, abusively withholds his agreement while having neglected 
the child in the sense of article 1524 of the Greek civil code
so that the adoption of the child becomes impossible.
The grounds on which article 1524 of the Greek civil code permits the 
court to dispense with agreement are when the parent either infringes 
or neglects his duties with'-respect to the custody and maintenance of 
the child or maladministrates the child's patrimony so that the property
of the child is at risk. Moreover, the court has the power to
dispossess a parent of his duties and provide the agreement by its own 
decision, if refusal of parental agreement constitutes an abuse of 
r i g h t . T h i s  authority of the court is exercisable when 
denial of agreement would involve a disproportionate disadvantage to the 
child, or in the event of a serious and permanent neglect of parental 
duties or indifference towards a child who has not been committed to the 
care of a social institution.
From the above description, it can be seen that in both laws there 
are three principal areas where agreement is considered unnecessary:
a) unfitness and neglect of parental duties;
b) unattainability of agreement due to legal incapacitation or other
reason concerning the person of the parent;
c) unreasonable acting of tie parent in withholding agreement.
Following this classification an attempt will be made in therinekt few 
pages to discuss each ground permitting dispensation of agreement under 
the laws of Scotland and Greece.
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II. Unfitness or neglect of parental duties
This section is concerned with the natural and legal duties of the 
parent from an objective point of view. Therefore the corresponding 
intentions of the parent may be effectively irrelevant. Only 
exceptionally are anyvconcessions provided on behalf of parents 
whose conduct had attributed little to the deterioration of the 
child's welfare. As a general observation, however, it can be said 
that the grounds included in this section are the most critical because 
the person accused of failing in his parental duties may be either
unaware or unconvinced of his failure.
a. In Scots law as stated above, a person has failed in his parental 
duties, or is considered unfit to retain them in the following 
cases :
a) he has abandoned or neglected the child
b) he has persistently failed without reasonable cause to
discharge parental duties and
c) he has persistently ill treated the child or done so so 
seriously that the rehabilitation of the child within his 
household is unlikely.
These grounds are unlikely to apply in normal circumstances, e.g. 
when the parent has taken the initiative of the placement for a 
parent will have had little chance to fail to discharge parental 
duties, neglect or illtreat the child and place it for adoption.
1. An early definition, provided in a custody case defined abandonment 
or desertion as the state where "a parent leaves the child to its 
fate".^^^ Statutory definition on the other hand, concentrates 
on the effects of abandonment on the child and defines it as the 
state where the child is left by his parent in a manner "likely to 
cause him unnecessary suffering or injury to h e a l t h " . B o t h  
definitions denote the same conduct by the parent and imply a degree
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of criminal liability, although it is tentatively suggested 
that the civil standard of proof a p p l i e s . T h e y  differ only 
in the emphasis they place on the effect that tiis conduct has on 
the child.
In relation to adoption, however, it is questionable whether the 
above definition of abandonment and neglect could have a clear 
application. In accord with section 6, the welfare of the 
child is of first consideration and adoption as a social measure 
is designed to have preventative application. Accordingly, 
if criminal liability of the parent is taken as the criterion 
for applying this ground, this could fetter intervention where 
deterioration of the child's life is due to non culpable conduct 
by the parent. A parent, for example, who leaves the child in 
the care of friends or relatives and keeps checking up regularly 
to ensure that he is alright has not abandoned the child in the 
legal sense. This type of consideration points to the parent 
and, though indicating concern for the results his conduct may have 
on the child,fails to meet the consequences on his welfare in full 
measure. Moreover it is doubtful whether this type of rejection 
of the child could be brought under the ground of persistent failure 
to discharge parental duties since the parent does not exercise 
parental duties vis a vis him, or whether it could successfully 
invoke the ground of unreasonably withholding consent. Indeed 
there is some difficulty in drawing a borderline to the scope of 
each ground but there are some instances of non culpable neglect 
where adoption is necessary but cannot be achieved by applying 
other grounds for dispensation with consent. For instance in the 
above example, it is neglect if the parent had entrusted the child 
to incompetent persons even though he keeps up regular visits, or 
if the child needs permanent parental care because this half way
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family is emotionally damaging to him. It is necessary, therefore 
to distinguish between parental concern when the child is entrusted 
to other persons and the satisfaction of the child's welfare in 
the hands of those persons, and it seems that abandonment in its 
civil sense points rather to the latter. It is more likely for 
instance to be considered as abandonment in a case ^here the child 
is in the care of persons who would not be considered as proper 
custodians or fail to meet the emotional needs of the childaand the 
parent calls in almost daily, than when it is left in the hands 
of competent people and the parent visits it rarely. Especially 
as to the visits of the parent, these have been held in a number 
of cases to have a negative effect since they disrupt the regularity 
of the child's life.^^^
Another factor to be counted is whether this situation is transient
and,in this case, whether the child's welfare would be served if
it was returned to its parent. If the separation is long-lasting
due to parental indifference, it appears advisable to suggest
adoption, even if the child is left in the care of competent people.
The same could be said if the child is entrusted to incompetent
people for any period, since that for sure will have results
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harmful to the child. The fact that the child will have associated 
the visits of the parent with any undesirable experience at the 
hands of such people leaves little room for reconstituting the 
natural relationship. In cases where the child has been temporarily 
separated from the parent, who is anxious to retain it, and 
remains in the hands of competent people, presumably it will be a 
question of fact and degree whether he has abandoned the child.
The age of the child, the indications that the parent-child 
relationship will revive and the suitability of the home of the 
parent are all factors to be taken into account.
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Obviously abandonment and neglect exist under the meaning 
of the present Act if the parent is found liable under the 
criminal law for deserting the child. In the less severe 
cases, however, if abandonment is due to facts beyond the control 
of the parent, his conduct and wishes must be taken into account, 
but always the decisive criterion should remain the long term welfare 
of the child.
2. A parent has failed without unreasonable cause to discharge
parental duties when "without abandoning or neglecting the child 
..., has shown no genuine interest in him and has no reasonable 
excuse, such as ill-health or lack of suitable accommodation, for 
his behaviou^r. ^
This ground first appeared in the 1958 Act and reappeared in
the 1978 Act with slightly modified terminology but with the same
purpose and scope of application. In the 1978 Act, in order to
achieve uniformity in the terminology, instead of the expression
"obligations of a parent or guardian" is employed the term "parental
d u t i e s " . A s i d e  of this change in terminology the ground still
has the purpose of resolving problems in the gap between abandonment
and unreasonably withholding consent, by securing a fair balance
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between the interests of the child and the rights of a parent.
It is not difficult to foresee, on the other hand, that with the 
current difficulties in applying the term of unreasonability in 
the relinquishment procedure or with the increased use of anonymity 
in adoption applications this ground may be of fairly wide application 
in cases where the child needs to be cut off from his parent even 
though his placement has not been finalized yet.
In an early application of the ground under English law, it was
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held as to include not only the legal duties like the "duty of a
parent to maintain hië child in the financial or economic sense",
or the duty to protect and promote his material welfare, but also
"the natural and moral duty of a parent to show affection, care
11 3and interest towards the child". Despite this promising
formulation in subsequent cases the ground has been applied with
considerable caution and under circumstances next to abandonment
or neglect in terms of gravity and assuming a degree of culpability
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on the part of the parent. Thus, as Bevan and Parry point
out "The most likely instances of this ground being successfully
invoked are those where the child is in the care of a local authority
either by virtue of a care order or by resolution of the authority
11S
made because of parental failure in bringing up the child'.'
Besides in cases where the parent had directly parted with the child 
to the prospective adopters his conduct was tested against the 
kind of criteria which are relevant to such resolutions. Nevertheless, 
in a few instances the court instead of applying the present ground 
applied the test of unreasonability in withholding agreement.
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Thus in Re p it was held that the mother of two illegitimate 
children with whom she had parted from birth had failed in her 
moral obligations because she never considered the possibility of 
taking the children to live with her though cohabiting with the 
putative father for the previous four years. Besides it was observed 
that she had shown little concern for their welfare and seldom 
turned up to visit them. With respect to her legal duties to maintain 
the children she had paid no more than £29 for their maintenance 
although she was supported by the putative father, a man earning 
no less than £12 a week, and although she had drawn £94 Family 
Allowance in respect of the children. On account of these 
circumstances the court held that she had clearly failed to
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discharge the obligations of a parent and that it had for
itself the discretion to dispense with her agreement. On the
117other hand, in Re M (an infant) an eighteen year old mother 
anxious to conceal her pregnancy arranged for foster parents 
to take over the child immediately after birth, with the view to 
adoption. In the meantime she gave formal consent whereupon an 
application for adoption was made. Later (after six months) 
she withdrew her consent and claimed the child although she had 
never visited the child. Under the circumstances the court held 
that her consent could not be dispensed with because failure to visit 
the child after deliberately placing it for adoption does not per se 
constitute persistent failure to discharge parental duties. But 
in the particular case, the court was bound not to decide otherwise, 
by the rationale of Re C. S .E . (an i n f a n t ) w h e r e  it was held that
not visiting the child may be best for it if this prevents emotional
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disturbance. In Re D (minors)(adoption by parent and step-parent)
the strength of the natural relationship was further emphasized.
Thus, albeit the father had defrauded his maintenance obligations
and refused to visit the children, except occasionally, and under
satisfactory circumstances, the court held that he could not be
deprived, insofar as it had not been proven that "he had washed his 
121
hands of them". In the same case it has been provided that the
122fact and degree of failure must be of "such gravity, so
complete, so convincingly proven that there can be no advantage
to the child in keeping continuous contact with the natural parent
who has so abrogated his duties that he for his part should be
123
deprived of his own child against his wishes". A similar
124reasoning was followed in Re H (adoption by a parent and
step-parent) where the father had sporadically provided maintenance 
and contacted the child whenever it was convenient to
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him. The Magistrate had dispensed with his consent on the ground 
that he had failed without reasonable cause to discharge the 
obligations of a parent, but the Divisional Court reversed the 
finding, considering the conduct of the parent as satisfactory 
in the circumstances. In the court's opinion he was loving as a 
father because he had visited the children, communicated with them 
albeit fitfully, when in employment responded to the maintenance 
due under the court order and that the instability in his life 
did not prove that no advantage accrued to the children from contacting 
the father. In addition the court in refusing the order took 
into consideration that the children would be deprived of any link 
with the father and his relatives without this resulting in any 
major benefit to their position. They were to stay with the mother 
and stepfather (the applicants), a unity, which would not be upset 
in the future.
In the last two cases, the applicants were parent and step-parent,
which alleviates the gravity of parental failure. It can be
considered, for instance, that the presence of the mother and her
efforts will remedy any harm caused to the child by the indifference
of the father. Therefore, courts in placing reliance on her conduct
have been tolerant with the father and his behaviour throughout
the separation. Thus, in Re. D ,Bhker, P.argued that "when marriage
breaks down, the husband will often withdraw or drift apart
from the family temporarily, particularly when, as in that case,
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he is living with another womanV However, if the same circum­
stances had appeared in a foster placement, where the anxiety to 
achieve normality in the child's life is primary, such allowances 
for parental conduct becomes rather critical.
The ground has not been clearly construed so farcin Scots law and.
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therefore, it is difficult to make any specific comments on its
application. There are instances, however, where the ground could
127
have been successfully invoked as for example, in the case X v Y .
In this case, the mother of an illegitimate child, who was placed
with foster parents within two weeks after birth, withheld her
consent in an application for adoption by the foster parents even
though she had shown no concern for its welfare and had made no
arrangements for taking the child back. In fact the child was to
return to the local authority and it was left to them to decide what
further steps should be taken. However, although there was an
element of parental failure since the child's infancy, the
Sheriff-substitute instead of applying the present ground, brought
into consideration the question of whether consent was unreasonably
withheld. Because the petitioners had required anonymity in which
case it is not possible to hear the application even in camera, the
sheriff, faced with difficulty in assessing whether consent was
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unreasonably withheld, remitted the issue to a reporter. The
upshot of this case was for consent to be dispensed with as 
unreasonably withheld. The mother, it was held, had not shown genuine 
interest in the child nor could she meet his future needs. Moreover, it 
was felt that her position was a permanent one, so that the care order 
ought not to be extended. The way that the case was handled, however, 
indicates that the sheriff, instead of questioning the obvious circumstances 
concerning the fitness of the mother in parental duties, took the more 
secure step of examining whether consent was unreasonably withheld. Perhaps 
due to her age and the circumstances of the case it was difficult to 
hold her responsible for persistent failure to discharge parental duties, 
but, nevertheless, for the same reasons one could not expect a reasonable 
decision from her. Therefore, it might have been better to try to 
convince her with a decision confined to assessment of her own 
circumstances, than to remove the child from her with a
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decision which includes this element but nevertheless could 
cause frictions between her and the adoptive parents.
On account of the above discussion the observation to be made 
is that the ground under its present construction normally applies 
to a non custodian parent who has failed to respond to his limited 
duties to such a degree and for such time that it is justifiable 
for him to be deprived of his duties. Persistent failure has 
been taken to indicate that the parent disregarded his duties and 
is proven to be beyond any hope of showing concern for the child. 
This is assessed in view of the damage caused to the child's 
welfare by placing emphasis either on the period or on the degree 
of parental failure. Nevertheless, a degree of culpability on the 
parents' conduct has been seen as a prerequisite.
Another matter to consider is whether it is possible to provide 
a wider construction on the ground of persistent parental failure 
to resolve problems which arise by applying the tests of unreason­
ableness in the relinquishment procedure or in adoptions where 
the applicants have required anonymity. In the first filace 
because unfitness in parental duties has been seen in relation to 
the culpable conduct of the parent, unless the latter is observed, 
the court may find it difficult to dispense with parental 
agreement if the circumstances of a placement have not yet been 
assessed at length. Indeed no law has been developed so far
to substitute for the present comparison between the natural and 
adoptive family. On certain occasions the court decided on the 
unreasonability of the parent by making the assumption that he
should rely on the guarantees offered by the institution and
129
therefore provide his consent. This resolution is to an extent 
satisfactory but may lead to the same problems because it places
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the circumstances of the parent as the hypothetical opposite of an 
adoption placement. Also this solution is somewhat fictitious 
because there is no uniform practice in adoption and the fact 
that any decision will be taken,' having in view the welfare of 
the child,-may not be sufficient for the parent who is usually 
anxious to know the circumstances of the future life of the child. 
Therefore, in these circumstances to ask him to rely on adoption 
per se and act with reasonableness seems unjusfied. But even 
when the decision is taken in view of a specific placement there 
is the possiblity,in the case of two children with the same needs 
and the same family circumstances, for the court to reach a different 
decision because the circumstances of the placements are different.
A question, therefore, to be raised is whether the court should 
look at the circumstances of the natural family inter se irrespective 
of the decision on the child's adoption.
In this case, the criterion for deciding on parental conduct would 
be based on what in society's opinion is an average parent. With 
this in mind the first questions that the court should ask are 
whether the parent is aware or could be made aware of his duties 
and, second, whether he lives up to them. The finding may be 
either that he is unaware and by no means could become so, in which 
case failure is present and of permanent existence (subjective 
failure); or that although he understands them he refuses to live 
up to them in which case the court must examine whether his 
conduct is tolerable in terms of law, social standards and the 
welfare of the child (objective failure). In the first instance 
the degree of incompetency of the parent to bring the child up 
properly in relation to the effect on its welfare must signify 
whether the failure is persistent. The lack of reasonable cause 
may be taken in this case as his inability to appreciate the
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parental duties instead of other external circumstances. In 
the second instance persistency may be assessed in relation to 
the conduct of the parent and its effects on the welfare of the 
child in respect of the existing alternatives like custody or 
guardianship which, if applied, could offer the option of a remedy 
for the natural relationship. In borderline situations the 
'just causes' presented for parental failure should count in 
favour of the natural relationship. Also in respect to both 
types of parental failure, so far it has been required to 
expressly indicate that the parent has failed in his duties estimated 
in terms of time and measures that have been applied, but should 
not be carried any longer to the degree of poving that the parent 
"washed his hands of the child". Perhaps in such cases parental 
failure is proven beyond doubt so that dangers of destroying the 
natural relationship without just reasons are considerably 
eliminated. However, this standard includes a number of dangers 
for the child so that it is better if this degree of proof is 
abandoned.
3. The illtreatment of the child as a ground for dispensing with
agreement appears in statute in two distinct forms, as persistent 
ill-treatment and serious ill-treatment. Due to the gravity of 
the grounds an attempt was made in Parliament to permit the courts 
to dispense with the agreement required for the adoption of a child 
in charge of a parent or guardian who had ill-treated a second 
child while under his care. The proposed amendment was withdrawn 
when some of the difficulties were pointed out.^^^
Persistent ill-treatment appears in the statute as a self efficient 
ground for dispensing with parental agreement and it is free of the
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concurrence of any other grounds. The court, therefore
may intervene in the relation, even though the parent or guardian
performs his legal and moral duties and, in general, cannot be
regarded as unaffectionate towards the child, if he on repeated
occasions treats the child maléficiently.. • No intentional
conduct or other particulars are indicated in the statute to
signify the relevant conduct of the parent. However, observing
the ground in relation to the rest ofthe same category, persistent
ill-treatment appears to be the frequent commitment of acts
resulting directly or indirectly in injury to the health and
happiness of the child. Namely, the brutal behaviour of the
parent, his indifference to the child's illness, his disregard
of the child's need for entertainment are acts that fall within the
■scope of ill treatment because they affect the physical and
emotional welfare of the child. For a parent or guardian it does
not appear that his conduct need be of a kind and degree rendering
him responsible in the criminal sense of the term. Even conduct
due to his irascibility or frivolity, as long as it appears in a
degree and frequency making probable harmful effects of a permanent
nature to the child's physical and emotional welfare, should
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suffice for the requirement.
Serious ill-treatment, even when not persistent, is itself
sufficient for dispensing with agreement subject to the condition
that the rehabilitation of the child within the household of
the parent or guardian is unlikely. This takes effect with the
recommendation of the Houghton Committee which speculated that,
though a single incident does not preclude the possibility of the
child being rehabilitated with the same person, under certain
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circumstances this may become impossible. Accordingly they
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recommended serious ill-treatment to be incorporated in the
reasons for dispensing with parental agreement so far as due to
such events, the parent/child relationship is irretrievably broken
or its spirit turned into an irremediably hostile or indifferent
one. Conduct of a criminal kind may be taken into account, in
this instance, to signify ill-treatment due to the singular nature
of the event. This, however, should not prejudice the gravity of
the condition in subsection(5) since what characterises ill-treatment
as a ground for dispensing with parental agreement is the likelihood
of the child's rehabilitation irrespective of the criminal
liability of the parent. In this context, it is submitted that
the likelihood of the child's rehabilitation may also be related
to other factors like the imprisonment of the parent or the
133commitment of the child into care. Also, if the mental
condition of the parent has been so deteriorating as to create the 
unlikelihood.
A problem pointed out by Bevan and Parry in relation to this ground 
is that the provision will place a heavy onus on adoption agencies 
and reporting officers in assessing the likelihood of rehabilitation 
especially since the Act omits to provide the limits against 
which the likelihood has to be set. The omission will be 
especially relevant in instances where the ill-treatment can be 
related to poor housing accommodation and attendant pressures on 
the parent. However, as they observe with the increasing and 
understandable practice of local authorities of instituting care 
proceedings in cases of child abuse, these problems will be
resolved and this ground for dispensation will quite often be
, ^ 135 invoked.
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b. In Greek law, the parent is deemed unfit to retain his rights 
and duties
(1) when he has deserted the child in a manner that the child 
is regarded as being of "unknown parentage" or in a state 
of abandonment, and
(2) when the child has been received into the care of a social
institution and its adoption prevented because the parent
abusively withheld his agreement although he has shown a lack
of interest that jeopardizes the child's health and moral 
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welfare.
In relation to the above ground three cases of parental unfitness 
can be distinguished in Greek law, which in terras of gravity are 
classified as follows. First, unfitness arising from the 
absolute absence of the parent-child relationship. It is 
submitted that this includes cases where the identity of the parents 
of the child is unknown. Second, unfitness arising from the omission 
of the parent to fulfil parental obligations towards the child so that 
the latter is considered as being in a state of exposure to danger 
according to the conditions of the law. And third, unfitness 
arising from the omission of the parent to fulfil his obligations 
to the extent that (without the situation being regarded as that of 
exposure of the child) there have been, nevertheless, negative 
effects on the child's welfare and the child is submitted to the care 
of a social institution. As it appears from the comparison between 
the subparagraphs A and C of article 11 of the L.D.410/1970, 
the institutional care of the child is not a prerequisite in the first 
two cases mentioned.
1. In Greek law a child is deemed of unknown parentage or a foundling 
when the identify of neither parent is known or can be otherwise 
traced. Such a situation may be considered to arise when the
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child is found in front of the door of a house or institution
or has escaped the attention of its parent and is picked up by
a stranger and any inquiry to trace its relations has ended in 
137
vain. In respect of illegitimate children, the child is
deemed of unknown parentage if the mother is dead or has
disappeared, and the same applies to a judicially affiliated child
for the purpose of the present a r t i c l e . T h e  power of the
court to deal with parental agreement in the present case emerges from
the unknown identity of the parents per se and not from
the effects that the lack of parental care may have on the child.
Therefore, since it is confirmed that the steps taken to trace the
parents have ended unsuccessfully the child may be subject to
adoption and the court is entitled to dispense with parental 
139agreement. However, because the circumstances vary from case
to case it may be considered appropriate to extend the period of 
inquiry by means of a foster placement, if the welfare of the child 
is susceptible to this extension. This will eliminate the risk of 
the child being adopted and then its parents appearing and'trying to 
reverse the order.
2. Abandonment under Greek law is regarded as the state where"the
parent has exposed the child in an unassisted condition',' as well as
when the parent "being in charge of the child deliberately omits
to show the expected care and protection or to fulfil his alimentary 
140obligations". This definition given in Criminal Law
distinguishes between complete abandonment and omission to fulfil 
parental duties. The former refers to any parent who has completely 
deserted his child and this presumes danger to his health and life. 
As such, although it includes lack of concern by the parent, it mainly 
points to the lack of any link between the parent and the child.
The latter refers to a parent in charge of the child or responsible
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for carrying out certain duties towards it lAerebecause of his
omission to do so the child is exposed to danger. Under criminal
law a prerequisite in both cases is the culpable conduct of 
141the parent. This element doubtfully responds to the
intentions of the legislature with adoption and therefore may not 
be incorporated. Namely, in almost every case of complete 
abandonment it is difficult to ascertain the basis behind the child's 
desertion and to try to do so may result in endless delays. The 
present ground places weight on the position of the child and is 
little concerned with whether its position is the result of a 
criminal act by the parent, so that, like Scots law, Greek law 
focusses on rescuing the child from the state of abandonment with 
the solution of adoption whenever the latter is appropriate to his 
welfare.
The L.D. does not make a distinction between the two cases of
abandonment and therefore there may be some difficulty in invoking
the ground for both cases. In the introductory report it is submitted
that the purpose of permitting the court to dispense with parental
agreement is to expand the usage of adoption as an appropriate
measure to be ordered by the court if the parent neglects his 
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duties. The stipulation is inspired mainly from article 352
of the ?rench civil code, as it was reformed by the Law of 1958 to 
permit the court to dispense with parental agreement in respect 
of the parent "who evidently was indifferent to the child, thus 
exposing to danger his morality, health or education .
On the other hand the term "exposed child" in the introductory 
report is used indistinctly but nevertheless appears under the 
same heading with children of unknown parentage. Thus prima 
facie it may be taken to apply exclusively to cases of complete 
abandonment excluding cases where the parent refuses to show
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concern for the child or neglects his duties and still maintains
contact. However, the parent has put the interests of the
child at danger and the child is considered exposed in the legal
sense even though both still live under the same roof and the
parent refuses to provide for it. Also a father, who neglects his
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duties towards his children and his ill wife , or the father
of a child born out of wedlock, who is bound to care for it,
if he refuses to do so and the child cannot be supported by its
145
indigent or sick mother has abandoned the child in the legal 
146sense.
In terms of family law, the consequence of such acts for parental
rights and duties may be for the parent to forfeit irrevocably
his right to exercise parental authority over the child. Namely,
147
according to article 1525 of the Greek civil code the parent
forfeits all rights and duties whatsoever related to parental authority
148
in respect of a particular child if he has been sentenced to at
least one month's imprisonment for a criminal act against the
life, health or morality of the child. The child then is submitted
149to the exclusive care of the otherparent or a third party. Such
consequence to parental rights may be effected if the parent is
found liable of exposing to danger the interests of the child since
150
such acts attract imprisonment of at least six months.
Nevertheless, the same consequence may be effected in respect of
minor acts against the child. Particularly according to article 312
of the Greek P.C. the parent may be convicted to at least three
months imprisonment if with his "persistent harsh b e h a v i o u r " o r
152
by "maliciously neglecting his obligations" he became the cause "of
153
body injury or damage to the health" of the child. Such
obligations may be those having an effect on the health of the child.
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such as obligation to maintain, to provide a home and clothing for
154
the child and to care for his health and overall protection.
Under those circumstances provided that the parent has been convicted 
to at least one month's imprisonment the relationship is terminated 
ipso jure. Otherwise it is subject to revision according to the 
stipulations of article 1524 of the Greek civil code.
In relation now to adoption, if a child, in either of the above
cases, is placed for adoption and the innocent parent agrees, the
court may find itself in great difficulty if the party who neglected
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his duties withholds his agreement. It may perhaps be possible
for the court to dispense with his agreement on the grounds of
abuse of right, or as abusively withheld in accord with the
conditions of article 11(C) of the L.D. 610/1970. However,
successful application of the first grounds mainly depends on the
overall circumstances of the parent in his relation to the child.
Therefore, it has a relative value for the present case. In relation
to the second of the grounds, on the other hand, a prerequisite
is for the child to have been submitted to institutional care as
a result of simple failure in parental duties as prescribed in
article 1524 of the Greek civil code. The above discussed
instances of abandonment, however, constitute a more severe case which
may invoke not only the measures of article 1524 but the complete
156severance of the relationship. Besides, whether the child has
been received into institutional care or not mainly depends on 
whether the other parent had undertaken the entire responsibility 
for the child throughout this period.
Following this ascertainment, it can be suggested that the term 
"exposed child" should be taken to refer as much to the case of
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complete abandonment as to neglect of parental duties whether 
it resulted in the parent forfeiting parental authority or not. 
Consequently, the court must have the authority to dispense with 
parental agreement in both cases for adoption for what really matters 
are the circumstances of the child's life from a substantive point 
of view. This accords with the rationale provided in the 
introductory report for dispensing with the agreement of the 
indifferent parent who exposed to danger the morality, health or education 
of the child. Adoption seems the only proper alternative in the 
circumstances. For the latter, the comments made in Scots law in 
respect to the degree of parental neglect and its effects on the child 
are also competent in relation to Greek law.
3. The ground referred to in article 11(c) of the L.D. 610/1970 
resembles that of "persistentfailure without just excuse to 
discharge parental duties", of Scots law, as it has been applied 
by the courts. Thus the court may dispense with parental agreement 
if the parent has failed in his duties in the sense of article 1524 
of the Greek civil code, which covers the wide range of acts 
involved in parental authority, and abusively withholds his 
agreement to the child's adoption. Moreover, this power of the 
court is by law restricted to children undergoing institutional 
care. The discretion of the court does not extend to
children still in the care of one of its parents even though the 
other had failed in his duties in the sense of article 1524 of the 
Greek civil code and the custodian parents intend to place it 
for adoption. The court may, perhaps, be able to dispense with 
that parent's agreement, if he refused to agree under circumstances 
that constitute an abuse of right.
The stipulations of article 11(c) assume the existence of
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three conditions in order to invoke the ground. First, the 
conditions of article 1524 of the Greek civil code must be 
complied with; second, the child must be under institutional care; 
and third, the parent must abusively withhold agreement.
As regards article 1524, this provides that "if the parent fails or
infringes his duty to protect the child" or "if due to the indigence"
of the parent, or "maladministration of the child's property",
this property is in danger, "the court on the request of the other
parent, the nearest relatives, or the public prosecutor, may order
any proper measure, i.e. to appoint a third person to the
representation or care (of the child), or to appoint a trustee to
administrate his property". Whether the parent fails in or
infringes his duty to protect the child or maladministrates his
property has been construed in the precedents to refer to acts
that could have immediate effect on the child's welfare or could have
an undesirable influence on his character and morality. Thus, it
has been considered appropriate to discharge the parent from his
duties, if he refuses to provide aliment to the child, or has
failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest towards the child,
157e.g. in education, health and care needed. The same has been
considered if the parent has exercised severely his rehabilitative 
power upon the child, engaged it in unhealthy or inappropriate 
employment for his age, or has involved the child in immoral acts.^^^ 
Nevertheless, within the scope of the article there have been 
included acts which assume the parent to be a bad example to the 
child. Herewith,concern is expressed for the influence that the 
parent may have on the morality of the child. Thus, if he is a 
habitual drunkard, an inmate or keeper of a house of ill-fame, 
or if he has been engaged in open and notorious adultery or
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fornication, it may be considered that he is unfit to perform
parental duties and that, therefore, the child should be entrusted
159
to the care of another person.
Another requirement is that the child must have been received 
into care by a social institution. The child may have been 
entrusted to the institution by the parent, or may have been so 
received because the overall conduct of the parent "badly 
influences (its) general protection and maintenance" and therefore 
the parent has been declared "morally unfit" by a Committee of the 
Child's Projection of the Regional Centre or by an Office of 
Social A s s i s t a n c e . I n  either case the authority takes care 
of fostering the child.
However, there is something unsatisfactory with respect to this 
somehow extended legal prescription in the present ground. A 
child normally is received into care if being born out of wedlock, the 
mother has giv en up the idea of bringing it up alone, or if being 
born in wedlock or being acknowledged by the father, neither parent 
is capable of fulfilling his duties properly. But unless the parent 
has taken the initiative to entrust the child to the institution 
or to place it for adoption, the child may be the subject of an 
order only after the utmost of parental failure has been observed 
and after undergoing long and possibly damaging institutional care.
It is questionable whether a child who has undergone this experience 
would appreciate normal family circumstances. Therefore, some 
power should be given to the court to dispense with parental agreement 
the child is not the subject of a care order, where the failing 
parent refuses agreement and the other, being unable to care for 
the child, agrees to his adoption. Furthermore, in the case of
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parents who live apart if the care of the child is to be handed 
from one to the other by reason of parental failure it may be 
advisable,to examine whether it is unlikely that the other parent 
will be able to care for the child properly and, if not, to place 
it straight for adoption, exercising the power suggested above in 
respect of the agreement of both parents.
For the court to dispense with parental agreement, the parent must 
abusively refuse to consent to the child's adoption. The 478/L969 
decision of the City Court of Athens^^^ in accord with the
recommendations made in the introductory report of the L.D. 4532/1966^^^ 
defined as abusive refusal the withholding of agreement which is 
motivated not from any interest for the child but from "hostile 
feelings" or "vile impulse". Although the court in deciding whether 
the circumstances of the case^^^ constituted an abusive refusal 
of agreement to the child's adoption confined its attention to a 
consideration of the 'just causes' presented by the parent for 
his conduct, emphasis was placed upon investigating the parental 
interest in the child. This was done in an effort to assess 
vhether the relationship could be preserved and whether this would 
serve the needs of the child as they have been altered in the 
course of his institutional experience. On this understanding, 
it can be said that in assessing whether consent is abusively 
withheld for a child undergoing institutional care, reference 
should be made to the previous conduct of the parent as well as to 
the prospects of him resuming the care of the child. Thereto, 
the parent may be regarded^unaffectionate towards the child either 
on account of his previous behaviour or on his refusal to provide 
agreement without having made any arrangements to meet the future 
needs of the child. In the presence of either or both of the
above factors the court may dispense with parental agreement if the
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parent-child relationship is unlikely to revive. However, 
in reaching any decision the welfare of the child must be of 
first consideration.
Another point to be discussed is whether it is permitted for the 
court to dispense with parental agreement if the child is 
received into care primarily for other reasons than parental failure 
or whether the two elements are interlocked for invoking the ground 
successfully. ' It isy:generally accepted that behind the commitment 
of a child into care for instance for "antisocial behaviour" lies 
a degree of parental failure. To this article 2(3) of the 
compulsory law 2724/1940 accords parental rights in respect of that 
child to the institution throughout the period of the order. The 
problem is created by the fact that in Greece there is the practice 
that children with prior convictions or under the care of a
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rehabilitative institution should not be placed for adoption.
Also in the precedents there has been emphasized the need for a 
strong correlation between the inability of the parent to cope with 
the child and his institutional care. Namely in the decision 
478/1969 the court paid particular attention to the fact that the 
child had been deliviered to the nursery because the mother could 
not live up to her duties for social and financial reasons.
However, there is a real doubt as to whetherthis opinion is properly 
founded in the law. One can assume that the interpretation
given to the term institution in the LD. 610/1970 includes those 
entitled to carry out welfare investigations which as a rule do 
not accommodate this category of c h i l d r e n . B u t  in respect of 
article 15(c) there is no affirmative reference to the institutions 
named in article 1(1) of the Royal Decree 795/1970, as in other 
parts of the Decree. So a wider construction of the term
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•institution' is possible. The main reason for suggesting 
this construction is that in case of parental failure, in the sense 
of article 1524 of the Greek civil code, institutional proceedings 
for antisocial behaviour on the part of the child are generally 
expected. Therefore, it is rational to allow ex-inmates or 
even inmates of rehabilitative institutions committed there for 
minor crimes to be adopted, if the care of another family seems 
promising for the reconstruction of their character
III. Unattainability of parental agreement
a. In Scots law, agreement may be dispensed with on the ground that
the parent or guardian "cannot be found or is incapable of giving
agreement". This is permitted to the court, if it is satisfied
that either every reasonable step has been taken to trace the
169
parent for the purpose of giving formal agreement , or there 
are no practical means for communicating with him. The latter 
corresponds to a somewhat extended interpretation of the ground 
provided in Be R ,^^^where it was thought that if anyone attempted to 
communicate with the parents, this might have involved them in danger 
because of the political situation there and the position of R. as a 
refugee in Britain.
The ground does not, however, dispense with the need to serve notice 
at the last known address of the parent. However, this becomes a
rather procedural formality before evidence on the unattainability
of parent's agreement, than an obstacle to the jurisdiction of the
171court to hear the application.
Incapability, on the other hand, of giving agreement includes 
either the state where the parent suffers mental deficiency to an 
extent that he cannot be aware of what is involved by consenting
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to the proposed adoption; or the state where he is ignorant
of the proposed adoption and cannot as a practical matter be made
aware of it. The latter has been considered for the parents in
Re . R and could be extended to include parents who in general
172
are unaware of the institution of adoption.
b. In Greece on the other hand, according to article 11(b) of the
Legislative Decree 610/70 agreement is deemed unattainable for
the parent suffering mental illness or for whom there is other
173
serious reason rendering it impossible for him to agree formally.
In both cases the court decides after hearing the opinion of the nearest
174
relatives of the child if practicable. Serious reason for the
present purposes constitutes the existence of a permanent impediment
making it impossible to get his formal agreement after taking all
reasonable steps. Thus, it has been accepted that the unknown
residence of the parent suffices to meet the requirements as well
as the impossibility of communicating with him, even when there is
175
positive information that he is alive. Moreover, the same
applies if the parent suffers such physical disability that he
176
cannot be aware of the meaning and gravity of the order.
IV. Acting Unreasonably
a. In the process of its application the ground of unreasonably
withholding agreement became the main cause of contested litigation
over adoption because it demonstrates more clearly than any other
of the relevant grounds the impossibility of maintaining a balance 
between the conflicting interests. When examining the scope of 
Section 6 of the 1978 Act the uncertainty over the criteria that should 
be taken into account to signify the reasonableness of the parental 
decision has been considered at length. As said there, the enactment 
of section 6 does not altogether remove the problems encountered
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177in the earlier law, because it is still disputed whether the 
criteria on the welfare of the child would apply to the 
resolution of such questions. Although this will make little 
difference because precedents range from considering the welfare
178of the child "first(and)... in some cases (to) ... be paramount"
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or of "potent ... (and perhaps) the foremost consideration", 
nevertheless, those views have been formulated on the merits of 
particular placements and as such fall short of having a unanimous 
acceptance. Indeed the uncertainty on the matter has given rise 
to what Lord MacDermott in the early seventies termed "the 
emergence of two distinct and conflicting schools of judicial 
thought" in assessing the unreasonableness of the parent.
According to one school, the word 'unreasonable' should be given a 
'special' construction as to assess the circumstances from the parents' 
point of view and should be read as including some degree of 
blameworthiness. According to the other, the word 'unreasonably' 
should be given a "natural" construction, it should be interpreted 
from the child's point of view and should not be read as requiring 
a degree of blameworthiness. However, this understanding 
points more to the gradual increase of the attention paid to the 
interests of the child as opposed to the rights of the parent 
and as such rather refers to two distinct periods of Scots law than 
to the formulation of two coexisting schools of interpretation.
Morover, the history of this dispute demonstrates more than anything 
else the need to provide a method of assessment where the tests on 
the welfare of the child should balance the circumstances of the 
natural parents and the prospective adopters in a manner acceptable 
by both and nevertheless applicable as much to the relinquishment 
procedure as to the case of a specific placement.
In early cases, the emphasis tended to be on the rights
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of the parents. Courts were of the opinion that in the
decision making process the judge should be primarily concerned
with the conduct of the parent notwithstanding the importance
attached to the child's welfare. Thus it has been excused as "
'^eminently reasonable" to withheld consent since the effect of an
182
adoption order is to destroy the parent-child relationship.
A similar concern for parental rights is observable in a number of
English decisions. This was taken to the extent that the parent
could be held to be unreasonble only in exceptional circumstances,
irrespective of the advantages to the child's welfare if
adopted. Thus it was possible for the withholding of parental
agreement to be considered reasonable, insofar as it was not whimsical,
in bad faith or arbitrary, even though the parent had forfeited
183his right to have care and custody of the child.
In the early sixties there appeared a shift of emphasis from the
importance accorded to parental rights towards the welfare of the
child. The real challenge, however, came with the AB v CD (1963)
184
(Petrs.) in which the welfare of the. child was held to have a
clear significance in terms of the reasonableness of the parent's
decision. In this case it was provided that a reasonable parent
would attribute great importance to the child's welfare in taking
his d e c i s i o n . T h e  logical consequence of this reasoning
was for the element of liability required for dispensing with
parental agreement to undergo a gradual devaluation until its
] 86
dismissal by the House of Lords. In Re W (1971) the House 
reaffirmed the need for objective considerations on account of the 
welfare of the child and brought an end to decisions veering between 
accepting or ignoring "culpability" as being an essential element 
of unreasonableness. The chance appeared with the "special" 
construction given to the term "unreasonably" earlier by the Court
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of Appeal in the same case. Here Sachs/ L.J., while stressing
the penal nature of the provision assets that "To resolve the
contests between a parent and proposed adopters on the basis that
normally the correct test is to take the course which is in the
better general welfare interests of the child is plainly wrong.
It ignores the necessity first to establish culpable conduct by the 
187
parent". similarly. Cross, L.J. expressed the view that the
ground envisages a degree of unreasonableness not falling short
of positive misconduct, and talked of shutting the parental eye
to a blameworthy degree to the very serious circumstances to
188
which the parent was exposing the child. However, it is
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submitted that this approach never met with much favour in Scotland
and actually in the same period as Re . W , the Court of Session, with
190its decision in A v B and C gave legal effect to the "natural"
construction of the term "unreasonably". In this decision the court 
upheld the opinion of the Shehf f substitute as responding to the right 
tests of the child's welfare since he took into account the 
benefit to the child of adoption not only from the material point 
of view but also spiritually and morally, and made up his mind having 
in view the long term welfare of the child. It is important to 
notice that in formulating a view on what the future of the child 
would be, the Sheriff paid much attention as to whether the 
natural parents' union had any permanence and whether it was likely 
for the child to be placed at risk again. Also attention was 
paid to the vacillating attitude of the mother and to the fact
that the driving force against her giving her consent was her
^ ^ ^ 191husband.
The decision of the House of Lords in the same case, reaffirmed the need
for a natural construction of the term. The court referred, with
192
approval, to the opinion of Lord Denning in In Re L , about a
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reasonable mother giving great weight to what is better for the
child so that it is possible to act unreasonably, even if there
is no element of culpability or reprehensible conduct in her
193
decision to withhold agreement. This has been formulated
as the need to answer the question of the reasonableness of
the parent by looking at the matter through the parents' eyes,
while objectively and on all facts. Accordingly, a parent's
decision which takes into account the welfare of the child falls
within the band of reasonable decisions, notwithstanding that on
certain facts two persons may well reach two different decisions
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and both be reasonable. According to Lord Reid's opinion on
the matter -
"... a reasonable parent, or indeed any other reasonable 
person, would have in mind the interests or claims of all 
three parties concerned - the child whose adoption is in 
question, the natural parents and the adoptive family.
No doubt the child's interests come first, and in some cases 
they may be paramount. But I see no reason why the claims 
of the natural parents should be ignored if the mother 
were deeply attached to the child and had only consented in the 
first place because of adverse circumstances, it would seem 
to me unjust that on a change of circumstances her affection 
for the child and her natural claims as a parent should 
be ignored. And the adoptive family cannot be ignored either.
If it was the mother's action that brought them in in the 
first place, they ought not to be displaced without good 
reason ... So to balance those claims is not an easy task. 
Often we are dealing largely with future probabilities ... 
so we cannot be certain what will be in the child's best 
interests in the long run. That seems to me to be an 
additional reason for giving considerable weight in proper 
cases to the claims of the natural parents and the 
adoptive family." 195
However, as one can foresee from the above statement the reception
of this development is not free from problems, e.g. the instance
of a parent who has not shown any blameworthy conduct in the
way that he has fulfilled his duties but the overall performance has
turned out to be damaging to the child's welfare. The problems
are likely to appear with the increased use of anonymity by the
adoptive parents and the introduction of the relinquishment procedure.
The court may be called on to dispense with parental agreement ag
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unreasonably withheld, even though there is no evidence of a 
196placement. Indeed, it is a problem to find grounds for
assessing whether the parent is unreasonable, if that parent with­
holds his agreement in ignorance of the future offered his child.
It may, perhaps be extremely difficult to convince that parent 
of the necessity of the order and for that reason , one can see 
a logical basis for the requirement of culpable conduct by the 
parent. There exists the parallel problem for the court as to 
how to predict in such circumstances that the order will be for 
the welfare of the child. Up to now, such decisions were taken
in the form of a two fold assessment in which comparisons between 
the circumstances of the natural and adoptive family prevail throughout 
the decision process. The reasonableness of the parent is 
assessed by reference to his views on the welfare of the child and 
thereto it is suggested that the court must make allowance for 
the concept of anonymity whenever this step has been taken. As 
said earlier, there is an element of artificiality in seeking 
to decide whether a natural parent is withholding his consent 
unreasonably, if he does not have any knowledge of the circumstances 
of the placement and it is submitted that the court must take into
account these missing factors and seek to determine how a reasonable
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parent would act in the knowledge of all the circumstances.
However, in this context the decision becomes more artificial than 
ever since the court would have to make a number of hypothetical 
estimations. Indeed such decisions will involve a great deal of 
balancing claims, mixed with considerations of future probabilities 
as to the welfare of the child - a task not always easy to perform 
and not without risks. For instance, there is the precedent 
where the decision to remove the child either from the parents 
or from the adopters has been taken on the assumption that a very
young child is not likely to suffer, provided that the person
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taking over its care is capable of bringing him up and anxious
to do so. As for a child of tender age the court has shown
reliance on the child's ability to adjust and regarded the
effects of parting with the parent or adopter as "mercifully
19Btransient", unless the contrary was strongly supported.
Nevertheless, a problem for the court is how to isolate transient 
facts from the evidence presented and assess this in the context 
of the child's needs, to predict the future conduct of either 
parent in relation to the child and to try to form an idea of what
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the future of the child would be if the order is granted or refused.
One avenue might be provided by the use of socio-medical evidence 
but judicial opinion in the past has been rather reluctant to 
attribute real weight to such e v i d e n c e . A  recommendation 
of the Houghton Committee for Scotland was that courts should be 
able to appoint expert assessors to assist in the evidential 
matters^^^ and that this might realise the above alternative.
However, the entire responsibility remains with the court and the 
judges have to make up their minds on account not only of the past 
experience of the child but also of future plans presented by the 
parents,
In relation to the latter, it must be noticed that frequently parents
appear with certain plans for bettering their personal circumstances
which intensified the dilemma as to whether to award the order 
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or not. And if this is looked at on the basis that, in a
considerable number of cases, the child is already emotionally or 
otherwise detached from the natural parents, the decision is not 
as simple as one would think.
In view of the complexity of the decision it is possible to
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predict the following dangers and make the necessary suggestions 
in relation to the assessment of the unreasonableness of the parent. 
In the first place, if the decision on the unreasonableness of the 
parent will continue to be of the nature of a comparative 
assessment of the advantages for the child if adopted or not, 
there is the danger of partiality. Second, under this method the 
tests applicable for assessing whether the natural relationship 
causes undue damage to the welfare of the child have a different 
significance than if the child was not to be adopted at all. 
Therefore, there may be some doubt as to the maturity of such 
decision. Third, in the context of this comparison the decision 
is characterised with individuality which in turn brings a 
relativity to the scope of the ground.
On the basis of those dangers there is a need to divide the decision 
into two distinct stages and decide whether the parents should be 
deprived of the child exclusively on circumstnaces relating to the 
natural family per se. As regards the role of the welfare of 
the child for that assessment, this has been discussed earlier in 
the relevant chapter. Given that the finding of this assessment 
is that the relationship with the parents causes harm to the 
welfare of the child and that there is no hope of any other remedy 
it may be possible to consider the alternative of adoption if the 
welfare of the child so indicates. The need to have evidence 
about the future of the child in adoption no longer has the 
same significance as before, since success is more or less 
sufficiently guaranteed by the standarized comprehensive adoption 
service. As to the natural parents this exclusive consideration 
will increase their understanding of the decision and eliminate 
the feelings of inferiority, friction and grief which are usually 
felt after a decision in favour of the adopters. This expectation
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is based on the fact that success or failure in keeping the child 
is the result of the application of social standards of which they 
may have a sufficient knowledge.
b. In Greek law, considerations concerning the unreasonableness of a
parent in withholding his agreement to the adoption of his child are 
a matter of dispute. They appear as an element in dispensing with 
parental agreement under article 11(c), but this condition arises 
only on failure as a parent which has resulted in the child being put 
into care. No definitie answer, however, has been given so far in 
the case where the parent of a child, who is not under institutional 
care, withholds his agreement even though he has failed to care 
properly for the child. Nor is it clearly specified whether such con­
duct by the parent constitutes an abuse of right according to the
203sense of article 281 of the Greek Civil Cbde.
If one tries to derive some knowledge on the matter from the precedents
or from opinions of scholars, one finds the former cover only the case
of conditions which on present standards almost certainly would have
given rise to care proceedings in relation to the child^^^ and that,
in the latter, opinions appear to be divided, some of them accepting
and some rejecting the application of article 281 in dispensing with
parental agreement. Thus, Spyridakis is of the opinion that "the
court is not fettered" if the parent, guardian or tutor abusively 
205denies consent. This view, however, contrasts the opinion of
Balis who argues that under no circumstances may the court dispense 
with any of the conditions required for a valid order?^^ Tousis, 
nevertheless inclines to the same opinion that abusive refusal by the
parent to agree does not allow the court to dispense with his
_ 207 agreement.
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G. Michaelidis-Nouaros, in a more detailed study on "The Meaning
of Functional Rights and their Zbuse",^^^ points out that every right
recognized by Greek Private law is subject to the control of article
281 of the Greek CLvil Obde. This general wording of this article
indicates that "droit discrétionnaires" are not recognised in 
209
Greek law. On the other hand in Greek precedents a distinction
is made between "concrete rights" and natural freedoms (droit indefinis)
the power of the courts being exercised only in relation to the 
210
former. The consent of the parent, therefore, because it is a
natural freedom according to the precedents escapes the control of the 
211
court. Natural freedoms, however, as Michaelidis Nouaros argues,
are not beyond any control but are submitted to the restrictions of 
article 919 of the Greek CLvil Gbde (Intentional cause of damage in 
a manner contravening the upright morality rendering the person liable 
to pay compensation.) Thus whenever a person exercises his natural 
freedom in a manner causing intentional damage to a third person and
212
contravening his moral obligations this act is prohibited as abusive.
However, considering the matter in the light of the developments 
introduced by the legislative decree 61C/ 1970 consent cannot be 
regarded as a genuine natural freedom. The L.D. sees adoption 
from a different perspective than the civil code. The purpose of 
adoption became a social one so that the prerogative of the parent to 
withhold consent underwent a substantial transformation. Under the 
civil code, the fitness of the parent in exercising parental rights 
and duties was immaterial to his right to provide or withhold agreement, 
This was so, primarily because adoption had the mere purpose of placing 
the child as the child of the applicant. Also the protection offered 
to the child was minimal since the court had only to be satisfied 
that the order would result to some benefit for the child and that
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213the legal conditions had been met. In this context the
decision of the parent to provide or withhold agreement prevails 
over all other considerations since the order lacks any social 
function of pervasive importance. Therefore this decision whether 
the child should remain his own or be given to someone else could 
not be otherwise than beyond any control.
The L.D., however, had introduced welfare tests in relation to the 
placement so that adoption should take place or be ordered by the 
court whenever the interests of the child require so. This, as has 
been argued earlier, is interlocked with the interests of the natural 
and adoptive parents. What remains therefore to be seen is whether 
it left unaffected the natural freedom of the parent to withhold 
agreement to adoption.
In the first place the characterization of parental agreement as a 
natural freedom even in relation to the previous law is unsatisfacory 
taking into account that its consequences have a direct bearing on 
a third person, the child, whose parent has the obligation to protect 
and promote his interests. Therefore, although it is justifiable 
for a contracting party to reject an offer and nobody can force him 
to enter into a contract, this is not similarly justifiable when his 
decision affects the interests of the child and has a social dimension.
Secondly, his agreement is not binding for the court. The court 
following the inquisitorial procedure has the discretion to award or 
to refuse to grant degree according to the conditions of article 2(1) 
of the L.D. Thus implicit control qualifying the functioning of 
parental agreement cannot be denied. To take the example of a 
parent who responds to his duties both materially and emotionally - it
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is unlikely for the court to give effect to his agreement under such 
circumstances by awarding an order to the applicants, which indicates 
that parental agreement is subject to the provisions of the law and 
to a qualifying control by the court.
Thirdly, according to the law, parental agreement is needed where 
there is some contact between parent and child or the animus of the 
parent-child relationship is extant. Thus, the court may dispense 
with parental agreement if the child is abandoned or of unknown 
parentage (11(a)), or because of the mental condition of the parent 
or some other reason why he cannot provide agreement (11(b)) and the 
interests of the child dictate that it be adopted. ALso the court 
may dispense with parental agreement if the parent abusively withholds 
his agreement while the child is committed to the care of a social 
institution. The court decides after considering the welfare of 
the child.
Gbmparing the aims of adoption, the characteristics of parental 
agreement and the grounds under which the court may dispense with it, 
one comes to the conclusion that parental agreement is not an uncontrolled 
natural freedom related to the person of the parent but a right deriving 
from a specific bond with the child. This bond can be identified 
in the parental relationship - a concept wider than that of parental 
authority referring to the existence of a family relationship recognised 
by law. As such, therefore, the right is interlocked with the family 
relationship - the latter overlapping the former. In consequence 
by accepting that rights and duties deriving from the parent-child 
relationship are subject to the control of article 281 the right of 
the parent to provide or withhold agreement, as being of the same 
nature, has to be identified within the same category. Furthermore,
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the strength of the right is limited within the boundaries of the
welfare of the child so that if the latter is at risk the parent may
be controlled in his decision to give or withhold agreement.
In support of this opinion one can recall the following
a) the right to give agreement is recognised to persons who, apart from 
being the parents of the child, are in a family relationship with 
the child (the mother, her husband, the father of a voluntarily 
acknowledged child or one that is so assimilated). It is not 
recognised to a father for whom paternity has been judicially 
established since that father is not in any proper family 
relationship with the child.
b) In consequence to the former the right of the parent is not a 
freedom recognised to the person of the parent as a result of the 
biological relationship, but in relation to a family relationship, 
legally regulated and of great social concern.
c) The preservation or not of that relationship is largely affected 
by the performance of the parent in his parental rights and duties. 
State intervention within the parent-child relationship justifies 
dispensing with parental agreement if the parent fails in his 
duties.
d) The parent does not correspond to his role in article 11 (a) and (b) 
of the L.D. while in 11(c) he fails to live up to his duties. 
Therefore the parental relationship is considered not to be 
preserved for the interests of the child if the parent by his 
conduct threatens the welfare of the child.
e) With the adoption order there is created a legal link in the 
interest of the child. The creation or not of that relationship 
depends on whether the parent exercises reasonably or unreasonably 
his right of agreement. Moreover, the order does not affect
380
the blood relationship especially in Greek law where rights and 
duties in relation to the natural family remain almost 
unaffected.
Having reached, therefore, the point that parental agreement is a 
functional right within the broad category of the rights and duties 
recognised in the parent-child relationship it is necessary to see 
whether submitting it to the control of article 281 strikes against 
the purpose of article 11, especially its part (c) of the L.D.
As Michaelidis Nouaros points out in relation to article 11(c)
"the legislature considered that it would be cruel and inhumane to
tear away a child who lives with its parents as a family unit, and to
give that child up for adoption against its parents' wishes ; that
is why the right of the court to substitute by its decree the consent
of the parents in the case of wilful refusal is only recognised by
the law when the child is no longer being brought up in the home of
its parents, but has been received by charity or foundation of social 
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assistance". Obviously such restrictive application leaves a
vacuum in the law which needs to be filled by applying the tests of
article 281. There are sound reasons for proposing this formula.
Not every child who lives with its parents constitutes a legally
acceptable unit and not every parent who withholds agreement does so
because of genuine feeling for the child. Such situations have been 
215revealed earlier and, though some of them may be dealt with on 
the grounds of part (a) of article 11, in certain other cases the 
court is left without power unless the child is submitted to 
institutional care. Such cases may arise in the instance of a 
particular placement, for instance because the child is submitted 
to the care of a third person by virtue of article 1524 of the Greek 
GLvil Gbde or in the instance of intervention in the relationship
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according to the condition of article 1524, provided the parent-child 
relationship is irretrievably damaged and the only possible alternative 
for his welfare is adoption. On the other hand to require the child 
first to undergo the experience of institutional care can hardly be 
accepted to be the true intention of the legislature since it exposes 
to undue risk the interests of the child. It should be accepted, 
therefore, that article 11 of the L.D. introduces special law intending 
to ease the position of the courts in specific circumstances where 
parental failure is clearly apparent and does not otherwise affect the 
regulations applicable to parental agreement requested under article 
1577 of the Greek GLvil Gbde^^^ in relation to article 2(1) of the 
L.D.
Accepting therefore that the right to agreement is a functional right,
what principles should apply in defining its abuse ? Adopting by analogy
those referred to by Michaelidis Nouaros in relation to the abuse of
functional rights the following should be recommended : The right in
itself like the others included in the parent child relationship must
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be considered as of "altruistic" nature created not for the sake
of any personal satisfaction of the bearer but, as a principle of 
social deontology, to serve purposes useful to the society and 
according to the intentions of the legislature (the overall function 
of the parent-child relationship) . T>b with every functional right 
of such broad nature, the bearer must have discretionary authority 
in exercising his rights, as for example with patria potestas, provided 
that he exercises the right in a manner in accord with the general 
and useful purposes.
Besides the discretion of the parent, however, stands his obligation 
to exercise the right. Thus, under circumstances where he would be
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expected to agree to the adoption, his refusal could be considered
as omission of duty and constitute "negative abuse of right". This
omission, in order to be abusive, need not necessarily arise from
fraud or negligence. Even in the absence of any offending conduct,
or where his acting is not legally blameworthy, his refusal could be
considered "objective abuse" if his conduct contravenes the purpose
of the law. In such cases the same remedies would apply as if
219
culpable conduct existed. However, it can be argued that alike
parental rights consent to adoption is not susceptible to detailed
control, the latter being permissible only in the event of serious
misconduct which affects or exposes to danger the health or morality 
220
of the child. But, insofar as abuse of authority is prohibited,
the acting of the parent is also open to control in determining this 
point, even though there is not serious misconduct. Thus, irrespective 
of the legality of the parental conduct it is permitted for the 
court to examine whether the performance of the parent of his duty 
deviates from the purpose upon which parental authority is founded.
Any decision, however, must be taken on account of all the circumstances 
of the case unless one act sufficiently signifies incompetency to 
perform in parental duties.
However, because in the application of this ground there appears 
the same dangers as in Scots law when parental agreement is dispensed 
with as unreasonably withheld, the method suggested there for 
assessing the circumstances should apply also for the present case.
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C H A P T E R  S E V E N
ADOPTION PROCEDURE AND RELATED ASPECTS
INTRODUCTION
The reduction of the amount of legal prescription concerning the 
qualifications for and conditions of adoption inevitably indicates 
the development of a more rigorous and sophisticated process for 
the adoption procedure to handle the manifold problems involved, 
starting with the initiative of placing the child for adoption and 
terminating with the after care needed for the order. A great deal
of attention, therefore, is expected to concentrate on the extra­
judicial procedures, in terms of administrative flexibility and of 
the monopoly of adoption agencies in making placements. But, the role 
of the courts, however, is by no means diminished. The court is 
legally required to be satisfied that adoption will be for the welfare 
of the child and to safeguard the rights and interests of all other 
parties involved. Thus the court may look fully at the merits of the 
application and check on the activities of the adoption agency. Its 
duty presumably will be to satisfy itself that the legal requirements 
have been complied with and that the adoption agencies were justified in 
formulating their recommendations.^
The motivating factor for paying considerable attention to the 
administrative part of the decision making process, according to Fisher 
lies in the fact that crucial decisions are taken in it so that much 
may depend upon the imagination shown at that stage. Thus, as he 
explains, the most significant decision is the decision as to the 
original placement and once the placement matures into an acceptable 
relationship between adoptive parents and child, it will become more
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difficult as the time passes to justify interfering with that 
relationship. The courts from their side have become increasingly 
sympathetic to such an argument, both in a contested application and where 
it is left entirely up to the court to decide whether an adoption order is 
for the welfare of the child. Md, as he states, that few applications
2
are refused reinforces the significance of the original placement decision.
In the following pages the law relating to the administrative part of the 
order will be examined in relation to each country, along with the role of 
the judicial authority in the adoption process. Thus, in the first place 
there will be examined the provisions for the adoption service in each 
country; second, relinquishment procedure; third, the procedure leading 
to the adoption order; fourth, the judicial process, fifth, the orders 
available to the court, and finally, the status conferred by the order.
A  EXTRA-JJ Dia AL ASPECTS CF THE ORDER
I. The Adoption Service
a. In Scotland
Part One of the Adoption (Scotland) Azt 1978 seeks to fulfil the need 
for a service comprehensive in scope and available throughout the 
country. Thus section 1 to achieve this objective requires every local 
authority to establish and maintain a service, or to ensure the existence 
of one in their area. This service should be comprised of child care 
services for the already adopted child, adoption placement service and 
assessment facilities, social work service to natural parents and after 
care for natural and adoptive parents. Also it is a duty of the local 
authority to secure the requisite facilities for the fulfilment of 
the above purposes or to ensure that those are provided by approved 
adoption agencies.^
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Nevertheless, it is required that this service should be provided
in conjunction with the authority':S other social service, in order
4
to achieve coordination and efficiency within the area.
The described service does not go as far as the Houghton Committee 
recommendations, which suggested, after receiving evidence of 
insufficiency or even lack of adoption service in certain areas,^ that 
the local authorities themselves should provide such a service as part 
of their general child care and family case work provision.^ However, 
it meets the recommendation that there should be a statutory duty on 
them to ensure, in cooperation with voluntary societies, that a
7
comprehensive adoption service is available throughout their area.
This service is entrusted with the decision as to the placement, 
which involves, in a preliminary form, all the aspects of the process. 
Thus, it comprises assessment of the needs of the child, choice of 
the most suitable applicants, securing of parental agreement and more 
important, assessment as to whether it is necessary to proceed for a 
placement in view of the background of the whole range of alternatives 
which may be open in a given set of circumstances. And it is not 
difficult to foresee that, with this complexity, to secure placement 
decisions of higher quality the decision must be taken by duly qualified 
persons. Not surprisingly, therefore, the Act imposes strict control 
over adoption agencies while nevertheless conferring upon them the 
administrative monopoly for arranging adoption placements.
Under the 1958 Act a voluntary adoption society had to register with 
the local authority. Control was not rigorous and the criteria 
simply envisaged the need of ensuring that the staff of the society 
was competent and numerically adequate, and that there was a committee 
responsible for the members, and controlling the activities of the
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society. These conditions were regarded by the Houghton Committee
as too narrow and,instead, they recommended centralization and a
tightening up of the registration system.9 In the view of the
Committee "there should be a phasing out of those voluntary adoption
societies which are unable or unwilling to provide a comprehensive
s e r v i c e . s i n c e  the concentration of administrative power in the
adoption service would involve considerable risk if not provided
with professional, economic and financial resources securing high
quality and standards in the s e r v i c e . H e n c e ,  instead of the
concept of registration the Act implements the concept of approval
under criteria of different character and administrative control over
the adoption agencies, aside from the judicial control which the court
12
may exercise over them as statutory bodies. The following matters,
it is suggested by the Committee, should require to be substantiated 
as a condition of registration
a) that the agency's programme would make an "effective contribution 
towards a comprehensive service";
b) that the resources of the agency are adequate in relation to its 
programme ; and
c) that the organization of the agency is "appropriate for the 
effective carrying out of the programme".
Those have been given effect in section 3 (3)-(5) of the 1978 Act.
Nevertheless, it is submitted that because those criteria require
not merely a factual investigation but also a functional analysis the
Secretary of State should be selected as the appropriate registering 
14authority, principally as this choice would most effectively achieve
high standards throughout the country and a "partnership between local
authorities and voluntary societies in planning a comprehensive 
15adoption service." On that basis the expectations are that the
quality of adoption services and their availability should thereby 
be improved and that, particularly by the integration of adoption
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services and other child welfare services, the problem of 'fchildren 
who wait" may be resolved-
The facilitating of a sophisticated adoption service naturally
presumes the aim of channelling placements through this service. Thus,
the Committee had suggested in their working paper that the law should
prohibit placements with adopters not related to the child and which
17had not been arranged through adoption agencies. In a similar fashion
they adhere to this suggestion in the report since different opinions
presented to them did not guarantee otherwise the quality of independent
p l a c e m e n t s . T h u s  they state that "Adoption is a matter of such
vital importance to the child (who is usually too young to have
any say in the matter) that society has a duty to ensure that the most
satisfactory placements are made. Society manifestly does not do so
19
while it is open to anybody to place the child for adoption". And as 
Fisher comments on this statement "This perfectly illustrates the use 
of the welfare of the child as the supreme justification for changing 
legal policy"
On this basis section 11 of the Act gives adoption agencies (i.e.
local authorities and approved adoption societies) a monopoly in
placing children for adoption except in cases where the proposed
adopter is a relative of the child. In addition, the section makes
it an offence for a person other than an adoption agency, i.e. doctors,
midwives, ministers, or even lawyers, to place a child with a person
not a relative or for a person not a relative to receive a child
21otherwise than through an adoption agency.
Given the aims of those recommendations and their statutory enactment 
the following conclusion would certainly seem justified. The
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contribution of the Act towards the concept of an administration-orientated 
process is remarkable not only for the expanded agency discretion at the 
point of placement and the extension of administrative control over the 
agencies themselves, but also for the provision of a comprehensive service 
capable of regulating any aspect of the procedure, and of assisting the 
court in reaching the best possible decision.
b. In Greece
In Greece, on the other hand, an adoption service in the form of a
specialized body able to offer a comprehensive service does not exist.
Problems that may appear at the time of placement or after the order are
dealt with by the departments of social work of the Ministry of Social
Services, or, if the child is in the care of an institution, by :the department
of social work of the institution. GCnsequently the original placement is
left unregulated nor does there exist restriction on independent placements.
Ai exception to be noted is when the child is in the care of an institution
in which case the institution may make the necessary arrangements and assess
the suitability of the applicants at an early stage. Even so, however,
the services offered to both natural and adoptive parents are restricted and
22
very rarely can those institutions maintain a close contact with them.
Provision is made on the other hand to regulate certain stages of the 
procedure by especially appointed bodies or by the departments of 
social service. Namely, once the placement is advanced and an applidation 
is intended to be made to the court, the applicant has to submit a 
prior application to one of the bodies appointed to "collaborate in 
adoptions" along with a report on his family and financial position. 
Qbllaborating bodies, as specified by article 1(1) of the Royal Decree 795/70, 
are the Cfentral Gbmmittee and the district departments of the Regional 
Social Services, as well as those in the province of the region of 
Attiki; also in respect to children received into their
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care are authorised the P.I.K.P.A.; the National Organization of care;
the infant centre "Mitera" with their district offices; and the public
infants asylums of Athens, Salonica and Patra. The same authorities
are entitled to collaborate in adoptions by foreigners, with the
exception that in the case of a regional social service the right
23
belongs only to the Central Office and not to the departments, as well
24
as to the Athens international social service.
On receiving the application the service has to appoint a social
worker, who will have to maintain contact with the applicants and
investigate and report on their circumstances to the department of the
25
social service or the central office (as the case may be) which
decides whether or not to supply the applicant with the required
certificate that investigation has been 'completed. The report of
the social workers along with the report on the findings of the committee
of the agency, on the other hand, remain confidential and are sent
directly to the City court, where the application is pending.
Since, however, the certificate supplied to the prospective adopter
27
is a qualifying document for the application, it implies that no 
adoption can be performed in Greece unless it is supervised and 
approved by an adoption agency, prior to the hearings. Nevertheless, 
as far as there is no provision for the recognition of private agencies, 
collaboration in the placement is with public services or publicly 
controlled institutions and herewith one can see a strong reason for 
classifying adoption among the measures operating within the scope of 
wider social policy.
The above mentioned bodies have also the duty to supervise the 
placement after an order is made and submit an annual report to the 
Mihistry of Justice and to the Ministry of Social Services about the 




In conclusion it can be said that the obvious drawback in the adoption 
service in Greece is that the adoption placement is unregulated. ' The 
involvement of the agency starts only from the moment of the 
application for the intended adoption so that there is no selectivity 
in the choice of parent. The agency, therefore, instead of having 
the responsibility of attracting the most suitable applicants in 
respect of the child has the passive role of supervising and approving 
or disa-proving placements in progress.
c. Prevention of trafficking of children in Scotland and Greece and 
the penal provisions of the Legislative Decree 610/1970.
In section 51(1) (2) of the 1978 Act and in Article 15 of the L.D.
provision is made to prevent the child from being the subject of an
illegal transaction. Thus, it is provided that it is an offence to
give or receive any payment or reward for or in consideration of the
adoption of a child made either by the prospective applicants, parents,
guardians or caring p e r s o n s . I n  Greek law, where the adoptive
parent has not the right to consent to adoption, there is a specific
prohibition on making arrangements for the further adoption by
31another person of his already adopted child. In both systems it
is also considered an offence to act as an intermediary in
arranging adoptions, especially when it is done in view of a payment
or reward. Similarly, it is an offence for theparent or guardian
to make any agreement with prospective adopter, after receiving payment
promising his consent to the child's adoption, or to transfer the care
32
and possession of the child with a view to adoption. Persons
that contravene these restrictions are liable in Scotland on a summary
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conviction to imprisonment for a period not exceeding 3 months or to
33a fine not exceeding £400, or both, while in Greece they may be
punished by imprisonment not exceeding two years and a fine up to
100,000 Drachmas (about £1,000). The Greek L.D. also provides for
more severe punishment (imprisonmeht not exceeding 3 years and a fine
up to 200,000 dr.) if the acts described above are done habitually 
34
or for profit.
It is also considered an offence for either parents or prospective
adopters to advertise their desire for adoption, or for anyone to advertise
35willingness to make adoption arrangements. Adoption agencies are
exempted from these restrictions?^ Persons who contravene the section
37
may be fined up to £400. In Greece a similar restriction exists in
the Press) Law*
The purpose of these restrictionsis to avoid any possibility of the
children being bought or sold, or of being put in the way of adoption
in the prospect of an illegal profit to their parents, guardians
or third parties?^ Bënind them, however, there lies the deeply rooted
opinion that the interests of the child are better served in the natural
family, and the provisions are intended to deter parents from giving
their children away, unless the welfare of the child so requires.
Particular emphasis is given to the restriction on the parent to
promise consent or to transfer the possession of the child when it
refers to the natural mother. It is well known that the latter is
vulnerable in many respects. In particular, the birth of the child
may have created problems, many of which have a financial aspect (lapse
or loss of employment, change of residence to avoid stigmatisation, etc).
Accordingly, the stimulus of financial assistance could work effectively
39
to overcome any hesitation in relation to the adoption.
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In the Greek L.D. special protection is also provided for adoptees
under 18, regarding their treatment by the adoptive parents, and the
right of the natural parents to have access to the child. First
it punishes with imprisonment not exceeding six months and/or a fine
of up to 100,000dr., the parent who uses the child in immoral tasks
40
or ones dangerous to his physical or moral health. Second,
the court has the discretion within the realm of a wider power,
at the adoption hearing or after, upon the petition of the adoptive
parent or the Public Attorney, to take away the right of access from
the natural parents, if it is of the opinion that contact with them
41
is harmful to the child. Furthermore it is within its power to take
any necessary measures designed to safeguard the physical and
42emotional health of the adoptee. Similar measures can be taken
against the adoptive parent if he contravenes article 15(1) of the
L.D. or has forfeited parental rights, and the court may even revoke
43
the order, if it is in the interest of the child.
In the Scots law, on the other hand, natural parents have no right of 
access to their children after adoption, but because the court is
empowered to include in its decision any terms and conditions that it
44 45
thinks fit, reasonable access may be ordered on their behalf.
Also conditions can be imposed on the adopters if the court thinks
46
necessary to order them to further safeguard the child.
II . FREEING THE CHILD FOR ADOPTION
Both laws provide a procedure for relinquishment of parental rights 
and duties, whereby agreement to adoption can be made final before 
the adoption application is heard. There is a concurrent investment 
of parental rights in the adoption agency. The purpose is to allow
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a reduction of the time needed for obtaining valid consent and to
47
secure the progress of the placement.
The legal reason that demanded the enactment of this procedure is 
that parental rights and duties,even after giving formal consent, remain 
in the person of the parent until the issuing of the adoption order, 
because the nature of the rights make it impossible to leave them in 
limbo. The parent could thus withdraw his agreement at any time up 
to the making of an adoption order. Moreover, the parent, when formally 
providing agreement, agrees to a particular placement, so that if it 
falls through, the agency cannot proceed with confidence to a new 
placement. The effects of this on adoption proceedings were 
considerable delays between first and second placement as well as 
many withdrawals of agreement, due to vacillation on the part of the 
natural parent. Accordingly, many children with prolonged 
institutional life suffered considerable harm being switched from 
placement to placement for those reasons. The agencies too, 
experiencing frustration from the disruption of their arrangements, 
became reluctant to place children if uncertain about parental agreement, 
and looked to a formula that could remove this insecurity.
Also, this interval causes a number of problems for both natural parents
and prospective adopters. Natural parents find the period leading up
to the adoption hearings an anxious one, as they are aware that they
have not yet made an irrevocable decision and consequently temporise
on whether to retain the child or not. The interval is particularly
difficult for single mothers who commonly ask for the final arrangements
to be brought forward. Similarly prospective adopters experience great
strain throughout the period leading up to the order, as they live with
the fear that the natural parent may withdraw his agreement before the
48date of the hearings.
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Accordingly, the Houghton Committee in Scotland and the Committee 
appointed by the Ministry of Justice in Greece, respectively, proposed 
separate procedures, to be held prior to the adoption hearings, at which 
the natural parent would relinquish his/her rights irrevocably in favour of 
an adoption agency.
a. Section 18 of the Adoption (Scotland) Act 1978 introduced to this effect,
makes provision for the transfer of parental rights on the request of
the parent and the agency, or the agency alone, if there is reason
for dispensing with parental agreement. The latter possibility is
designed to deal with children who have been in children's homes since
early infancy and would be placed for adoption if the parent was not
refusing agreement. Under the previous law this could only be achieved
by placing the child and then asking the court to dispense with
agreement on one of the statutory grounds. A frequent consequence
was either the mother attempting to remove the child or the court
49
refusing to dispense with agreement.
The application must be forwarded to a court of competent jurisdiction,
which must satisfy itself that each parent or guardian agrees fully
and unconditionally to the child being adopted. If not, the court
must decide whether his agreement can be dispensed with on one of the
grounds of section 16(2).^^ At least one parent will have to
consent ti; the application, unless the agency wants the court to dispense
with both parents' agreement. In this case they must have the child 
51
under their care, and placed with adoptive parents, or satisfy the
court that the child will be the subject of a placement in the near 
52future. Provided there is the consent of one parent, the
application is validly submitted, but, before making the freeing order 
the court must be satisfied that the other parent agrees to adoption
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or that his agreement should be dispensed with. This is also subject
to the condition that the child has been placed for adoption, because
it will be unjust to deprive the unwilling parent of all rights unless
adoption were virtually certain. But, nonetheless, as the purpose of
the provision is to enable the child to be free for adoption before
being placed, it is permissible for the court to consider the application
53if the placement is probable. It should be noted here, however,
that the chance of considering the placement as probable is greater 
if the consent of the other parent is given. The other parent is 
left alone to meet the child's needs in the short run in order to 
convince the court that by retaining the child this will serve his 
welfare according to section 6.
The section does not specify any time that should expire between
the issue of a freeing order and the adoption order, but makes provision
as in section 15, for effective consent to be provided once the child
54is no less than six weeks old. This does not debar from submitting
an application earlier but no formal agreement can be secured at 
55
that stage. As to the point of for how long the agency may retain
the rights if the child has not been placed for adoption, section 20 
permits the parent who had agreed to the adoption to apply for the 
resumption of rights under certain circumstances (infra).
The agency which, either alone or in cooperation with the natural 
parent, can initiate proceedings in the majority of the cases
will be the local authority applying in respect of a child who remains 
in a children's home. Nevertheless, it equally extends to cover 
cases where a voluntary organisation, which is an approved adoption 
society, is willing to apply to secure agreement for the adoption 
of a child boarded in their premises.
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The additional consent of the minor child is also preserved and no 
order can be made without the agreement of the child, if aged over 
sixteen. However, if the court is satisfied that the minor is
57
incapable of giving formal agreement it may dispense with this.
The parent or guardian who consented to the application must be asked
whether he wants further involvement in the child's f u t u r e . G i v e n
a negative answer the crdsr brings to an end the parent-child relationship,
On the other hand, when a declaration in favour of involvement is
59
submitted, sections 19 and 20 apply. These entitle the parent to
receive a report from the agency on the progress made towards the 
adoption of the child^^ and even to apply to resume parental rights 
and d u t i e s . H o w e v e r ,  it is open to the parent to submit a
62
declaration of non-involvement at any time after the freeing order.
The agency must serve a report to the parent who expressed the wish 
to be informed immediately after the adoption order or within the 14 
days subsequent to the expiration of a years time from the date that 
the freeing order was made, whether an adoption order has been made 
or, if not, whether the child has his home with a person with whom he 
is plhced for adoption. Provided that the child is not adopted 
within the first 12 months the agency has a duty to inform the former 
parents of any subsequent order that will occur as well as to serve 
notice on them whenever the child is placed for adoption or 
ceases to have his home with the person with whom it was placed for 
adoption.
Furthermore, a parent who did not make a declaration of non-involvement 
and whose consent has not been dispensed with is entitled to apply 
for revocation of the freeing order, if he wants to resume parental 
rights, stating the reasons why revocation would serve the interests
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of the c h i l d . T h e  application can be submitted at any time after
the first 12 months unless in the meantime the child is adopted or
placed with prospective a d o p t e r s . T h e  law, to secure that the
parent will be considered, prevents the placement of the child while
his application is p e n d i n g . I f  the freeing order is revoked,
parental rights and duties will revest in the former parent or guardian,
even though these have been assumed by the local authority or voluntary
organization prior to the order vesting them in the adoption agency.
The reversing order by-passes them and reinvests rights in the individual
or individuals from whom they have been taken in the first place.
The purpose of this provision is to ensure that no parent can bring a
reversal of the order returning the child to an institutionalised life
from which he could get it back whenever convenient for him. The parent,
when he applies, has to make sure that he offers the kind of home
and care for the child that will be looked at with favour by the court
The revocation order also revives any duty relating!to payments towards
6 9
the child's aliment that existed prior to the order. In general
however, any right or duty insofar as it is related to any period 
before the date of revocation, remain unaffected by the changes in 
the child's status.
When an application by a former parent is dismissed on the ground
that it is contrary to the welfare of the child, as specified in
section 5, the applicant is normally not qualified to make a new
application,^^ and the agency has no longer a duty to serve notice on 
71him. The court which dismissed the application has, nevertheless,
the right to give leave to the former parent or guardian to submit 
a further application if the child has not been adopted or ceased to 
live with the persons with whom he has been placed for adoption. This 
is subject to the condition that the court has been convinced that.
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due to change in the circumstances or for any other reason, allowing
72
the application serves the welfare of the child. One of the
anticipated dangers is that the child may not be adopted. Though this
is only theoretical with the present availability of adopters, the
law in the last resort has to involve reconsideration of the natural
parents in order to prevent any damage that may be caused if the child
73remains in the institution and in a long lasting legal limbo.
However, to restore rights to the natural parent has been seen as
achievable by the Committee, either by giving the court an unrestricted
discrétion, or a discretion subject to the proviso that restoration
will be for the welfare of the child, or by prescribing detailed
74circumstances of restoration. The second alternative thus is
adopted when the parent applies to resume the rights in the first 
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instance , whereas if the parent submits an application and a previous 
one has been rejected it is necessary in addition for the court to 
state explicitly the changes in the circumstances or other substantial 
reason that is in favour of the restoration. The latter, however, is 
of particular significance - if applied analogically - in assessing 
the circumstances and the conduct of the parent in agreeing to adoption 
becuase it is one of the few where the law presumes tests, of the nature 
and gravity required for awarding an adoption order, in respect of 
the natural parents.
Also as discussed earlier, in accordance with the policy of the 
Houghton Committee of involving putative fathers, provision is made 
in section 18(7) that no order may be made freeing the child for 
adoption, unless the court satisfies itself that any person claiming 
to be the father of an illegitimate child and who does not have custody 
either has no^intention of applying for custody or if he does, his 
application would be unlikely to s u c c e e d . O n  the recommended
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basis of relinquishment proceedings this right of the father is unchal­
lengeable, since his rights and duties will be terminated by the
77
relinquishment order in the same way as those of the mother. However, 
as said in the part dealing with parental agreement, neither the mother 
nor the court nor any other person, according to the meaning of this 
subsection, need positively seek the father to enable him to protect 
his rights if he does not draw any attention to them.
As regards the attention to be paid to the interests of the mother's 
husband, in the relinquishment procedure, when he is not the father 
of the child or when he disputes that fact, the matter has been discussed 
at length in the section dealing with parental agreement.
In relation to the above discussion it should be mentioned that the 
Act, by introducing this new concept in adoption law, secures a 
system where the particular placement and the natural parent-child 
relationship can be confronted by the court as two distinct questions.
This eliminates the problems observed in dealing with consent in view 
of a specific placement.
As Fisher points out this "division oftthe role of the courts into two
parts should direct the court's attention to the issues before the
court and at the same time define more precisely the functions of the
court compared with those of the other persons involved in the adoption
process. One consequence may be that the court will rely on the
supporting investigative processes where appropriate more than they
78
tend‘to do at the moment ...". And indeed one may foresee within 
this process the opening of the way towards a more detailed investigation 
and the formulation of objective standards on the suitability of the 
natural parents. Besides, the concept of relinquishment procedure
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comprehends any problem that is likely to appear in the circumstances. 
The period of twelve months is sufficient for arranging the placement. 
Moreover, it is appropriate to suspend the right of the parent to apply 
for the same period since during it no substantial change can be 
expected in the circumstances of the parent. Also, proper attention 
is paid to considering early the putative father and this should be 
exploited to an extensive degree. Finally, care is taken to revest 
the rights in a parent, who consented in the first place, if he offers 
a secure home for the child and in extreme cases even inadequate 
circumstances may be accepted when the further institutionalisation 
of the child seems more risky.
b. In Greek law, article 12(2) of the Legislative Decree 610/70 provides 
that agreement to the adoption of the child may be given in blank, so 
that the child can be placed with prospective parents of the choice 
of the agency and can be adopted without further involvement of the 
natural parents.
The measure applies to adoptions handled by the child welfare
authorities or by a recognised adoption agency for children "received
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by them for social assistance". The article does not specify
whether the child has to be boarded at the premises of the institution 
or has a more extensive meaning to cover the cases where the child 
has been entrusted to foster parents while the authority retains 
the legal custody of the child and supervises the placement. In the 
preparatory works it was suggested that emphasis should be placed on 
children abandoned on the premises or collected from the streets as a 
result of the parents' failure to meet their needs and awaiting 
adoption boarded in the institution.^^ Nonetheless, however, 
insofar as the letter of the law does not restrict application, the
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terms should be given the wider meaning to cover the case of a 
child committed to the care of a local authority due to parental 
failure to control him, especially when there are indications through 
a foster placement that the child is behaving well under the care of 
other people. The only drawback to this approach is that the court 
cannot dispense with parental agreement at that stage and, unless the 
parent cooperates, the measure cannot be applied. This is a problem 
because agreement secured in advance solves the problem of uncertainty 
in the placement. However, it is understandable in terms of the 
general approach preserved throughout the Legislative Decree in 
favour of the natural relationship. The legislator was reluctant to 
provide in advance intervention in the natural relationship without 
positive evidence that the relation is being left behind for the permanent 
interest of the child.
Moreover, proceedings can be initiated only by the welfare authority
in charge of the child. Neither the parent himself nor an adoption
agency which acts as a welfare investigator under article 9(1) of the
L.D. can submit an application. The application must be submitted
to a court of competent jurisdiction and a special session must be
arranged where the parent will provide his general and unconditional
agreement to the adoption of the child by persons of the choice of the
a g e n c y . T h i s  agreement is irrevocable and no right is preserved
82on behalf of the natural parent for further involvement. A general
requirement applying to any adoption order concerning a child for whom 
agreement has been secured in advance is the dual anonymity. Neither 
the adopters' nor the adoptee's identity should be revealed at any 
stage in the proceedings. To achieve this article 12(3) of the L.D. 
suggests the use of a pseudonym, while the real names of the litigants 
are kept in a secret register preserved to that effect in each 
City Court.
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The justifiable inference from the above procedure, is that it has 
a restricted scope and mainly aims for the benefit of the parents.
As such, then, it fails in many respects in relation to its counterpart 
in the Adoption (Scotland) Act 1978. No provision is made to meet 
subsequent change of circumstances by appointing in the last resort 
the natural parents to the care of the child nor is it at all prepared 
to meet, otherwise than by acknowledgement, a claim by the natural 
father. Also the procedure becomes operative only when the parents 
wish to cooperate and the child is in the care of an institution.
The latter prerequisite leaves open to the risks of forced third party 
placements a child whose mother is anxious to give it for adoption.
F inally, the procedure has the major defect of being irrevocable.
The child may not be adopted, in which case there is no provision to
end the institutional life of the child by reconsidering the natural
4- 84parents.
III. Procedure leading to the making of an adoption order
a. The child living with the adopter before the order is made
The length of time that the child has been in the care and supervision 
of the adopter(s) is listed among the matters subject to enquiry prior 
to the granting of an adoption. The condition aims to satisfy the 
court that sufficient opportunities were granted to see the child with 
the applicant or applicants, and that their home environment has been 
closely investigated by the adoption agency or by the local authority 
within whose area they have their home. That concern has been given 
a legal effect in Scotland, while in Greece only in the practice of 
some adoption agencies may there be given an opportunity for mutual 
adjustment between adopters and adoptee.
Section 13 of the Act sets the minimum period during which the child
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must have his home with the applicants. Namely if the child has been
placed by an adoption agency he must have lived with the prospective
adopter(s) for the 13 weeks preceding the hearing, save that the first
six weeks of the infant's life does not count. The same period is
necessary if the prospective adopter is the parent, step-parent or a
relative of the c h i l d . B u t ,  where the applicants are not relatives
of the child and the child has not been placed for adoption by an
adoption agency^ the child must be at least 12 months old and have
lived with the applicants or one of them for at least 12 months
87preceding the making of the order. This arrangement would apply
to relatively rare instances due to the prohibition of independent 
placements. It would apply when the foster parents want to adopt a
child fostered by them. Their application, however, is yet subject
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to section 53(1) of the Children Act 1975. Thus, the court may 
consider whether an award of custody would be more appropriate and, 
if so, should direct the application to be treated as one of custody.
The statute requires the child to "have his home with the adopter"
which is different from the wording of the 1958 Act, requiring "continuous
care and possession" of the child for the three months preceding the
hearing. The Houghton Committee doubted whether any change in the 
89
law was necessary but this was in fact required because short
interruptions in this period could lead to the refusal of the order.
The new wording is intended to make it easier for the courts to reach
90
reasonable decisions in difficult borderline situations. In fact
the wording of 1958 Act could not cope with the "lOBgumanus" care and 
possession but applied only to situations where the child adhered to 
the applicant continuously for the preceding three months. On the 
other hand, the present wording, though not entirely clear, could
hardly have been intended to make the test more restrictive than under
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the old law. A more relaxed formula seems to be intended and temporary 
absence is excused where the absence refers to a reasonable part of 
the probationary period, when the child is due to be returned to the 
applicant's home, and when he shows the appropriate concern expected 
from a person caring for a child while the child is away, (contact,
91visits in hospital, visits to the boarding school of the child, etc.).
A provision is made for the case of prospective married applicants
of whom one is away from home. In this case it is sufficient if the
child has his home with one of the adopters provided that the adoption
society or local authority has had sufficient opportunity to see the
child in the home environment and in 1he prasaice of the spouse who is 
92away.
The 19 weeks time of the caring period is provided for the father and
mother of the child, as well as for the relatives who intend to adopt 
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it. The natural father is not a parent but he is also included
94by virtue of section 65(1) which regards him as a relative. The
same applies to a step-parent. It is difficult, however, to determine
whether the husband of the natural mother is a step-parent and whether
he will continue to be referred to as such after the dissolution of
the marriage. For certain purposes of the Act (i.e. parental
agreement), the mother is regarded as parent but it is not clear whether
this should extend to this purpose because a natural mother is not a
mother in a proper civil sense. The definition of a step-parent
is otherwise certain enough and refers to the person that the pareht
remarries, whether the previous marriage has been dissolved by death 
95
or by divorce. However, in the context of the present law, the
natural mother is treated as the person exercising parental rights 
over the child and the idea is that a fairly wide meaning should be 
given to the term step-parent and that it should cover the man who
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has married the mother of an illegitimate child and who, now a 
widower, applies to adopt the child. Such a person is likely to
96have as close a relationship with the child as certain relatives.
However, such an adoption is against the policy established by the
Houghton Committee and is discouraged if a custody order could serve
97better the welfare of the child.
The Greek law has not specifically provided a probationary period to
precede any adoption placement. The matter has attracted some attention
98but little real interest was shown. The Committee proposed a
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probationary period of 4 to 6 months which was rejected by the 
Ministry of Justice on the grounds that neither were they manned by 
enough personnel to do the job nor did they expect that Greek prospective 
adopters would willingly cooperate with social w o r k e r s . T h e  
explanation^ however, fails to convince if one takes into account that 
the number of adoption orders in Greece are approximately 1,600 per 
annum of which a great deal concern placements with relatives where 
supervision is more relaxed- also that probationary supervision 
usually operates by visits of regular intervals which could be easily 
performed by the personnel of the regional social services and the 
independent foundations.
Another explanation given for the lack of probationary period is that 
in practice most adoptions involve institutionalized children and 
the various institutions have established a procedure for adjustment. 
Usually the adopting parent visits the child in the institution three 
or four times a week under the supervision of the social worker, who 
provides him with the necessary advice. Such procedure, for example, 
is followed by the infant centre "Mitera" for adoptions concerning 
one of the centre’s i n f a n t s , b u t  as Spinellis observes, neither the
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length of time nor the place guarantees the creation of a parent-child 
relation nor can a proper estimate be made by the agency as to the 
future of the placement if an order were granted.
In the present law, nevertheless, such a requirement can by 
implication be founded if one takes into account the conditions of 
article 9(1) of the L.D. 610/1970 and the purpose of the social 
investigation. The article requires investigation of the capability 
of the applicant to rear the child properly and on the possibility 
df the child adjusting to the family of the applicant. Such matters 
are to be investigated by a recognised social service and to be 
included in its report. The report is an essential prerequisite 
of the application. Therefore, it must be based on objective evidence 
and not be co loured by personal opinions. For the collection of 
any information regarding the above matters it is essential to have 
a testing period in which opinions can be formulated objectively.
b. Investigation and report by the local authority or agency:
In Scotland, in cases where placement was not made by an adoption agency,
the applicants are required to give the local authority within whose
area they have their home at least 3 months notice of their intention
104to apply for an adoption order. It is a duty of the local
authority after receiving the notice to investigate the matter and
submit a report to the c o u r t . P a r t i c u l a r l y  it must investigate
the suitability of the applicants and any other matter relevant to section 6
togeter wLti ' the reasons why the placement is not made by an adoption
a g e n c y . T h e  same duty is imposed on the adoption agency for
placements made by t h e m . A c c o r d i n g l y ,  the agency has the duty
to submit to the court a report on the suitability of the applicants
and any other material matters relevant to the operation of section 6
and shall assist the court in any manner the court may direct.
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This duty is first imposed on the agency or local authority by the
1978 Act. Prior to this they did report directly to the court but
109
investigation was done by the curator ad litem. The Houghton
Committee, in order to bring the courts close to the preliminary but 
also essential procedure, felt that the court ought to have a first 
hand account of the judgments and assessments made by the adoption 
agency, and that the agency should be responsible for completing the 
report for the court on the suitability of the applicants. A 
further advantage would be to save time in the procedure because under 
the 1958 Act in addition to the social worker afcting on behalf of 
the agency it was always necessary to appoint another one to act as
curator ad litem. Under the 1978 Act the appointment of the latter
became optional for specific cases which eliminates the need for
duplicate inquiries and reports as in the 1958 Act.^^^
In Greece, whereas early involvement of the agency is not provided for,
it is obligatory that an inquiry by a social worker is made as to the
suitability of the applicant, in order to assist the court in reaching 
112its decision. Such investigation must take place before any
proceedings. According to article 9(1) of the L.D. the petition for 
adoption is inadmissible unless it is accompanied by a certificate 
issued by an authorised social service certifying that a thorough 
social investigation by a trained social worker has been conducted on 
the following matters:
a) the personality of the applicant;
b) his health, morality, the family circumstances and financial 
situation;
c) the motives of the prospective parent and his qualification to rear 
the child adequately.
Moreover, the investigation must cover the likelihood of the child
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adjusting to the family of the applicant and any other matters from which
one might establish whether the adoption would be to the benefit of
the child. To perform these duties, the social worker is
facilitated by the right to apply to the various authorities to issue
113
the various certificates necessary for the adoption proceedings.
Applications submitted without a certificate that investigation was
carried out are according to the letter of article 9(1) inadmissible.
This wording caused a series of articles and contradictory decisions
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prior to the issue of the Royal Decree authorising agencies. Today,
however, the tenour is quite clear and it remains to be seen whether 
the court can accept an application if investigation has not been 
carried out or when the one carried out is incomplete.
In the introductory report of the L . D. 453^/ 1966 the vague explanation was given 
as "inadmissible"to have ihepurpose of preventing the court from 
entering discussion on the merits without any investigation having 
been carried out.^^^ In such a case, the court would need either to 
order an investigation itself or, if such had been carried out but 
was in its opinion incomplete or inadequate, to demand further inves­
tigation. As Kroustalakis points out, such application neither 
explicitly nor implicitly qualifies in the substantive law and 
nevertheless, according to the meaning qf the term "inadmissible" in 
the civil procedure and established practice the application must be 
r e j e c t e d . O n  the other hand, Beis has advanced the opinion that
"inadmissible" in article 9(1) is not the inadmissibility of procedural
117
formality but refers to the substantive law which opinion seems to be 
supported by the Introductory Report of the L.D. 610/1970.
Consequently, the meaning of inadmissible in article 9(1) is to 
protect the interests of the adoptee through a preventive control and.
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as such, though it operates as a procedural formality, refers to the
relation between adopter and adoptee. The matter therefore is
whether the cause of the law would be better served by rejecting
the application or^  if it is retained, by ordering an investigation.
As Beis explains the defect of the application debars the court from
entering the discussion on the merits, while, at the same time, it is
a defect visible and remedial in the short term. Thus, though in
principle it implies rejection of the application in order to provide
protection of the procedural act of the party, the short term
reraediability of the inadmissibility must not debar the defective 
119application. However, to this compromise opinion, which in
terms of child's welfare is adequate insofar as the court
does not' enter discussion on the merits, one should add that
the majority of cases of adoption in Greece concern either children with 
a disturbed family background or that of institutionalised life.^^^ 
Consequently, there is no merit in delaying matters on grounds of legal 
formalities, as far as there is a possibility for the social service 
to give the required report instead of waiting till the child becomes
the subject of a new application.
Spinellis, also, has advanced the thesis that when the application
concerns a child already adopted into the family, investigation is
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not in fact necessary. The decision 765/1969 of the city
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Court of Athens requiring investigation for the petitioner who 
was the wife of a man who had already adopted the child in question 
six years ago, gave rise to the assumption that it was. in fact, in the 
particular case, the court had not been overprotective because, apart 
from the fact that the first order had been granted in a period where 
investigation was not made much use of, the relationship of a parent 
is quite different from that of the step-parent. For the purpose of
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the present law the assumptions can by no means be made on the
particulars of article 9(1) that such parental rights can be vested
directly in a spouse without contravening the protective aims of the
article. For if any investigation had been carried out in respect
of the family, this would have concerned the spouse as a step parent
and not as a parent in whom rights should be vested. Besides, as the
rationale of the decision suggests, the adoption is a different
adoption, despite the fact that the child would be deemed as a child
123born to the adopters in lawful wedlock.
c. Restrictions on removing the child whose adoption is pending:
Section 27 of the Adoption (Scotland) Act 1978 provides that no parent
or guardian of the child is entitled to remove the child from the
custody of the person with whom the child has his home against that
person's will except with the leave of the court. The prohibition
stands while the application is pending and the parents or guardians
of the child have agreed to the making of an adoption order (whether
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or not they know the identity of the applicant); as well as
when an application for an order freeing the child for adoption is
pending and the child is in the care of the adoption agency which
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applied without the consent of the parent or guardian. A person
who contravenes either of these provisions is liable on conviction to 
three months imprisonment or a fine not exceeding £400 or both.^^^
Provision is also made in section 28 for restriction on the removal 
of the child where the applicant has provided a home for the child for 
five years or more. No one can remove this child against 1he will of 
the person caring for it given that an adoption application by him is 
pending, except with the leave of the court or by authority confirmed 
by any enactment, or on the arrest of the child. The same restriction 
exists when the person has notified the local authority of his
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intention to apply for an order in respect of the child cared for by
him. Thus, foster parents are protected from having their child
removed by the natural parents, by the local authority or by anyone,
from the time that they give notice to the local authority of their
intention to adopt up until the time of the hearing. However, if
they give notice to the local authority and they do not apply
within 3 months the protection ceases. They must go through the
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same procedure again but within 28 days.
The above provision also applies where the child was in the care of the 
local authority at the time when he first began to have his home with 
the applicants and remains in the care of the local authority, at the 
time of application. The authority cannot remove the child 
without the consent of the applicant or of the prospective adopter 
except in accordance with section 30 or 31 or with leave of a court. 
Subsection 3 does not apply however, where the removal of the child has 
been authorised in terms of part III of the Social Work  ^ Scotland)
Act 1968, by a justice of the peace or a Children's Hearing.
Section 28 is aimed partly at safeguarding the interests of foster
parents who decide to adopt, but mainly at those of the children who
would in most cases suffer if they were removed precipitantly from
the foster parents with whom they have had their home. It neither
confers additional rights on the foster parents nor introduces
preferential treatment at hearings where the application is dealt
with exclusively on its merits. As such, according to J. Terry^ it
does not represent a serious infringement of natural parents' rights,
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although the section has been opposed on this ground.
If a child is taken away in breach of sections 27 of 28, an authorised
412
court is empowered by virtue of section 29, on the application of the
foster parent, to order that the child should be returned to him.^^^
Similarly, if the person has reasonable grounds for believing that
another person intends to remove the foster child from his custody,
he may apply to the court for an interdict preventing the other person
131
from removing the child.
When the child has been placed for adoption by an adoption society
or local authority and an application is pending for adoption by the
caring person in respect of the child, the person may give a written
notice to the society or authority of his intention not to retain
132
the care and possession of the child. Similarly, the society
or authority may cause a notice to the caring person of their intention
not to allow the child to remain in his care and possession. But if
he has already made an application , the permission of the court is 
133
needed. By virtue of subsection (3) within 7 days after
notification either by the applicant or the adoption society of refusal
or withdrawal of the application, the person has has care of the child
must return the child to the society or authority. The court may, if
134
it thinks fit, any time before the period expires order an extension
135of care not exceeding 6 weeks. Persons Who contravene the
provisions of section 30 are guilty of an offence and liable on 
summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 months 
or to a fine not exceeding £400 or both, and the court may order return 
of the child to his parent or guardian.
Moreover, section 31, in respect of a child under the care of a local 
authority, who has been placed without a view to adoption, provides 
that if the caring person gives notice in pursuance of section 22(1) 
to the authority of his intention to apply for an adoption order
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in respect to that child, section 3091) shall apply, with the exception
that where the application is refused or withdrawn, the child need not
be returned to the local authority in whose care he is unless that
137authority so requires. The subsection (2) also suspends the
right of the local authority to claim the child back other than in 
pursuance of section 30 after the notice is given and until the 
application for an adoption order has been made and disposed of. Sub­
section (3) also provides that while the child is assumed in the care 
and possession of the person by whom the notice is given, persons 
liable under section 78 of the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968 to 
make contributions in respect of the child shall cease of their
obligations unless 12 weeks have elapsed since the giving of the notice
without application being made or the application has been refused by 
the court or withdrawn. The notice automatically stops any 
obligation but if the application is refused, withdrawn or not 
submitted within 12 weeks the obligation automatically revives.
d. Protected children:
The purpose of the notice to the local authority is to ensure the
proper supervision of c h i l d r e n , a n d  from then on the child
becomes a protected child, while he has his home with that person.
The child is not protected, however, by reason of such notice while
he is in care of any person or any school, home or institution as
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mentioned in section 2(3) of the Children Act 1958, while resident
140
in an establishment provided for persons suffering from mental disorder,
or he is liable to be detained or subject to guardianship under
141
section 23 of the Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1960.
The child ceases to be deemed as protected on lapse or withdrawal 
of the a p p l i c a t i o n , o r  if it is granted or otherwise determined.
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Similarly, protection ceases if the child has been the subject of a
144
custody or guardianship order or attained the age of 18 years.
The point of the protection is to secure the well-being of the
prospective adoptee. The local authority, from the time that the
notice is received^must maintain visits by its officers who "must
satisfy themselves as to the well-being of the children" and provide
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any appropriate advice as to the care and maintenance of the child.
A sheriff, and in an emergency a justice of the peace, may order
the child's removal to a place of safety if the child is kept or if
it is to be received by an unfit person or in premises and an
environment detrimental to the child. The Act imposes a duty to place
the child in safety until other arrangements can be made or until
146
it is given back to a parent, relative or guardian. However, in
147
any case where practicable they must inform the parent or guardian.
e . Notice of the hearing :
Provision is made in both jurisdictions to serve notice to any parent 
or guardian whose rights would be in any way affected by the adoption 
order. Thus in Scotland the 1978 Act makes provision for the 
introduction, by z^ ct of sederunt, of a duty in an application for 
adoption;, or in an application for an order freeing the child for 
adoption, to inform every person who can be found and whose agreement 
or consent to the making of the order is required to be given or 
dispensed with, of the date and place of the h e a r i n g . T h e  purpose 
of the notification is to inform him where he may be heard on the 
application of the fact that he need not attend the hearing unless he 
wishes, or if the court orders so.
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Under the present law there is a duty imposed upon the petitioner 
to inform the following persons
a) any person or body having parental rights or the custody
and care of the child;
b) any person who by virtue of an order or agreement is liable to
contribute to the maintenance of the child;
c) the local authority specified in his application;
d) the local authority or agency who took part in the arrangements;
149
e) any other person or body that the court requires.
In Greek law, a similar duty is imposed on the applicant^^^ to notify
by legal document any person who, in his opinion, has a legitimate
interest in having notice of the matter. The notified person has the
151right to intervene in the hearing. Notification has an important
role in relation to the force of the final judgement because the
decision is not otherwise enforceable against him if he is related to
either the petitioner or the child, as a parent or child or having 
152patria potestas. Against third parties not involved in the
hearing the decision proves the adoption but it is not binding as
regards its validity. Such third parties, if they have a legitimate
153
interest’,' may complain against its validity. In the decision of
A.P. 228/196^^^ however, it was provided that such legitimate
interest belongs to all persons having a personal, family or
succession right offended by adoption. This defines the range of
155 156
persons that must be notified, as follows : parents, guardians
157
of the child, children of the applicant, the spouse of the
158 159applicant, an agency assuming parental rights over the child,
persons having actual c u s t o d y , a n d  the illegitimate father who
voluntarily or full judicially admitted paternity.
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O THE ROLE OF THE COURT
here agreement between the parties concerned is not sufficient to give 
legal force to any placement unless approved in both legal systems by 
a judicial authority. The role of the courts in the present law 
is to make an order, on an application by the prospective adopters 
and following on a report by the local authority or social service, 
if it thinks that all legal requirements have been met and that the 
order will operate to the child's benefit. In this prospect the 
function of the court is not confined to the mere control of formalities 
but rather tends to the wider objective of the protection of the welfare 
of the prospective adoptee.
The involvement of the judicial authority may appear as a tiresome 
formality in Scots law when most of the important decisions and safe­
guards - as described above - operate long before the hearing, but 
the law is always likely,as Hoggett points out, to require a formal 
order to make such a drastic change in status, affecting not only the 
parties but their families and indeed anyone who comes into contact with 
them.^^^ In Greek law on the other hand, where pre-court procedure 
is less extensive, the onus of any decision is exclusively with the 
court.
I . Cbmpetent Gburts
Courts authorised to receive applications for adoption in Scotland are, 
according to section 56 of the Adoption (Scotland) Act, 1978 the Court 
of Session and the Sheriff court of the sheriffdom where the child 
resides. Both have jurisdiction for applications concerning children 
residing in Scotland, whereas for a child who lives abroad or if the 
application concerns a Convention Adoption Order the application must 
be submitted to the Court of S e s s i o n . H o w e v e r ,  if the petitioner
417
applies for a return of a child taken away in breach of section 27 or 
28, the authorised court is the one in which an application for 
adoption is pending^and in any other case the Court of Session or the 
Sheriff court in the residence of the applicant.165
The Houghton Committee in its recommendation suggested the retention 
of the concurrent jurisdiction of the two courts with the exception 
that adoption proceedings should be transferred from the Inner to the 
Outer House of the Court of S e s s i o n . T h i s  proposal had the 
approval of lawyers and social workers since there was no reason to 
reserve adoption for the Inner House as far as divorce, custody and 
separation actions were dealt with in the Outer House. Further 
since appeal jurisdiction in adoption matters anyway lies with the 
Inner House, it seems inappropriate that jurisdiction of first instance 
- no matter how frequent the cases - should also lie there.
Another recommendation concerning the courts related to the appointment 
of expert assessors to assist in weighing up evidence, especially 
with medical questions. Legal opinion in Scotland was against 
the suggestion as diminishing the role of the courts. On the other hand, 
social work practioners wore generally in favour of the proposal, 
which reflected existing discussion between them and the courts
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regarding the evaluation of medical and other special evidence.
The committee anticipated that such assessors would be carefully selected
after consulting professional bodies and would be publicly funded,
to offer an unrestricted type of expertise to assist the courts with
any type of problem, which rather points to a change in the balance of
functions between judicial and non-judicial bodies than restricting
170
the power of the court.
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As regards the hearings, previously applications for adoption were
usually heard in private, although this constituted an exception under 
171the 1958 Act. Under the present Act, the rule is that hearings though
discretionary, whenever held, shall be heard and determined in private
172
unless the court otherwise directs. The section ensures that
proceedings should be in private, both in the case of applications 
for adoption and of applications to free a child for adoption as 
well as in hearings concerning the return of a child taken away in 
breach of sections 27 or 28 of the Act.
Presence of the petitioner and the child according to the letter of
section 10 of the Act of Sederunt 1959 appears not to be compulsory.
However, the court may refuse to pronounce an order if they are not
173in personal attendance. On some occasions it may be necessary
for the court to interview the petitioner and the child or either of 
them privately and in such cases their absence may cause unreasonable 
delay. It is also at the discretion of the court to direct persons 
or bodies notified, to attend and be privately interviewed.
In Greece the adoption hearings are subject to the non-contentious
175jurisdiction of the -CLty Court and an application may be
submitted to the court of the area where either the applicant or the 
child resides.
The courts have the discretion to appoint one or more professional
experts, if they are of the opinion that special knowledge for a
177
particular question is required. Moreover, it is obligatory for
them to appoint expert assessors on the request of either of the
litigants provided that it is sufficiently argued in the petition
178
that special knowledge is required.
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Hearings in relation to adoption are heard in public as are any
proceedings before the Magistrates' Court. However, if the court
foresees any danger arising from the public nature of the proceedings
it is empowered to take any appropriate steps, i.e. to order the
application to be heard in camera, to safeguard the interests of the
179child and the parties involved.
As regards the presence of the litigants, this is obligatory in any
adoption hearings to enable the court to formulate a personal opinion
on the merits of the case.^^^ This arrangement is the result of
the lack of comprehensive service in Greece which shifts the entire
responsibility of assessment to the courts. Thus, although article
1578 of the Greek civil code is still applicable, the Legislative Decree
widens judicial flexibility so as to empower the court to be involved
in any question arising out of the h e a r i n g s . C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  the
presence of the petitioner required by article 1576 of the Greek civil
code has been reinstated in the same manner and in the present law.
This article provides that the "adoption is performed by a judicial
decision, the adopter being present and consenting". According to
the letter of the law, therefore, the applicant cannot be represented 
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by his attorney nor by any person having power of attorney. Also
this implies that the application itself does not presume consent and
that he has to consent formally before the court. However, since the
nature of this consent is to express his wish to acquire parental
rights and to serve the welfare of the child it may be given before
an authorised court or a rapporteur judge if necessary in a separate 
183
hearing. The presence of the adoptive child is not necessary
unless he is a minor aged over 16 when by virtue of article 1577 of the 
Greek civil code he must be present and give his agreement to adoption.
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II. Curator ad Litem and Reporting Officer and their role in the 
investigation by the court.
In Scotland the office of the curator ad litem arose from a need 
for impartial justice. The interests of the child, during the hearings 
becomes of "none's interest" since the parents may be determined to 
interpret his interest according to their own views. At the same 
time the court could not be the defender of the child's interests 
without ceasing to be impartial. The problem was thus resolved in 
the 1958 Act by appointing a third person to act as a curator ad 
litem with the duty to investigate and report on all circumstances
relevant to the application and safeguard the interests of the child
 ^ 184
before the court.
The 1978 Act, however, following the recommendations of the Houghton 
Committee, partly abandoned earlier practice, providing for the 
separate appointment of a curator ad litem and a reporting officer.
This innovation resulted in a significant change in the office of 
the former since a considerable number of administrative aspects 
of the procedure were transferred to the latter. Thus, under the 
1978 Act the curator ad litem retains his main duties as regards 
the protection of the interests of the adoptive child and he is 
bound to exercise them in a manner prescribed by rules of procedure. 
However, the Committee envisaged the appointment as no longer 
mandatory. The court should have the discretion to appoint a 
person to the office in instances where further investigation is 
n e e d e d . T h e  Act gives effect to this recommendation by providing 
that rules shall provide for the appointment of a curator ad litem 
in such cases as the rules may prescribe in adoption hearings as 
well as in applications to free the child for a d o p t i o n . T h e  
enactment to follow this section must specify the cases where the 
court exercising discretionary power may appoint him and the
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188necessary qualifications for the appointment. This has been
seen as imposing an additional obligation on the court to consider
whether the circumstances of the case warrant such an appointment,
which may make the decision to have a report from the curator more
meaningful and effective. And in relation to this it is pointed
out that the decision will cease to be a purely formal one since
"the attention of the court will have to be directed towards a
consideration of at least some basic issues" and may be forced
"to consider in greater depth the social and sociological implications 
189
of its functions.
A corollary of the shift of attention from legal to sociological
questions in the process was the recommendation that preference
must be given to social workers, "because lawyers are able to
satisfy themselves as to the legal aspects of the case, but are not
190generally equipped to make social assessments". The lawyers,
however, should continue to play an important role in the procedure, 
even although it may be susceptible of subtle changes, for the procedure 
remains with the courts and a number of legal questions in respect 
of rights and duties has to be answered.
The new concept in adoption law however, is found in the role of
the Reporting Officer. The office in many respects resembles
the office of the Reporter in the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968
and his duties are described to include supervision and report on
matters mainly concerning the dissolution of the natural relationship.
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In the Act it is provided that rules should prescribe his duties,
but as the Houghton Committee envisaged the office of the court
192
would have the obligation to appoint a social worker, in the 
relinquishment procedure as well as in applications for a specific
422
adoption, with the duty to report whether the parent had in fact
freely come to his decision after a consideration of the alternatives 
193
and implications. The appointment should be made after the
court had received a report by the agency or the local authority on
what steps have been taken to help the parent to reach his
decision. The duty of the officer then is to interview the mother
and the agency to ascertain whether agreement is freely provided,
and to witness the signing of the consenting document. Moreover,
the Reporting officer must inform the parent of the date and time
of the hearing and inquire whether he wishes to attend. If the
parent is unwilling to be present at the hearing, the officer has
to forward a notice to the court accordingly, signed by the parent.
The notice, however, does not have formal effect on his right to be
present and he may attend the hearings if he subsequently changes 
194
his mind. The need for facilitating this procedure arose
from the fact that many parents,.e.g. unmarried mothers, feel it
particularly depressing to follow the proceedings step by step.
Thus, due to the lack of a separate procedure many parents hesitated
to appear in court and give agreement, which cancelled a number of 
195
placements. The officer, after completing the enquiries, should
submit a report to the court and be present at the hearings. His 
presence is compulsory in the experimental period with the view
that at a later stage it might be left to the discretion of the
 ^ 196 
court.
The curator ad litem and the Reporting officer require to be
appointed independently of the adoption agency which placed the child
197
or made the application in section 18. They may be the same
person if the court thinks it appropriate, appointed from the
198staff of the panel of persons available to the court. In any
423
case, a Reporting officer may be appointed before the application
is made, provided that the court received the necessary notice, but
not before the statutory six week period has elapsed from the 
199
child's birth.
In Greece on the request of either party an exclusively defending
role is recognised for the public attorney to protect the interests
of the child but his involvement is not mandatory. However, by
virtue of article 1603 (2) of the Greek civil code the public
attorney on such request may appoint a temporary guardian to
represent the interests of the child in an instant action if they
are in conflict with those of the parent or guardian. The duties
of the appointed guardian are specified in the appointing deed.^^^
Moreover, it is left to the discretion of the court to secure consent
in a separate session or by appointing a judge rapporteur with the
duty of witnessing parental agreement and the conditions under
201
which agreement is provided.
III. Concluding remarks on the role of the Court
Obviously fears, whenever expressed, concerning a diminishing of the
role of the court by reason of the extensive involvement of the adoption
agency and social workers seem to have no proper foundation. In both
countries, the court remains the master of the entire process since
adoption is performed by a court order and the role of the administrative
202
bodies remains more or less that of assistants of the court.
The courts look fully at the merits of the case and then come to an 
independent decision or endorse the views of the administrative bodies 
involved’. An argument, however, that can be sustained in respect of 
the discretion of the court is that it cannot function properly in
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this power because the degree of judicial awareness that can be achieved
over details of the various stages of the process is inadequate. As Louis
Blon-Cooper foresaw there is insufficient judicial control over the
various stages of the adoption process which keeps the court unaware of
203
many important details. Maybe this defect is partly compensated
for by the fact that the placement is carefully regulated and supported
by a complicated administrative system. This is true to a great extent
for Scotland but not for Greece where critical stages are left out with
the involvement of the agency. Thus as Blom- Cooper points out, if the
courts were to perform any real function in ensuring the protection of
the child and of guaranteeing parental rights, the moment immediately
prior to placement is the point at which judicial power should be
e x e r c i s e d . I n  fact, this could be of great assistance in ensuring
that valid agreement is given or dispensed with prior to placement and
in declaring it given, so that the placement will not depend on the
parents. It could be more important in ensuring close observation of
the various stages of the placement. Similar views are shared by sir Roger
Ormrod, who observes that the courts are wholly dependent on what they
are told by the parents or the social worker. They are incapable of
carrying out any action except in the last resort to make orders and
enforce them. Such modifications, if practicable, would relieve the
courts of their overtly authoritarian character in their role as sole
deciders on adoptions, providing them with a more dynamic involvement,
and, on the other hand, resolve many problems of uncertainty in 
205the proceedings. Maybe such suggestions will alter radically the
role of the court and may confuse administrative with judicial processes 
but there is sufficient reason for considering more active involvement 
of the court if the final word is to be left with them.
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D. THE ORDER
If the court is satisfied that the legal requirements are met with and
that the adoption will be for the welfare of the child it may award
an order in favour of the applicant. Nevertheless the court may refuse
the application, or in Scotland make an interim order or award custody
to the applicants depending on the circumstances. The legal
nature of this order has been a matter of some dispute in the past. The
theories advanced varied in regarding adoption as a contract ratified
by the c o u r t , a s  an order of mixed nature in which the contractual
207
and judicial elements co-exist, or as an act with pure judicial 
208character.
I. The nature of the order and its legal consequences
In the Scots law, the decisive role of the court was recognised from
the very beginning and in the present Act, by virtue of section 12(1),
adoption is created via an order made by an authorised court on the
application of the adopters, producing a prospective vesting of parental
209rights and duties in them. On the other hand, in Greece the matter
is still the subject of dispute, despite the fact that article 1576
of the Greek civil code states that "the adoption is performed with a
court decision ...". The prevailing theory was on behalf of the mixed
nature accepting that adoption is a contract in which, however, the
judicial order prevails, belonging to the "broader category of family
law contracts " like m a r r i a g e . A  recent issue of court decisions
on the other hand abandoned this theory and advanced the approach
211
recognised in Scotland. The decision 228/1964 of Arios Pagos 
provided that the decision of the court has the creative character of a
new relation, and the decisions 1545/1972 of the Appeal Court of
2X2 21xAthens, and 695/1970 of Arios Pagos accepts that in adoption
214
orders the judicial character predominates. These decisions reinstate
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the actual spirit of the articles 1576 to 1978 of the civil code requiring
the judicial authority to handle the entire process and determine with
its power the very validity of actions of the parties involved. This
is clearly implied by article 1578 as reformed by article 2(1) of the L.D.
610/1970, which states that the court authorises the adoption after
seeing that the legal requirements are met and after examining whether
215
the order will be for the interests of the child.
The recognition of the order as judicial act has the consequences that when 
it becomes final it can be reduced only on restricted grounds with 
reference to parental agreement and the eligibility of the applicant.
In the first place it became obvious in the discussion about parental 
agreement that this agreement is not consent in its contractual sense 
giving approval to the adoption of the child, but an agreement provided 
by a person who exercises parental rights or being a paren^ forwarded 
to the court and indicating whether he wishes to retain or discharge 
his rights and duties. This, however, is not binding for the court 
which may dispense with consent, or refuse to award an order despite 
the fact that agreement is supplied. Therefore, adoption cannot be 
reduced on the ground of essential error, misrepresentation, fraud, 
ignorance or mistake on an applicant's identity, or because he gives his 
agreement on the belief that the applicant had certain qualifications.
Secondly, as regards the statutory prerequisites for adoption, the
position is not entirely clear because if the decision of the court can
remedy non-compliance with the conditions, this strikes at the very
validity of the law. Furthermore, it is not considered as satisfactory
to try to solve the problem by reference to the welfare of the child.
The application of this test would make any order conditional and it
217
could be set aside when the child's interest requires so.
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Therefore minor irregularities concerning the place of residence or
that the child had his home with the applicants for a shorter period
than that required can hardly have been intended to carry the sanction
of nullity. On the other hand adoption of àn adult or married person
should be liable to reduction. Also adoption awarded to minors
218concerning their illegitimate children.
As regards Greece, the distinction'is drawn between subjective
prerequisites and constructive conditions of adoption. Non compliance
with constructive conditions like the contractual capacity of the 
219
adopter the eligible age, childlessness, age difference between
220adopter and adoptee renders the adoption voidable. Therefore,
parties not notified to attend the hearings having a lawful interest of
a family nature, can submit a petition to that effect. On the other
hand, subjective prerequisites as the impediment of the ward,
lack of the consent of the spouse, according to the prevailing
221opinion provide relative voidability. Thus, the parent, the spouse or
the ward may submit a petition requiring annulment of the order if they
have not been notified of or attended hearings. The purpose of these
provisions is to safeguard the interests of the above persons and,
222
therefore, they have an exclusive right to bring the petition.
II. Where an adoption order is refused
In the case that the court had refused to award an order, the child has
to be returned to the adoption agency in Scotland within the prescribed
223limits of seven days and to the caring institution in Greece as
soon as it is practicable. When in Scotland an agency is not involved,
if the application concerns a child under 15, by virtue of section 26,
the court may, on refusing to make an adoption order, make a supervision
223aorder to the local authority or a care order where exceptional
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circumstances make this desirable for the child not to be entrusted
224
to the parents or to any other individual. For both cases
a special provision is made empowering the court to order alimentary
payments by the parent to the local authority in respect of the child
225
of an amount that the court thinks reasonable.
Ill. Interim order
When the child is free for adoption and the order still stands, or when
the court is satisfied that the parent agrees to the child's adoption
or there are grounds for dispensing with his agreement, and the applicant
had duly notified the local authority of his intention to adopt the child
the court may defer making a full adoption order and "make an order
vesting the custody of the child in the applicants for a probationary period
not exceeding two years upon such terms for the aliment of the child
and otherwise as the court thinks fit".^^^ Such an order can be
extended, if it is for less than 2 years, byi.a further order but the
227duration of both should not exceed 2 years in all.
The purpose of the interim order is to enable the adopter to act for a
probationary period sufficient to enable the court to make up its mind
228
on the rightness of the placement.
The order has been used, as well, in cases where it appears to the 
court to be uncertain whether an order is appropriate in the interests 
of the child or in whether he should be returned to his parents. The 
measure is open to criticism in that it leaves considerable doubt as to
the child's future while at the same time the child becomes accustomed
to a family and a way of life. The Houghton Committee was very reluctant
in suggesting the use of the measure and expressed the hope that their
recommendations on improving the agency standards, the banning of 
independent placements with non relatives and the alternative of
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guardianship for step-parents and relatives, would greatly reduce the need
229for interim orders. However, because the order is a forerunner
of an adoption order such an order can only be made by the court having
jurisdiction for the adoption provided that they are satisfied as to
230
the conditions concerning the eligibility of the applicant. The
intention of the legislator appears that the provision should by no 
means be used to secure care and possession by the applicant when 
fulfillment of certain conditions is a problem of time.
The court may impose a variety of terms or conditions. They may give
a right to access to the biological parent or sustain his obligation
4 - 2 3 1  to aliment.
By virtue of Section 30(4) where the period specified in an interim
order expires without an adoption order having been made in respect
of the child the application must be treated as refused at the expiration
of the period and the child must be returned within seven days to the
232agency or authority. An extension of this period is possible not
233exceeding six weeks but thercourts must refuse an extension if
the order was not made because of failure to meet the welfare 
requirements.
As an alternative suggested instead of the interim order is the
234
adjournment of the proceedings However, it was felt that over this
course the interim order presents advantages in the sense that the
agency or the authority will remain in contact with the adoptive home
during the period of the order which will enable them to form an opinion
on the matters that have diverted the application into an interim order
235
as well as to make further investigations on the welfare of the child. 
Particular attention then must be paid to the terms and conditions 
imposed by the court if those are imposed as a test or to obtain further
430
information on the suitability of the applicant. Nevertheless, 
it was found that such an order would prevent unsuitable natural 
parents from removing the child during the currency of the order.
IV. Revocation of an adoption order
An order in Scotland is generally irrevocable and the Act does not
specify any grounds for that purpose. The only exception appears in
section 46 where the revocation of the order is permitted on legitimation
of the child. Thus the court which made an adoption order may revoke that
order on the request of any of the parties concerned, in the instant
of a marriage of the parents of an illegitimate child if that child is
237
the subgect of an adoption order by the one parent alone. The
same is provided in respect of a child who is adopted by his father
238or mother alone under a regulated adoption order if that child has
been legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his parents. Jurisdiction
239
in this case is recognised to the Court'of Session.
In Greece on the other hand the adoption order may be terminated by a
court decision on a variety of grounds. Namely on the request of the
adopter, the adoptive child, his natural parent, and the public
attorney, the court may revoke the order if there is any reason justifying
disinheritance, danger to the child's welfare, or ingratitude towards
the a d o p t e r . B e s i d e s  it is recognised as an ipso jure dissolution
of adoption if a marriage has been celebrated between adopter and
241
adoptee in violation of the relevant impediment.
Specifically the grounds for the revocation of the order as provided in 
the civil code permit the dissolution of the order for an offence 
committed against the adopter or the adoptee by the other party if the 
act itself justifies disinheritance. Or it may be requested by the
431
adoptive parent if an act is committed showing ingratitutde of the
242adoptee towards the adopter. Disinheritance is a conception of
succession law and should be understood here in the narrow sense of
the term which means the exclusion of the person who would otherwise
be entitled to his legal share of the estate of the testator. The
aforesaid right is based on the nearest blood relationship and the moral
243
family which unite the heir with the testator. Since the latter
constitutes the foundations of adoption the court is allowed to revoke
the order if the family ties "suffer an irreparable blow as a consequence
of a grave offence" committed by either party, because further
244
coexistence between those persons has become intolerable. The
grounds on which either the adopter or the adoptee can demand through 
his action the dissolution of the adoption by reason that disinheritance 
is justified are the following
a) if either of them makes an attempt against the life of the other,
his spouse or the descendants,
b) if either of them is found guilty of felony or a grave misdemeanor
'by intention towards the other or to the others spouse;
c) if either violates maliciously his legal obligation to maintain the 
other;
d) if the adoptee leads a dishonest or immoral life contrary to the 
desires of the adopter or
245
e) causes physical injury to the adopter and his wife.
The two latter grounds are settled only in favour of the adopter and 
emerge from the fact that the parent whether natural or adoptive is 
in a more "advantageous social position than the child, enjoying 
greater respect and esteem from society, and his deeds are regarded
246
to be characterized mainly by freedom of action and common sense." 
However, irrespective of whether such allowances could be permitted 
inra natural relationship, in adoption where the relationship is more
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critical this freedom of the parent may prove to be risky for the 
child.
The ground of ingratitude, first introduced in article 1587 of the
247
Greek civil code by article 20 of the L.D.4532/1966 further
deteriorates this unbalanced situation by creating one more privilege in
favour of the adopter. According to this ground the adopter can
demand the dissolution of adoption if there exists a grave fault of
the adoptée, which according to the provisions of article 505 of the
Greek civil code constitutes a reason of i n g r a t i t u d e . T h e  gravity
of the fault is left to the free discretion of the judge and it is
his prerogative to decide in each case whether there is ingratitude
in the legal sense after taking into consideration the life standards
249
and the moral concepts involved in the case. However, the essential
element incorporated in the ground is a serious fault by legal 
250appreciation, which is to say a "fraudulent action or omission,
or in some circumstances, of negligence" presuming culpability of the 
251
adoptee, and the act being considered as "ingratitude by moral and
252social appreciation. There may be cited as examples attempts against
the life of the adopter, physical ill-treatment, wounding, iniquitous 
attack, fraud, theft, grave slander, false accusation, unjustified 
desertion of the adopter for a long time during illness or imprisonment 
and the like.
As Daes points out the introduction of this ground is completely
inconsistent with the aim of reforming the law towards the interests
of the adoptee since it reduced,without sufficient justification, the
protection originally afforded to the child by the civil code. Thus




An effort is made to manipulate the powers afforded to the adopter
in the civil code with the enactment of the provisions in article 13(3)
and (4) of the L.D. Thus it is prohibited for the adopter to bring
an action in respect to a child who has not yet completed his 16th year
of age, if that child is liable for an act constituting a ground for
255
disinheritance or ingratitude. This provision is in line with
the criminal responsibility recognised for minors in the Greek Penal
256
Code which starts from the age of sixteen.
Additionally in article 13(4) à right is granted to the district 
attorney to request the dissolution of the adoption
a) if the adoptive parent transgresses his duties in a manner covered
by the conditions of article 1524; or
b) if the adoptive parent uses the adopted child in immoral tasks or
ones dangerous to his physical or mental health, or is involved
257
in arranging the further adoption of the child; or
c) if the adoptive parent has forfeited his parental:authority according
to article 1525 ofthe Greek civil code. The same step can be taken
258by the curator ad litem.
As one can see from the above grounds the attention of the Greek 
legislator is focussed on a restraining control over adoption to remedy 
problems that may arise from the inadequacy of the adoption service.
The correctness of this observation becomes quite clear not only by 
comparing the grounds for dissolution of adoption in each country but 
also by the manner that each handles the possibility of having such 
situations in the relationship. Scots law moves with confidence in 
the relationship and permits the further adoption of the child if 
needed, and so far there is no precedent indicating a further placement 
of the child for any of the aforementioned reasons. On the other hand.
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of course, one must acknowledge the advantages of the dissolution of the order over 
the assumption cf parental rights by the local authority especially if the relation­
ship turns out to be an immoral one. But under the present circumstances 
of the adoption service in Greece, this alternative is characterised more 
as a punitive resolution aiming at'a preventative contrèl by the 
parents. Irrespective of the effectiveness of this control, however, 
the experience of the child in the meantime may be rather harsh so that 
it is mandatory to shift the attention towards the stage of placement.
B. THE STATUS CONFERRED BY ADOPTION ORDER
The order in both systems brings forward a significant change in the
child's status. Scots law goes as far as to proclaim the child as the
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child of the adopter born to him in lawful wedlock, whereas in
Greek law the change brought about with the order declares the 
child as the legitimate descendent of the adopter without bringing a 
complete severance of the relationship with the natural parents.
At the outset, it should be pointed out that the status recognised by
the order is a new one in the sense that it neither transfers nor
improves the already existing s t a t u s . T h i s  is explicitly provided
in section 12(3) of the 1978 Act which envisages that the adoption
order extinguishes any parental right or duty,relating to the child
whichhas been vested in a person whether parent or tutor, curator or other
guardian as well as any duty owed to or by the child in respect of
aliment or other payment arising out of parental rights and duties,
without their extinction implying that they must re-vest in their previous
form in the person of the adopter. The child from the date of adoption
acquires the new legitimate status in his relationship to the adopter
262
as if it were born to him from that date.
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Similarly in Greece the status conferred is absolutely new, and
irrelevant to rights and duties existing prior to the order with 
263other persons.
a. Family Integration
In both laws examined the general principle has been laid down of
equalisihgnthe rights of the person adopted with those of a person
born to the adopter in lawful wedlock and the integrating of the child
within the adoptive family. This is formulated in an almost
identical form. Scots law refers to vesting all parental rights
and duties in relation to the child, as if the child was for the
264adopter or adopters a lawful issue , and in Greek law the words
used are "deemed as the legitimate descendant of the applicant from
265the date of adoptionV. Where adoption is granted to a married
couple in Scotland, the child is deemed as born to the adopters'
marriage from the date of a d o p t i o n . I n  Greece it stands from that
date as their common legitimate child, which applies also in the case
where the spouse adopts the legitimate child of the other spouse.
However, though both jurisdictions emphasise that the adopted child is
in all respects considered as equal to the adopter's own children and
that no distinction whatsoever is made between the two categories,
some reservations in respect to the effects of the order still apply.
Scbts law thus makes certain exceptions as regards the acquisition of
titles, premiums of insurance policies, acquisition of nationality.
Greece on the other hand confers a status, comparable to, but not
identical with that of a legitimate person. The relationship is
confined to the applicant and the child and extends to the legitimate
269descendants of the adoptee born after adoption. but no other
relationship is acquired by either party. Also reciprocity for
270certain rights is retained. The integration of the adopted child
may thus be complete in Scotland but not in Greece. Moreover, in
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Greece as far as the biological family is concerned, the links
between the child and his natural parents are not broken because of 
271
adoption. Except where the law provides otherwise, the adoptee
and his natural parents have the obligation to give support and care
to each other and the parents retain the right to custody in certain 
272cases. It follows that Scots law embodies the general principle
of legitimating adoption where all parental rights and duties are vested 
in the adopter and extinguishes from the time of the making of the 
order, any right or duty included in the previous parental rights.
On the contrary, Greek law goes as far as to provide for a legitimate 
child but retains duties and rights of the natural family as either 
simultaneously or alternatively operative.
b. Recognition of family relationship and kinship.
Generally a family relationship between the adopted person and the
adopter is recognised in both systems. In Scotland, this extends
to the relatives of the adopter, with the exception cf ihat in respect to
impediments of marriage. Only the child and the parent are deemed
273
within the forbidden degrees.
In Greece on the other hand this extends to the descendants of the 
274adopter, legitimate or illegitimate. Apparently the relationship
extends in both systems to the descendants of the adoptive child.
Kinship, on the other hand, is generally recognised in Scotland between
adoptee and relatives of the adopter as indeed are all rights and duties
275
based on such relationship. In Greece, on the other hand,
adoption does not result in equating kinship with that of persons born 
to the adopter in wedlock. It fulfills that objective insofar as the
mutual relationship established between the adopters and the adoptive 
child is concerned.^ H o w e v e r ,  kinship is extended to the descendants
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of the adoptee born to him after the date of adoption.
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
.The findings of sociological studies, either reflecting public opinion or 
assessing situations in the parent child relationship, manifest a number of 
contradictions and inadequacies in the current legal policy of the two 
countries. Although they do not clearly illustrate how far the law is 
responsible for the present situation they place a heavy onus upon the law 
because of the claims made on its behalf to reflect social realities and to 
adopt the right approach to social needs.
Thus, as illustrated in the first chapter, the laws reflect the traditional
conception of the status of legitimacy which is based upon moral, social and 
pragmatic assumptions undermined by present social realities. There became 
apparent throughout the study of the laws on anxiety to absorb as many 
children as possible within the marital family and to protect the status so
attributed to them. A variety of motives are hidden behind this idea, of
which at least one is directly concerned with the welfare of the child: the
view that the stable legal family affords the best protection to the interests 
of the child. Indeed no one can deny that fact since from the nature of the 
marital relationship the paternity of the child can be presumed with a high 
degree of certainty, and consequently both parents can be required to under­
take their duties immediately. In addition, because marriage is presumed 
to last for life it is regarded as the best prospect for a continuous care 
of the child. Throughout history this combination has received overwhelming 
support and undoubtedly it must continue to do so, particularly since recent 
evidence shows that marriage has undergone a democratizing process so that, 
at least as long as it exists on healthy bases, it supports both the certainty 
of paternity and cooperation of the parents in bringing up their children.
In this respect it may be appropriate to hold both children conceived and 
children born in wedlock as children of the mother's husband without this
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being an arbitrary resolution. However, for children born but not 
conceived in wedlock, the present state of factors leading to the 
construction of a man-woman relationship makes the approach of neither law 
entirely satisfactory, given that adequate attention needs to be paid to 
the interests of the child. Thus, the approach of Scots law in requiring 
acknowledgement in order to hold the child as of the husband lacks the 
public concern expected for the child. On the other hand, Greek law 
which, under circumstances presuming acknowledgement of the child, holds 
the presumption irresistible exposes the marital relationship to undue 
danger. The right approach probably lies partly with Greek law in holding 
the child as that of the husband unless formally disclaimed within a short 
period and partly with Scots law in holding the presumption rebuttable 
after this period or of the child has been falsely acknowledged. Since 
recent statistics show that most of first births in wedlock have been pre­
marital pregnancies the approach suggested, apart from offering a better 
protection to the child, is probably the most suitable for the present 
conditions. On the other hand since the existence of a pregnancy has 
not as a rule decisively deterred another man from marrying the mother, it 
may be appropriate to make it relatively easy for the husband to declare 
the child not his. Some attention, however, must be given to the conduct 
of the husband during the pregnancy and delivery. It must be a matter of 
fact and degree whether his conduct is an express acknowledgement of the 
child as distinct from assistance offered to his wife on the basis of his 
conjugal duties.
Apart from the indisputable benefit of the marital family for the rights 
of the child, dogmatic legal thinking has envisaged that family as inter­
locking with other important but frequently absurd assumptions of social 
deontology. Thus it has been agreed that support for the marital family 
is necessary to uphold moral standards as well as because that family pro-
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vides the cement of socjÆty. Original Christian sources, which had 
much influence in the formulation of our present moral values, do not 
clearly show ethical concern for the spiritual family, although they are 
found to do so in respect to the well-being of the parent-child 
relationship. Nevertheless such concern emerged in later Christian 
writing when religion was subordinated to the demands of organized societies 
Today this morality faces a strong challenge by different ethical codes of 
public opinion which, without attacking religion as such, criticize most 
of its concepts of social deontology. In fact what Christian morality was 
supposed to support in the monogamous marriage was the elevation to a 
spiritual level of fundamental assumptions as to how society could secure 
the renewal of its membership and the upholding of the status quo in the 
reproduction of children. Those assumptions, however, reflect social 
realities and as such they must receive consideration on their social 
merits.
The dependency of children on their parents and the complexity of their
needs undoubtedly are the factors that should determine future legal policy.
However, the assumption that these factors can only be accomodated within
marriage is found to be artificial and in addition hardly consonant with
the present state of family relations. Instances have been noted where
the status of the child may come while the parents are separated or at a
time when the child has ceased to be dependent on them. Nevertheless, it
reflects a legal stereotype perceiving a uniform construction of man-woman
relationship whereas this is in a dynamic movement. Changes in the
status of women, education and the involvement of both sexes in work make
the relationships more sophisticated and more demanding. In consequence
marital relationships have been more personalized and operate to higher
standards which in turn reduce tolerance as well as the influence that the 
interests of the child may have in keeping the parents together.
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On the other hand there has been revealed an ongoing disuse of formal 
marriage. Cohabitation in many instances has been the permanent choice of 
all generations and in many instances it has involved the production 
of children. Those children, although they have not experienced single 
parenthood, have been refused legal protection. This state of flux in 
the relationships of the sexes, rightly observed to bring a considerable 
fluidity to the composition of families today, renders marriage rather 
insecure as a basis for the entire policy concerning the child's status.
This may be particularly so since the changes in the relations between the 
sexes have had considerable effects on the durability of the marital 
relationship. Continuous increase in the incidence of divorce and ’ 
separation shows that the fundamental reason for institutionalizing children 
within the marital family, permanent parental protection, cannot be argued 
the same as before. Therefore, the present state of the marital family, 
though in its democratic conception it may hold good on the issue of 
paternity, nevertheless cannot justify a policy which regards it as the 
exclusive institution for bringing up children. To support such an 
absolute policy presupposes a minimum deviation from the pattern, whereas 
in present circumstances it is rather high. Arguably therefore the 
presumption of conception in wedlock may be preserved to create parenthood, 
but the securing of the interests of the child born in wedlock cannot be 
used as a starting point for discrimination against children born outside 
wedlock. Acknowledgement of the additional advantages to the child if his 
parents are married may be met by an exhortative policy, since it seems 
to be rather incidental and remote to the contemplation of society at 
large. This observation must influence also the rebuttal of the presumption 
of paternity, which must be liberated from policy considerations for the 
additional reason that the present state of conjugal relations has increased 
the likelihood of extra marital intercourse. The tendency noticed in the 
laws to maintain the presumption or to rebut it upon facts must become the 
rule.
442
However, the present image of the legal family might not be sufficient 
reason to overturn an entire policy if other conditions did not conduce 
to the same conclusion. Better treatment for children born outside 
wedlock has been subordinated to historical factors concerning the wider 
interests of society. Those factors have to be tested against the demand 
for recognition of the child's right before reaching any conclusion.
The ancient pagans, as said, disfavoured certain classes of children to 
protect citizenship and this was transformed to pure family levels in the 
Imperial period when the organization of the Roman state took the form 
of a collection of families. A person who could not trace descent from 
a pater familias was regarded as stateless. The decay in family bonds along 
with the rise of legislation recognising the independent existence of the 
individual shifted the emphasis in the protection of familial property 
rights. This tendency is clearly reflected in the legislation of 
Byzantine emperors in a varying degree. In medieval Europe discrimination 
revived in the form of denial of basic civil rights along with isolation 
of the child from any family lineage. The common law attitude to an 
illegitimate child was to regard him as a filius nullius in order to protect 
the interests of the landed classes and upon that basis was developed the 
entire approach of Scots law on illegitimacy. Civilian systems on the 
other hand, varied in their approach - some restricting the relationship 
with the parents to basic rights with others and among them Greek law 
adopting the late Roman law approach, where because of the degree of 
certitude of maternity, the relationship with the mother was a complete 
one while that with the father varied according to its degree of certainty. 
The formulation of the law, however, is marked by the inherent tendency 
of organized societies to regard temporary liaisons as a threat to the 
marital family and therefore as undermining society's very existence.
This attitude has varied in accord with the influence of religion, ideology
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and the particular social needs of the time. By the time of Constantine 
when the political and religious authority was invested in the Emperor 
both authorities were used interchangeably to exercise control over the 
family. Once the church, however, secured its position, it started • 
exercising independent control over family matters which ended with the 
clash of the "stasis of Nica" which enabled Justinian to reform the law 
of illegitimacy and give considerable recognition to children born in 
concubinage. His reform, however, still reflected religious beliefs 
as did the legislation of subsequent emperors. In Medieval Europe where 
the church regained control over pol itical matters the attitudes to 
illegitimate children became particularly severe to end in a clash with 
the political forces of the time. Feudal attitudes which influenced 
legislation from then on were particularly concerned with the conservation 
of properties. Nevertheless it seems that the rulers were well aware 
of the dangers in their position if the lower classes suffered excessive 
oppression. Thus the ethical concern they showed about illegitimacy - 
in which they had cooperation of the church - was rooted in the fact 
that marriages were a matter of property and this property was likely to 
escape the control of the family with illegitimacy. The lack of pure 
ethical concern manifests itself in the fact that bastards of noble origin 
were not despised. The implementation of welfare policy with the Poor law 
to alleviate the mixery of the lowest classes, which were a continuous 
threat for the landed classes, found difficulties in achieving its purposes 
because of widespread illegitimacy. The system was based in the concept 
of less eligibility and thus mothers with children born out of wedlock 
absorbed most of the funds disposed. This resulted in a tightening up 
of attitudes towards illegitimacy, a policy that partly changed with the 
emergence of individualism by the end of the last and beginning of this 
century. Political theories evolved at that time, concerned with the 
welfare of the individual in the social context, followed the well-known
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path In assuming that that interest can be best served in the context of 
the marital family. Aiming basically at improving social standards 
with limited resources, since the wealth was still controlled by certain 
sectors of the population, the options were limited. The inevitable 
choice therefore was for this policy to be centred around family and 
deterrence, ignoring the variety of factors involved in extra marital 
conceptions. However, the policy could not be carried out by denying any 
sort of relationship with the parents without this turning against the 
fundamental purpose of improving social life. This approach is clearly 
reflected in recent legislation which, on the one hand, excludes the child 
from family lineage and the benefits attributed to this structure and, 
on the other hand, recognises a certain set of rights and duties which 
fulfils the child's basic requirements and maintains the human face of 
society. To complement this policy the state has implemented entitlement 
to special welfare legislation where the basic needs of the child cannot 
be fulfilled by his parents. The price paid for this policy has been shown 
to be particularly high since the basic legal protection has proved to be 
inadequate to the circumstances.
This policy, as formulated by tradition and ideology, has been set side 
by side with and analysed in the light of present social conditions and 
has been focused to present basic misconceptions. Marriage has been 
observed to be a well settled institution though in the character of a 
personalized relationship and operating at this level. Its value for 
the reproduction and bringing up children has been widely acknowledged but 
as of only incidental importance in terms of the parent-child relationship 
as such. Parental roles tend to be regarded not as stemming from the ties 
between the parents but as based in a duty of a personal character - a 
fact confirmed by the attitudes of the parents when divorced.
On the other hand, it was found that the reproduction of children
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continued, both inside and outside marriage, at a rate fluctuating in 
its own right, irrespective of the implementation of legislation trying 
to control the incidents. In periods of social stability it was 
observed that illegitimacy followed closely trends of general fertility 
with minor deviations due to changes in the policy towards abortion and 
contraception and a steady decline in marital fertility. Attempts to 
uncover the causes of extra-marital conceptions have not been particularly 
successful. Nevertheless there have been noticed some contributory factors 
going beyond the control of the law - such as the present state of marital 
relations and the continuous invasion by adolescents of areas of social 
life which until now were reserved for adults. In relation to adolescents 
the double standards applying to sex and the negatives stressed in parental 
attitudes were arguably observed to make an "ideal" combination of 
contributory factors, rendering the entire policy self-contradictory. This 
is particularly so if it is taken into account that pre-marital acquaintance 
is an indispensable feature of marriage today. However, what the 
discussion on aspects of illegitimacy has mainly revealed is that mostly 
illegitimate pregnancies are incidental to a variety of conditions of 
deep-seated social origin. Social opinion has started, though slowly, 
to acknowledge this and to an extent shows considerable sympathy for the 
mother and the child. The discussion has also revealed that the deterrence 
policy is not only ineffective but also unnecessary in the context of 
preventing extra marital conceptions or supporting the institution of 
marriage. Additionally in respect of the labelling of the mother and her 
child as deviant it has been pointed out that a culpable deviation from 
the prevailing norms can be established in no more than a few instances.
Most important, however, is the fact that the child is the person least 
responsible for the acts of his parents and he mostly suffers the consequences 
This conception of the child's position is incompatible with the independent 
recognition of his membership of society and the protection it should be 
afforded by the law in having its relationship with the parents recognized.
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Reaching, therefore, to the point of finding that illegitimate children 
are the victims of an unjustifiable and often illogical policy for which 
the law bears a responsibility for its negative sanctions, it has 
been considered appropriate to follow the example of many other countries 
and to change its task to one protective to the illegitimate child. The 
support from legal quarters for expressing through the law public concern 
for the natural relationship has been mixed, some thinkers still 
vacillating among the alternatives of legitimation or adoption, others 
expressing concern as to whether reform should be carried out to the 
extent of sweeping all the differences away and only a few giving their 
overwhelming support to such an approach. Sociological writing on the 
other hand, being more concerned with the problems of the individual, gives 
its support to such a contribution by the law. Their findings further 
forecast the possibility of the natural relationship operating as that 
with divorced parents. Given that there has been substantial reform in 
respect to specific rights of the illegitimate child, much of the ground 
work for abolition of the distinction has already been accomplished.
Accordingly the effects of its abolition on the substantive rights of the 
child will be minimal. The major difference, though,is that these so far 
have had an individual enforcement whereas with abolition of the 
distinction they will come into operation by power of status. Finally 
a certain benefit can be claimed for social order since the linking of the 
child with his natural parents will eliminate disorganization and 
remove part of the burden for its welfare from the social services, 
accordingly improving their efficiency.
Given this conclusion, the choice lies between assimilating the rights 
of children born out of wedlock to those born in wedlock and abolishing 
the status of illegitimacy by incorporating the concept of parenthood entailing 
the same rights and duties as with children born in wedlock. The second
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approach being considered more secure and less discrimatory, has been 
followed in chapter three.
The first difficulty that one faces in incorporating the concept of 
parenthood into unmarried relationships is to overcome the arguments 
for exercising preventive control in cases where there are no signs 
of the relationship being functional in any respect. The dilemma faced 
is whether the concept of parenthood should be connected only to the fact 
of procreation or whether it must be submitted to welfare control, since 
after birth we have evidence of parental conduct. Such an approach, 
apart from its disadvantages as discriminatory, in principle could not be 
given effect without duplicating the law by incorporating aspects of 
adoption.
The second difficulty was concerned with the possibility of constructing 
a presumption of conception which was rejected due to the variety of 
circumstances in pre-marital conceptions and because such parents do not 
make a case in the law as married parents do to generate the law on time.
Thus it is suggested that formal recognition should apply in all cases 
under a procedure confined to revealing the biological relation in the 
most convincing way. This gives the option of providing the same 
protection for children born in and out of wedlock.
In the choice of the methods and their construction a number of adverse 
factors had to be taken into account without these running counter to 
the importance of the fact of paternity. It was considered appropriate 
to encourage the father to acknowledge the child. Voluntary acknowledgement 
has therefore, been constituted in a particularly flexible form, mainly 
by a declaration to a registrar in Scotland and to a notary in Greece, 
amounting to proof against the father and effective in rem.if otherwise 
confirmed. The burden of contesting this paternity has been transferred
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to the persons having an interest in doing so to avoid complications
and in the belief that a man will not normally acknowledge a child unless
he believes himself to be the father. For the cases where the parent
fails to acknowledge the child or paternity is a contested matter the
method adopted is that of judicial recognition of paternity. Due to
the importance of the issue attention has to be given to adopting a
neutral judgemental system of declaratory nature, concentrated upon the
proof of biological fact. Thus it is suggested that the issue be
treated as the main question in the proceedings with which ancillary claims
may be connected without the impact of those claims having any influence
upon the decision of the court. Further, in order to prevent evidence
from becoming obsolete and to implement adequately public concern for the
establishment of paternity, it is considered that the action should be
compulsory and be raised within a short period after the birth. This
approach faces severe criticism as a major invasion of the privacy of the
individual, although not altogether convincingly when balanced against
the obvious advantages to the child and to social order of having his
lineage established. In line with these views a number of matters
are considered to require implementation in the law. Thus, it is regarded
as appropriate for the finding of the court to be recognised as of
declaratory nature and proof in rem, and for jurisdiction to be transferred
to the Sheriff court in Scotland due to its lengthy experience wLtiissues cf
JegLtLmcy. The petition may be validly submitted to the court of the petitioner's
residence if the residence of the father is unknown. The court should
have the obligation to take care ex officio for the continuation of the
proceedings, following an inquisitorial procedure and may hold hearings
in camera if there are reasons for doing so. As regards the litigants,
the right of the mother to raise the action is preserved along with an
unqualified right of the child to apply. Other collaterals or third
parties may do so if they have custody of the child. A special right is
also supplied to the office of public prosecutor to avoid the risk of
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dependency on variables connected with the persons involved. The 
action should be directed against the putative father and on his death 
against his relatives. Care is taken for the right to raise the action 
not to run counter to the right of the father to acknowledge the child 
by obliging the mother to serve notice to him before raising the action.
In addition, in line with the need to protect the evidence from becoming 
obsolete and to avoid any possibility for the child remaining fatherless 
for long, it is suggested that the mother's right should prescribe after 
3 month, thus reviving to the office of public prosecutor. This period 
appears also in relation to the right of the mother to give formal 
agreement to the child's adoption, being regarded as a period which should 
elapse before crucial decisions are taken about its future. The 
question of proof of paternity has been treated with much scepticism because 
of the difficulties in proving paternity, especially when both father and 
mother are unwilling to cooperate, and because of its importance for the 
order. Though maternity may be attested by the act of delivery, which 
is a fact of indisputable certainty, with paternity the matter is far more 
complicated. Proof beyond doubt cannot be achieved while simple proof is 
found to accord only a relative credibility to the order. In addition 
it is necessary to overcome inherent suspicion without reducing the 
possibility of paternity being established. In this respect consideration 
was given to the system adopted in Norwegian legislation as presenting 
the highest certitude amongst its rivals as well as because it vests the 
finding with advantages which forecast its social acceptability to a similar 
level with conception in wedlock. Thus there is employed the concept 
of affirmative and negative attestation of paternity aiming to prove 
not only that the person held to be the father may be so, but that no other 
person could have possibly fathered the child. In this respect the wide 
use of blood tests is suggested because of their infallibility in 
excluding paternity and the affirmative proof they may supply if the
450
blood exhibits rare characteristics. Because the quality of this evidence 
cannot be controlled by the court and further involves certain 
dangers it is suggested that tœts be carried out under a security system 
preventing impersonation and to high laboratory standards. If they 
contradict customary evidence,blood tests should prevail as less 
involving such variables as human error and perjury. Also in accord with 
their importance for the question of paternity it is recommended that 
it be compulsory for any person to give a blood sample if requested.
However, because blood test evidence involves mainly a laboratory 
process with which many people are not familiar and, therefore, lacks 
for them the conviction offered by customary evidence, it is thought 
to be essential for the finding to be supported by customary evidence.
In accord with the approach that there should be no distinction between 
legitimate and illegitimate children and the consideration given to the 
issue of paternity the concept of legitimation has no reason to exist 
in either system. The unrestricted right of the father to acknowledge
the child as well as the availability of judicial proceedings to settle 
the matter makes it unnecessary.
Adoption, being an artificial method for creating a parent-child 
relationship, has been treated as such. Its unique characteristic of 
creating a legal relationship between a strange child and an adult makes 
adoption the best alternative to a dysfuncticnaLor non-existent family.
To this end Scotland provides a highly advanced system aiming at the 
complete integration of the child in the new family, whereas Greece, 
still under the influence of its experience of adoption law, compromises 
between traditional and modern approaches.
The history of adoption law shows us that the institution has had a
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strong interaction with familial needs. Its development, nevertheless, 
has been in accordance to parental rights and the social position of the 
child. Thus in days of absolute parental authority and when the social 
position of the child was designated by his family membership, there 
is observed a complete integration of the adoptee in the adopting family.
The rise of legislation concerned with the individual citizen along 
with the gradual decay of familial ideals effected substantial transformations 
in the character and aims of the institution. Thus the need of the 
childless to find a child to secure the continuation of the spiritual and 
social ideals of his family gave way to a concern with the practical needs 
of daily life. Certain forms of adoption emerged in this context, mainly 
concerned with transferral of properties. This is clearly reflected in 
Roman Byzantine legislation where the family relationship accorded to 
adoption tended to be limited to the persons immediately concerned,with or 
without any effects on the rights of the child with his natural family.
More importantly, however, the ends of the individual adopter were 
strengthened in this process, which as a consequence reduced public concern 
for the institution. This conception of adoption, implemented in the 
civilian legislation of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries^put 
the institution in a position remote to the public interest^ so that many 
even argued for its abolition.
The revival of interest in adoption is marked by the increasing intervention 
of the state in the parent-child relationship and the arising of an 
independent recognition of the child's interest, and a regard for his 
welfare. Pb strong concern emerged for children who had become parentless 
because of the vicissitudes of this century, or because of their defective 
family status, adoption was selected as the appropriate solution for this 
problem. In addition, as public opinion started becoming less tolerant 
towards the maladjustment of children within the natural family, the 
scope of adoption was extended to cover such children. With
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this modern view of adoption, there appeared a number of problems and 
misconceptions, especially in respect of the latter function, clearly 
illustrated in the experience of Scots law and likely to be repeated 
in Greek law which has recently incorporated this function in a half­
hearted fashion.
In respect to the child's welfare recent Scots law has shifted the 
emphasis from regarding it as paramount and placed it instead as of 
the first consideration. This approach, which it was found could be 
accommodated by the relevant Greek provision, is an important innovation 
if the concomitant changes in the scope of adoption are taken into 
account. In this context the welfare of the child, without losing its 
primary importance, runs parallel with the general social interest which 
requires that adoption will not cause disorganization to the lives of 
other individuals. Thus the interests of the child have to be balanced 
against the interests of the natural parents, while the adopter must 
be appropriately qualified so that the introduction of the child into 
his family will not effect damage. The change, if seen in conjunction 
with the reinforcement of the importance of the natural relationship, 
coheres with the following principles : a natural relationship will
be terminated when and only when this is clearly necessary; better 
prospects in the adoptive family will not influence the decision on 
the termination of the natural relationship; the adopter should 
qualify only if he measures up to acceptable standards of parenthood 
and has the additional qualities required for an artificial relationship; 
no other interests will have any significance in any decision unless 
they coincide with the interests of the child; because by definition 
the adoption assumes that the interests of the child will be served in 
a family context the law must facilitate both its adjustment to and 
integration within the new family.
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Many of these principles are embodied in Greek law, though frequently 
in an unsatisfactory form, while others are ignored altogether. F irst 
as regards the qualifications and conditions,the major difference is 
that Greek law still focusses on single applications and thus fails 
in terras of the essential prerequisite of a complete family unit. The 
fact that the spouse has consented to the placement of the child in 
the family does not provide sufficient guarantees for his welfare since 
the relationship with the non-adopting spouse is far from enjoying 
express recognition in Greek law. The relatively high age limit is 
another striking feature since it inhibits the option of considering 
young and suitable couples. This feature was argued to be connected 
to a number of other features of the law, worthy of further attention.
Thus, apart from the restrictions of single applications, the lack of an 
advanced adoption service and the condition of childlessness have a 
certain influence in the choice of the limit. As regards childlessness, 
it clearly manifests a traditional conception of the child's interests 
- as its exceptions further confirm - incompatible with the modern aims 
of adoption and thus worthy of repeal. In complete contrast to the 
Scots tendency to discourage adoptions by natural parents and step-parents, 
Greek law affirmatively promotes these adoptions and, further,waives the 
age limit in such applications. This aspect of adoption, in aiming to 
compensate defects of status, will be eclipsed with the recognition of 
an equitable status for children born in and out of wedlock. Further, 
such adoptions have the important defect that they conceal from the 
child its trre origins and affect the relationship with the other parent. 
They must, therefore, be avoided except where the interests of the 
child manifestly require this solution in the circumstances of the 
specific case. Parental agreement is the area where both laws
appear to have certain limitations with regard to children born out of 
wedlock, arising from the fact that neither law secures adequately
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the prior rights of the child in relation to his natural parents. Thus 
neither law recognises a right to the natural parent to agree to his 
child's adoption, with the exception in Greek law in respect of a 
father who has or is deemed to have voluntarily acknowledged the child.
The effort made in Scots law on the other hand to improve his position, 
by according to him the right to be informed and even to apply for 
custody of his child, operates within the limits of the filius nullius 
concept and thus fails to impose any express obligation to seek out the 
father. However, in conformity with the general principle embodied 
in this study - that an adoption placement will not run counter to the 
rights of the child arising from his natural parentage - it has been 
suggested that, despite the objections expressed, no adoption placement 
should be attempted in respect of a natural child unless all the 
possibilities for establishing the relationship with the father have been 
exhausted. This has been preferred over other considerations in 
that it opens the way to considering all the dimensions to the child's 
rights, which so far have been dependent upon the mother. Also it has 
been suggested that the right of agreement should be given to the 
father, subject to the power of the court to dispense with it. With 
regard to the agreement of the mother's husband against whom the presumption 
operates it is suggested that the court should not refrain from 
carrying out a full inquiry into the matter if, from evidence presented, 
it appears that he might not be the father. The variety of dangers 
involved in this case mean that the matter has to be treated with 
extreme caution.
The difficulties of balancing the interests of the child with that 
of the natural parents, as well as the need to secure that the relation­
ship is not dissolved in haste, have been sufficiently revealed in the 
course of dealing with the grounds for dispensing with agreement.
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Although the court may refuse an order whether or not the parent agrees 
to it, it was felt essential to put more emphasis on the necessity of 
distinguishing and even separating the decision on the adoptability 
of the child from that concerning the particular placement. Since 
influence on the decision of the court by the nature of the intended 
placement cannot be precluded, such a separation is preferable. A 
limitation on this is that the involvement of the court starts late in 
the whole process and it frequently is faced with de facto situations 
which it is under pressure to preserve. For the grounds themselves, 
while Scots law provides a wide range of grounds permitting dispensation 
with parental agreement if the relationship is not conducive to the 
child's welfare, the grounds in Greek law are rather limited and are 
argued to expose the interests of the child to undue risk. Particularly 
noticeable is the lack of any ground permitting the court to dispense 
with agreement when the child is still in the custody of either of his 
natural parents. A variety of instances have been indicated where 
this may be necessary - without first committing the child to 
institutional care.
Probably most of the limitations observed in Greek law arise from the 
lack of an advanced adoption service capable of responding to any matter 
concerning the placement. Today, because most of the decisions are taken 
outside the court, a comprehensive service is an essential feature of 
any adoption process. The importance of the initial placement and the 
complex assessments that have to be made either in respect to the 
natural family or in respect to the suitability of the adopters require 
a service with specialised personnel, especially employed for this 
purpose, along with the necessary facilities for caring for the child 
throughout the process where necessary. Relevant to this is the lack 
of any provision for the child to live with the applicant prior to the
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order. These omissions operate against the extensive investigation other­
wise required as to whether the circumstances of the placement are 
conducive to the child's welfare and most probably attribute to the 
report only a relative validity. The relinquishment procedure also 
needs to be reformed so as to permit the court to dispense with agreement 
and to be operated in cases where the child does not undergo institutional 
care.
Two more aspects in which the two laws appear to present major differences 
concern the dissolution of the order and the status conferred. Scots 
law permits the revocation of the order only if the child has been 
adopted by one of his parents who has subsequently married the other partner, 
a regulation that still may find application under an equal status for 
children born in and out of wedlock. Dissolution is permitted on a 
variety of grounds in Greek law of which a few are concerned with the 
child while the others clearly point to the interests of the adopter. 
Particularly, the grounds of ingratitude and disinheritance are a 
reflection of the old conception of adoption and are inappropriate 
for legislation with pure social aims. On the other hand, the grounds 
in favour of the child, although they introduce a form of control over 
the placement, are felt to be inappropriate to the time and to reflect 
the lack of suitable assessment procedure in the first place. It would 
be better, therefore, if the emphasis were transferred to the initial 
placement.
F inally, as regards the status recognised to the relationship, while 
Scots law places the child in a complete family relationship with the 
adopter and extinguishes any right and duty related to the natural parents, 
Greek law recognises a relationship between the applicant and the child 
and leaves the natural relationship almost unaffected. This feature
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is probably the most significant difference between the two laws and 
undoubtedly the major limitation of the Greek system, calling urgently 
for reform. The importance of adoption lies significantly with 
this factor since an order which does not achieve complete integration 
within the adoptive family and fails to cut off the child from the 
background which puts it in this position is unlikely to have any 
substantial success. Further, in this half-way process are included 
risks of erosion for the institution, apart from the major risks of 
the child being confused over his parentage or suffering emotional 
disturbance with the involvement of the natural parents.
The comparative analysis of the two laws once again confirms the 
possibility of complementing a legal system by testing it against another. 
On the positive side, it may provide formulas giving satisfactory 
solutions and on the negative it may reveal possible dangers experienced 
in a certain practice. Even in this critical area of the law where 
cultural factors have such importance^ solutions can still be exchanged 
as long as care is taken concerning their adjustability in the particular 
social context. Irrespective of this experience, however, the important 
lesson of this comparison is that instead of putting the family law into 
a 'strait-jacket' it is necessary to provide the means of updating 
legislative policy since familial relations neither present rigidity 
nor respond to a stagnant conception of a certain social order. If it 
is permitted to adopt the phrase used in the Report of the Quebec Civil 
Obde to describe its aims "it had to be a body of law that was alive 
and contemporary, and which would be responsive to the concerns, 
attentive to the needs and in harmony with the requirements of a 
changing society in search of a new equilibrium".
F OOTNOTES
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system vested on the absence of a son whether adopted or not, the adoption 
serving the purpose of providing an heir, though a son adopted by Will 
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interest in the education of the child. Therefore unless there is an 
outstanding danger, the court cannot remove the rights of the natural 
parents.
106. City Court of Athens 1141/1969 E.E.N, 36: 562, and comments by 
Kamenopoulos, supra.
107. Article 11'(a) , (b) of the L.D. 610/1970.
108. Article 11(c) of the L.D. 610/1970.
109. "Introductory Report of the L.D. 4532/1966", p.206.
110. City Court of Patra 1424/1966, Hell. Dikaiosyni, 8:95, supra note lOl.
111. City Court of Athens, 478/1969, E.E.N. 36:361.
112. Elements and guidance in making this division ha;e been taken from
D.H.S.S. ' S.W. S.G.Sc. A Guide to Adoption Practice, prepared by
the Advisory Council on Child Care, (London : HMSO, 1970). Chapter III 
p.25-38, and from the classification offered by Clive and Wilson,
Husband and Wife, pp 583-590 in relation to the welfare in custody.
113. ibid, p.583; see also A and B (petrs) 1976 S.C. 27 per Lord President 
at p.32; Stone, Recent developments in the Law of adoption", op. cit. 
p.249 defines the degree as "active promotion as well as passive safe­
guarding of the child's welfare".
114. Mr. and Mrs. A. (petrs) 1971 S.C. (H.L.) 29, per Lord Reid at p.142 "In 
unusual cases medical evidence may be helpful, but I should be sorry to 
see any general tendency to call medical evidence in these cases."
115. Sect. 6 of the 1978 Act and Section 6 (ë), (p) of the Adoption of
Children (Sederunt) Act 1959.
116. Spinellis, "Law of Adoption in Greece and Israel", op. cit. pp 187-8.
117. Section 6 (M) of the 1959 Act of Sederunt.
118. Sect. 6 (b), (d), of the 1959 Act of Sederunt.
119. Sapre, P. "Awarding custody of children", 9 Univ. Chic. L . Rev. 672,
675-685; For judicial opinion on the matter see Chapter 7 under "Acting 
Unreasonably".
120. For discussion see Ormrod, Sir Roger, "The Role of the Courts in Relation 
to Children" in A.B.A.F.A., Child Adoption (London, 1975) pp 204-5.
121. Deide, R.C., "Two Pairs of Parents : Repulsion or Harmony" in A.C.T.A.
World Conference on Adoption and Foster Placement, (Milan, 1971), pl88 et subq
122. As Eekelaar ascertains (Family Security and Family Breakdown, p.179) 
though most of placements depend upon them there is no direct evidence 
to confirm how far adoption can increase the happiness of an otherwise 
childless marriage, (but) that it often does so is certain. However, 
adoption should not be used to "bolster" failing marriages. Its stability
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is a factor that according to the law must stand in the judicial assess­
ment : see Hoggett, Parents and Children, p.227 and note in "By the Way",1975 
Family Law, 5, p.137.
The problem goes back to when the Hurst Committee was reporting in the 
fifties where they referred to "the deplorable cases in which a doctor 
acts as third party for the benefit of a patient whose neurotic condition 
he seeks to remedy or whose marriage he hopes to stabilize by this 
means", Cmnd 9248, par. 43, p.11. The Houghton Committee, without 
disregarding altogether the need to help with childlessness, in accord 
with the principle that adoption will be a child centred process suggests 
that though some help must be given to them, to come to terms with their 
disappointment, this must be ancillary to the central aim which is to find 
a home for the child: Cmnd 5107, par 36, p.11. For general discussion
on the interests of the adopters : R.G. Deide, "Two pairs of Parents" 
op. cit and Nakhooba, Zulie, "Adoption and Modern Society : A Challenge" 
in A.C.T.A. World Conference on Adoption and Foster Placement, (Milan, 1971)
i.e. p.32, ff, 45 ff.
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CHAPTER FIVE
1. Section 65 of the Adoption (Scotland) Act 1978; Article 1 of the 
L.D. 610/1970.
2. M. (petr.) 1954 S.C. 227; Article 127 of the Greek Civil Code.
3. S. 12(5) of the 1^78 Act ; Article 1 of the L.D. 610/1970.
4. S. 13(1), (2) of the 1978 Act.
5. Art. 10 of the L.D. 610/1970.
6. Sect. 6(0) Adoption of Children (Sederunt), Act 1959.
7. Art. 7(1) of the L.D. 610/1970.
8. The child can be re-adopted if the existing valid order has been cancelled
by a court decree, or with the death of the parent. (Vallindas, Family 
Law, p.213, Spyridakis, Civil Code, 1572 note (1),) given the consent
of the natural parents: City Court of Athens, 765/1969, No. V, 17: 991.
9. S. 12 XI) of the 1978 Act.
10. S. 1(1) of the Adoption Act 1958.
11. S. 15 (2) (a) of the 1978 Act.
12. S. 14 (2) (a)
13. Art. 14 of the L.D. 610/1970.
14. S. 2(1) (a) Adoption of Children (Scotland) Act, 1930.
15. S. 2(1) (b) of the 1930 Act. The decision was left to the discretion of
the court.
16. For discussion see Trotter, On Children Acts, p.225 and note 2.
17. S. 2 of the 1958 Act; HMSO, Working Paper on Adoption, par. 25, p.20.
18. A compromise solution was proposed so as to permit a childless couple to
adopt after ten years of infertile marriage or when according to the
opinion of the court special reasons concerning the interest of the adoptee 
require the issuing of an order. Michaelidis Nouaros, Adoption Law 
Reform", op. cit, p. 1029.
19. Art. 2 of the L.D. 4532/1966; G. Michaelidis Nouaros "Some Observations 
on the Reform of Adoption Law in Greece" in Bates, F . (ed) The Child and 
the Law, 2:,ivol. (New York : Oceana Publications 1976), Vol 1, 271-282, 
p.271.
20. S. 3(b) of the Adoption (Scotland) Act 1930; S.l of the Adoption Act 
1958; Trotter, On Children's Acts, p.238; Brown, "Parental Consent to 
Adoption", op. cit. p.171.
21. Cmnd 9248 par. 38, p.9; Working Paper on Adoption, pars. 24, 25, 26, p.8.; 
Cmnd 5107 par. 73, p.20.
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22. Cmnd. 5107 par. 20, p.5.
23. For detailed discussion Working Paper on Adoption, part IV and infra same 
chapter under VIII.
24. Initially it was suggested that any adult should be eligible to adopt 
(Working Paper on Adoption, par 61, p.21), subject to satisfaction of 
the conditions. From 1.1.1970 it became the 18th year of age which gave 
rise to concern among the experts because of the instability and fluidity
in the lives of persons around that age. Finally the age of 21 was accepted. 
(Cmnd 5107 par. 77, p.21) probably as the golden medium between the too 
low, in terms of experience for parenthood,age of majority and the too high 
limit of the 1958 Act.
25. Cmnd, 5107 pars. 76, 77, p.21; Bromley, P.M., Family Law, 5th ed. (London: 
Butterworths, 1976), p.359.
26. Michaelidis Nouaros, "Adoption Law Reform", op. cit. pp 1028-29;
Idem "About the Voidness of Adoption", op. cit. p.481-2; Rousopoulou,
"The Reform under consideration", op. cit. pp 1236-7; Tousis, Family Law,
VdI B, p.209; Appeal Court of Athens, 1203/1973, No.V, 21: 1113.
27. Rousopoulou, Agni, "Greek and Interstate Adoptions", (1959), No.V. 7:1228- 
1234; Michaelidis Nouaros "Adoption Law Reform", op. cit. 1029, City Court 
of Athens 20117/1963. Hell. Dikacosyni 4: 1159.
28. Sections 14(1) "... an adoption order may be made on the applications of 
a married couple where either has attained the age of 21 years ..." and 
Sect. 15(1) "... on the application of one person where he has attained 
the age of 21 years ...". In relation to Greece article 2(2) authorises 
the courts to allow an adoption if the applicant "has full legal capacity 
(and) has attained the age of thirty ...". Legal capacity alone, which 
concurs with the age of majority (21st year of age), suffices for an 
application submitted under article 3 of the L.D., Appeal Court of Athens, 
1563/1972, No. V. 20 : 1328.
29. It is unlikely for children qualifying for adoption under the present law 
to be placed for adoption with an elderly person due to the high concern 
expressed for the relationship to be normal. Their experience, however, 
may be of great help in difficult placements (children of different ethnic 
origin, handicapped or with special problems) since they can show a high 
degree of understanding. Therefore, they may be considered where higher 
skill is required : D.H.S.S. ' S.W.S.G.Sc. A Guide to Adoption Practice, 
par.Ill, 14, p.28.
30. Art. 1558, 1559, 1567 of the Greek Civil Code; Art. 1530 of the Greek Civil 
Code for the natural child-mother relationship; the adopted child article 
1579 "is deemed legitimate for the applicant ..."; by accepting that the 
adopted child should be included in the exception does not contravene the 
rule adopted in jurisprudence that adoptions by spouses constitute two 
independent orders (for the rule see Spyridakis, Civil Code, Vol. 4. 1572, 
note (2); Vallindas, Family Law, p.213. voidhess in relation to the
one party does not render the order void for the other) so that the conditions 
have to be looked upon separately for each of them; see Appeal Court of 
Athens 1563/1972 No. V. 20: 1328 where the court permitted adoption by a 
person less than 30 years of age having legitimate issue.
31. See infra appendix on custody. It is disputed whether a father for whom 
paternity has been "completely judicially" established would be awarded 
custody by the court despite his legal entitlement.
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32. Report of the Committee on the Age of Majority (Latey Report) Cmnd 3342, 
(London: HMSO, 1967), p.42-3.
33. M. Rood de Boer, "Coming of Legal Age: The Legal Position and Reform
in the Netherlands", in Bates, F ., The Child and the Law, (New York:
Oceana Publication, 1976), pp 37-45, i.e. pp 37-9.
34. Cmnd 5107, par 76, p.21; see D.H.S.S. & S.W.S.G.Sc., A Guide to Adoption
Practice, par III, 13, p.27-8.
35. ibid., par 77, p.21. The adopted limit is in line with the recommendation 
made by the Advisory Council on child care that the child be brought up
by parents within the age range usual for natural parents of a child of 
that age. D.H.S.S. & S.W.S.G.Sc., A Guide to Adoption Practice, par III 14, 
p.28. The lowering in the age of first marriage along with the fact that 
most children are adopted from infancy means that many children will be 
adopted under the most normal conditions. The Council also express concern 
for the relationship of the couple to be normal as regards the age difference 
A gap in their age should not be a bar to consideration but when the one 
partner is acting towards the other in the role of a parent towards a 
child, it may be difficult for the adoptee to be loved and accepted and 
not viewed as a rival, par III, 15, p.28.
36. Tousis, Family Law, Vol. A, p49 who reveals the disproportion of the
responsibilities that a minor undertakes with marriage and parenthood;
and Panagiotakos, Manual on the Marriage Impediments, pp 28-9 who stresses 
the biological inadequacy of the minor to undertake parental duties satis­
factorily. In relation to adoption attention is paid to settling an age 
which by itself presumes fitness and normality in the relationship without 
contradicting the condition of childlessness.
37. The preference for marriage and rejection of cohabitation or single 
applications arises from the participation of the community, as well as 
from the artificial nature of adoption which require additional safeguards. 
The difference between bringing up an adopted child and a natural child,
as well as the fact that adoptees come normally from disturbed backgrounds 
necessitates a complete stable family capable of producing a happy 
environment for the child. This is not to say, of course, that a stable 
cohabitation or a single applicant cannot produce the same results, but 
because the policy of adoption concerns children with evidently disturbed 
backgrounds, whereas in natural parenthood this need not be the case, the 
solution to be adopted here must be different and precautionary. This 
approach has been adopted in the draft of the Quebec Civil Code notwith­
standing that it is permitted for consorts not living together to adopt 
a child if special circumstances justify such an adoption. (Article 293 of 
Quebec Civil Code). Thus, if they have raised the child before their 
separation or divorce they may adopt the chid, but not unmarried cohabitees. 
Moreover, posthumous adoptions are permitted if one of the applicants died 
after the motion or it has been clearly established that the deceased 
consort intended to adopt (art. 294, 295, of the Quebec Civil Code).
See Report on the Quebec Civil Code, Vol. II, 2, pp 192-3; for further 
discussion on the preference for marriage see D.H.S.S. & S.W.S.G.Sc., A 
Guide to Adoption Practice, pars. Ill, 11-12, pp 26-7; Cassanmagnago,
Laria Luisa, "Social Trends in Adoption and Foster Care", in A.C.T.A.,
World Conference on Adoption and Foster Placement (Milan, 1971), i.e. 
pp 13-17.
38. Bevan & Parry, Children Act, 1975, p.40; also infra under V.
39. see supra Chapter 4 on aspects of the welfare; Agni Rousopoulou, "Again
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the Secrecy of Adoption" (1971) Neon Dikaion 27: 1970.
40. "Introductory Report of the L.D. 4532/1966", op. cit. 203; and "Intro­
ductory Report of the L.D. 610/1970" X1970), Kodix No.V. 18; 865.
41. Although, consent of the spouse of the applicant presupposes that both
partners in a marriage are actively in favour of adoption in many 
instances the spouse agrees simply in order to please the other. However, 
because Greek law does not recognise the rule "child accepted into the 
family" the legal links with the consenting spouse are very loose which 
may turn against the interests of the child. A deep investigation into 
the matter may be of great help and under certain circumstances it may
be appropriate to treat the application as one of a single person.
42. Cmnd. 5107, par. 101. p.28.
43. For instance de facto fostering when the welfare of the child requires
the situation not to be disturbed. It depends on the age and understanding 
of the child,however, whether that relationship can be transformed to one 
of parent and child.
44. Sect. 15 (1) (b) : of the 1978 Act.
45. Re F. (R) (an Infant) [l97o] 1 Q.B. 385, Inability to find the other must
exist at the date of hearings, Mr. and Mrs. O (Petrs), 1950 S.L.T., 64.
46. Either kind of separation produce fiscal effects. See Clive & Wilson,
Husband and Wife, p.436. See also Bevan and Parry, Children Act, p.41.
47. Clive and Wilson, Husband and Wife, p.436. Ettenfield v. Ettenfield ['.1940'j
P. 96. ^
48. Hopes V. Hopes [l949’,], f .227; Mouncer v. Mouncer [l972.] 1 All. E.R, 289.
As cited by Freeman, Children Act 1975, c72/ll note in Subs. (1).
49. Freeman, supra.
50. See Clark, Hall and Morrison, Children and Young Persons ,(London; 
Butterworths,19^7 )p.523; whether this has been sufficiently indicated 
c.f. Clive and Wilson, Husband and Wife, p.437, 410.
51. Bevan and Parry, Children Act 1975, p.41.
52. ibid. p.41.
53. see Freeman, Children Act 1975, c72/ll. note in sub.s.(l).
54. Bevan and Parry, Children Act, 1975, p.41.
55. The consent of the spouse is a substantial prerequisite of adoption 
Appeal Court of Athens 991/1967, No. V. 15: 585. Therefore whether such 
reason exists or not is subject to the judgement of the court of adoption.
See also Tousis, Family Law, Vol. B ., p.218.
56. V3. V. 12 : 919.
57. Applying by analogy the ground of de facto separations, A certain degree 
of permanence in the reasons must be present. \hllindas, Family Law,
p.213.
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58. Michaelidis Nouaros, "Some Observations on the reform of adoption", in 
The Child and the Law, p.274.
59. See Michaelidis Nouaros, Family Law (Univ. Textbook), p.322; Idem, "About 
the voidness of adoption", op. cit. p. 485, 486.
60. Bromley, Family Law, p.359; Saario, V. V. A Study of Discrimination 
Against Persons born out of Wedlock, (New York : United Nations, 1967), 
p.153.
61. See supra note 41. City Court of \ëroia 524/1953 E .E.N. 21, 527, See
\allindas. Family Law, p.214, held consent as an objective prerequisite
that must exist at the first hearing; Atsalakis, St., Erm. Ak 2476 (11) .
This approach, although offered for adoptions performed under the Civil 
Code provisions, for the reasons stated is more appropriate for adoptions 
for minors.
62. For the obligation of the spouse to accept the child into the family and
for his limited obligation to provide aliment arising from moral duty.
See Atsalakis, Erm.Ak. 1476(11),(13), G. Michaelidis Nouaros, Family Law, 
(Athens, 1953) par 94 note (3), contra Balls, Family Law, par 55(4), p.120.
63. See for example Prachican^Chr. Family Law, (Athens, 1953) , par 148, p.445, ff; 
Balls in Themis 65: 18 {Opinion); Roilos (-Koumantos) , Family Law, 1568- 
1588 Prolegomena C .; Michaelidis Nouaros, "About the Voidness of 
Adoption", op. cit. pp 482-4.
64. Roilos (-Koumantos) Family Law, 1573 (10); Appeal Court of Patra 128/1947,
E.E.N. 14, 481; Tousis, Family Law, Vol. B. p226, note (15).
65. See supra note 61.
66. Michaelidis Nouaros, Family Law (Univ. Textbook), p.322. Appeal Court of
Athens 991/1967, Mb. V. 15:585.; Appeal Court of Athens 1545/1972
Dikaiosyni (1973), 314.
67. Tousis, Family Law, Vol. B, p.218; Vallindas, Family Law, p.214;
This receives suppoitin a number of decisions holding that a third party 
claiming a personal family or succession right (AP 228/1964, No.V. 12 682) 
may apply for the revocation of the order because the applicant does not 
meet any of the conditions of articles 1568-1577 of the Greek Civil Code
- amidst them consent of the spouse: AP 695/1970, No.V. 19: 175,
AP 253/1973, No.V. 21 : 1087.
68. Tousis, Family Law, Vol. B. p.218 and note (28). The court, therefore,
before any discussion on the merits has to examine whether consent is 
provided and if not whether it should be dispensed with.
59. Art. 6 (2) of the LD. 610/1970.
70. Tousis, Family Law, \bl. B, p.218.
71. Spyridakis, Civil Code, \bl. 4, 1573, Xlj.
72. Cmnd. 9248, par. 33, p.9.
73. Cmnd. 5107, par. 73, p.20.
74. \hs. 33, 1, 12; Hell. Nomosch. 1874, art. 362.
75. Art. 1568 of the Greek Civil Code; article 2 of the L 4532/1966.
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76. Balls, Family Law, pp 362-3 in 3; \hllindas. Family Law, p.210;
Spyridakis, Civil Code, \bl. 4, 1568 (1).
77. Art. 1581 of the Greek Civil Code; Tousis, Family Law, Vcl. B, p.210,
230; \^llindas, Family Law, pp 211-212, 220.
78. Article 1570 of the Greek Civil Code : Unless adopted with the same
court order. Article 5 of the L.D. 4532/1966 subject to the exception that 
further adoption was permitted if the already adopted child suffered from 
an incurable disease. Michaelidis Nouaros, Family Law ’(Univ. Textbook) , 
p.326. This provision is a corollary enacted for the same reasons that 
prevented adoptions by applicants with issue of their own. Thus it aims 
to prevent conflict between a first and a second adoptee and protect the 
interests of the already adopted. The first argument freed opposition
even in the pre-code law by K. Rallis who argued "the fear of possible 
friction and conflicts is almost non-existent, taking into consideration 
that the adopted children are normally of very young age ; therefore it is 
the responsibility of the adopter to prevent the creation of such 
instincts of conpetitiveness between them by offering the appropriate 
education". (About the Institution of Adoption, (1891) , p.40, as cited 
by Michaelidis Nouaros, "Adoption Law Reform", op. cit. p.1030.)
As regards the protection of the interests of the adoptee, i.e. succession 
rights it has been argued that since adoption is basically a contract 
its content cannot be altered unilaterally but only with the consent of 
the other party (Roilos (-Koumantos), Family Law, 1569 (4). Michaelidis 
Nouaros has opposed this approach arguing that from a legal point of view 
adoption is as much a judicial act as a contract whose results are pre­
defined in the law; besides from a moral point of view, as the first 
child cannot prohibit the parents from giving birth to other children, 
in the same manner the existence of the first adoptee cannot prevent 
further adoptions. "Adoption Law Reform", op. cit. p.1030. A justification 
for the prohibition is given by Rousopoulou who envisages the restriction 
as necessary since with rapid industrialization and the demand for cheap 
labour after the Second World War abuses of adoption were mostly expected 
given the poor legislation on child protection and the indisputable 
parental authority at that time. "The Reform under Consideration" op. cit. 
1235. The paradoxical point, however, about article 1569 is that adoption 
is permitted without any restriction of more than one child, which, 
at least in terms of child welfare, is a major defect because a parent who 
wished to adopt more than one child had to undertake the extensive 
responsibilities of bringing up several children simultaneously instead of 
proceeding to a second and subsequent adoption : Michaelidis Nouaros
Family Law (Univ. Textbook) pp 313-4.
Idem "Adoption Law Reform", op. cit. p.1030 and notes (22) ,(25) : The
Committee appointed by the Ministry of Justice in 1959 proposed modification 
of the law so as to permit second adoption after 3 - 5  years provided 
that the applicant satisfies the welfare requirements/. Finally, article 5 
of the L.D. 610/1970, allowed the adoption of several children under the 
same order or subsequently; Magistrates' Court of Evros, 159/1970, 
Dikaiosyni (1971): 137.
79. Vallindas, Family Law, p.210; Tousis, Family Law, Vol. B, p.209, note (1)
80. Article 1583 of the Greek Civil Code ; vallindas. Family Law, 221-2.
81. Michaelidis Nouaros, Family Law (Univ. Textbook), p.312; Tousis, Family 
Law, V)l. B, p.210.
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82. Tousis, Family Law, VdI. B. p.209, note (1)
83. E.E.N. 14.226.
84. In favour of childlessness': Tousis, Family Law, \bl. B, p.209,
Michaelidis Nouaros, "Adoption Law Reform", op. cit. p.1030; See contra 
Enrico Forni, "Adoption in Modern Society : A challenge", i.e. p.115-7,
Angelo \accano "Family of Blood and Adoptive Family" and Giacomo Rerico, 
intervention p.93 in A.C.T.A. World Conference on Child Adoption and 
Foster Care (Milan 1971); The Advisory Council on Child Care. (D.H.S.S.
& S.W.S.G.Sc., A Guide to Adoption Practice), has been particularly 
cautious about the suitability of childless couples for adoption. As it 
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to infertility and the age of the applicants, as well as the actual duration 
of marriage are all inter-linked and interwoven in any relevant assessment. 
The adopters themselves should have come to terms with their infertility 
or their inability to have further children on their own". Furthermore 
referring to the research of Michaels, R, and Brenner, R.F. (A Follow-up 
Study of Adoptive Families (New York, 1951), and Humphrey, M. (The Hostage 
Seekers (Longmans 1969) it points out that "... for successful adoptive 
parenthood, couples who have been told that there is no known reason for 
their failure to conceive need a longer time to come to terms with this 
before applying as adopters than do those whose infertility is known to 
be organic", par. Ill, 13, pp27-8. For further review on the research 
see Lambert and Streather, Children in Changing Families, pp. 36-45.
The condition has been bitterly criticized by Risotaxis (Health and Welfare 
Services, p.128) , as causing undue humiliation by entering a strictly 
personal matter with the possibility of affecting adversely the conjugal 
relationship. It almost makes the act of adoption a sort of stigma, an 
official end to the hopes of a childless couple, and there appears to be 
no valid reason for it since the couple who have taken the serious step 
of adoption will not stop caring for the adopted child if they have a child 
of their own. In addition, she regards the lack of selfish motives for 
couples, with children, who want to adopt as a valid reason for repealing 
the condition altogether.
85. See Tousis, Family Law, Vol. B. p.209 and authors cited in note '(1) .
Against the importance of the succession rights,Rousopoulou "The Reform 
under Consideraton", op. cit. p.1235, idem "Again the Secrecy of Adoption", 
op. cit. p. 171 also Luciano, Leonor Ines, "Adoption in the Far East" in 
A.C.T.A. World Conference on Adoption and Foster Placement (Milan, 1971) ,
i.e. p 252, 266.
86. Article 12(2) of the European Convention which came into force on April 26, 
1968 provides that "a person who has, or is able to have, a child born ih 
lawful wedlock, shall not on that account be prohibited by law from adopting 
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87. G. Michaelidis Nouaros. "The law on Adoption in Greece", in The Unprotected 
Infant, pp 59-70, p.74.
88. Spinellis, "Law of Adoption in Greece and Israel", op. cit. p.184.
89. Rousopoulou "The Reform Under Consideration", op. cit. p.1237; Spinellis, S 
"Law of Adoption in Greece and Israel", op. cit. p. 184 and note 123; 
Michaelidis Nouaros, "Some Observations on the Reform of Adoption Law in
Greece" in Bates, The child and the law p 273.
90. Appeal Court of Aegeon 84/1972, No. V. 21 : 1364.
91. See "Introductory Report of the L.D. 610/1970", op. cit. p.866;
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children see Pringle, Mia Kellmer, The Needs of Children, (London, 
Hutchinson, 1975), pp 117-123; for the assessment that must be made, 
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pp 138-147.
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104. ibid. par. 98, p.27.
105. See ibid. par. 101, p.28 and par. 98, p.27.
106. Sect. 15 (3), (a) (b)
107. Bevan and Parry, Children Act 1975, pp 53-4.
108. ibid. p. 54; Cmnd 5107, par. 102, p.28.
109. Grand. 5107, par. 101. p.28.
110. ibid. par. 101, 102, pp 27-8.
111. see Scottish Law Statutes (1978). c.28/16 note in Subsection (3);
Bevan and Parry, Children Act 1975, p.55.
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112. Kostaras, "The Adoption of Illegitimate Children", op. cit. p.911.
The prohibition was supported by the Pandectists with the revival
of the Roman Law in Europe because it was considered that allowing the 
adoption of natural children would bring confusion between artificial 
and blood relations. The inward concern, however, was that, if adoption 
was permitted, concubinage and marriage would have the same consequences, 
to the damage of the latter.
113. Michaelidis Nouaros "Adoption Law Reform", op. cit. p.1029, argues 
that the drafters of the civil code brought in a wider form the 
Justinian prohibition of adoption of illegitimate children. The first 
rule ever recorded is that of Justinus (L.7. C (4,27)) later confirmed 
by Justinian (Novel 89, ch. 7, 11, par 2): Katopodis Family Law, p 266, 
prohibiting the adoption of children born in concubinage. When concubin­
age ceased to be recognised as a family law institution there was 
nothing to debar the adoption of illegitimate children. The courts, 
however, preserved the rule, making the distinction between affiliated 
and non-affiliated children (Appeal Court of Athens 1598/1893V Themis 4, 
569). Thus an adulterine could be validly adopted by his natural 
father insofar as paternity had not been established. City Court of 
Athens, 1619/1918, Themis 29:270; City Court of \blos 1247/1936, 
Dikaiosyni 9 : 729.
114. According to Kostaras "Adoption of Illegitimate Children", op. cit. 
p. 912, the article has been borrowed from the Italian Civil Code of 
1865, article 205 providing a general prohibition of the adoption of 
illegitimate children. Similar provision is to be found in the 
Samian Code art. 296, and abroad in the Rumanian Civil Code 1864, the 
Spanish Civil Code of 1888 and the Belgian Civil Code of 1898 reflecting 
the spirit of the period against illegitimacy.
115. ibid. p.192. The drafters of the Civil Code took the original form 
of the article 203 despite the fact that, as modified in 1938, it 
distinguishes between affiliated and non-affiliated children 
{article 293); see also Todsis, Family Law, Vol B, p.214, note 15.
116. The decision of the City Court of Piraeus, 1855/1948. Themis 59:925, 
held that even when the applicant admits paternity before a court of 
law hearing on adoption the court must not refrain from issuing an 
order if paternity has not otherwise been established; Balis, Family 
Law par. 172.2, p.357, and \Allindas (Family Law, p. 211) incline to 
the opinion that in such cases the court has to consider the moral 
aspect involved and refuse to grant decree. See also Michaelidis 
Nouaros, Family Law (Univ. Textbook), p. 313; Contra Kostaras, "The 
Adoption of Illegitimate Children, op. cit. p.912, who holds the position 
existing in the pre-code law. Thus if there is no legal link with
the father he can validly apply for the adoption of the child.
117. "Introductory Report of the L.D. 610/1970", op. cit. p.866.
118. Article 1530 of the Greek Civil Code. For the need to give wider 
assurance in illegitimate relations see Rousopoulou. "The Reform Under 
Consideration", op. cit. p. 1237; Michaelidis, Nouaros, "Adoption Law 
Reform", op. cit.pl029-30.
119. Article 1584 of the Greek Civil Code.
120. Article 82(2) of the Bill.
121. "Introductory Report of the L.D. 4532/1966", p. 205.
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122. "Some observations on the reform of adoption" in Bates, The Child 
and the Law, p. 273.
123. Koussidou, T.J. "Foster Care in Greece: Existing Programs and Problems"
in A.C.T.A., World Conference on Adoption and Foster Placements (MilAn, 
1971) .
124. ibid. p. 476. Only 6 of the children were placed with foster parents
with a view to adoption.
125. Risatakis, Health and Welfare Services, p. 126, 127.
126. in Michalacopoulou, N. "The Children of Bad Luck", op. cit.
127. pp 44-5; For the ineffectiveness of Greek social services to meet
the need for proper family surroundings for children see Risataki, Health 
and Welfare Services, pp 126-7.
128. p. 45.
129. Article 1584 of the Greek Civil Code; Appeal Court of Athens 2447/1968, 
Armen, 23 : 346.
130. Vallindas, Family Law, p. 222.
131. cf. articles 1579, 1813, 1825 of the Greek Civil Code and 1539.
132. Article 54 to reform article 1501 of the Greek Civil Code.
133. Article 86 to reform article 1537 of the Greek Civil Code.
134. Article 93 to reform article 1555 of the Greek Civil Code.
135. see articles 1545 to 1549 of the Greek Civil Code and articles 89, 90,
91, 92 of the Bill.
136. Section 12 (1) (3) of the 1978 Act; Cmnd 5701 par. 110 p. 30.
137. Art. 1580 (2) of the Greek Civil Code; the father's rights are that 
of illegitimacy; Vallindas, Family Law, pp 219-220.
138. See Grey, Eleanor, A Survey of Adoption in Great Britain (London 
HMSO, 1971) p.94; in Greece a rise of such adoptions must be expected 
after the approval and support given to them with the L.D. 610E1970; 
articles 1(3) and 3. see the Introductory Report, pp 865-5.
139. See for example Z v. Z 1954 S.L.T. Igh. Ct)i 47, A. and B. v. C . 1978
S.L.T. (aiCb) 55; B and B/1936 S.C. 256; I and I (Petrs) 1947 S.C.
485.
140. Cmnd. 5107, par. 105, p.29,
141. ibid. par. 106, p. 29, and pars. 109-110, p.30.
142. ibid. par. 107, p. 29.
143. ibid. par 109, p. 30 and recommendation no 20, p. 31.
144. supra under III, b.
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145. Article 5(2) of the L.D. 610/1970.
146. The:' child on divorce will be considered as natural for the one 
parent and adoptive for the other. The adoptive parent's spouse can 
adopt the child but not the spouse of the natural parent; see for 
Scots Law supra Under I.
147. Cmnd. 5701 par. Ill, 112, p.30 ; see Mrs. D. (Petr) 1951 S.L.T. (Sh.QzJ , 
19; B and B . 1965 S.C. 44.
148. Working Paper on Adoption, par. 31; Cmnd 5701, par 113, 114, pp30-l.
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CHAPTER SIX
1. Article 1577(2) reads now in conjunction with article 11(a) (b) of 
the L.D. 610/1970.
2. Although the L.D. repeats the grounds of the Civil Code it innovates
by imposing a duty on the court not only to receive evidence as to whether 
consent is unattainable but also to investigate whether dispensing with 
parental agreement will be conducive to the child's welfare. Thus assessment 
will not be restricted to whether the evidence received proves 
unattainability of consent but should extend to whether the natural 
relation should be severed.
3. Article llXb) of the L.D. 610/1970; after hearing the nearest relatives.
4. Article 1577(c) of the Greek Civil Code; after hearing the opinion of 
the Justice of Peace acting as the family council if the child is 
illegitimate, article 1665(2) of the Greek Civil Code; if legitimate, 
this is composed of the nearest relatives and the Justice of Peace as - 
president: article 1612 of the Greek Civil Code.
5. Cmnd. 5107 pars. 188, 190, pp 54-5.
6. D.H.S.S. & S.W.S.G.Sc. A Guide to Adoption Practice, par II 27-35,
pp 19-22, i.e. par II, 31.
7. Spinellis, "The Law of Adoption in Greece and Israel", op. cit. p.174-5.
See also for the importance attached to this aspect by courts infra in 
dispensing with parental agreement.
8. H . and H . (petrs.) 1944 S.C. 347.
9. Section 16(1) (b) (I) of the 1978 Act.
10. ibid. it can be any information that will increase the parent's
understanding and help him in reaching a mature decision. The information 
has to be general and to satisfy the existing parental anxiety about
the future of the child. But, although there is nothing to stop the parent 
from saying that "I will agree provided that I know who the people are 
and I can visit the surroundings where my child is to brought up", such a 
request is unjustifiable and challenges the entire welfare network surround­
ing the adoption : see B and B (pets) 1946 S.L.T. (ShCtj , 36.
11. Cmnd. 5107, pars. 228, 229, 230, p.65.
12. The protection provided for parental rights in Section !10 (b) of the
Guardianship Act 1973 is absolute. The right to consent cannot be 
limited nor otherwise renounced.
13. Section 6 of the Adoption Act, 1958, to read in conjunction with Section 1
and 4 of the Adoption of Children (Sederunt) Act 1959.
14. Sect. 55(1) of the 1978 Act.
15. Sect. 16(4) of the 1978 Act; also supra.
16. Still in force by reference; article 8 of the L.D. 610/1970.
17. Art. 12 of the L.D. (part (1) gives the discretionary power to the
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court on the request of either party or when it thinlcs appropriate 
to remit the consenting procedure to a rapporteur; part (3). The 
names of the parties must be kept secret and part (4) recognises
maintenance of the requested confidentiality as an official duty (invoking
certain penalties) of the judge and the officials involved.
18. Tousis, Family Law, Vol B., p.220 and note (3); A.P. 657/1974, No. V.
23: 272: Consent of the parent is given by reason of the blood relation­
ship and the emotional link involved, and not as that of a person 
exercising parental rights. This is a major controversy in Greek law 
since what is least affected by adoption is the blood relationship, art. 
1583 of the Greek Civil Code.
19. Articles 1575, 1576 of the Greek Civil Code; A.P. 695/1970, No. V, 19:175;
A.P. 650/1969, No. V. 18 : 535, A.P. 253/1973 No.V. 21:1087.
20. A contrario from article 11 of the L.D.
21. Article 10(1) of the L.D.
22. Article 1575 of the Greek Civil Code; Michaelidis Nouaros, Family Law 
(University Textbook), p.315; Balls, Family Law, par. 174 (6).
23. Article 14 of the L.D.; Risatakis, Health and Welfare Services,
p. 128.
24. See supra note 12; Section 16(1)(b).
25. c.f. sub.sect. (3)(a) and (7) of Section 12 of the Act.
26. Mr. and Mrs. O. (petrs) 1950 S.L.T. (ShCt) 64; X v Y 1967 S.L.T. (Sh.Ct )
87; A.B. (petr.^ ) 1975 S.L.T. (ShCt) 49.
27. A.B. and C.B. (petrs) (Appelants) 1963 S.C. 124.
28. A.B. and C.B. supra, per Lord President, p. 137. See also Terry, J.
A Guide to the Children Act 1975, (London : Sweet and Maxwell, 1976) , p.33
29. Section 63(1) of the 1978 Act but he is deem ed a relative of the child.
30. A. V. B. 1955 S.C. 378; Cmnd 5107, par 192, p. 36; according to
Wilkinson, "Children Act 1975", op. cit. pp 237-8, the agreement of the 
putative father may be needed when the mother alone seeks to adopt 
since the expression "natural parent" in Section 13X3) comprehends the 
putative father as opposed to the term parent alone which by ordinary rules 
of construction does not.
31. Section 63(1) of the Act 1978; the change in respect to the father 
having custody was first introduced by the present Act.
32. Under Section 2 of the Act.
33. Under Section 9 of the Act.
34. Sect. 18(7) of the 1978 Act; Cmnd 5107 par 193-194 pp 56-7 and 
recommendation no 47, see the Adoption of Children (Sederunt) Act 1959 
sect.8(c).
35. Normally this will be expected to be done by the agency,Cmnd 5107 par. 195 
p.52, and recommendation no. 48.
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36. Cmnd. 5107, p. 196, p. 57; But the court needs to be satisfied
that he does not wish to be involved or that the agency has taken all 
reasonable steps to trace the father.
37. Tousis, Family Law, Vol. B. p 220, 222; Spyridakis, Civil Code, Vol. 4. 
art. 1577 note 3; A.P. 724/1976, E.E.N., 43 : 878.
38. City Court of Thessaloniki, 1326/1950. Armenopoulos, 4 : 400.
39. Appeal Court of Patras, 198/1963, No. V. 12 ; 215 Xboth parents with 
limited capacity; in the same decision it was held to be irrelevant that 
the father exercises patria potestas-consent of both parents is validly 
needed).
40. See supra note 39; the Appeal Court of Athens 1543/1972, Arm. 26: 855,
held that the widowed mother who failed to call for the appointment of a
guardian for her child after marrying (1595 of the Greek Civil Code), 
though de jure deprived from guardianship rights, validly consents to the 
child's adoption as the only living parent.
41. Article 12(c) of the L.D. see infra in Section BII.
42. Article 281 of the Greek Civil Code, see infra in Section B IV.
43. City Court of Athens, 765/1969 No. V. 17 : 990.
44. A.P. 657/1974, No. V. 23: 272 even when she is a minor having the limited 
capacity of article 129 of the Greek Civil Code her personal agreement is 
needed.
45. Appeal Court of Athens 2905/1972, No. V. 21: 67.
46. Appeal Court of Athens, 1543/1972. Arm. 26 ; 855.
47. Article 1577 (3). He is not a parent within the meaning of part (2) of
the same article, see supra note 45.
48. The right of the father to acknowledge the child is unlimited and gives
him a decisive power to veto adoption whenever he wishes to assume the care
of the child. Where the mother does not intend to continue, or she has 
turned out to be unfit for, having care, the father has a lawful interest 
needing protection and therefore the court must exercise its power under 
article 753 of the Code of Civil Procedure. If the father acknowledges 
the child the future of the order will be determined by applying the tests 
of article 2(1) of the L.D.
49. Cmnd 5107 par. 195 p.57; For criticisms see Turner, Improving the Lot of
Children, p. 39; Samuels A. "Reports of Committees" (1970), 33 M.L.R.
684, p . 685.
50. Cmnd 5107, par. 196, p. 57.
51. W. P. no 74, p.85.; also see Burges, Linda C, "The Unmarried Father in
Adoption Planning" in Tod, R. Social Work in Adoption: collected papers
(London : Longman, 1971) (1980), pp 21-2.
52. "Reports of Committees" (1980) 43 M.L.R. 299, at pp. 301-4.
53.ibid. p. 303.
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54,., ibid, p. 303.
55. Skalts, "Legal Situation of Children K>rn outside Marriage", in The Human 
Rights of those Born out of Wedlock pp 6-20; See also article 299 of the 
draft of the Quebec Civil Code.
56. ibid. p. 9-10, 20; A full account of the practice of an adoption agency
in the United States to invite the father to cooperate in planning for 
adoption and its beneficial results, see Burgess "The gnmarried Father in 
Adoption Planning", op. cit. pp 23-29.
57. Clive, "Aspects of Illegitimacy", op. cit. p. 235.
58. Turner, Improving the Lot of Children born outside Marriage, p. 48, in
4 (iii) (a) .
59. ibid. pp 30-32, 48 in 4 (iii) (b) .
60. ibid. p. 32; Clive, "Aspects of Illegitimacy", p. 237.
61. W.P. 74, par. 65, p. 86.
62. ibid. par. 6.6, p. 86.
63. See for instance: Hayes, "Reports of Committees" in 43 M.L.R., p. 304.
64. W.P. no 74, p. 6.6, p.86; for the similar process in the Draft of the
Quebec Civil Code see articles 298, 299, 307, 310.
65. Article 1471 of the Greek Civil Code.
66. See supra Chapter 1 in C.I.
67. See articles 41, 42, 43, 44 of the Bill prepared by Gazi Committee.
68. Cmnd. 5107 par 200, p.58.
69. ibid. par 201, p. 58.
70. ibid. par. 199-203, pp 58-9.
71. See Fisher "Adoption and the Courts", op. cit. p. 148.
72. Cmnd 5107, par 201, p. 58.
73. ibid. par 202, p. 58.
74. ibid. par 202, p. 58.
75. ibid. par 203, recommend 50, p. 59.
76. See ibid, par 199, p. 58; For review of Scottish authorities on the
matter see : Burman v . Burman, 1929 S.C. 362 per Lord Murray, p. 364;
The husband may not be involved if the evidence presented amounts to absolute 
proof; relevant also. A and A (petrs) , 1949 S.L.T. (Sh.Ct.) 77.
77. Cmnd. 5107, par 202, p.58.
78. See Wilkinson v. Bain (1880) 8 R 72 per Lord Young at p.73 for considerations
relevant to the point raised here; also Fisher, "Adoption and the Courts",
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op. cit. p. 148; for opinions on the risks of collusion involved in 
declarators of Bastardy, see : Dickson, Evidence (3rd ed) par 284;
Walker and Walker, The Law of Evidence in Scotland, p. 168; Burman v . Burman, 
supra per Lord Murray, p. 368-9.
79. Cmnd. 5107, par 202, p. 58.
80. See Imre v. Mitchell, 1958 S.C. 439.
81. 1949 S.L.T. (ShCt) 77.
82. 1953 S.L.T. (Notes) 10.
83. per Lord Patrick, p. 11.
84. 1958 S.C. 439.
85. Relevant also is Wilkinson v. Bain (1880) 8 R 72.
86. See per Lord Ordinary p. 441, i.e. pp 455-6.
87. See per the Lord President at p. 463; per Lord Sorn at p. 473; per 
Lord Carmont, pp 469-70.
88. Per the Lord President, pp 462-3.
89. Per Lord Sorn, p. 475.
90. Cmnd 5701, pars. 200 and 202, p. 58.
91. Per the Lord President, pp 463-4; for the value of such declarations 
as evidence see Burman v. Burman, 1929 S.C. 362.
92. Cmnd. 5701 par 202, p. 58.
93. In line with the suggestion made earlier that once the action of paternity
is raised it must be irrevocable and the court will have ex-officio the
duty to continue the proceedings, it seems appropriate where the mother
has led evidence against her husband for the court to order proof to be
taken on the matter. Apart from the reasons explained in the text an 
additional one is that mother balancing the consequences will have second 
thoughts before raising the matter.
94. Sect. 65(1) under (a) of the 1978 Act; see also infra the relevant appendix.
95. Section 65(1) under (b) of the 1978 Act
96. Art. 1589 of the Greek Civil Code; See and relevant appendix infra.
97. Arts. 1603, 1662 of the Greek Civil Code; City Court of Thessaloniki,
142/1973, Armen. 27 : 603.
98. Article 1599 of the Greek Civil Code.
99. Article 1601 of the Greek Civil Code.
100. The duties of the guardian do not extend beyond representation and admin­
istration of his property (Article 1631 of the Greek Civil Code) to rights 
affecting the status of the child if the parents of the child are alive 
(1577(3)) save the exceptions of article 11(1) of the LD. City Court of
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Thessaloniki 142/1973, Armen. 27:603. Thus consent of the guardian is 
needed for parentless children who are not deemed of unknown parentage 
or foundlings.
101. Although care proceedings and adoption present a basic difference - the
latter being irrevocable - as social measures of preventive character they
share a lot in common. Thus the tests applied in judging the performance
of the parent in his duties as a basis for dispensing with consent in 
adoption must be in line with the tests applied in care proceedings subject 
to the irrevocability of the adoption order. In this respect valuable 
information has been taken for the following part from the works of 
Clive E. "Getting Children out of dangerous homes" 1976 S.L.T., 201-8; 
idem, "Refusing to return children to dangerous homes", 1976 S.L.T. 265-271; 
Graham Hall, J., "Protecting children from their parents - grounds for 
state intervention", 1980 10 Family Law, 201-3. . MacEwan, J.N.S., "Powers
and duties of Local Authorities with regard to Children", 1971 S.L.T., 89-92. 
Freeman, M.D.A. "Removing babies at birth : a questionable practice", 1980
Family Law, 313-4; and Middleton, D.N., "Child Abuse, Child Neglect and 
the Law's Remedies" ( 1980), 48, 8 .C.O.L.A.G. 128-130.
102. Article 11 (a)(b) of the L.D.
103. Article 11(c) of the L.D.
104. Article 281 of the Greek Civil Code; Spyridakis, Civil Code, Vol. 4, 1577 
(4); Michaelidis Nouaros "Functional rights and their abuse", in Honorary 
Volume in Memory of Professor Maridakis, (Athens University, 1967) , Sup­
plement p.1-61 at p.45 in relation to children in institutions.
105. Mitchell v. Wright (1905) 7F, 568, per Lord Dunedin, p. 574.
106. c.f. Children and Young Persons (Scotland) Act, 1937, S.12, as cited in
S.L.S. (1978), c. 28/16, subs. (2)(a).
107. Sevan and Parry, Children Act 1975, p. 39; English Courts held that the 
conduct must be such as to give rise to criminal liability : Watson v . 
Nikolaisen [,,1955^ ] 2QB 286, but it is suggested that there is little justif­
ication for incorporating this additional requirement into the law of 
adoption especially since Parliament had not expressed such intention.
S.L.S. (1978), C28/16, subs. (2) (d) .
108. Re C.S.E.[ 1960.]l W.L.R. 304; Re M [l96s], 109 Sol.u.574. The ground 
most probably will apply against the putative father for whom paternity 
has not been established though his conduct may be taken into consideration 
if he has been informed of the pregnancy.
109. The Draft of the Quebec Civil Code article 307 (3) confronts the problem 
of de facto abandonment by imposing time limits. Thus there "may be
declared eligible for adoption: (3) a child whose care, maintenance or
education has not in fact been assumed by either his father or his mother 
for more than six months;" see and Report on the Quebec Civil Code, Vol.II, 
part 1, p. 197.
110. Bevan, H.H. The Law Relating to Children (London, Butterworths, 1973), p.349
111. Bevan and Parry, Children Act 1975, p. 38.
112. Cmnd 9248, par 120 and Cmnd 5701, pars. 205, 219, p.59, 62.
113. Re P (infants) [l962], AllE.R. 789.
532
See cases below; Also MacEwan, J.N.S. "Powers and Duties of Local 
authorities with Regard to Children", op. cit. i.e. p.p. 90-91.
Children Act 1975, p. 38; The number of children that could be subjected 
to this resolution by reason of abuse or neglect in Scotland may be as 
high as 1100, see Middleton "Child Abuse, Child Neglect and the Law's 
Remedies, "op. cit. p.128.
Re P (infants), op. cit.
|1965,] 109 Sol. J. 574.
[i960], 1 W.L.R. 304.
The point is of the most contradictory since failure to visit obviously 
counts against the parent. At the same time it is necessary to prevent 
emotional disturbance while the child is adjusting with the applicants. For 
the natural parents not to visit on such good grounds will strengthen the 
position of the adopters.
1973, All. E.R. 1001.
The term first appeared in Re B (an infant) ^96Sj, Ch. 204, per Goff, J. p.214,
referring to the father of a little girl of about six as having washed
his hands of her" so that his behaviour was "symptomatic of complete neglect".
per Boilings J. at p. 1007 distinguishes the meaning of persistent as to 
be a question of fact and degree rather than presuming any amount of 
permanency.
Per Sir G. Baker P. at p. 1005.
The Times, November 25, 1974.
[1973 ] All E.R. 1001, p. 1006.
See supra in Re M and Re C.S.E. and notes 108 and 119.
X V Y '1967' S.L.T. (ShCt) 87; The ground has been put under consideration
in H and H (petrs) 1976, S.L.T. 8, adoption by parent and step-parent.
A V. B 1955 S.C. 378, at p. 379 and 1955 S.L.T. 436. Proof held even in
camera might not have preserved the anonymity of the adopting parents which
it is one of the prime objects of the Adoption Act to preserve, since at a 
proof the parties are entitled to be present and among the parties the 
adopting parents are included.
X V Y supra p. 88: "In a case like the present where the petitioners are to
remain anonymous, there is a certain artificiality in seeking to determine 
whether the natural mother is acting reasonably or unreasonably in withholding 
her consent. She can never see to assess for herself, the prospects, 
favourable or unfavourable, which the adoption offers to her child, and must 
reach her decision on such information as can legitimately be imparted to 
her."; B and B (petrs) 1946 S.L.T. (Si.Gt.) 36 and supra note 10.
H.L. deb. Vol. 356 (1975) cols. 818-824 as cited in S.L.S. (1978) c. 28/16 
sub 2(3); See too Freemen "Removing Babies at Birth", op. cit. i.e. pp 133-4; 
Graham Hall, "Protecting Children from their Parents", op. cit. i.e. pp202-3.
See Bevan and Parry, Children Act 1975, p. 39. They argue, however, that
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the conduct of the parent must be of a kind and degree that would render 
the parent or guardian criminally liable. This in fact is a situation 
implying positive misconduct or gross negligence of the child's 
interests which must be carried out for such a period and to such a degree 
to satisfy the condition of persistence. This situation, however, 
resembles more to serious ill-treatment. See Graham Hall, "Protecting 
Children from their parents", op. cit. p. 201.
132. Cmnd. 5107, par 219, p. 62, par 220 (recom. no 52), p 63. For being 
of punitive character and therefore requiring careful application, see 
Terry, A Guide to the Children Act, 1975, p. 41.
133. Commitment of the child to care will vary between local authorities 
due to their different organisation and facilities. It may be possible 
for a child to remain with his family and be rehabilitated there because 
the local authority can offer daily close supervision. Terry, A Guide 
to Children Act 1975, par 68.
134. Bevan and Parry, Children Act, 1975, p. 39.
135. ibid. pp 39-40.
136. Michaelidis Nouaros, "Some observations on the reform of adoption" in
Bates The Child and the Law, pp 276-7, article 11 (c) of the L.D. in 
conjunction with article 1524 of the Greek Civil Code.
137. City Court of Athens, 9617/1946, Themis 58 : 198, City Court of Athens, 
2183/1946, Themis 59 : 155.
138. City Court of Thessaloniki, 142/1973, Armen, 27 : 603; Appeal Court of
Athens, 4081/1955; E.E.N. 23: 915. Complete judicial recognition is
not included : Vallindas, Family Law, p. 217.
139. Magistrates' Court of Patra 1424/1966, Eel. Dik. 8 (1967) ; 95-6.
c.f. Appeal Court of Patra 127/1955, Armen. (1956): 318, Appeal Court 
of Athens, 4081/1955, E.E.N. 23: 915 and A.P. 237/1957, E.E.N. 24: 800;
140. Art. 306 of Penal Code
141. Fraud in the first instance and negligence in the second: Vavaretos, G .,
Penal Code (with commentaries), 5th ed. by Karra A. (Athens : Sakkoula, 1974) 
p. 944.
142. "Introductory Report of the L.D. 4532/1966", op. cit. p.206.
143. Michaelidis Nouaros, "Adoption Law Reform", op. cit. p. 1031.
144. Appeal Court of Thessaloniki, 60/1954; Magistrates Court of Thessaloniki, 
375/1954; A.P. 415/1966. See Vavaretos, Penal Code, p.943,945.
145. A.P. 16/1967; A.P. 271/1964; Vavaretos, Penal Code, p. 943.
146. Vavaretos, Penal Code, p. 940, 941, 943.
147. Though the article refers to the person exercising patria potestas it is 
submitted that it also covers the case of a mother substituting for the 
father (art. 1500(a) of the Greek Civil Code) or to the parent having 
the guardianship and custody of the child. Tousis, Family Law, Vol. B. 
p. 133; Spyridakis, Civil Code, Vol. 4, 1525 note 1; Articles 1590, 1592 
of the Greek Civil Code.
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148. Tousis, Family Law, vol. B, p. 132; Spyridakis, Civil Code,
Vol. 4, 1525, note (3); 1628.
149. Tousis, Family Law, Vol B, p. 133; the parent retains the right of 
access and to claim aliment of the child Spyridakis, Civil Code,
Vol. 4, 1525, note (e).
150. Art. 306 (1) of the Penal Code.
151. Article 312 (1) of the Penal Code; by applying the common socio-moral 
and educational criteria : Magistrates Court of Kalamata 323/1969 in 
Vavaretos, Penal Code, p.966.
152. Article 312(2) oftie Penal Code; See Vavaretos, Penal Code, p. 967:
it is not malicious if it is due to the inability or indifference of the 
parent, but it may affect custody see Tousis, Family Law, Vol. B, p. 417 
and note 8.
153. The cause of bodily injury or damage to the health is incorporated in 
both paragraphs of the article and constitutes grounds for depriving the 
father of patria potestas, article 1525 of the Greek Civil Code; for the 
mother see supra note 147. In consequence paternal authority over the 
child stops (Article 1526(1) of the Greek Civil Code) and the child is 
submitted to the guardianship of the mother, article 1590 of the Greek 
Civil Code.
154. Vavaretos, Penal Code, p. 967; Relevant also is article 360 of the Penal 
Code: Negligence of the supervision of a minor by persons having de jure 
or de facto the care of the child, p. 1122-3.
155. The parent who forfeited parental authority still has the right to consent
Appeal Court of Patra 198/1963, No. V. 12 : 215; Different is the draft of
the Quebec Civil Code article 307 (5) where the child is ipso jure eligible
for adoption if the parent has been deprived of parental authority, 
according to art. 359.
156. c.f. the measures applicable in the intances of art. 1524 and 1525, 1526 
of the Greek Civil Code.
157. Appeal Court of Athens, 871/1970, Armen, 24 : 886. City Court of
Halkidikis (Mon) 273/1971, Armen 26 : 350, Vallindas, Family Law, p. 177.
158. see supra in 157 also City Court of Thira (Mon.) 34/1971. Arch. Nom. 22,
316; in general in any abuse of rights deriving from parental
authority : Vallindas, Family Law, p. 177; Spyridakis, Civil Code, Vol.4.
1524, note (1).
159. See Tousis, Family Law, vol. B. p. 129, and note (1); relevant ton the
Appeal Court of Athens 1806/1949 Themis 61 ; 418.
160. Art. 1 of the Law of Assistance to Unprotected Children 4051/1960 and
article 1 of the Royal Decree 669/1961; "Introductory Report of the L.D. 
4532, 1966", op. cit. p.206 for the limited application of the ground.
161. E.E.N. 36 : 361.
162. E.E.N. 33 : 206 and Michaelidis Nouaros "Adoption Law Reform", op. cit.
p. 1031 and note 30.
163. For the circumstances of the case see Chapter 4 in the section dealing
with welfare in Greek law.
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164. Vallindas, Family Law, p. 277 for the incapacitated minor because of 
his inability to consent art. 1577(3); the reasons, however, are the 
grounds for the dissolution of adoptions in Greek law (infra Ch. 7); 
because of the high probability of those children showing ingratitude 
towards the adopter, children with criminal parents are not considered 
adoptable. Spinellis, "The Law of Adoption In Greece and Israel", op. cit. 
pp 173, most probably because the links with the natural family are ' 
retained after adoption.
165. E.E.N. 36 ; 361; see also comments by Kamenopoulos on the City Court of 
Athens 1141/1969, E.E.N. 36 562.
166. See article 1(1) (b) of the Royal Decree 795/1970. The services mentioned 
in sub.(a) of the same article have the discretion to deal with the child 
by placing it with foster parents or to call for the appointment of a 
guardian, or to commit the child to an institution of social assistance as 
long as the child has not broken the law. See "Introductory Report of the 
Compulsory Law, 2724/1940", and article 1 of the same law, in The Government 
Gazette, no. 449 (December 27, 1940), pp 3227,3228, 3230; Introductory 
Report of the LD. 4532, p 203, 206, and supra in note 160.
167. See "Introductory Report of Compulsory Law 2724/1940" op. cit. p. 3227 and 
art. 1 of the law; Article 122(c) (d) of Penal Code; see for the size
of the problem in numbers N.S.O.Gr. Statistics of Justice 1978, table 7(2) 
for the family background; table 8(1) for the reasons of commitment: 
first in the list is theft, second antisocial bëhaviouç third vagrancy 
and table 9(1) for the reasons of commitment in relation to the family 
background. It is a shared belief between commentators on criminality 
amonst adolescents that most of it is due to bad family conditions 
and that the children spend many years in rehabilitative institutions because 
there is no appropriate family situation to receive them back. see 
Gardikas, K. Criminology, (Athens, 1959).
168. Sect. 16(2) (a) of the 1978 Act.
169. Mr. and Mrs. O . (petrs) 1950 S.L.T., 64; Re F (R) [l970 ] 1 QB. 385.
170. Re R [1966 1,1 2 All. E.R. 613.
171. J. and J. v C's tutor 1948^ S.C. 636, per Lord President p.642. The
court exercises under the relevant statutes and Acts of Sederunt "the
widest discjcétLonary powers as to the investigation and verification at 
its own hand of all relevant facts"; Re F (R) ‘[l970'1lQB. 385 : if this
is not done leave to appeal out of time may be given if'iiàlLthe circumstances
it is right to do so.
172. Freeman, Children Act 1975, c72/12 sub (2); S.L.S. (1978) c.28/16
sub (2) (a); Bevan, The Law Relating to Children, p. 342; Re R [ 1966 1 
2 All. E.R. 613.
173. Article 1577 of the Greek Civil Code and 11(b) of the L.D. 610/1970; 
Vallindas, Family Law, pp 216;7; the assessment of the facts is subject
to the discretionary power of the court : Appeal Court of Athens, 1545/1972;
Dikaiosyni (1973), 314.
174. City Court of Athens, 751/1971, No. V. 19 : 766, "Introductory Report
of the L.D. 610/1970", op. cit. p. 866; to assess whether the care of the
child can be met within the extended family: c.f. with 11Xc) of the L.D. 
where such inquiry is not needed.
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175. City Court of Thessaloniki 142/1973, Armen, 27 : 603. Appeal Court of 
Athens, 4081/1955, E.E.N. 23 : 915; City Court of Verria 32/1947,
Themis, 60 : 39.
176. c:f. Appeal Court of Athens, 1545/1972. Dikaiosyni X1973) 314,
A.P. 650/1969 No. V 18'(1970) : 535; if the parent goes abroad or under­
goes hospital treatment he may consent formally with a notarial deed or
before a rapporteur judge ; "Introductory report of the L.D. 610/1970", 
op. cit. p. 866; article 10(2) of the L.D,; relevant and the City Court 
of Thira 434/1966, Hell. Dik. 8 : 91.
177. See Chapter four supra, S.L.S. (1978) c. 28/16 note in sub (2)(b);
Wilkinson "Children Act 1975", op. cit. p.222-225. Bevan and Parry 
Children Act 1975, Chapter 3 and pp 37-8.
178. A and A (petrs) 1971 S.C. 129, per Lord Reid at p. 141.
179. Re D , {[1977] 1 All. E.R. 145, per Lord Simon of Glaisdale at p. 161.
180. Re W (an Infant) [ H97l] 2 All. E.R. 49 at p.64.
181. See : Brown, "Parental Consent to Adoption", op. cit. p. 172, ff. and
authorities cited there; also the comments of Bates, P. "Consent in 
Adoption Cases and the Nature of the Relationship of Parent and Child", 
19771 S.L.T., p 4-6.
182. Re K (an infant) lO.B.117 per Jenkins, L.J. p. 129.
183. See Bevan, The Law Relating to Children, p. 343 and authorities cited 
there.
184. S.C. 124.
185. The court held with approval the opinion delivered by Lord Denning M.R.
in Re L [l962'j 106^ Sol. J. at p.611t "I must say that in considering 
whether she (i.e. the parent) is reasonable or unreasonable we must take 
into account the welfare of the child. A reasonable mother surely gives 
great weight to what is better for the child. Her anguish of mind is 
quite understandable: but still it may be unreasonable for her to withhold
consent. We must look and see whether it is reasonable or unreasonable 
according to what a reasonable woman in her place would do in all the 
circumstances of the case", per the Lord President (Clyde) p. 135. See 
also A.B. V. C.D. 1970 S.C. 268, per the Lord President (Clyde), p 269.
186. A.C. 682.
187. Re W (an Infant), [,,1970 1 2 QB. 589.
188. at p. 608.
189. A.B. and C.B. v. X ’s Curator 1963 S.C. 124.
190. Court of Session 11.12.1970. reported 1971^ S.C. (H.L.) 129.
191. per Lord Migdale, p. 138.
192. supra note 165.
193. A V. B and C 1971- S.C. (H*L.)129per Lord Simon of Glaisdale, p. 145
537
194. Per Lord Simon of Glaisdale, p. 145.
195. p. 141.
196. Cmnd 5107, p. 223, p. 63.
197. A. V  B. and C . 1971, S .C. {HL.)13per Lord Simon of Glaisdale, p. 146.
A.B. (petr.) 1975\ S.L.T. (ShiOt.) 49, X v Y 1967 S.L.T. (SijCt) 87;
Brown, "Parental consent to adoption", op. cit. pp 181-4.
198. Bevan, The Law Relating to Children, pp 345-6, and authorities cited there;
relevant too AB v C D 1970 S.C. 268; A v B and C 1971, S.C. (H.L.)
129 per Lord Guesf p.143.
199. A. V B. and C. 1971,s.'C.(hL) 12Q per Lord Reid p.142; per Lord Simon of
Glaisdale, p. 147-8; Re C (an. Infant) [Ï 964], 3 All. E.R. 495, per Diplock,
L.J.
200. A V B and C supra per Lord Reid, p. 142; Bates, Consent in Adoption Cases, 
p. 6.
201. Cmnd 5107 pars 287-290 pp 80-81.
202. See for example A v B and C supra; see also A.B. (petr) 1975 S.L.T.
(%Cb.) 49.
203. It is argued that the power of the court does not extend to children
living with their parents : see for example "Introductory Report of
the L.D. 4532/1966" op. cit. p. 772. Michaelidis Nouaros, "The 
Meaning of Functional Rights and Their Abuse", op. cit. p. 45.
On the other hand the application of article 281 though considered in 
the light of civil coee provisions may be held applicable under the L.D. 
Article 8 of the L.D. holds by reference article 1577 to apply to 
adoptions of minors with the exceptions of article 11.
204. A.P. 126/1926, Themis, 37 : 529.
205. Spyridakis, Civil Code, Vol. 4, 1577, note (4).
206. Balls, Family Law, par 176.5, p.361.
207. Tousis, Family Law, Vol. B, p.223.
208. op. cit.
209. ibid. p. 5-7.
210. A.P. 136/1948, E.E.N. 15 : 474. A.P. 83/1954, E.E.N. 21 : 656.
ibid p.7 and note 13.
211. ibid. pp 7-8 and authors referred in note 12.
212. ibid p.8.
213. article 1578 of the Greek Civil Code.
214. "Some Observations on the Reform of Adoption" in Bates '(ed) The Child 
and the Law, p. 277.
215. See supra same chapter in B II b.
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216. Article 8 of the L.D. 610/1970; contra Michaelidis Nouaros, "The
functional rights and their abuse", op. cit. p. 45 who sees the power
of the court as a special sanction imposed in the instance of article 
11(L) of the L.D.
217. For an analysis of rights of "altruistic" nature see ibid pp 9-12, 16, 17, 
18, 25-27, 31.
218. ibid. pp 32-5, 37.
219. ibid. p. 36 and author's in note (11) and pp 41-2 and authors in note 
(22) - (26).
220. ibid. p. 37, 38, 39.
221. ibid. pp 39-41 and authors in notes (19) - (21).
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CHAPTER SEVEN
1. See for general discussion, Fisher, "Adoption and the Courts", op. cit.
p. 145, ff; idem, "The 1972 Adoption Report", op. cit. pp 189-192;
Louis Blom^Cooper, "Parental Rights in Adoption Gases", op. cit. pp 192- 
194; Ormrod, Sir Roger, "The Role of the Courts in Relation to Children" 
in A.B.A.F.A. Child Adoption, pp 196-207.
2. Fisher, The 1972 Adoption Report, op. cit. pp 183-4; see A v B and C 
1971s. C (HL.) 129, per Lord Rèid, p. 141.
3. For an analysis of the reasons behind the need for case work in adoption 
and how it should function, see D.H.S.S. & S.W.S.G.Sc., A Guide to Adoption 
Practice, par I. 17 - 1.19 pp 5-6; Cmnd 5107, par 35-38, pp 10-11.
4. Section l',(3) of the 1978 Act; other social services as specified in
sub-section 2 of the same section and the general family welfare services 
controlled by the local authority Xsee infra); Cmnd 5107 par 42, p.12.
Cmnd. 5107 par 32-34, p. 10.
ibid. par 44, recommendation 2, p.12.
5. .







5107 pars 50 and 51-61 pp 14-17
ensured if control is left to the local authority which usually strives 
to manage its finances or to judicial control. Thus the Committee 
recommended administrative control over them. See ibid, pars 49, 51, 55, 
pp 14-16.
13. ibid. par 58, (a)(b)(c).
14. The choice does not seem to have been an easy one for the Committee
to whom various compromises and arguments were presented (pars 52, 53, p.15) 
mainly favouring a central government registration but envisaging a consid­
erable involvement of the local authority. Moreover because of the functional 
analysis needed for the criteria of registration the Sheriff Court was 
regarded as an unsuitable forum to determine registration appeals (see 
par 60, pp 16-7). In fact the Committee thought special machinery for 
appeals to be .unnecessary.
15. ibid. pars 54, 56, p 15, 16.
16. Wilkinson "Children Act 1975", op. cit. p. 237.
17. W.P. On Adoption, p.23.
18. Cmnd 5107, par 85, 88. p 23, 24. As the Committee explains, a court
hearing is the final safeguard and safeguards are needed much earlier. 
Moreover, the court may find it difficult to refuse an order if there is
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no agency to which to return the child.
19. ibid. par 88.
20. Fisher, "The 1972 Adoption Report", op. cit. p. 186.
21. See also : infra prevention of trafficking.
22. Infra on the investigation by the social agency.
23. Article 1X2)(a) of the R.D. 795/1970.
24. Article 1 (2) (c)
25. Article 1 (3).
26. Article 1 X4).
27. Article 9 (1) of the L.D. 610/1970.
28. Rousopoulou, "The Reform under Consideration", op. cit. p. 1237.
"Introductory Report of the L.D. 4532/1966", op. cit. p. 205.
29. Article 4(2) of the R.D. 795/1970.
30. Sect. 51(1) (a) of the 1978 Act, Article 15 )2)(b) of the L.D. 610/1970;
For a detailed discussion on the prohibitions see Bevan and Parry,
Children Act 1975, pp 64-67, 200-1; Hoggett, Parents and Children,
pp 229-230, "Introductory Report of the L.D. 4593/1966" op cit. p.207.
31. Article 15 \2) (a) of the L.D.
32. Sect. 51X1)(b), (c) of the 1978 Act and Art 15(2)(b) of the L.D.
33. Sect. 51(3) of the 1978 Act.
34. Art. 15 (3) of the L.D.
35. Sect. 52 (1)
36. Sect. 52 (1) (L)
37. Sect. 52 (2) :.
38. Hoggett, Parents and Children, p.255; "Introductory Report of the 
L.D. 4532/1966", op. cit. p. 207.
39. Such danger of course exists also among married couples. The most
striking case that one can come across is that reported in a Greek
newspaper recently (Ta Nea, 5th January 1981) referring to a couple who
of the sixteen children they had produced since they had been married in 
1964, they had placed thirteen for adoption with profit and who were 
going to so place their recently delivered infant, despite a conviction 
for trafficking in 1979.
40. Article 15 (1) of the L.D.; unless he is found liable of an act invoking 
more severe punishment.
41. Article 13(2) of the L.D., City Court of Athens, 1141/1969 E.EuM. 36:562 
and comments by Kamenopoulos, pp 362-3.
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42. Article 13(2) of the L.D.
43. Article 13(4) of the L.D.
44. Sect. 12(6) of the 1978 Act.
45. English courts had used this provision in this context : Re J . (1973)
Pam. 106; Re S (1975) Fam. 1.
46. In G.D. (petrs.) %195dj S.L.T. (Sn,Ct.) 34 adoption was granted only when 
the natural father undertook the obligation to pay a weekly sum into a 
fund for the child's benefit. See S.L.S. (1978), c28/12 note in sub.6.
47. Fisher, "Adoption and the Court", op cit, pp 145-8. Wilkinson, "Children
Act 1975, op. cit. p. 225. Cmnd 5107 pars 173-186, 188-191, pp 50-56,
221-225, pp 63-4. Hoggett, Parents and Children, pp 245-6. "Introductory
Report of the L.D'.' 610/1970, op. cit. pp. 866-7. Michaelidis Nouaros,
"Some Observations on the Reform of Adoption" in Bates, The Child and the 
Law, pp 2 77-8.
48. Fisher, "Adoption and the Cpurts", op. cit. p. 145; Cmnd 5107, pars 
168, 169, 171, 172, pp 49-50. "Introductory Report of the L.D. 510/1970" 
op. cit. p. 867.
49. Sect. 18(2) of the 1978 Act, Cmnd 5107 par 168., pp 45-50, pars 221-224, 
pp 63-4.
50. Sect. 18(1) (a) (b)
51. Cf. Sect. 18 (2)(a) and (b).
52. Sect. 18(3). In the view of the committee"an agency would be unlikely
to support an application for relinquishment unless it was reasonably 
confident that it could find an adoptive home for the child. Otherwise the 
agency should defer making application for relinquishment until a placement 
had been made or was guaranteed." Cmnd. 5107, par 184, p.53.
53. Cf. S.L.S. (1978), c 28/18 notes in subsection (2); see also Hoggett, 
Parents and 'Children, p. 245. Of course the possibility of the child 
not being adopted in this instance has to be eliminated. A thorough 
investigation of the reasons that led the one parent to agree while the 
other still objedsto adoption may be appropriate along with investigation 
of whether the decision of the consenting parent is mature and what other 
alternatives may be considered in the circumstances.
54. Sect. 18(4) of the 1978 Act.
55. Cmnd. 5107 par 182, p.52. The child may be placed with the adopters
straight from the hospital but the procedure cannot be completed before 
the specified period. Of course the court must take care the placement 
does not prejudice the rights of the putative father, i.e. if he was 
ignorant of the child's existence.
56. Under Sect 15 of the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968. The voluntary 
adoption agency applying for such an order must be a highly equipped one 
capable of taking the responsibility of boarding out the child for a 
considerable period. See also Fisher, "Adoption and the courts", op. cit. 
p. 146; Hoggett, Parents and Children, p. 246.
57. Sect. 18(8) of the 1978 Act.
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58. Sect. 18(6); The view originally held by the committee was that, given 
the nature of the relinquishment, it would be inappropriate to go back to 
the mother and explain that the adoption had not taken place. With the 
danger of no placement or order taking place the Committee had to consider 
various alternatives and even to leave it open under certain circumstances 
for the parent to resume his rights.
59. Sect. 19(1)
60. Sect. 19(2) (a) (b). See text.
61. Sect. 20 (infra)
62. Sect. 19 (4)
63. Sect. 19 (3)
64. Sect. 18 (6), 19 (1) and 20 (1) , (4) ; It is implicit in hearing different
proceedings that the first application may be granted and the second 
refused, since it is justifiable for the court to terminate the
rights of the natural parent, i.e.. if it is so requested and at the same 
time it may be contrary to the welfare of the child to entrust it to any of 
the actual applicants. There are strong grounds therefore in support 
of the condition of Sect. 18 (3) and for allowing the parent to resume
rights since experiments with placements may be damaging to the child's
welfare.
65. Sect. 20 (1) (a) (b) .
66. Sect. 20 (2)
67. Sect, 20 (3) (a) (b)
68. Freeman, The Children
in Subs. (4) .
69. Sect. 20 (3) (c) .
70. Sect. 20 (4) (a) .
71. Sect. 20 (4) , (b) .
72. Sect. 20 (5) ; Freeman,
This subsection was moved at the Report Stage in the House of Commons, 
(Vol. 898. cols. 1458, 1459). It was felt that otherwise, s 20(4) 
would act as a severe deterrent to parents applying for their rights to 
be restored. Parents whose child had been freed for adoption but not 
placed would have been in a worse position than parents with a child
subject to a custodianship order, care order or s.2 resolution.
73. Fisher "Adoption and the Courts", op. cit. p. 147.
74. Cmnd. 5107, par 184, p.53.
75. Section 20(4) reads: "if the application is dismissed on the ground
that to allow it would contravene the principle embodied in Section 6".
76. Sect. 18 (7) (b)
77. Sect. 18 (5).
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78. Fisher "Adoption and the Courts", op. cit. p. 148.
79. Michaelidis Nouaros, "Some observations on the Reform of Adoption" in 
Bates The Child and the Law, p. 277;' see also "Introductory Report of 
the L.D. 610/1970," op. cit. p.867.
80. See comment in the Introductory Report (supra).
81. Art. 12(2) of the L.D.; Michaelidis Nouaros, "Some observations on the 
reform of adoption" in Bates, op.: cit., p.278.
82. ibid; article 12 (2) (b) of the L.D.
83. Article 12(2) (c) of the L.D.
84. For the conditions and consequences of long institutional life in Greece 
and fostering see Koussidou, "Foster Care in Greece" in A.C.T..A.,
World Conference on Adoption and Foster Placement, pp 475-7.
85. See Spinellis, "The law of adoption in Greece and Israel", op. cit. p. 163, 
189. Maganiotou, V. "Aspects sociaux et juridiques de 1' adoption en 
Grece" in A.C.T.A. World Conference on Adoption and Foster Placement, 
(Milan, 1971) p.283-5. Rousopoulou, "Greek and Interstate Adoptions", 
op. cit. p. 1233.
86. Sect. 13 (1)
87. Sect. 13 (2)
88. Cmnd. 5107 parp 91, p. 25.
89. ibid, par 241-242, p.68.
90. cf. S.L.S. (1978), c.28/13 in general note.
91. Cmnd 5107 paras 242-243, p. 6 V; for further comments see S.L.S. (1978)
c28/13 note in subs. 1 and authorities cited there.
92. Sect. 13(3) (a) (b)
93. As defined in section 65(1)
94. A V B 1955 S.C. 378.
95. I.R.C. V. Russell 1955 S.C. 237 per Lord Sorn at p. 241.
96. See (1978), S.L.S. c. 28/13 note in subs. (1)
97. c.f. Section 15(1)(a) and 65(1) : "where the child is illegitimate
any person who would be a relative within the meaning of this definition
if the child were the legitimate child of his mother and father".
98. See supra in note 85.
99. The Commitee appointed by the Ministry of Justice to Reform Adoption 
Law, minutes six and seven of June 19 and 26, 1959; see Michaelidis 
Nouaros, "Adoption Law Reform", op. cit. p. 1033-4, note (41).
100. ibid. p. 1034.
101 Spinellis, "Law of Adoption in Greece and Israel", op. cit. p.163.
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102. Maganiotou, "Aspects sociaux et juridiques", op. cit. p. 283-5.
103. supra note 101.
104. Section 22 (1) of the 1978 Act; Cmnd 5107 par 2, p. 68.
105. Sect. 22(2).
106. Sect. 22 (3) (a) (b); for the importance of the report see Cmnd 5107 par
237 p.68
107. Sect. 23.
108. This is not required as a second report along with that of the local 
authority but as the only and independent report to be submitted to the 
court by the agency responsible for the placement. Therefore due concern 
is expressed by the committee that its ability in performing such duties 
should be a criterion for registration Cmnd 5107, pars 237-8, p.67.
109. ibid. pars. 234-5 pp 65-7.
110. ibid. par 244, pp 68-9.
111. ibid. par 236. p.67; Terry, A Guide to Children Act, 1975, p.51.
112. Michaelidis Nouaros, "Some observations on the Reform of Adoption",
op. cit. p. 275; Spinellis "The Law of Adoption in Greece and Israel", 
op. cit. p. 166.
113. Art. 9 (2) of the L.D.
114. City Court of Patra, 1424/1966, Hell. Dik. (1967): 95. City Court of 
Thira 434/1966, Hell. Dik. (1967): 92. City Court of Athens 765/1969,
No. V. 19 : 990; Koroustalakis, "Some problems of the L.D. 4532/1966" 
op. cit.; Beis, "The unacceptability of an application of adoption", op. 
cit. See also Spinellis, "The law of adoption in Greece and Israel", op. 
cit. pp 177-8.
115. p. 205.
116. "Some Problems of the L.D. 4532/1966", op. cit. p. 989.
117. "The Unacceptability of an Application of Adoption", op. cit. p. 1193.
118. "Introductory Report of the L.D. 610/1970", op. cit. p.856, et seq.
119. "The Unacceptability of an Application of Adoption", op. cit. p. 1194.
120. Spinellis, "The Law of Adoption in Greece and Israel", p. 153.
121. ibid. p. 178.
122. No. V. 17 : 990.
123. ibid. p. 991.
124. Sect. 21 (1) of the 1978 Act
125. Sect. 21 (2).
126. Sect. 21 (3) , (5).
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127. Sect. 28 (6).
128. Sect. 28 (3).
129. A Guide to the Children Act, par 79, p. 49.
130. Sect. 29 (1)
131. Sect. 29 (2)
132. Sect. 30 (1) (a)
133. Sect. 30 (1) (b) , (2)
134. The period of 7 days according to subs. (3) .
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APPENDIX 1
SURNAME
The right to a name is recognised to be fundamental for the child.
Principle 3 of the Declaration of the Rights of the Child provides 
"The child shall be entitled from his birth to a name ... ". Article 
22 bis, paragraph 2 of the draft Cbvenant on CLvil and Political Rights 
provides : "Every child ... shall have a name."^ In the absence of 
express definition this should be taken to include both first name and 
surname with emphasis on the latter since this is what distinguishes the 
individual in the community.
Explanations for the legal nature of the name are manifold, being, apart
from identification, an outward sign of filiation distinguishing a person
from others and placing him in a certain lineage, an attribute of legal
personality or as having to do with inheritance and acquisition of familial
properties. However, whatever one says of its legal nature, as a
matter of law and custom the attribution of a surname has always been
connected to the names of the parents as a consequence of their legal
relationship,usually on account of special rules limiting selection.
Strictly speaking the question of surname is not exclusively one of
status but more or less one of filiation, though status in itself seems
to have particular importance for the matter. The attribution of surname
is closely linked to the fact of birth, disclosing the identity of the
parents and,as such,for children born out of wedlock has significant
importance for countries like Scotland and Greece which maintain 
2
discrimination. Attitudes towards the name between the two countries 
vary depending on whether the child is born in wedlock, legitimated, 
adopted, or is born out of wedlock and has been affiliated or not.
A child born in wedlock in Scotland normally is given the surname of the 
parents or of the father^ while in Greece as a rule it is given the
1.2
4
parents surname corresponding to that of the father. On legitimation
in Scotland the child has the right for the father's name to be entered in
5
the register and probably has a right to use his surname. In Greece
whether the legitimation is per subsequens matrimonium^ or judicial^ the
child concerned is entitled to bear the father's surname as in legitimacy.^
On adoption, because the child stands as legitimate to the adopter, this
entails for him a right to bear his name. Thus in Scotland the surname of
9
the child may be changed and the change would be entered in the register.
Such change must be specified in the adoption order by stating the surname
of the child requested in the application, and,if not the original child's
name and the applicant(s) s u r n a m e . I n  Greece if the child is
adopted by two spouses or the husband alone it bears the surname of the
husband^^ whereas if adopted by the wife or a widowed woman alone, according
12
to the prevailing opinion it bears her maiden name. The child nevertheless
13
may retain his surname besides that of the adopter. The possibility
of changing the first name of the child on adoption should be mentioned 
14as well. The surname given to the child through adoption in Greece
prevail other surnames that may be given to the child by changes in his
legal status while the order stands. Thus if the child is acknowledged
or legitimated and remains the subject of an adoption order his surname
15
will remain unaltered.
On illegitimacy neither country allows free usage of the father's
surname on the basis of the biological relationship. In Scotland 
the mother has the right to decide on the child's surname which normally 
will be hers^^ or if paternity has been registered or admitted may be 
that of the father. It is not entirely clear if the father can veto 
usage of his surname as indication of paternity though for certain he 
cannot object to registration of his name if he is found to be the father, 
In Greece, prior to recognition or in "incomplete" judicial affiliation
1.3
the child by power of law bears the maiden name of the mother
irrespective of whether it was attributed to her through legitimacy,
19
adoption or acknowledgement. Her husband may give his surname
to the child with a notarial deed^^ provided this has consent of the
21
mother and the child. This surname cannot change if the mother comes
to a new marriage but perishes by the acknowledgement of legitimation 
22of the child. On voluntary or complete judicial acknowledgement
23
the child's surname changes to that used by the father at the time of
acknowledgement and follows subsequent c h a n g e s . S p e c i a l  provision
is also made in both countries for a surname to be given to a foundling
25
by the administrative authority.
The way that the surname is attributed to the child has been frequently 
criticised in countries like Greece where it is subject to legal regulation. 
Nevertheless, in view of the equality of children, certain problems 
arise in relation to the surname of a child born out of wedlock. In 
general, the suggested approaches to the problem can be classified in 
the following headings :
1. The child receives the name of the father;
2. The child receives the name of the mother;
3. The child receives a name consisting of the parents' names;
4. The parents choose which of their names or what name or combination
of their names the child will have.
In Scotland since the attribution of the surname is a matter of usage
probably some protection will be needed for the father of the child born
out of wedlock to have a greater legal control over the change of the
s u r n a m e . A t  present neither of the parents can affect the child's
27
surname without the consent of the other. In disputes, a compromise
might be for the child to receive at least two surnames of the
1.4
28choice of the parents which may serve the practical purposes of
29
identification with the increasing use of computers in registration.
If the surname is going to be regulated the following considerations
should apply for both countries. The surname of the father though of long
tradition in both countries, cannot be considered as the only possible
solution without this running counter to the principle of equality.
Attribution of the mother’s surname to a child should be retained for
31the child born out of wedlock until the establishment of paternity.
The usage of her surname however for children born inside and outside
32wedlock, although the best and most trouble free solution cannot be 
considered at the moment as the conditions are not mature enough to disrupt 
an age-old tradition. Turning now to the third and fourth approaches
it has to be considered whether the child should have one or two surnames 
and whether the choice of name should be left to the discretion of the 
parents.
Two surnames, apart from lacking in simplicity, present difficulties in
the order of attribution and in addition passes the problem of choice to
33
the next generation. Therefore, it is preferable for there to be
only one. As regards the matter of choice, this has been considered
recently in the proposals of the Gazi Committee. They envisage a
decision being taken and notified prior to marriage or adoption in
respect of each possible child of the family and, in the absence of such
a decision, the child receiving the surname of the f a t h e r . T h i s
resolution, though not faultless in terms of constitutional law, is
35practically simple for children of the marriage. Of course, for
children conceived outside wedlock such agreement in many cases would 
be difficult to achieve. The Gazi Committee in this case proposes for 
the child to receive the father's surname or to add it to his surname.
1.5
given a notarial declaration by the mother, the child's guardian or
by the child himself in his m a j o r i t y . A n o t h e r  proposal suggests
giving a right to the father to apply to the court for an order that the
child take his surname. The court should have the general discretion 
37
to decide. For the same case the law in Germany envisages
the child's surname changeable subject to the consent of the father who 
has acknowledged the child. If he refuses the mother has the discretion 
to petition the c o u r t . B e t w e e n  the three approaches the choice lies 
with the relevance that surnames must have the biological relationship. 
Birth out of wedlock should not be considered as a shame. Besides there 
is the need for identification and acceptance of a biological relationship. 
On the other hand, it may be argued that the child's surname should not 
be such as to attribute to him the ill-fame of either of his parents.
The choice seems to be particularly difficult taking into consideration 
that in quite a few instances the contact and attitudes of the parents 
to each other would be far from appropriate.
The common features of the three approaches is the weight that they 
attribute to the position of the father in relation to the child's 
surname and the minimum protection of the mother agaist laving the identity 
of her paramour revealed through the child's surname. Starting from 
this point the fundamental recommendation is for ttesurname of the child to 
be changeable and be attributed to him by a declaration signed by both 
parents simultaneously or subsequent to the act of acknowledgement. If 
such declaration is not provided the child will receive the father's 
surname. The mother will have the right to petition to the court against 




The international instruments protecting the Nationality of the child 
as stated by Saario^ are as follows :
1. Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaims 
that :
(a) "Everyone has a right to a nationality"
(b) "No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor
denied the right to change his nationality".
2- The Declaration of the Rights of the Child adopted on 20 November 
1959 by the General Assembly of the U nited Nations in principle 3 
provides that : "The child shall be entitled from his birth ... to
a nationality".
3. The Cbnvention on the Reduction of Statelessness adopted by the
Cbnference on Statelessness held in New York on 28 August 1961 under 
the auspices of the United Nations provides inter alia: "Article 1.
A contracting State shall grant its nationality to a person born in 
its territory who would otherwise be stateless ...". Article 4.
A. contracting State shall grant its nationality to a person, not 
born in the territory of a contracting State, who would otherwise be 
stateless, if the nationality of his parents at the time of the person's 
birth was that of that State .
2
The child of a marriage may acquireU .K. citizenship by birth in the
3
U.K. or a Cblony since 1948 (lex soli) by descent from a father who
4
is a U .K. citizen at the date of the child's birth (lex sanguinis) 
or by registration if the parent acquiresU .K. citizenship.^ In 
Greece the rule applicable is that of lex sanguinis so that the child 
normally acquires citizenship through descent from a Greek father. 
Nevertheless, acquisition of citizenship is possible by registration.^
2.2
Aside from citizenship through legitimate descent the child acquires
citizenship by adoption’. In Scotland, if the adopter, or in the case of
a joint adoption, the male applicant is a citizen of theU .K. and
colonies and the child is not, the latter acquiresU .K. citizenship from
7the date of the adoption order. ALso in Greece if a Greek citizen
adopts a minor of foreign origin the child becomes a Greek citizen from 
the date of the adoption order.^
A child in general under British law cannot trace citizenship by claiming 
descent from a mother who is a United Kingdom citizen - F requently
this may result in the child being stateless if born outside 
U nited Kingdom territory ocb colonies and unable to claim citizenship 
from the state of his father's origin. The probability of this 
is quite high given that most countries accord nationality only by the 
lex sanguinis.
However, although descent from a mother does not invoke citizenship for 
legitimate or illegitimate children, it bears harder on the second if the 
country of the child's birth or of the acknowledging parent refuses to 
grant its own citizenship or nationality on the basis of birth or 
acknowledgement. The English Law commission refers to two remedies for 
children born to a mother who is a U .K. citizen and who wants to 
attribute her citizenship to her child. F irst by registration under 
Section 7(2) of the 1948 Act which permits the Home Secretary, at his 
discretion, to register any minor as aU .K. citizen "in special 
circumstances". Statelessness by illegitimacy has been treated as a 
factor in assessing the presence of "special circumstances". However, 
it is the practice of the Home Secretary to use tîfts power when the mother 
is aU .K. citizen by birth (or adoption) and it is seldom exercised 
if she is a U.K. citizen by descent, or by registration or naturalization
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unless it is evident that the child's future lies in the U.K.
Second, in compliance with obligations under the United Nations Cbnvention
on the Reduction of Statelessness, the child born to a mother who is a
UK. citizen may also acquire citizenship by registration. To that effect
Section 1 of the British Nationality (No.2) Act 1964 provides that
application for registration as aU.K. citizen may be made by or on
9
behalf of any such child who is and always has been stateless, if born
to a mother who was a U .K. citizen at the time of his b i r t h . A s
%
the English Law Cbmmission observes registrations under this section are 
not common but unlike the previous caæ they are not dependent on the 
exercise of the Home Secretary's discretion and application is not restricted 
to the age of minority.
In Greece, the natural child acquires citizenship either by his mother
or by his father irrespective of the place of birth and acquisition of
a nationality different from that parent. A natural child tracing
descent from a mother of Greek nationality or one who has been voluntarily
or "completely" judicially acknowledged by a father of Greek nationality
automatically becomes a Greek national from the date of birth or from
12
the date of acknowledgement. Special provisions govern the resignation of
Greek nationality by a natural child tracing descent from a Greek mother
if that child acquires citizenship of another state by an act of 
13
acknowledgement.
The solutions suggested in order to eliminate discrimination in this
area largely accord to the existing law in Greece. The idea that 
14
E. dive puts forward is to enable the child to claim citizenship 
from either parent, as the New Zealand Citizenship Act of 1977 does 
presently. The same resolution is put into consideration by the 
English Law Cbmmission in their Working Paper. Particularly for a
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child born to a mother who is aU .K. citizen they see a strong argument
ensuing for allowing that child to acquire British citizenship
irrespective of any other nationality that he may acquire by reason
15
of birth or acknowledgement.
However, it would be against any principle of equality if such reform were 
carried out only in relation to the mother. Therefore, the Cbmmission 
puts forward the need for recognition of citizenship if descent is 
established from a father who is aU .K. national, to avoid sexual 
discrimination.
Acove all, however, what needs substantial consideration is the present 
distinction in the transmission of citizenship for children born within 
and outside wedlock. Such a distinction needs to be removed,although 
it is not entirely clear if this should be carried out to the extent of 
abolishing the dependent nationality of the child, born in wedlock, on his 
father. Such a development would increase the number of binationals 
and the problems of jurisdiction in family matters. On the other hand 
not to do so would create a discrimination against the wife and the 
child itself. Probably a fair solution would be to give weight to the 
jurisdiction of the domicile since it is the active aspect of inter-state 
relations in family matters and oblige the child to choose between his 
nationalities when attaining the age of majority.
APPENDIX 3
DOMICILE (RESIDENCE) AND RELATED MATTERS
U ndoubtedly the most problematic area is that of private international 
law, especially when domicile and nationality do not coincide. The 
perspectives vary, with Scotland giving considerable weight to jurisdiction 
based upon derivative domicile and with Greece hardly acknowledging 
the concept ~ being mainly concerned with the law of nationality. There is 
a fundamental difference between the two approaches since jurisdiction 
based upon domicile implies invocation of legal rules which have a daily 
application upon the life of the individual and the protection of a set 
of rules with which the individual himself chooses to live. The approach 
of nationality, on the other hand, though free from the fluidity of 
changes of domicile, and therefore more coherent and certain, nevertheless 
presents the problem of applying to the'individual a set of rules with 
which he may have little connection.
By definition, a domicile is the place where the person has his legal 
home, by being primarily established there and to which whenever absent, 
he intends to return or, in the case of a minor, is assumed to belong. 
Domicile, therefore, may be distinguished in relation to persons who are 
sui juris and who can choose their own domicile and to persons who are 
alieni juris, this being determined by law and therefore imposed upon 
persons who are subject to the authority of a parent or guardian. We are 
concerned here only with the second case aid feras long as the child is 
subject to parental control.
With the introduction of the Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973
a married woman is able to acquire a domicile independent of that of her
husband.^ In relation to a child incapable of having an independent 
2
domicile the traditional rule is retained so that the child born in
wedlock acquires that of his father.^ Exceptionally for that child, if
4
his parents are living apart, clause 4(2) provides that the child's
domicile will be that of his mother if
Xa) he then has his home with her and has no home with his father; or
(b) he has at any time had her domicile by virtue of paragraph (a) above
and has not since had a home with his father.
The section has been criticised as discriminatory to the extent that it
5
"preserves the pre-eminence of the father's domicile". This criticism
stands so far as domicile acquired from the mother comes upon facts
related to the child's life and not to the fact of birth. However, this
pre-eminence relates only to the acquisition of domicile, since the
mother's once acquired, continues to determine the child's status after the
mother's death unless the child acquires a home with his father.^ Perhaps the
provisions for domicile of legitimate children apply to adopted ones in
accord with the principle embodied in sections 12(3) and 39X1) of the
Adoption (Scotland) Act 1978. However, independent domicile is rarely
7a problem in adoption, though later it may occur and in such cases the 
provisions of the Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973 apply.
The Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973, despite the improvements 
that it made in relation to the domicile of a married woman and her 
legitimate child, left unaltered the rules applying to illegitimate 
children. Sub-section (4) of Section 4 provides that "Nothing in this 
section prejudices any existing rule of law as to the cases in which 
a child's domicile is regarded as being by dependence that of his mother."
In this respect, of course, apart from preserving the distinction between 
legitimate and illegitimate children, in addition it omits to establish 
fair treatment for the parents of a child born out of wedlock on the basis 
of who has actual custody of the child.
In Greece the present law incorporates the principle of "legal residence" 
which, like domicile, presumes actual establishment of a person in an area 
and intention to stay there,^ In relation then to persons who are 
alieni juris, aritcle 56 of the code adheres to the traditional principle
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so that the non-eraancipated minor has a residence, that of his father 
9or guardian". This residence continues after emancipation or majority
unless the child acquires a new one.^^ As the result of an adoption
order the child also acquires the residence^^ of the adopter and in the
12
case of a joint adoption, that of the male applicant. The illegitimate
child on the other hand takes the residence of his mother "even when
13it has been acknowledged by the father". Due to the fact that the
wording of the article does not make any distinction between voluntary and
judicial acknowledgement, it is submitted that the child retains the
residence of the mother irrespective of the kind of acknowledgement and
irrespective of whether she has the care of him and^ or is his "dative 
14
guardian". An interesting provision affecting the actual but not the
legal residence of the illegitimate child is provided by article 1538 of the
Greek CLvil Cbde. According to this the child who is voluntarily or
completely judicially acknowledged may "cohabit" in the house of the
acknowledged father. This right of the child has the same nature as that
of a legitimate child, subject to the restriction that if at the time of
the voluntary (or judicial) acknowledgement the father was married, the
child may cohabit in the matrimonial home only if the wife of the 
15
husband consents ad hoc. The expediency of the right to cohabit has
been criticized as to its very existence, probably because no woman will
17accept such a child in the house. However, latter proponents of the
rule comment in favour of the provision as it stands because without 
putting the interests of the parties to any risk it opens the way to the 
paternal h o u s e h o l d . A  similar right is probably recognised in 
Scotland for the natural child though such an offer by the father can no 
longer be made to meet a claim to aliment. Normally, the child will 
live in the paternal household as a result of a custody or care order, 
or as a result of an agreement between the parents.
3.4
V arious alternative solutions have been suggested to the problem of the
19dependent domicile^legal residence of children. dive referring
to the Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Bill and then Act 1973
envisages as a reasonably practical and less discriminatory solution,
letting the domicile of a pupil child follow that of the mother in all
cases with an exception, the converse of that of the Act, when the
parents are living apart and the child has or has had his home with the
father. In his article on aspects of illegitimacy he generalizes
the concept so that domicile would follow the residence of the child and
be that of theparent with whom the child has, or last had, his home
until old enough to acquire an independent d o m i c i l e . A  similar concept
is adopted by the Gazi Gbmmittee for Greece. "The minor subjected to
'parental care' has his residence as that of his parents or of the parent
who alone exercises parental care (over the child). If both parents
exercise parental care and they do not have the same residence, the minor has
his residence as that of the parent with whom he lives. Minors subject
to tutorship or incapacitated persons have as their residence that of 
21
their tutor". The Report on the Quebec CLvil Code probably provides
the median ■ solution in relation to the above propositions. Article 63 
of the Draft provides as follows :
"A minor is domiciled with his parents or with his tutor."
"A minor whose custody has been the subject of a judicial decision is 
domiciled with the person who has bustody of him".
"When no judicial decision has been tendered with respect to custody, 
and the minor's parents have no common domicile, the minor is domiciled 
with the person with whom he habitually resides".
According to article 353 of the Draft, parental authority is exercised 
ex officio by both parents so that domicile derivative of tutorship may 
occur only rarely. However, if a tutor is appointed, since he will have 
custody, it is thought to be correct for it to be from him that the
3. 5
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child derives his domicile. The second paragraph regulates the
domicile of the child if the parents live apart as a result of divorce
or separation a mensa et thoro and the child becomes the object of a 
23
court decision. The third paragraph regulates the child's residence
on de facto separation or acquisition of separate domicile by the parents
24
on account of his habitual residence with either parent. A similar
formula is currently practised in Germany with the exception that the
non-marital child has the residence of the mother, as she will exercise
the parental authority by power of law. Occasionally there may be a
change to that of the father if he is substituted for the mother in parental 
25
authority.
On the basis of the above discussion the following major approaches may 
be distinguished:
(a) Domicile emerging from the act of birth and
(b) regulated and changeable domicile. However, before making any 
choice between the two, it may be necessary to see what implications 
domicile and legal residence may have for the child. For Scotland, 
domicile has significance in choice of law, where the lex patriae governs 
Thus section 1(1)(a) of the Legitimation (Scotland) Act 1968 attributes 
legitimacy to the spouses common child if the father at the date of 
marriage was domiciled in Scotland. Also domicile empowers the person
to apply for a national adoption o r d e r . I n  addition, the status of
27 28
the child and custody matters will be considered according to the
domicile of the parents.
For Greece, on the other hand, legal residence has less important
implications. Legitimacy is regulated by the law of the husband's 
29
nationality and the relations between parent and child by the law of 
their common nationality and, if different, by the law of the father's
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nationality at the child's birth. On the father's death the relations are 
regulated by the law of the last common nationality of the mother and the 
child and if different, by the law of the mother's nationality at 
father's d e a t h . W i t h  regard to the illegitimate child and his mother 
the relations are regulated by the law of their common nationality and,
31
if different, by the law of the mother's nationality at the child's birth.
Similarly, the relations with the natural father are regulated by the
32
law of the father's nationality at the child's birth but relations
concerning the parents by the law of mother's nationality at the child's 
33
birth. Also legitimation is governed by the law of the father's
34
nationality. For the care of the child also domicile is immaterial,
35everything being governed by the law of nationality. Domicile and
in its absence, temporary residence, has significance only for a stateless
child^^ and probably in the case of binational persons if neither of the
37
nationalities is Greek since it indicates the jurisdiction with which the 
child is more connected and therefore the applicable law.
Due to the fundamental differences in the two systems it may be appropriate 
for each of them to be given a different treatment.
F or Scots law questions related to the establishment of the parent-child 
relationship may be answered on account of the parent's domicile. Thus a 
child born to parents either of whom or both are domiciled in Scotland may 
enjoy the right to a complete relationship with both parents. This is 
to say that a Scotsman who fathered a child born in a foreign country 
where the mother is a foreigner as well would have the right to recognise 
his child and from that recognition would create rights related to Scotland. 
The same must apply in the case that the mother is domiciled in Scotland. 
Also a complete relationship should be presumed to exist in relation to a 
parent not domiciled in Scotland who acknowledged the child according to 
Scots Law or according to his national law, if that law recognises such
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a relationship for persons born out of wedlock. A similar principle 
must apply if the parents ,at least oneofwhom is domiciled in Scotand entered 
into a valid marriage.
F or Greek law, questions concerning the creation of the parent-child 
relationship are included among the matters considered by the Gazi 
Gbmmittee. The Gbmmittee leaves unaltered the provisions of articles 19-21 
of the Cbde on illegitimacy and for legitimacy and legitimation makes the 
following recommendations. Legitimacy' and legitimation with marriage 
are governed by the law governing the conjugal relationship. For a child 
born after the dissolution of marriage his legitimacy lies with the law 
governing the conjugal relationship at the time of its dissolution. The 
law governing the conjugal relationship governs rights and duties between 
parents and child. On the death of either parent the law of the nationality 
of the surviving spouse is applicable, but if the law governing the 
relation until then was that of the habitual residence of the couple, and
thesurviving spouse and the child continue to reside there, this law
3 8should continue to apply. On termination of the marital relationship
or judicial separation, the law applicable is that which should be applied 
if "marital cohabitation" was still existing.
For a non-marital child the only recommendation made concerns the 
legitimation of the child by a decree of an authority whether judicial 
or administrative. Thus article 6(3) of the Bill to reform article 22 of 
the Greek Civil Gbde provides that such legitimation would be governed 
by the law of the father's nationality. There is an unjustifiable 
conservatism in this provision as well as in the preservation of the Civil 
Cbde provisions in respect of the acknowledgement of a non-marital child. 
Moreover, it contrasts with the stipulations of article 5 of the Bill 
(to reform article 18 of the Greek CLvil Cbde) which recognises as
applicable the law governing the marital relationship, which may be 
different to that of nationality. It may appear necessary, therefore, 
to provide for such an act to be governed either by the law of the 
child's domicile'at birth or his nationality, if recognising such 
relationships, because the establishment of the relationship concerns the 
child's interest most.
Turning now to the administration of the relationship which refers to 
matters such as the custody of the child, access, the aliment due, 
and other aspects concerning the daily life of the child, the choice 
must be between the law applied to the acquisition of the relationship and 
that of the child's residence. The second presents the decisive 
advantage in that it 'invokes upon the child the set of rules with whom 
the child's life is more connected. Therefore, it is preferred to the 
first.
In respect of the above observations, the formula to be adopted for the 
child's domicile in Scotland and for his legal residence in Greece must 
be as follows :
(a) F or a child of the marriage the family's domicile would determine that
of the child and the applicable law. If the child is subject to
tutorship he acquires the domicile of his tutor subject to the exception
that if the order is defined to be of a short period, or the
circumstances indicate so, the change in the child's residence must be
treated as a temporary one which leaves unaffected the child's
domicile and the applicable law. The proposition to retain as
the domicile of origin that of the mother, despite its solid advantages
in the context of certainty of maternity; of applying the same rule
to legitimate and illegitimate children, of her usually retaining
39
custody after the dissolution of marriage, has the disadvantage of 
introducing sexual inequality and also, in a number of instances, it
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may be different to that of the rest of the family. For instance, the 
family as a whole may reside in country X and the mother or the father 
due to his work acquires a different domicile in country Z. It is 
not necessary to change the law governing the family relationship as 
long as the family exists as a unit by reason that the child habitually 
resides with the parent in country Z.
(b) A child who is a subject of custody order, whether born in wedlock
or out of wedlock must acquire the domicile of the parent who has
custody of him,
(c) A child who is not the subject of a custody order, whether born in
wedlock or out of wedlock must have, as domicile, the common domicile
of his parents. If the parents do not have a common domicile the
child will acquire the domicile of the parent which can be presumed as 
his habitual residence on account of express indications showing a 
stronger connection with the domicile of that parent.
APPENDIX 4
GUARDIANSHIP AND CUSTODY*
This area of the law has been marked by substantial changes affecting
both children of the marriage and adopted children with the recent tendency
to equalize the rights of the parents over their children. Nevertheless,
in relation to illegitimate children, it has been the stopping point of
the illegitimate child's march towards a broader legal relationship with
his father. As a rule such rights are retained for the mother, she being
considered the appropriate person to care for the child. But where
she turns out to be unfit, the care of the child is not handed by power of
law to the natural father. Normally control and care over the child are instead
entrusted to a third party. It may be helpful, therefore to give a brief
description of the law that now governs legitimacy and adoption on guardianship,
custody and related matters in each country and then to consider the
possible alternatives that may be suggested in relation to illegitimate
children.
A. LEGITIMACY AND LEGITIMATION
I. Legal provisions
Apart from Common law, the main Scottish statutory provisions relating 
to guardianship and custody are now in the Conjugal Rights (Scotland) 
Amendment Act 1861, the Guardianship of Infants Acts 1886 and 1925 as
amended by the Guardianship Act 1973. Also relevant are the Matrimonial
Proceedings (Children) Act 1939, the Custody of Children '(Scotland)
Act 1939, and the Children's Act 1975.
In Greece the relevant provisions are incorporated in the Civil Code.
* Here guardianship and custody are examined in relation to the parents. The 
rights of relative or other third parties to claim custody is seen only 
incidentally in its relation to the rights of the parents.
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Articles 1500 to 1529 of title eleven deal with patria potestas 
for children subject to paternal authority, and articles 1589 to 
1655 to title fourteen and articles 1666 to 1685 of title fifteen 
with the guardianship of children. The former deals with the tutor­
ship of children who are not subject to patria potestas while the 
latter deals with the curatory of emancipated children.^
II. Parental rights over the child
The concepts of guardianship and custody constitute the parental rights 
and powers over the child which are distinguishable as two basic kinds;
(a) parental rights aiming at directing and guiding the persons of 
children under majority and,
(b) the right of administration of the child's legal affairs and 
his property.
Acts of the parent falling within the former category are usually termed
those concerning legal custody of the child while acts falling within
the latter are regarded as acts of his office as guardian. If the
parents are cohabiting and parental powers have not become the subject of
a judicial order, the parent is both the guardian and custodian of his
child under age. In Scotland, guardianship may then be either tutory
in respect of a pupil child or curatory in respect of a minor child.
In Greece the same child which is subject to parental authority is
subject to the patria potestas of the father or the guardianship of
the mother. An emancipated minor on the other hand is subject to
the curatory of the father and under certain circumstances also of the 
2mother. Nevertheless guardianship, exercised by the parent,
affects custody unless the latter has been regulated by a court order. 
Parental authority, however, in either country has a different 
confrontation, with Greece adhering to the concept of patria potestas 
which gives pre-eminent rights to the father and with Scotland giving
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equal rights to both parents. The bill drafted by the Gazi 
Committee to reform the civil code aims to attribute equal rights 
to Greek parents and therefore it will be discussed along with the 
provisions of Scots law.
Ill. Patria Potestas
The concept in its present form is the remnant of the absolute power
of the father under the Roman Law family system to administer and direct
his family affairs. It used to be a recognised right of the father
under the common law in Scotland^ and it is still an authority exercised
4
by the father of a legitimate child in Greece. It includes a 
pre-eminent right of the father to custody of his child under age and
5
the authority to regulate the child's upbringing and discipline.
In this respect it includes the legal cutody of the child in the sense 
that the father has the power to regulate the day to day life of the 
child, its residence and its upbringing.^
In this authority the father may be substituted by the mother if he
7
is temporarily unable to perform his duties and it may be diminished 
or lost in the following instances :
(a) When the parent disregards or transgresses his rights deriving 
from patria potestas in respect of the day to day care of the 
child or maladministers the child's property? Upon the request 
of the mother or the nearest relative, or the public prosecutor, 
the court may take any appropriate measure to restrict the power 
of the father, i.e. to appoint a third party to represent the 
child or to entrust to him its day to day care, or to appoint a 
tutor to administer the child's property.^
(b) The father forfeits patria potestas if he has been convicted with 
at least one months imprisonment for a crime against the life,
4.4
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health or morals of the child. However, the same will occur on
the father's death, or presumed death, or the emancipation or
majority of the c h i l d . T h e  mother substitutes for the
father if he is unable to perform his duties, although if she
is unable to fulfill this role the child is submitted to the
authority of a g u a r d i a n . A l s o  if patria potestas is terminated
while the child is still subject to parental authority, it is
submitted to guardianship, though in this case the mother has
12
the bx officio right to act as guardian of the child. A
guardian nevertheless may be appointed in the will of the father
who exercised patria potestas until his death if there is no mother
12a
or the mother cannot act as the guardian of the child. The 
mother may also appoint a guardian in her will if she either 
exercised parental rights as the guardian of the child or
12b
substituted the father in patria potestas until her death. 
Appointment made by either parent is cancelled if the father 
regains patria potestas or the mother the legal custody of the 
child.
IV Custody
Within parental rights and duties is included the custody of the child. 
As regards Scots Law Section 10(1) of the Guardianship Act 1973 affects 
custody in the sense that it places the parents as joint guardians 
of the child and gives them equal rights to custody. In Greece under 
patria potestas the father retains a pre-eminent right to custody.
However, custody is concerned with control of the physical person of 
the child^^ and must be distinguished from tutorship or cufatorship 
of the parent or guardian which, in both systems, is more concerned 
with the legal representation of the person of the child. Both 
concepts are included in the broad category of parental duties, but
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may be distinguished and exercised by different persons. As a rule, 
however, custody does not affect tutorship or curatorship which may
15
still be exercised by a parent not having the custody of his child.
As pointed out, custody is concerned with the day to day life of the
c h i l d . A s  such, therefore, it regulates the residence^^ of the
child in the sense that the parent who has custody may have the child
living with him^^cr if entrusted to someone else reclaim' it at any 
19time. It also imposes on the parent the obligation and discretionary
power to guide and direct the child's upbringing with regard to its
physical and moral w e l f a r e , i t s  education^^ and the application of
22
appropriate rehabilitative measures. A parent without custody is
23
normally entitled to access to his child as ordered by the court. In 
exceptional circumstances this may be removed.
V . Parents under equal rights
In Scotland the Guardianship Act 1973 repealed the common law right of 
the father to have patria potestas of his child and placed both parents 
jointly and severally as guardians of the child. The mother until 
then had no guardianship rights during the father's lifetime. On the 
father's death, she became the tutor of her pupil child, but not 
curator of her minor child which can contract alone. In the absence 
of court proceedings the father of a legitimate child aLëo had a 
pre-eminent right to custody although this right has been considerably 
restricted by section 1 of the Guardianship of Infants Act 1925, 
putting the welfare of the child as the first and paramount 
consideration. Certain statutory provisions incorporated in the
Guardianship of Infants Acts 1886 and 1925 improved the position of the 
mother, but substantial changes came only with the enactment of the 
Guardianship Act 1973.
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The clause adopted in section 10(1) of the 1973 Act provides that
"In relation to a pupil or minor, and to the administration of any
property belonging to, or held in trust for, a pupil or minor, or
the application of income of any such property, a mother shall have
the same rights and authority as the law allows to a father (and shall
accordingly hold the office of tutor to a pupil, or as the case may
be, curator to a minor) and the rights and authority of a mother and
father shall be equal and be exercisable by either without the other."
According to subsection (2) of the same section a prenuptial agreement
24
to give up any of those rights is unenforceable. However, an
antenuptial agreement may hold for a child of theirs regulating the
administration of their rights and powers in a separation, but it
is subject to the discretion of the court which may decide not to
give effect to it if it sees that it will not be for the benefit of
the child. Disagreements between ihe parents may be referred to the
court as long as these concern the child's welfare and it may make such
24a
an order regarding the matter as it thinks proper. The power of the
court in this case does not extend to making any order regarding the
24b
custody of the child or the right of access to him by either parent.
Orders made by the court modifying parental rights may be varied or
25
discharged on the application of either parent, or guardian or a
25a
person having the custody of the child. The Act, however, did not 
change the position of the minor mother to represent her child. She 
is still subject to the curatorship of her husband and her rights are 
suspended until she attains majority.
The Gazi Committee, onihe .other hand, propose to repeal the patria
potestas provisions of the Greek Civil Code and replace them with the
concept of "parental care" (goniki merimna). Thus the clause adopted
27
in article 53 of the Bill reads as follows :
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"The care of the non-eraancipated child under the age of majority 
is the duty and right of the father and the mother, exercisable jointly 
by them (goniki merimna). On parental disagreement, and as long as 
the interest of the child calls for a decision to be taken, the 
court decides."
"If the parent is unable to exercise parental care, either because 
of factual reasons or because he is incapacitated or has a limited 
capacity to transact, the parental care is exercised by the other 
parent. The parent who is not of full age has the care of the person 
of the child (custody)."
28Article 54 defines the context of parental care as including "the
care of the person (custody), the administration of property and the
29representation of the child", Article 58 defines the care of the person 
of the child to include "the upbringing, supervision and education" 
of the child, "regulation of its residence and the application, if 
appropriate, of the necessary rehabilitative measures". Nevertheless 
Article 55 regulates the representation of the child "to be jointly 
by both parents whether judicially or extra-judicially in respect 
to any matter or transaction concerning the person or the property of 
the child". Either of the parents represent the child alone in 
"ordinary actions" or in actions of "ordinary administration" or 
"urgent" as well as "in receiving a declaration of will directed to the 
child".
Although the general rule adopted with the clause in statute 10(1) of 
the Guardianship Act 1973 that the mother and father have equal rights 
is acceptable, it is submitted that it may be proper to provide
that this rule could be varied by the court either on an independent 
application or in a consistorial action and that if the parties were
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living apart, in the absence of a specific court order, guardianship
might be given to the parent entitled to custody, or if both were
entitled to custody, to the one with whom the child had, or last had, his
home.^^ Furthermore, it has been suggested that guardianship
acquired under these rules by a parent or parents would continue,
in the absence of a court order altering the position, even if the
child were placed with a third party. Once lost however by a
parent under those rules it would not revive automatically on the death
of the other parent. Guardianship would be subject to the power
of the court on the request of the parent or a third party and may
32
be exercisable on behalf of either of them.
What gave rise to these recommendations wæ the fact that the Act
refrains from regulating tutorship or curatorship which may produce
some unsatisfactory situations if custody becomes the subject of a 
32a
court order. Normally the parent who lost custody retains tutorship 
or curatorship unless he is declared unfit under Section 7 of 
the Guardianship of Infants Act 1886, in which case, upon the death of 
the other parent, the survivor is not entitled to a right to the child's 
custody or guardianship. Similar unsatisfactory situations arise 
today in Greece from the rules of patria potestas if custody has been 
awarded to the mother in so far as the father's rights to represent 
the child and administer his property have not been removed by the 
court according to Articles 1524 and 1525. The Bill prepared by
the Gazi Committee distinguishes between cohabiting and non-cohabiting 
parents and suggests regulation of tutorship or curatorship in 
circumstances when the custody of the child becomes the subject of 
a court order. However, Article 55, if read in conjunction with 
Article 57(2) and 56(4) and as implied a contrario from the exception 
in Article 55(2), enunciates joint administration by the parents in an
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Informal separation unless it concerns an act for which the parent
33is entitled to represent the child alone. Protection of the
child is provided with the general rules of article 1524 and 1525 of the
34
Greek civil code as reformed by articles 76 and 77 of the Bill.
However, according to paragraph (2) of article 55, in case the parents 
cease to cohabit, in the absence of court proceedings regulating 
the child's custody, the.parent with whom the child resides is 
entitled to represent it in an action for aliment against the other 
parent.
It is not entirely clear if, when the question of guardianship arises 
on de facto responsibility, this must produce pre-eminent legal 
rights in favour of the parent who is de facto custodian against 
the other parent. F or certain, if such a situation lasts for 
a long time, it will produce a gradual decrease in the significance of 
the other parent's rights. If at the very end, when parental rights 
become the subject of a court order the de facto care by one parent has 
created a desirable and happy situation, this ultimately may lead the 
court to confine parental rights exclusively to that parent. However, 
if the de facto care of the parent results in exclusive rights being 
accorded to him by law the following disadvantages can be observed :
(a) There may be some uncertainty and confusion over the administration 
of the child's affairs since it is difficult in such a transitional 
period to set rigid criteria about the right of a parent to 
guardianship. Therefore, changes in the de facto care of the 
child, either short or long term, which are common between separated 
parents will result in uncertainty about the right of the parent and
the validity of his action.
(b) The period for one of the parents will be transitional in terms 
of its competence to care for the child. One of them may have
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left the household and be seeking accomodation to resettle 
himself. Therefore, he is in an inferior position to care for the 
child and normally, if he is a concerned parent, he will refrain 
from involving the child in such troubles unless there are 
special reasons. By proceeding then to accord legitimate 
exclusive parental rights to the other parent under such circum­
stances may cause undue alienation of the first parent and damage 
to the child's welfare.
(c) The conditions are premature in assessing how the child's 
welfare can be benefitted by either parent. Both, though 
separated, may continue to play an important role in his life.
On the other hand, giving exclusive rights to one of them lessens 
the contact of the child with the other and may result in a 
substantial alienation between the parent and the child. 
Additionally, such a solution biases the rights of the parent 
without care, in the sense that it prepares the ground for the 
custodian parent to play an important role in the child's life, 
creating a situation which may be regarded by the court as custody 
proper and not to be disturbed. It does not appear that leaving 
the matter unregulated, at least for this period, will result in 
any disadvantage to the child's welfare since normally it will 
follow the parent who offers the best facilities and is more 
concerned. There is the danger, of course, that parental 
cooperation in de facto unregulated custody reaches deadlock 
with damaging consequences to the interests of the child.
But, on the other hand, legitimation of de facto care may be 
abused by the parent who pressures the other for concessions 
in divorce matters.
(d) F rom the above considerations it can be argued that some
speculation for the time being will benefit the welfare of the
4.11
child. The parents will reorganise their lives, and if they 
cannot reach an agreement on the custody of the child, the 
court will have the option to choose the one who is the best 
prospect for the child. Besides, if this time is treated 
as a trial period, the parents may find a solution which suits 
them better - one of them undertaking the administration of 
the child's affairs and the other the day to day care; or ohe 
exclusively having both. A similar arrangement may be 
considered by the court if it thinks that the welfare of the child 
will be better served if one parent has the administration and the 
other the care.
VI Parental rights in court proceedings
Custody and guardianship ultimately may need special regulation in 
prolonged de facto separation or in judicial separation, divorce or 
nullity of marriage. The alternatives to be considered in such cases 
are either to treat administration of the child's property, its legal 
representation and care of its person as interlocking matters which 
cannot therefore be divided between the parents or to treat them as 
divisible on account of the welfare of the child.
The basis of the jurisdiction of the Scottish court on custody is
provided in Section 9 of the Conjugal Rights (Scotland) Amendment Act
1861. Thus in an action for separation a mensa et thoro or for
a divorce or for 'nullity and adherence' the court may from time to
time made such interim orders and may in the final decree , and in
certain cases on dismissal or absolvitor "make such provision as it shall
deem just and proper, with respect to the custody, maintenance, and
education of any pupil children of the marriage to which such action 
35
relates". The power of the court has been extended to children
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below 16^^ and to children not of the marriage - one who is either the
illegitimate child of the spouse or the child of one of the spouses,
37whether legitimate or illegitimate, accepted into the family. The
Matrimonial Proceedings (Children) Act 1958 provides that in such actions
the court must not grant decree (i.e. must not make the order sought
by the pursuer) unless and until it is satisfied that arrangements have
been made which are satisfactory or are at least the best which can be
devised under the circumstances, or that it is impracticable for the
spouses^^ in the litigation to make such arrangements. The Guardianship
of Infants Act of 1886 further gives the court power in pronouncing a
decree of separation or divorce to declare the parent "unfit to have
custody" of the children of marriage if such a decree is made by
39reason of his misconduct.
The court also has statutory jurisdiction on the application of either
parent to deal with questions of custody and access arising independently
of actions of divorce, nullity of marriage or separation in respect
40
of a child under 16. Also one of the parents may be awarded custody
of and aliment for the child even when he or she lives with the other 
parent but the aliment order is not enforceable during such cohabitation.
The Guardianship of Infants Act 1925, which also applies in court 
proceedings on custody, enshrines the guiding principle which is now 
applied in all custody disputes. In section 1 it is provided that 
"Where in any proceedings before any court ... the custody or upbringing of 
an infant, or the administration of any property belonging to or held on 
trust for an infant, ... is the question, the court in deciding the 
question, shall regard the welfare of the infant as the first and 
paramount consideration, and shall not take into consideration whether 
from any other point of view the claim of the father, or any right at
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common law possessed by the father, in respect of such custody, upbringing/
administration or application is superior to that of the mother, or the
41claim of the mother is superior to that of the father.* The
Guardianship Act 1973, on the other hand, by altering the background 
against which the court exercises its powers, provides the option for 
different solutions since both parents have equal rights to custody and 
guardianship.
However, such power is recognised so far only in relation to the power
of the court to grant a custody order which may entrust the child to
either parent and recall or vary the order either ex proprlo motu or
42
on the request of a person concerned. Tutorship or curatorship
on the other hand remained unaffected unless the parent is declared
43
"unfit" to have custody. As a rule custody matters are resolved on
account of the welfare of the child which is of paramount consideration. 
Accordingly though custody is commonly granted to the innocent party, 
it may be granted to a parent found guilty for desertion or adultery if he
or she can better serve the welfare of the child. If the child is in
its formative years it is a relevant factor but not conclusive. Thus 
a pupil child may not be entrusted to his mother unless his welfare 
is equally well secured with her as with the father.
In relation to Greece, Article 735 of the Code of Civil Procedure
44
empowers the court if the spouses "cease cohabitation* to order any 
temporary measure that it thinks to be appropriate in the circumstances 
with respect to the "personal relations between the parents and children",
i.e. to regulate the custody of the children and access by their 
parents. However, such arrangement is mainly a security measure whilst 
custody in its very nature is regulated by the civil code after a 
petition for divorce or annulment of marriage is brought before the court
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of competent jurisdiction. Thus, according to article 1506 of
the Greek Civil Code, "During the judicial proceedings on divorce or
annulment of marriage the court may appoint the parent to whom
provisional custody of the child b e l o n g s " . I n  the absence of such
proceedings it is argued that the court cannot enter their questions of
custody irrespective of whether the parents still cohabit or cease to do
so. The factors then that may be considered for the custody of the
child is that the security measures of article 735 of the Code of Civil
Procedure differ to those relative to divorce or separation and largely
favour the father. Under patria potestas he has a superior right which
must be taken into consideration by the court. Thus it is suggested
that the father's right to custody may be taken away if constituting an
abuse of right (for instance because the father removed a child of tender
46years of age from the mother who can satisfactorily care for it) or in
47accordance with the provisions of Article 1524 . These recommendations
are of ambivalent value because unless the father is considered unfit
to care for the child, the court reluctantly will remove his right even
though the mother can better serve the child's welfare. To remedy this
inconsistency it is submitted that Article 1506 should apply by analogy
for any form of separation, in order to achieve uniformity in legal 
48
reasoning. In this respect the decision concerning the child's custody
must be decided by the court but its power is limited since it has the
49option to choose only between the parents.
When a divorce order^^ (or an order anulling the m a r r i a g e ) i s  pronounced 
and both parents are alive, according to Article 1503 "the custody of ■ 
the child belongs to the parent who had petitioned for the divorce if 
he is the innocent party. If the decree was pronounced on equal 
responsibility of the spouses the custody of the daughter and the 
son who is below his tenth year of age belongs to the mother, while
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the custody of a son above the age of ten belongs to the father. The 
court may order otherwise if the interests of the child so require and may 
award custody to a third party. The decision may be altered in the 
light of posterior events.
The Bill prepared by the Gazi Committee radically alters the situation, 
first by proposing in Article 57 application of the regulations for 
divorde to separation in general and to annulment of marriage and, 
second, by proposing a major change in the provisions for custody in 
divorce. Article 56 of the Bill provides that "If a divorce order 
has been issued, while both parents are alive, parental care is 
regulated by the court according to most advantageous way to the 
child. The exercise of parental care may be commissioned to one of the 
parents, unless the interest of the child requires otherwise, especially 
as the custody of the child may be commissioned to one of the parents 
and the administration of his property to the other. The parent who is 
deprived of part or the whole of parental care has the right to be kept 
informed by the parent exercising parental care, and he may petition the 
court to cancel its decision only if the way that he fulfils his duties 
constitutes an abuse of right. The article places the welfare of the 
child of paramount consideration and treats the parents on equal bases. 
However, the important innovation which may be considered in relation 
to Scots law, is that the Bill submits tutorship and curatorship to 
welfare tests. Thus, the court may regulate them according to the 
best interests of the child. By placing them within the wide jurisdiction 
of the court in custody, the court will take care that the decision 
concerning the legal representation of the child will be taken by the 
parent or a third person who can act quickly and is concerned for the 
child's interest. Besides care will be taken that such decisions will 
be less affected by the disputes of the parents.
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B. ADOPTED CHILDREN
According to the clear spirit of section 12 (1) of the Adoption (Scotland)
Act 1978, with the adoption order all parental rights relating to a child 
will rest with the adopters. Duties and liabilities of the natural parents 
or guardians in relation to custody and guardianship are extinguished and 
they Vest with the adopters. Specifically section 12(3) provides that the 
adoption order will operate to extinguish - " (a) any parental right or duty 
relating to the child which immediately before the making of the order was 
vested in a person (not being one of the adopters) who was
(i) a parent of the child, or
(ii) a tutor, curator or other guardian of the child appointed by a deed 
or by the order of the court".
The status conferred on the child is that of legitimacy and therefore 
his custody and guardianship from then on is governed by the law applicable 
to legitimate children. However, a limitation to this rule is provided by 
section 12(4) (b) which states that "Nothing in subsection (3) (b) shall of
itself terminate the appointment or function of any judicial factor loco tutoris 
or curator bonis appointed to administer the whole or any part of the 
child’s estate".
In Greece, in accordance with Articles 1579 and 1580 of the Greek Civil Code
the adopted child is deemed as the legitimate child of the adopter (s) even
51a
when a spouse adopts the natural child of the other spouse. Thus, article 1584
of the Greek Civil Code provides that with the adoption order the patria potestas
of the natural father or the curatorship or guardianship, to which the child
was subjected are replaced by the patria potestas of the adoptive parent and,
52
n adoption by a woman, by her guardianship. The article is among those
due to be reformed by the Bill of the Gazi Committee which suggests the 
following arrangement :
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'F rom the date of the adoption order the parental care of the natural parents
the guardianship or curatorship of the child are replaced by the parental
care of the adoptive parent (s). If the spouse adopts the child of
the other spouse, the spouses have jointly parental care or curatorship 
53of the child. Custody and guardianship vested in a person by an
adoption order are regulated by the rules applicable to legitimate
54
children. The same rules will apply on divorce of the adoptive parents.
However, there is a major deviation in this rule in relation to the
custody of the adoptive child. Namely while patria potestas, or guardianship
(and after the reform parental care) do not revive in the-person of the
natural parent if the adopter (s) forfeit his (their) rights, the natural
55
parents have the right to custody of the minor child. In such cases
56the court has to appoint a tutor or curator of the child. This
provision is rather unfortunate taking into account the previous role of
the natural parent as custodian of the child. Therefore, it would be
preferable in such instances for the custody of the child to be subject to
the discretion of the court, treating the natural parent as a third party
57
claiming custody with a prior right among equally qualifying custodians.
C . ILLEGITIMACY
In Scotland because the natural child is deemed filius nullius neither 
of the parents has any proper civil rights over the child. Neither
does the father have patria potestas nor any right to administer the child's
58 59
affairs, nor does the mother. Judicially the child is normally
represented by a tutor ad litem appointed ad hoc.
Under the common law the father has no right to c u s t o d y , t h e  mother 
being primarily the person entitled to have custody of her natural child. 
The father might, when the child reached seven, have offered to take it
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into his home to aliment it in natura and if this was refused, the
mother lost her right to claim contribution from the f a t h e r . S t a t u t e
has repealed this right of the f a t h e r . W i t h  the Illegitimate
Children (Scotland) Act 1930 a substantial modification was introduced
in respect of the mother's common law right to custody so that priority
64
had to be given to the welfare of the child. Specifically section 2
provides that the court may, on the application by the father or mother
in any action of aliment "make such an order as it may think fit regarding
65
the custody of the child" and probably the right of access thereto,
"having regard to the welfare of the child and to the conduct of the parents
and to the wishes as well of the mother as of the father aid may on the
66application of either parent recall or vary such an order." Also by
reference to the same welfare tests is exercised the court's power on 
divorce to regulate custody of an illegitimate child of the parties of the
66a
marriage or that of one party who has been accepted as one of the family.
In a similar fashion in Greece acknowledgement is immaterial to the legal 
representation of the natural child by his father. Any kind of recognition 
by the father does not confer on him right to patria potestas and the 
child is always subject to "dative guardianship".^^ The guardian is 
appointed by the court on the request of the nearest relatives or of a 
person having a lawful interest, or the public prosecutor "after having 
the opinion of the justice of peace"^? In the office, the mother^^ or 
the acknowledged father^^ may be appointed.
According to Article 1663 the custody belongs to the mother who is
entitled to take any decision concerning its day to day care. The court
71 . 72may order otherwise taking into consideration the interests of the child.
The right of the mother is not in any way affected by the recognition
of the child by his father since acknowledgement per se does not confer on
73him any rights to custody. Either parent, not having custody of the
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74child is entitled to reasonable access as arranged by the court.
The Gazi Committee in its Bill proposes a substantial change to the rights
of the mother, while for the father it is thought appropriate to increase
his rights in voluntary acknowledgement and reduce those recognised in the
Civil Code for complete judicial acknowledgement. Specifically article
82(2) of the Bill gives the mother the right to "parental care" of her 
75
child, and in this respect she has the right to custody and legal
administration of the child's affairs. For the father who voluntarily
acknowledged paternity, the Committee sees it as appropriate for him to
have "parental care" but to exercise his rights only if the mother
forfeited her rights, is unable to exercise them, or if "parental care" by
the mother has stopped for any r e a s o n . A  further restriction imposed
by the Bill deprives the father of any entitlement to the income of the 
77
child's property. None of the rights deriving from "parental care"
is recognised on behalf of a father for whom paternity has been fully
78
judicially established. In respect to access, the Committee considers it 
appropriate for the father who voluntarily acknowledged the child to have
rights to personal contact with the child but not for the father for whom
79
paternity has been the matter of a judicial dispute.
In the light of these recommendations the following changes can be 
observed in the law of custody and guardianship for voluntarily acknowledged 
children taking into consideration the wider scheme of reform suggested 
by the Gazi Committee.
In the first place the right of the mother to custody is strengthened 
by giving her rights to represent her child as if it was born to her in 
lawful wedlock. The father has the same rights in an auxiliary form and 
may petition as a parent to the court for the mother to be deprived partly 
or as awMe of parental care. He automatically substitutes for her
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in office or acquires cutody or represents the child either by reason of
the mother's inability^^ or because the court decided so.^^ The court,
82nevertheless may appoint a third person if he is unfit.
Secondly, as the Committee proposes, the rules applicable to children
born in wedlock should govern custody and guardianship of natural
children^^ with the exception that the council of relatives is formed
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by the justice of peace and two persons from the maternal line. Thus
either parent may appoint a guardian in his or her will or with a notarial
deed provided that he or she had parental care until then. For a child
for whom paternity has been judicially established, the right belongs
only to the mother. However, no appointment can be made if there is a
parent alive qualifying for parental care.^^ Also a parent having only
custody of the child may appoint in his will, or with a notarial deed
or a declaration before a justice of peace the person who may have custody 
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after his death. W_ih failure of the parent to appoint a guardian, or the
one appointed having to be excepted^^ or having resigned from office^^
the court, on the petition of the child's relatives (maternal) or of
any person with a lawful interest, or the public prosecutor, may appoint
89
a guardian for the child after hearing the council of relatives. In
90
urgent cases the court may appoint a temporary guardian. The guardian
91
appointed will have custody of the child unless the parent had appointed
a different person or the court has ordered otherwise, after hearing the
92
council of relatives. The guardian not having custody, as well as
any relative of blood of the child up to the fourth degree, has the duty
to watch over the upbringing of the child and to refer to the court or the
93
council of relatives.
Broadly speaking, in consequence to the proposal for abolishing the 
status of illegitimacy the father and mother should have prima facie
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equal parental rights. Neither of the two jurisdictions have clearly 
attempted to take this step, though the proposals of the Gazi Committee 
in respect to the voluntary acknowledgement adequately approach this 
aim. In general, however, the proposals of the Committee present the 
following disadvantages. They give a superior right to the mother 
while parental care must be governed by the welfare of the child. Besides, 
by giving to the father an auxiliary right it fails to facilitate the 
cooperation of the parents in parental rights, i.e. in cohabitation or in 
instances where they can reach an agreement. Also this proposition is 
by itself discriminatory and prejudicial to the attitudes of the natural 
parents. The latter point, however, becomes more serious in relation to 
the suggestion of the Committee of complete exclusion of the father from any 
parental rights if paternity has been judicially established. As 
argued elsewhere in this study a dispute between the parents should not 
be anticipated as determining his future attitude towards the child. Doubts 
on paternity are expected and it is a duty of the law to facilitate their 
removal.
Accordingly the following changes may be considered for equalizing the
position of children born out of wedlock to those born in wedlock in
respect Of custody and guardianship by parents of their children as if they were
born to them in lawful wedlock. The clause embodied in section 10(1)
of the Guardianship Act 1973 should be extended to apply to children born 
94
out of wedlock. The same recommendation should be made in respect of
the formula adopted in article 53 of the Greek Bill so as to apply to
both classes of children. In consequence to this recommendation both
parents would be prima facie jointly custodians and legal administrators
95
of the child's affairs. A parent who is not deprived of his parental
rights would have the power to appoint a guardian for the child after 
his death who would have the obligation to cooperate with the surviving
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parent. The guardian must have the power to contest the parental
rights of the surviving parent and petition for their modification
or regulation. The same right should be had by the parent against
96the appointed guardian.
Differences between parents themselves or between parent and guardian 
must be referred to the court which should resolve the matter as 
presently is the law for married and not judicially separated parents.
The degree and gravity of the disagreement between the parents must 
signify whether the court should proceed to a permanent decision on the 
aspect referred to it. Any decision should be taken on the basis of 
the child's welfare, i.e. from a point of view of whether the parent by 
his disagreement exposes the interests of the child to risk.
If the parents or guardians cannot reach agreement on the child's affairs 
or live apart or as a matter of fact cannot cooperate, the child's welfare 
may require,in a number of instances, the court to deprive the parent or 
guardian of guardianship rights. Presently such power is recognised 
to the Court of Session under common law by reason of positive misconduct 
of the parent in his parental duties. Similarly, the Magistrate's 
Court in Greece has the power to modify patria potestas (and with the Bill 
"parental care") on grounds of parental misconduct. Of course, to remove 
his right from the parent in the present case would be potentially a 
far reaching power because it might be necessary to do so without providing 
specifically pre-defined grounds and without testing behaviour of the
parent in relation to them. However, such power ought to be exercised
97only if it were clearly in the child's interests.
The courts presently have a wide power in relation to custody and the 
same discretion probably must be conferred on them in relation to
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guardianship. This is to say that courts must have the power to
decide for any aspect of parental rights. In relation to this suggestion 
the following alternatives may be considered : either to give weight
to custody and even link administration of the child's affairs with
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custody or to treat them as equal and divisible matters . Though
in practice, the first will normally occur,nevertheless, at least as a
matter of policy, the second approach has to be adopted because it provides
more options for active involvement of both parents and less risks of
alienation.
With custody the court now will have the reverse of the task that they used 
to have for children born out of wedlock. They will be asked to remove 
or modify the right of either parent to have the day to day care of the 
child. The equality adopted in section 2 of the Illegitimate Children 
(Scotland) Act 1930 is a principle that must be preserved, though words like 
"having regard to ... the conduct and wishes" of the parents 
must not be regarded as determining the welfare of the child but as matters 
to be assessed only in considering what is important for the child.
When a parent has to apply to the court for a custody order - which may 
be inevitable in a considerable number of cases-a fair solution may be 
to treat the parents as divorced. The law of divorce embodies solutions
which appropriately satisfy the present needs. When the custody of the 
child has become the subject of a court order the situation must not be 
upset by the appointment of a guardian. The parent or guardian may 
contest the order, however, in changing circumstances, but the final 
decision should lie with the court which must decide on account of the 
child's welfare.
Access rights must be recognised to every parent or guardian where he 
is not granted custody as is ihe present law for legitimate children and
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save for some exceptions, for illegitimate ones in Greek law. The 
parent or guardian should have a prima facie right to access unless 
the court decides to remove it.
APPENDIX 5
ALIMENT IN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC LAW
In general, the obligation of aliment refers to the duty of a person to
furnish to another, for his support, the means for living. This duty 
lies primarily with the family though the state, particularly this century, 
has assumed the obligation to supplement this support if inadequate and 
in a number of instances even to substitute for the family in its duties.
The latter, termed as a public law obligation to aliment, appears in the 
fields of public assistance and social welfare in the form of benefits 
payable to the child of a family with an income below a certain level or 
in the form of subsidies to the earnings of the head of a household with 
children. ^art from those obligations which emerge in their own right
a duty to provide aliment may be freely created, for example, by
accepting a child of the family or by means of contracts, gifts or bequests.
A. Private law obligation to aliment
Anong the duties imposed upon the parents towards their offspring, 
probably the most fundamental, after care and protection, is the duty 
to maintain them until they become self-sustaining. In general this 
means supporting the child until it reaches a certain age, and uncer 
certain circumstances continuing to do so for a longer period of time.
This mainly depends upon the situation of the parents and the aptitude of 
the child, e.g. if the child, because of its physical health or because 
it is still attending education or for other reasons is unable to support 
itself.
The obligation of the parents to aliment his child is a fundamental aspect 
of the legal provisions delegating the institutionalizing of children to 
within the family. In consequence it is one of the areas where the 
law discriminates against children born out of wedlock. The legal 
discrimination comes harder because of problems inherent in those situations
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and the likely existence of responsibilities by the parents towards 
other alimentary creditors (children of marriage, wife, parents, etc).
The legal family is in itself a financially independent unit where there 
is a de facto accumulation of wealth from which the child is maintained.
The parents take their obligations for granted and the fulfilment of the 
child's needs to an extent comes as a natural consequence of this family 
structure. Without exaggeration if someone tries to break this financial 
dependency his behaviour will be considered by a majority of the parents to 
be offensive. Of course when the family breaks up normally the non-custodian 
parent to an extent withdraws from his duties, and it may become necessary 
to enforce his obligations. In illegitimacy there are some additional
disadvantages apart from those already implied. Frequently disputes between 
the parents end with one or other of them refusing to pay his contribution. 
Also the lack of immediate contact, usually arising from living at a 
distance, is a factor contributing to irregularities in aliment as well 
as the fact that illegitimacy is usually associated with poverty and 
thus it is most likely that the immediate family of the parents will absorb 
most of the funds.
The number of problems involved has given rise to considerable criticism 
of the system, carried to the extent even of suggestions for the abolition 
of the private law obligation. The Scottish Law Qbmmission,^ which 
dealt with the matter recently, argues against such substantial change 
by reason that the arguments for its abolition point rather to pathological 
situations (divorce, separation, illegitimacy) the quantum of which is 
not of the degree to suggest the state stepping in and substituting for 
the parent in his duty; and that if the system were altered radically
2
the cost to the tax payers would be substantial. Even the Finer Committee 
which sharply criticized the system of private law anticipates its 
preservation and suggests changes in the methods according to which the 
duty should be fulfilled. In brief, the Committee proposes a system
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whereby a relative, and not only the state, is liable to provide 
aliment, whether it is provided directly, or indirectly through 
reimbursement of an administrative authority. In this respect the 
obligation primarily remains with the relatives and what really changes 
is the method for providing support involving a shift from private law 
to public law techniques. Both works mentioned, along with others dealing 
with their recommendations, offer the most important and innovative 
considerations of the methods seeking to satisfy private law alimentary 
claims. No doubt the application of their recommendations would bring 
a new era in the matter. However, such a rich topic cannot appropriately 
be examined in the limited lines of an appendix. Thus it will be confined 
to reviewing briefly the appearance of an alimentary right in the person 
of the parent under the present status distinctions and what changes may 
be considered if such distinctions were to be removed.
a. In both countries for a legitimate relationship there is recognised a
reciprocal alimentary claim between ascendants and descendants.^ The
nearest relatives are liable before the more remoter ones and the duty
4
primarily lies with the descendants of the claimant. s^ regards the
ascendants, however, concerning children, the duty is imposed upon the
parents,^ the father being the one primarily responsible.^ Failing the
father, the responsibility falls upon the mother and other ascendants.
However, the hierarchy differs in the sense that in Scots law the next
liable are, first, the paternal grandfather, then the paternal grandmother
until the range is exhausted, when the obligation starts for the maternal
7
line in the same order. In Greece though the paternal line has the
first responsibility nevertheless equally close relatives must share
the liability in proportions assessed according to their respective means.^
Also, unlike Scots law, brothers and sisters under special circumstances
9
are bound to aliment each other. Under Scots law an adopted child is
5.4
placed as the legitimate descendant of the adopting p a r e n t . T h u s
the order extinguishes any alimentary obligation owed to or by the child
in respect of his natural relatives and creates a reciprocal obligation
between the adopter and adoptee. This affects any duty to pay
or provide aliment, as well as any payment incidental to parental rights
12
and duties in respect of any period occurring after the order. The
order, however, does not extinguish any duty arising under a deed or 
agreement which constitutes a trust or which expressly provides that it is 
not to be extinguished by an adoption o r d e r . U n d e r  Greek law a
14
reciprocal alimentary claim is created between the adopter and adoptee
but if the adopter fails in his duty he is substituted for by the
15
natural parents and other relatives.
b . Under the present law in Scotland parents are jointly,and severally bound 
to support their illegitimate child according to their means and position
and the whole circumstances of the case but a child is not reciprocally
16
bound to support his parents. Moreover,,the grandparents have no
i'7
such duty towards his child's illegitimate child and vice versa. Under 
Greek law the mother and maternal relatives have a reciprocal duty towards 
the child similar to that owed to a legitimate c h i l d A  similar
reciprocal duty is recognised in respect of the father who has voluntarily
19
acknowledged the child (or one who is so assimilated) without this
20
extending to further ascendants or descendants on either side. The
mother's duty, however, follows that of the father who is primarily
21
responsible for maintaining the child. In respect to a child whose
paternity has been judicially recognised (simply) the duty owed by the
father consists of a limited aliment according to the social position of
the mother and the means of the father, which may vary before duties of
22
the obligent towards his wife and legitimate child.
5.5
c. The content, extent and duration of maintenance is also an area where
discrimination appears to exist. While the parent is bound to aliment
his legitimate child until it becomes legally and in fact capable of
24maintaining itself, statute restricts the limit to 16 years of age 
25in illegitimacy unless the child undergoes full time education, and if
need be throughout his life.^^ In Greece also the claim depends on
27
whether the claimant can support himself though the unmarried minor
even with property is entitled to aliment if his income is not sufficient 
28to maintain him. For the illegitimate child the duty lasts until he
29
attains the age of majority unless because of a physical or mental 
handicap he cannot support himself.
7b a general rule, no obligation to aliment arises unless the alimentary
creditor is in need : a person who can support himself at the appropriate
level has no right to aliment from relatives. No major differences
appear to exist as regards the extent and the content of the duty owed
to a legitimate and illegitimate child between the two countries though
both discriminate against the latter. A parent in Scots law has the
duty to preserve his child from "want" which is a relative term to be
31
interpreted in accordance with the social position of the parties. In
Greece the parents have the duty to provide aliment according to the
32social position of the child (Proportional Aliment). In both countries
the claim includes living expenses as well as expenses for upbringing and
education, and may be readjusted in changes of circumstances. In Greece,
however, the aliment may be reduced to the strictly necessary if the
claimant has committed an offence against the obligent justifying disinher- 
33
itance.
with respect to the duty owed by the parents to an illegitimate child in 
Scotland as Walker points out "the amount which may be awarded as aliment 
depends on the means of the parties, the minimum being the amount of
5.6
34
support beyond want which must be accorded to an illegitimate child".
In Greek law a child for whom paternity has been judicially established, 
if u nmarri e d , i s awarded aliment proportional to the social position 
of the mother and the means of the father,including that necessary
to live and the expenses of his upbringing and analogous to his social
37 38
position education. It may be varied in change of circumstances
and be reduced to the strictly necessary if the child has committed
39
an offence justifying disinheritance.
B. Public law obligation to aliment
7s said earlier various sums are payable by each country, either to 
complement or even substitute for the private law obligation to aliment.
A numberc-of arguments have been adduced for such in respect of children 
and the family in general, giving due attention to the employment factor, 
the social welfare and the participation of society in the upbringing of 
children. It has been considered that family benefits, where children 
are concerned, guarantee a reasonable subsistance income for all 
children - an object that cannot be secured by wages, as these do not 
take into account the family size to the extent that the public law does 
in terms of the qualifications of the worker. Probable dangers 
arising by permitting benefits to be equal to or to exceed earnings from 
work where the claimant is unemployed or disabled, have to be borne 
since allowances for children have to remain alike during earning and non­
earning periods. The provision of child benefits is conducive to a 
higher birth rate. Because they are mainly financed by general taxation, 
the child's support becomes a community matter and thus increases social 
awareness and concern for his welfare.
a. Scotland
Non-contributory benefits in respect of the child.
5.7
i. Child Benefits : This is payable to the person responsible for 
the child (the custodian or the person liable for the child's support 
at a rate exceeding the weekly rate of the benefit) for any child under 
16 or under 19 undergoing education, at a fixed weekly rate. It is 
payable to the person with whom the child lives and in a two-parent family 
to the mother. That person has priority over the alimentary obligant. 
From the benefit are excluded children under the care of local authority, 
or when the claimant (or the spouse) is exempt from U.K. income tax or,
he (or one of the child's parents) has not lived inU .K. more than 
26 weeks in the 52 weeks preceding the claim. The claim is neither 
assignable nor taxable and cannot be used as security. An increase may 
be claimed in the special circumstances of single parent families 
(divorced, separated or single people).
ii. F amily Income Supplement payable to the head of a family with
a low income employed in full-time work, if the family has at least 
one dependent child. ALI children under 16 or over 16 undergoing 
secondary education may be included in the family provided that they 
live with the claimant. The supplements are one half of the amount of 
which the family's gross weekly income falls below the relevant prescribed 
amount. It applies equally to one or two parent families and increases 
according to the number of children.
iii. Supplementary Benefit: This is a non-contributory benefit
payable to anyone over the age of 16 who is not in full-time employment 
and whose resources fall short of satisfying his needs. It frequently 
comes as a supplement to other state benefits but provision is made to 
avoid duplication with them. The benefit is payable in cash or (rarely) 
in kind to a single person or the head of a household in respect of his 
dependants. Special provisions apply to persons who refuse or neglect
5.8
to maintain themselves or their dependants and, when the benefit is 
paid to meet requirements for a spouse or child which some person is 
liable to discharge, the Cbmmission may recover the cost of benefit from 
the person liable. The Commission also has the same right as a mother 
to bring an action for affiliation and aliment for a child born out of 
wedlock.
iv. National Insurance Benefits (Contributory) and other Benefits :
A number of other benefits, mostly related to the contributions of the
parent during his work, are related to the child. These are the
Widow's Benefit, the child's special allowance. Sickness Benefit,
Unemployment Benefit, tax allowances and credits, rent rebates and
allowances, rate rebates, educational maintenance allowances and benefits
and allowances in respect to health or general welfare of children in
40families with low income.
b. Greece
Because in Greece tasks of social security are divided between the 
state and a number of subsidiary foundations of certain professions, no 
details of the provisions concerning the benefits of its organization 
in respect of children will be offered. In general, however, the 
employer has the obligation to contribute in the salary of the employee 
such sums in respect of his children and make such contributions in 
respect of their health insurance as prescribed by law. F rom a special 
account (Distributive Account for F amily Allowances of Employees, 
Legislative Decree 3868/1968) there is provided an allowance in respect 
of children of employees in cases that the employer does not have such 
responsibility. This varies according to the number of children and the 
number of days for which the claimant was engaged in work for the previous 
year. It is payable in respect of legitimate, legitimated, adopted, 
acknowledged and step children of a male claimant and the illegitimate
5.9
children of the female claimant.
Reference should also be made to the allowances aiming to protect
families with four and more children and allowances payable to the third
and subsequent child of the family as provided by the Legislative
Decree 1153/1972 (The Government Gazette 76/25.5.72 Part A) . The first
is an annual sum payable to families with four children below the age
of sixteen residing in Greece and living with at least one of their
parents. The status of the children is irrelevant though adopted and
step children do not qualify. The second consists of a monthly sum
payable to the third and subsequent child of the family of the claimant
whether legitimate, legitimated or acknowledged. The allowances are paid
to the mother or, where she has lost the care of the children, to the
41
father or guardian. Those are not means-tested benefits.
Ç. Mother's Inlying Expenses
Under Scots law a court upon the claim of the mother may award in an action
of affiliation and aliment any sum in the name of mother's inlying
expenses having regard to the means and the position of the pursuer and
42
the defender, and the whole circumstances of the case. If the
action is raised prior to the child's birth and is undefended or paternity
is admitted the court may order a certain sum to be paid in advance which
may be accorded to the actual expenses of the mother with a further order
43after confinement. The action, however, cannot be raised more than
44
three months prior to the specified date of delivery.
If the mother has been working she is entitled to a maternity grant (upon 
her own contributions) to help with the general expenses of confinement. 
Also if she has paid sufficient contributions as an employed or self- 
employed person she is entitled to maternity allowance for 18 weeks
5.10
starting 11 weeks before the week the baby is expected provided that
she stays out of work and this may be varied if she has an adult
45 46
dependant or dependant child. In the case of F reer v Taggart
it was held that the court in assessing inlying expenses should not take
into account the mother's maternity grant but that the defender's
47
earning capacity should be, as well as his past and present income.
In Greek law the mother's similar claim against the father includes the
expenses incidental to delivery an alimentary claim for 6 months starting
482 months prior to delivery, and the moral duty imposed by article 359
of Penal Gbde to support and assist her during the pregnancy {Aaandonmen
49of a pregnant woman). The Gazi Gbmmittee made some substantial
modifications to the civil law claim of the mother as described below.
In the first place the Gomraittee preserves the duration of the alimentary
claim with the possibility of it being extended up to one year under
special circumstances.^^ Second, unlike the civil code where aliment
was due irrespective of the means and the position of the mother,
in the Bill it is subject to the condition that "she cannot support 
52
herself". In calculating the aliment the father's earning capacity
53is relevant . His obligation, however, does not extinguish if the claim
54
by the mother endangers his own maintenance. In the claim there may
be taken into account all living expenses: food, clothing, rent, heating, 
55medical expenses, as long as these are not included on the expenses
incidental to delivery. The latter includes all actual expenses plus
any additional expense incurred thereafter (for example medical treatment)
56related to the delivery. The Gazi Gbmmittee preserved the claim
of the mother in an auxiliary form so that she may claim all or part
of the expenses not covered o t h e r w i s e . T h e  claim of the mother is
57
subject to the establishment of paternity, it may be connected as an
5.11
ancillary claim in an action for recognition of paternity^^ and
59prescribes in three years after confinement. Further claims for 
damages are not precluded.
Also the mother who is employed in remunerative work and pays 
contributions is entitled to a maternity allowance and a maternity 
grant. These, as provided by the main social security organization in 
Greece the I.K. A. foundation of Social Security), include a lump sum 
for delivery expenses and a daily allowance payable for 42 days prior to 
and after delivery, subject to increases if she has dependnats.^^
p. Basic changes to be considered
Although there is the tendency in public law to restrict the parties in 
the alimentary relationship, such may not be justified in respect to 
private law obligation without further deterioration of the links of the 
extended family. However, the Scottish Law Cbmmission recommends that
51
the obligation between grandparents and grandchildren should be repealed,
though it would be better for it to be retained as a further security.
Between parent and children they recommend the duty to be the same for
legitimate and illegitimate children^^ and the adoptive child to stand
exclusively in the position of parent and legitimate c h i l d . T h e y  also
recommend the recognition of an alimentary claim for the mother of a 
64
natural child. An ambivalent proposition made in respect to the right
of the illegitimate child reads that the mere fact that a man has had
sexual intercourse with the mother at the probable time of conception
65
should not render him liable to aliment the child. This needs to be
extended as to make the right enforceable upon the establishing of 
paternity. If the right will be equal between all classes of children, 
a tendency expressed in public law benefits, and the remedy may be 
assimilated with remedies available to the child of divorced or separated 
p a r e n t s . T h i s  proposition is adopted by the Gazi Gbmmittee in
5.12
Greece which recommends that either parent is liable to aliment his/her 
child according to his means and p o s i t i o n . T h e  measure of aliment 
should be the same for both classes of children and must be payable 
until the age of majority or beyond if this is expedient. Among other
points that might be made, one of the most important is to emphasize 
that the remaining distinctions in public law should be removed altogether,
APPENDIX 6
SU CCESSION
The area where discrimination has been particularly harsh for the 
child born out of wedlock is in succession. Though legitimate children 
were always entitled to the parent's estate and adopted children up to 
a certain extent, illegitimate children in general have suffered various 
restrictions in their succession rights.
As regards the adoptee under previous Scots Law while the child was
treated for all purposes (custody, maintenance, guardianship) as though
he was the child of the adopter born in lawful wedlock, such a child
did not obtain any rights of suaææion from his adoptive parents nor did
he lose any such rights by his natural parents. Also the adopter could
not claim succession rights if he survived the child.^ The arrangement
2
was considered a major defect in the previous law of succession and its
3
remedy was one of the objectives of the MacKihtosh Gbmmittee. The
Succession (Scotland) Act 1964, which is based upon the recommendations
of the committee, treats the adoptee as the child of the adopter and not
as the child of any other person for purposes relating to testate or
intestate succession and the disposal of property by virtue of any 
4 5
inter vivos deed. As Meston explains "succession of a deceased 
person is to be construed as including the distribution of any property 
in consequence of his death and any claim to prior rights or legal rights 
out of his estate. In other words, an adopted child clearly has the 
right to legitim out of the estates of his adoptive parent or parents as 
well as his right to share in the free intestate estate arid any other 
property being distributed on the adopter's death, as a lawful child of 
the adopter."^
As to the collateral succession, section 24 (1) of the Succession (Scotland) 
Act which deals with computation of relationship provides that "an
6.2
adopted person shall be deemed to be related to any other person being the 
child or the adopted child of the adopter or (in the case of a joint 
adoption) of eitherof the adopters
(a) where he or she was adopted by two spouses jointly and that other 
person is the child or adopted child of both of them, as a brother 
or sister of whole blood;
(b) in any other case as a brother or sister of the half-blood."
The section creates a relationship of full blood between children
who relate to both parents by blood and the jointly adopted child.
Between the child of a previous marriage or previously adopted by one of the
applicants and the jointly adopted child it creates the relationship of
half blood. This provision has been criticised because of its inadequacy
to create full blood relationships in some instances where children born
7
out of wedlock are involved. Meston refers to the rare case where a 
mother gives birth to twins and subsequently adopts them herself in order 
to get a clear birth certificate. These children remain half blood 
collaterals for the purpose of succession and in fact one may"wonder whether" 
the general policy of the adoption provisions is carried out in this 
case".
The Act also replaces the right of the natural parents to succeed to the
child's estate with that of the adopted parent^and entitles children to
represent their adoptive parents in successions in which the adopting
9
parents would have been entitled to share by survival.
In Greek law, by virtue of article 1579 of the Greek Civil Gbde the 
adopted child inherits from his adoptive parent, whereas the adopting 
parent has no right. Moreover the adopted child retains his rights of 
inheritance from his natural parents and natural parents can also inherit
6.3
from an already adopted c h i l d . A  blood relation, though, does not 
exist between the adoptee and relatives of the a d o p t e r , a n d  the child 
cannot represent the line of his adoptive parent in distribution of
12
property of a deceased blood relative of the parental line or his wife.
The nature of the right of the child to succeed to the adoptive parents *
property includes full succession rights on intestacy and to the compulsory
portion on testate succession. The parent, unless the child has so
disposed of its property, cannot inherit from the child. This, however,
is permitted as far as he preserves the compulsory portion of natural 
13parents. The reason for excluding reciprocity in succession according
14
to Nouaros is that, in principle, adoption must not procure material 
benefit to the adopter.
However, there are some problems to be considered in relation to the recip­
rocity retained by the succession law between the child and his natural 
family and the extent to which the child is deemed as the child of the 
adopter, for the purposes of succession law. In the first place this 
reciprocity cannot operate in a number of instances because of the 
confidential nature of a d o p t i o n . B u t  even when this problem is overcome 
most probably the child will inherit nothing, taking into account the 
usual background of the natural family. On the contrary retaining the 
relationship unaffected encourages speculative placements probably not 
so much in terms of the succession . rights of the natural parents as 
to their right to claim aliment. In general, however, such beneficial 
treatment of the natural parents is hardly justified - taking into 
account that in a considerable number of cases the child has been placed 
for adoption due to their failure to meet his needs. On the other hand 
placing the child in a complete relationship only with the adopter and 
recognising one sided succession rights again involves risk for the child 
and results in an injustice against the adopter. Normally a child
6.4
will not possess property but even if he does, it will be in a trust, or
subject to some other arrangement and therefore, will remain unaffected 
16by the order. Even if there are such risks, there is the alternative
of fostering or of a custody order to consider. U sually, if an adopted 
child has property, he must have acquired it while living with the 
adoptive family and this is a sound reason for keeping this property 
within this family. However, it does not seem that the adoptive parents 
will be benefitted by reciprocity because the property of the child will 
usually be a small donation which has been made to him. Also as a 
matter of fact, normally the child will survive the adoptive parents.
The alternative of retaining the rights with the natural family has been
put forward by the MacKintosh Gbmmittee which, considering the issues
involved, concluded that "it is not desirable from any point of view that
a child should be regarded for succession or for any other purpose as
being a child of two different families at one and the same time ... if the
policy of adoption is to be successful, everything should be done to put
the child in the position of a lawful child of the adopter and to cut all
connection with the natural family". The same suggestion was made by
various bodies concerned with the social aspects of adoption which found
it to be essential for the child to be treated exclusively as the
17
legitimate child of the adoptive family. Similar suggestions have
been frequently made in Greece and it may be essential to change the
17a
law for a complete integration of the child with the adoptive family. 
However, taking this step would only be a half-way solution and damaging 
to the child if the rights with the adoptive family were restricted between 
adopters and adoptee while at the same time it lost all rights deriving 
from the relationship with collaterals in the natural family. There may 
be some objections to allowing an adoptive child to inherit from a relative 
since the relative may know nothing about the adoption, or has been
6.5
hardly involved. However, because the preservation of rights with the 
natural family is objectionable, to limit the rights of the child
between adopter and adoptee will be unfair since rights with natural 
collaterals have been extinguished and because there is the need for 
complete integration of the child within the adoptive family. It may 
therefore be appropriate to supply the child with the right to represent 
his adoptive parents in succession from further ascendents or 
collaterals as if he was their child born in wedlock.
F or illegitimate children on the other hand provisions on their succession 
rights has been more striking. In Scotland, the harsh treatment of 
illegitimate children was nowhere more apparent that in the common law 
rules relating to succession. However, the common law rules were 
dealt with elsewhere in this study and here attention is given to the 
statutory changes introduced by the Succession(Scotland)Act 1964 and the 
reform needed.
In Section 2(1)(a) of the Act it is provided that "where an intestate is
survived by children, they shall have right to the whole of the
intestate estate". This in fact regulates the whole succession of
legitimate descendants when read in conjunction with the scheme of
representation contained in Section 5 (1) and the distribution contained
in Section 6. Although Section 4 of the Act, was initially directed to
give the natural child a right of succession to his mother's free estate
when the mother died intestate and without lawful i s s u e , a f t e r  the
Law Reform (Misc.Prov.) (Scotland) Act 1968 the child is placed in a
position to share in the intestate free estate of both parents, on a
19basis of equality with legitimate children. Section 10A also gives
the right to the illegitimate child to legitim in the estate of both
^  20 parents.
6.6
The substantial difference that still exists between children born in
wedlock and those born out of wedlock is that the latter cannot represent
a predeceasing parent in a succession opening after the parent's death.
His right to legitim is restricted to his immediate ascendant and therefore
he cannot claim legitim from, or otherwise succeed on intestacy to,his
grandparents'estate. His claim would depend wholly on representation
under Section 11 but this right is conferred exclusively to a "lawful
21
issue" of the parent. But in the construction of deeds reference to
persons of a particular degree of relationship are to be presumed to include
those whose relationship is illegitimate. Thus, reference to children
shall be taken to include illegitimate children unless an express
contrary intention is shown- With collateral succession, the situation
remained unchanged - namely the illegitimate relationship is not a relation-
22
ship for succession purposes. Rights exist between the parents and
the child only, subject to representation of the child in the parent's
23
estate by its "lawful issue".
In Greek law testamentary and succession laws are complex and appear to have
some fundamental differences from the common law rules. At the outset
there is no free testation as long as the deceased is survived by
descendants, parents or spouse. Provided that those relatives could
24
inherit the estate of the deceased if he died intestate, they are
entitled to a compulsory portion. A will, however, excluding either of the
above relatives cannot be invalidated for that reason but the relative
excluded has the right to claim from the legatees half of what he would
25
have received on intestacy.
Article 1813 of the Greek CLvil Gbde defines the "first order" of 
relatives, which excludes further ascendants or relatives. The rule 
embodied there provides that "as heirs in intestate succession" there
6.7
should be called in the "first order" the descendants of the deceased.
The nearest of them excludes the more remote in the same stirpe.
In the position of a predeceased descendant at the date of the inheritance's
inducement are called his descendants who through him are corinéctèd with
relationship to the deceased (succession oer stirpes) - The children
succeed in equal shares. Article 1814 defined the "second order"
which includes parents of the deceased, brothers and sisters and their
descendants. The right of the spouse as defined in article 1820 is
a quarter of the free estate if she succeed with relatives in the first
order and half if she succeeds with relatives in the second, third and 
25a
fourth order. She is called alone in the whole estate in the fifth 
26order. In relation to illegitimate children, article 1539 orescribes
27
the right of the voluntarily acknowledged aid the so assimilated child
if the child succeeds along with lawful descendants, or parents or the
spouse, of the father. As regards the claim against the mother, in
accord with the spirit embodied in article 1530 of the Greek CLvil Cbde
28
the child is one of her heirs in the "first order". A. child, however,
which is judicially recognised does not have succession rights against 
his father.
On account of the above provisions, the following observations can be made 
in relation to the rights of the natural child against his parents' 
estate :
(a) The illegitimate child is entitled to the same share in his
29
mother's estate as if he had been legitimate.
(b) If legitimated per subsequens matrimonium or judicially he has 
equal rights in succession with children born in wedlock.
(c) The child in favour of whom the results of voluntary acknowledgement
operate, is entitled to the compulsory portion in testate succession
31
and to a portion in intestacy.
(d) This portion is half of that of a lawful child if the deceased is
6.8
survived by either a lawful descendant, or a parent, or his
32 33spouse who is entitled to claim from the inheritance.
(e) With further ascendants or collaterals, the child is entitled to
the whole of the father’s estate as if it was a lawful descendant.
34
(f) Since the child cannot claim relationship through his father
he cannot represent his predeceased father in a claim against
34 a
the estate of the paternal grandparents. Nor can the lawful
descendants of a predeceased natural child establish a claim
against the estate of the acknowledged grandfather, - the right
35
has been simply restricted between father and child.
(g) With respect to collateral succession natural children tracing 
descent from the same mother are deemed relatives of the half 
blood^^ and receive half of the portion of that of the full blood.
The same applies to a judicially legitimated child in respect of his 
collaterals of the father's m a r r i a g e . N o  relationship, however, 
is recognised between children acknowledged by the same father and 
therefore such children cannot claim from their sibling's estate,
(h) While the mother is entitled to the child's estate as a lawful
39
ascendant, the acknowledged father is not.
(i) General expressions in a will referring to the intestate or legal
heirs of the deceased unless a contrary intention is indicated should
be construed as to include the acknowledged child as long as its
40
right to the estate is legally recognised.
With equality among both classes of children differences that may
appear between children born in wedlock and children born out of
wedlock have to be removed altogether. Fears have been expressed that
this may cause serious problems in intestate succession or even in
testamentary succession where the testator omitted to name his legatees,
41
i.e. with fraudulent claims against rich men. dive, however, in 
relation to the operation of succession law in Scotland from 1968 points
6,9
out that the attribution of succession rights to natural children has
42
not given rise to great difficulty, while Samuels in respect to the 
relevant English law argues that such fears are misplaced within the 
present social conditions. Even so, however, such fears may be totally 
unjustified if the procedure earlier suggested on ascertainment of 
paternity is applied. The principles adopted there are early establishment 
of paternity and under such safeguards that leave little doubt about the 
paternity. Rarely, therefore, would a claim be initiated against a 
non ascertained father and if so such a claim would have tobe supported 
with substantial evidence since the primary concern of the action is to 
place the child in a family position with the relatives of the deceased. 
There is another way, however, to look at the problem. So far with the 
strong proof required to rebut the presumption of legitimacy a number of 
children have been passed off as children of the marriage and claimed 
succession from the husband's estate. Nobody ever argued for the rights 
of legitimate children to be susceptible to attestation as the incidents 
of adultery increase. If the establishment of paternity is supported
with evidence showing a high degree of probability obviously fraudulent 
claims will not be proportionately higher than that of the children passed 
off as children of marriage. Aid, even if some cases appear, it is not
proper to discriminate against children born out of wedlock as a whole 
by reason of a few fraudulent claims.
On account of the present position of the law the following changes may be 
considered in succession law. In the first place in intestacy any person 
born outside wedlock, for wh om paternity has been established or can be 
established, should be entitled to succeed from either parent or to 
represent him in claiming inheritance against the estate of parental 
relatives as presently is the law for children born in w e d l o c k . A n
44
equal right should be recognised to the parents and parental relatives. 
Intentions to exclude such children, i.e. if appearinc after the father's
6.10
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death,should be expressed through a will. In the case where a child
appears after the distribution of property the appropriate solution 
would be to hold the heirs as debtors in proportion to their shares 
for satisfying the claim of such a child. Also, it may be appropriate
to impose time limits for a child for which paternity is not established
46
for claiming from the father's estate.
Secondly, as regards the construction of wills or other instruments 
the word "child" should be anticipated to refer to both children born 
in wedlock and children born out of wedlock unless a contrary intention 
is explicit. Such intention however, should not be presumed if reference
is made to the legitimate child or lawful child. Also the word "heir" 
or nicer expressions like "grandchildren" should be construed as to 
refer also to a person born out of wedlock or tracing relationships through 
birth out of wedlock.
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1. As cited by Saario A Study of Discrimination p.83
2. For discussion on the international trends towards surname see ibid pp. 83-89; 
Krause "The Creation of Relationships" op.cit. pp. 70-72. For the function 
of the surname see Saario, ibid. and Papantoniou, N. "The Updating of 
Family Law", op. cit.
3. Walker, Principles of Scottish Private Law", p.305. "Registration of
Births, etc : a modern code" 1955 S.L.T. 197. Clive, Aspects of
Illegitimacy, op. cit. 234. The attribution of name is more a matter of 
usage than of law. Therefore any name can be given to the child.
4. Art. 1493, Gr.C. C. "The child receives the surname of the father." The 
provision is one concerning public order. Therefore the right of the 
child to bear his father's surname is protected and the child cannot resign
from his right, subject to the provisions allowing the change of surname
on specific circumstances. Tousis (1979), F amily Law, Vol. 2, p.82.
Change in the surname of the father does not automatically bring a change 
to the child's surname (Roilos (-Koumantos) (1865/1966), 1493, 9 p.170) 
though later it was submitted that such a change must be followed by change 
to the child's surname when in minority (S. Gasparinatou "Change and 
Attribution of Surname" (1962) No.V . 17 : 761 ff.
5. Hunter, Scottish Woman's Place, p.58. The child does not get the name 
automatically and a motion is needed.
6. Tousis, Family Law, Vol. 2, p.196 and note (2). According to article 1557
the parents have to declare the child concerned as born to them with a 
declaration to the registrar of the place of marriage. Omission to declare 
does not affect the child since it may bring a petition to be recognised
as a child of the marriage and to have his name changed. See Roilos 
(-Koumantos) F amily Law 1557 (4) p.4L5.
7. Tousis, ibid, p.203.
8. Article 1559 recognises the child legitimated with the marriage of the 
parents "as lawful in any respect in relation to both parents" and article 
1567 recognises the judicially legitimated as lawful in any respect in 
relation to the father.
9. Adoption Act 1958, ss. 22-24.
10. ibid. s. 23(1), (2). It is submitted that a widow who intends to adopt
her illegitimate child and give him the surname of her late husband
cannot do so without the consent of the husband's relatives. See Mrs. C. Cn or CL 
1951 S.L.T. (Sh. Ch.) 83.
11. Art. 1582 of the Gr.C. C. ; Tousis (1979) Vol. 2, p.80-81.
12. Roilos (-Koumantos) (1965/1966) :"F amily Law',' 1582 (17); CLty Cburt of
Kalam 47^ 1973, Arm. 27 : 604. The wife, however, would continue to 
use her husband"s name in such a case and it may be considered more 
appropriate to give the child this surname. This can be established on 
the wording of article 1582 which has been construed to refer to the name 
that the applicant uses at the time of the order, as well as because the
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husband consents to the adoption by his wife and therefore as an element 
of the consent there may be anticipated his agreement to the usage of 
his surname (/allindas, F amily Law, p. 221).
13. 1582(2); Spyridakis, CLvil Code, V ol 4, 1582, note (2).
14. Adoption Act 1958, s. 23(1), (2). Article 1(1) of the Presidential
Decree 12/ 1975.
15. Tzouganatou Gasparinatou, The Judicial Recognition of Paternity referring 
to Egger,(1943, par. 326, 6 p.275), p.276 note (1).
16. Walker, Principles of Scottish Private Law, p.320. For the common law 
rule where the illegitimate child establishes a surname "by reputation"
and not by "inheritance" see Turner, Improving the Lot of Qiildren Born
out of Wedlock, p.36 and authorities cited.
17. c.f. Hunter, Scottish Woman's Place, p.58 and s.s. 18, 19 of the 
Registration of Births, Deaths and Marriages (Sc.) Act 1965.
18. The arguments are strong taking into consideration that great concern has 
been expressed for the damage that this may cause to the reputation of
the father. (McDonald v. Ross 1929 S. C. 240, and authorities cited there),
i.e. when he is married (see Armholm "Parents and Children" op. cit. p.16.
19. Art. 1531 (1) of the Gr. C.C.; A.P. 674/1963, E.E.N. 31 : 204;
Tousis, Family Law, Vol.B., p.141.
20. 1531 (2)}Gr.C. C.
21. 1531 (2) Gr.C.C. On mother's death the consent of the child suffices,
consent must be free of terms and conditions. See Tousis, F amily Law,
V ol.B. p.142.
22. ibid.
23. Art. 1537(1) and 1555 (1) of the Gr.C. C. ; G. Michaelidis Nouaros (1972)
par. 202, p.286. Tousis, Family Law, Vol.B. pp 80-81 and 154;
Roilos (-Koumantos) , F amily Law, 1537, 7; Tzouganatou Gasparinatou,
The Judicial Recognition of Paternity, p.275.
24. Tousis, Family Law, Vol.B. p.81, 154; Tzouganatou Gasparinatou, The 
Judicial Recognition of Paternity, pp 275-6.
25. 'Registration of Births, etc'.' op. cit. pp 198, 199, 200. For Greece
see art. 35 of the Compulsory Law 1179/1938 for Regional Governors as 
reformed by article 1 of the Decree 2573/1953 and the Decision no. 71039
of 28.9/2.10.1953 of the Minister of Interior, the Governor of the Region
sanctions the attribution of a surname to those children.
26. See S.P. no. 74, par 6.13, p.20; Turner, Improving the Lot of Children!
Born out of Wedlock, par 6 (b) (c), p.49.
27. The right to change the child's surname before majority probably lay 
primarily with the father as the natural guardian of the child (Walker, 
Principles of Scottish Private Law, p.3o5). However, this may no longer 
be the case since with equality the consent of the other spouse may be 
essential. See W.P. no. 74 p.6.11 and English authorities cited 
there; also Walker, p.305 and reference in note (5).
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28. See infra
29. See Report on Quebec CLvil Cbde, Vol. 2 part I, p. 30.
30. Papantoniou, N. "The Updating of F amily Law", op. cit.; Report on the
Quebec CLvil Gbde Vol. II, part 1, p. 30.
31. Such a formula, already existing in Greece, has been adopted in the
report of the Quebec Civil Cbde, c.f. art 1531(1) of the Gr.C. C. and
art. 33(2) of the Draft of the Qu.C. C. The English Law Cbmmission on 
account of the common law rule suggests the choice in such a case to 
remain with the mother which may be the solution if the right in Scotland 
remains unregulated. W.P. no.74 p.6.13; See also Turner, Improving the
Lot of Children Born out of Wedlock par 6(a), p.48-49.
32. The Report on the Quebec Civil Code (7ol.2, part 1, p.30) suggests
that although it may be discriminatory as retaining the father's 
surname, it would have the advantage of placing all children on an equal 
footing regardless of the circumstances surrounding their birth and whether 
or not their parental filliation has been established. Besides such a 
solution would accord to the change of principle desirable in the parent 
child relationship as demonstrating "primacy of the biological tie over
the legal tie". There are other reasons to be considered, however,
as the elimination in the changes of the child's surname due to change on 
his status, certainty about one's identity and so forth.
33. Papantoniou, N. 'Updating the F amily Law", op. cit.; Report on the Quebec 
Civil Code, Vol. 2, part I, p.30.
34. Art. 49 of the Bill to reform article 1497 of the Gr. C. C.
35. Papantoniou, N. "Updating the F amily Law", op. cit. The children may
be with different surnames and nevertheless the protection of the wife's
right is by no means absolute.
36. Article 86 of the Bill to reform article 1537 of the Gr.C.C.
37. Turner, Improving the Lot of Children Born out of Wedlock, par.6.(b) p.49
38. ibid. p.37, 49 6 (c).
Appendix 2
1. Saario, A Study of Discrimination, p.132.
2. The matter is somehow complicated as regards Britain since the British
Nationality Act 1948 distinguishes between "British Subjects" and "Citizens 
of the U.K. and Cblonies". The former refers to the Commonwealth citizens 
where the latter to residents of the U nited Kingdom (British Nationality 
Ast 1948, ss. 1, 2; S.P. no. 74, par 7.1 and notes (1),(2),(3) at p.91). 
Attention will be diverted to the U nited Kingdom Citizenship since it is 
the one controlled by British parliament and nevertheless corresponds to 
nationality in its ordinary sense.
3. Sect. 4 of the British Nationality Act 1948.
4. Sect. 5 of the 1948 Act.
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5. Sect. 6(2), sect. 10 (Nationalization) of the 1948 Act - see also infra.
6. Article 1 of the Cbde of Greek Nationality as cited in Tousis, F amily Law 
Vol. B p.83.
7. Sect. 40 (1) of the 1978 Act.
8. Art. 19(1) of the L.D. 61Q/1970. When the child acquires foreign 
nationality by reason of adoption it may petition to the Ministry of 
Interior to abandon the Greek nationality. The Ministry decides after 
consulting the Nationality Council taking into account all the circumstances 
of the case: Spinellis, "The Law of Adoption in Greece and Israel", op. cit.
p.171.
9. As cited in W.P. no.74, par. 7.5 p.93.
10. Sect. 1(1) (2) and (3) of the 1964 Act; as cited, ibid. note 13, p.93.
11. ibid. par. 7.5 p.93.
12. Art. 3 of the Gbde of Greek Nationality: "A person voluntarily
acknowledged by his father or for whom paternity has been completely 
judicially established before attaining the 21st year of age becomes a Greek 
National from the date of acknowledgement". See in General Metermacher-
Gerousis, in E.E.N. 28 : 161; Appeal Cburt of Athens, 2272/1947 Themis
49 : 259; Michaelidis Nouaros, Family Law tJniv. Textbook), par. 202, 
p. 286. Tzouganatou Gasparinatou, The Judicial Recognition of Paternity, 
p.276.
13. Tousis, Family Law, vol. B. p.154; acquires the nationality of the 
acknowledged father.
14. dive "Aspects of Illegitimacy", p. 235.
15. W.P. note 74 par. 7.7, p.94; see, however, in relation to the following 
recommendations, pars. 7.6-7.12, pp 94-96.
%>pendix 3
1. Section 1 (1), (3) of the Act.
2. Section 4(5) of the Act, for the application of the section to Scotland 
Sect. 4 (6).
3. A contrario from section 4 sub (1) (2).
4. As defined in sect. 4(1), whether indicating actual separation or by power 
of her right recognised in section 1(1) (2) of the Act.
5. E. dive, "Domicile and Guardianship of Children" in 1973, S.L.T. 84 p.85.
6. Sect. 4 (3) of the Act.
7. c.f. sections 13 and 15(1) of the Adoption (Scotland) Act 1978. See
also comments in Scottish Law ; Current Statutes 1978 (Edinburgh, Green & Son), 
628/13 in relation to subsection 1.
8. Article 51 of the Gr.C. C.
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9. Art. 56(1) of the Gr.C.C. The word minor is used to contrast with
emancipation though the wording of the article would be more compatible 
with the term person "under-age" which covers infancy pupillarity and 
minority.
10. Article 52 of the Gr. C. C.
11. Tousis, Family Law, Vol.B. p.229 and note (1) in par. 217.
12. c.f. articles 1579, Ï580 and 1584 of the Gr.C.C.
13. Article 56(3) of the Gr.C.C.,
14. See Tzouganatou Gasparinatou The Judicial Recognition of Paternity,
p.278 and n(l) and authors cited there.
15. Consent may be explicit or implicit.
16. Ibid. p.277; also article 1538(2). The right to cohabit under the
L.D, 14/17 July 1926 did not provide for such a safeguard.
17. Pratsikas, F amily Law, op. cit. 157, p.432.
18. Roilos (-Koumantos), F amily Law, op. cit. 1538 (3) p.334;
Tzouganatou Gasparinatou The Judicial Recognition of Paternity, p.277.
19. "Domicile and Guardianship of Children" op. cit. p.86.
20. dive, "Aspects of Illegitimacy", op. cit. p.235; see also W.P. no.74, 
p.98.
21. Article 9 of the Bill to reform article 56 of the Gr.C.C. To assess the 
articles one has to see it in the context of the innovations of articles
53 of the Bill (to reform Art. 1500 of the Gr.C.C.) which confers the right 
to exercise parental care to both parents and article 82 (to reform Art. 
1530) and 83(1) (to reform article 1537) the first attributing "parental 
care" to the mother of a natural child and the second attributing it to 
the father "if the mother ceases to exercise or has forfeited her right, 
or is unable to exercise it".
22 Report on Quebec dvil Cbde, op.cit. Vol. 2, part 1, p. 37,
23. Ibid. p.37.
24. Ibid. p.37-8. Probably the term habitual residence is used to qualify 
the degree of time and expressions that may signify change or acquisition 
of domicile with either parent. Though particular qualities are not 
illustrated in the report, probably the enrolment of the child in a school 
in the area of the parent accompanied with residence with that parent or 
other express indications from acts related to the daily life of the child 
and implying permanent living with him may sustain "habitual residence" 
for the child.
25. See for discussion also references to the German law in Turner, Improving 
the Lot of Children Born out of Wedlock, p.35-6, 48, 5(b). The concepts 
adopted in that law are like the proposals of Gazi Committee, see supra in 
the text.
26. Section 14(2) (a) and 15(2) (a) of the Adoption (Scotland) Act 1978. See
also supra on the chapter dealing with qualifications and conditions.
27. Walton, F .P. Husband and Wife According to the Law of Scotland, 3rd ed. 
(Edinburgh : Green & Son, 1951), chapter X3V .
28. Clive, "Domicile and Guardianship of Children", op. cit. p.85.
29. Art. 17 of the Gr.C.C.
30. Art. 18 of the Gr.C. C
31. Art. 19 of the Gr.C.C.
32. Art. 20 of the Gr.C.C
33. Art. 21 of the Gr.C.C.
34. Art. 22 of the Gr.C.C.
35. Art. 24 of the Gr.C.C.
35. Art. 30 of the Gr.C.C.
37. Greek nationality prevails other in the case of binationals.
Art. 31(1) of the Gr.C. C.
38. Art. 31(2) provides as applicable law that of the state with which
the person is more connected.
39. Clive, "Domicile and Guardianship of Children", op. cit. p.86.
Appendix 4
1. Minor children have a certain power to transact but depending on their 
age and the nature of transaction the consent of curator or guardian 
may be needed.
2. Art. 1670 of the Gr.C.C.
3. Harvey v. H. (1860) 22 D.1198.
4. Art. 1500 of the Gr.C.C.
5. Art. 1501 of the Gr.C.C.
6. Art. 1502 of the Gr.C.C.
7. Art. 1500 of the Gr. C. C.
8. Art. 1524 of the Gr. C. C.
9. Art. 1525 of the Gr.C.C.; this terminates patria potestas for the specific
child. Art. 1526 (1) of the Gr.C.C.
10. Art. 1526 (3) of the Gr. C. C.
11. Art- 1589(2) of the Gr.C.C.
12. Art. 1590 in conjunction to 1589(1) of the Gr.C.C.
12a. Art. 1599 (1) of the Gr.C.C.
12b. Art. 1599 (2) of the Gr .C.C.
13. Art. 1599 (3) of the Gr.C.C.
14. Walker, Principles of Scottish
Gr. C.C.
15. Clive and Wilson, Husband and Wife , pp 565-6; cfi.f. Articles 1501 and 1502, 
of the Gr.C. C.
15. Subject to any order that the court may make: Gbnjugal Rights (Scotland)
Amendment Act 1861, sect.9; Art. 1524 of the Gr.C.C.
17. Clive and Wilson, Husband and Wife, p.565, Art. 1502 of the Gr.C.C.
18. ibid. p. 565 and cases in note (3); Tousis, Family Law, Vol. B, p. 106.
19. The right is contestable in Scotland and when court proceedings follow the 
court will decide having regard to the welfare of the child (first
and paramount consideration); Clive and Wilson, Husband and Wife, p.565, 582; 
Guardianship of Infants Act 1925, sect. 1. In Greece the right of the 
parent seems irresistible: Tousis, F amily Law, Vol. B., p.106 notes (21)
(22), but also p.97 note (206).
20. Clive and Wilson, Husband and Wife, p.566, 583-590.
21. Clive and Wilson, -Husband and wife. p.566. The right before to the tutor,
now to the custodian; Art. 1502 (1).
22. Art. 1502 (1), Gr.C.C.; Tousis, Family Law, Vol.B, p. 107; c.f. Clive
and Wilson, Husband and Wife, p.584.
23. Clive and Wilson, Husband and Wife, pp 567-8, 577, 590; Article 1504
of the Gr. C.C.
24. Farccitisism of the term and its incompetency in Scots law see Clive, E.
"The Guardianship Act 1973" 1973, S.L.T. 225, p.228-9. However, though 
it can not be clearly supported the agreement between the parents is not 
to a renunciation of parental rights but suspension of their enforcement 
under a contractual agreement which must be governed by the rules of 
cancellation of contracts. Contracts are not uncommon in family law and 
as a rule (as also in the present case) are subject to the discretion of
the court to enforce or not, if contravening morality or public order or
the child's interests. Of course that the concept approximates more to
English law is indisputable but that it is without support in Scots law
is an unacceptable view.
24a. Sect. 10(3) of the 1973 Act.
24b. Sect. 10(4) of the Guardianship Act 1973.
25. As defined in Section 10(5=) .
25a. Section 10(5).
26. dive, "The Guardianship Act 1973", op. cit. p.225.
27. To reform article 1500 of the Gr.C.C.
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28. To reform article 1501
29. To reform article 1505
30. To reform article 1502.
31. dive, E. "Domicile and Guardianship of Children", 1973, S.L.T., 84, p.86.
32. ibid. p.86, see also infra in Greek law.
32a. dive "The Guardianship Act 1973", op. cit. pp. 227-8.
33. See distinction made supra.
34. As with patria potestas at present.
35. dive and Wilson, Husband and Wife, p.568.
36. Sect. 1, custody of Children (Scotland) Act 1939.
37. Sect. 7, Matrimonial Proceedings (Children) Act 1958.
38. dive and Wilson, Husband and Wife, p.574; applies only to spouses.
39. Sect. 7.
40. Sect. 5 of the Guardianship of Infants Act, 1886.
40a. Gloag and Henderson, Introduction to the Law of Scotland, p.688.
41. For the extent of its application see Clive and Wilson, Husband and Wife, 
p.572.
42. Sect. 14(3) Matrimonial Proceedings (Children) Act, 1958
43. See supra; also Walker, Principles of Scottish Private Law, p.309.
44. Art. 1394 of the Gr.C.C.
45. As reformed by art. 57(3) of the Introd. Law of the Code of dvil Proc.
46. Kafkas, C. A. "Custody of Children of non-cohabiting Parents", (1950)
Themis 62 : 49, pp 49-50.
47. Ibid. p.50; Tousis, Family Law, vol A p.416 note (7)
48. Spyridakis, dvil Code, Vol.4. 1504 (4) and 1506 (2) and cases cited there
49. Tousis, F amily Law, V ol. A. p.416 note 7, unless the conditions of article 
1524 concur.
50. Decree to be irrevocable : A.P. 1056/1972, No.V . 21 : 620.
51. Art. 1505 of the Gr.C.C.
51a. Art. 1580 (2) save the exceptions 1579(b), 1581(b) and 1582(b) of the Gr.C.C.
52. There is disagreement as to whether the emancipated child will be 
submitted to her curatory.
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53. Art. 97 of the Bill.
53a. Spyridakis, Civil Gbde, 1580 (2).
54. Ibid. 1580 (1)
55. Article 98 of the Bill in conjunction to article 1584 of the Gr.C.C.
55. Tousis, Family Law, Vol. B. p.235.
57. c.f. for example the position of the natural parent after relinquishment
in Scotland.
58. Cbrrie v. Adair (1860) 22 D.897.
59. Jones v. Somerrell's Tr. 1907 S.C. 545 as cited by Walker, Principles of
Scottish Private Law, p.326, note 6.
60. Corrie v. Adair, supra
61. Brand v. Shaws (1888) 15 R. 449; see also in chapter 3 on the historical
development of the law.
62. Corrie v. Adair supra; MacDonald v. Denoon,1929 S.C. 1972.
63. Sect. 2(2) of the Illegitimate Children (Scotland) Act 1930.
64. Sect. 2(1) of the 1930 Act; Brand v . Shaws (1888) 15 R. 449.
65. Walker, Principles of Scottish Private Law, p.325.
66. See sect. 2(1) of the 1930 Act.
66a. Supra; Also Matrimonial Proceedings (Children) Act 1958, Sect 7(1) (a) (b)
67. Arts. 1662, 1602-1603 of the Gr.C.C.
68. Acting as Council of Relatives arts. 1603, 1665 of the Gr.C.C.
59. Art. 1662 (b) of the Gr.C.C.
70. Art. 1662 (c) of the Gr.C.C.
71. Art. 1663 (b) of the Gr.C.C.
72. City Court of Thessaloniki (Mon.) 193/1973, Arm. 27 : 179.
73. City Court of Chalkida (Mon) lOC/ 1973, No.V . 21 : 831.
74. Tousis, Family Law, vol. B. p.329 and note (3).
75. To reform article 1530 see also Chapter five adoption by a single natural 
parent.
76. Article 86 of the Bill.
77. Article 86(3) of the Bill.
78. Article 93(2) of the Bill to reform Article 1555.
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79. Article 93(2). The father had the right under the Civil Code.
80. Art. 53(2) of the Bill.
81. Article 1524 of the Gr. C.C.
82. Article 76(2) of the Bill.
83. Article 115(a) of the Bill.
84. Article 115(b) of the Bill.
85. d.f. Arts 78 and 86, 99(2) and 101(2) of the Bill.
86. Art.. 112 of the Bill.
87. Art. 109 and 110 of the Bill
88. Art. 104 (2) of the Bill.
89. Art. 105 (a)
90. Art. 105 (b)
91. Art. Ill of the Bill.
92. Art. 112 in conjunction to art. Ill of the Bill.
93. Art. 113(2) of the Bill.
94. Clive, "Domicile and Guardianship of Children", op. cit., p.86.
95. Ibid. p.86; Idem "Aspects of Illegitimacy" op. cit. p. 234.; W.P. no. 74,
pars. 321(vi) p.32 and 4.8, 4.9, 4.10 pp 38-39; Report on the Quebec
d v i 1 Code, Title four, i.e. art. 350-354, 357.
96. Clive "Domicile and Guardianship of Children", p.86.
97. W.P. no. 74 par. 4.17 p.42.
98. Clive, "Aspects of Illegitimacy", op. cit. p. 234.
99 See for example the proposals of Gazi Committee on divorce supra.
100. See Turner, Improving the Lot of Children Born out of Wedlock, p.48 (ii)a 
in relation to the law of New Zealand.
%»pendix 5
1. Memorandum no. 22, op. cit.
2. Qnnd. 5629
3. Memorandum no. 22, p.10, 16 and cases in note 13; "Smith v. Smith's Trs. 
(1882) 19, S.L.R. 552; Article 1476 of the Gr.C. C.
4. Memorandum no. 22, p.38. MacKenzie's Tutrix v. MacKenzie 1928, S.L.T. 649.
Article 1479 of the Gr.C. C. ; see Atsalakis, Erm. Ac. 1479, 3-6.
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5. Dickinson v. Dickinson, 1952, S.C. 27.
6. Walker, Principles of Scottish Private Law, p.314; Article 1480 of the 
Gr, C. C. unless the mother exercising patria potestas has the ususfruct
of the child's property; Atsalakis, Erm. Ac. 1480 III 5-12.
7. Memorandum no. 22, p.38; Walker, Principles of Scottish Private Law, p.315
8. Art. 1480, Atsalakis, Erm. Ak. 1480 II, 2-4; Also recommended for Scots
law by the Scottish Law Commission, see Memorandum 22, p.44.
9. c.f. Art. 1492 of the Gr.C. C. and Greenhorn v. Addie, (1855), 170, 860.
10. Sect. 39 of the 1978 Act.
11. Sect. 12 (3) (a) (1).
12. Sect. 12 (3) (b) (1)
13. Sect. 12 (4) (a)
14. Spyridakis, Civil Code, Vol.4, 1574 (4): the claim of the adopter does
not precede that of the natural parents. Michaelidis Nouaros, F amily Law
(Univ. Textbook) p.319. 1476 et seq. of the Gr.C. C. apply also in this
case : Atsalakis, Erm Ak. 1476.2
15. Art. 1586 of the Gr.C. C. It is disputed however, if the duty owed by a
natural father under article 1545 of the Gr.C. C. is a duty which should 
be extinguished with adoption. The artument points to the lack of any 
familial link between them. See however discussion„Beis, C. "The Legal 
Nature of the Duty of the Natural F ather for Aliment and its Priority over 
the Similar duty of the natural Mother and the Adopter" (1962) No.V . 10:56.
16. Section 1(2) of the Illegitimate Children (Scotland) Act 1930.
Clarke v. Carfin Coal Co. (1891) 18 R. (H.L.) 63; Memorandum no 22, p.12
but see cases in note 23, p.12.
17. Nicoll V. Magistrates, Heritors and Kirk Session of Dundee (1832) 10 S.670 
as cited in Memorandum no.22 p.17 note 45; also see in the same cases
in note 46.
18. Atsalakis, Erm.Ak. 1476, 7(b), Beis, "The Legal Nature of the duty of 
the Natural F ather" op. cit. 56 et seq.
19. Atsalakis, Erm. Ak. 1476, 7,(3) (st)., Tzouganatou Gasparinatou, The 
Judicial Recognition of Paternity, pp 284-5 and authors in note (1) p.284.
20. Ibid, p.286. and authors and cases in note (2).
21. Ibid. pp 296-7.
22. Art. 1545 of the Gr.C. C. Due consideration must also be given to
the duty of the father towards a voluntary acknowledged child or other 
duties towards judicially recognised children; Balls, F amily Law, par 165
24. Gioag and Henderson, Introduction to the Law of Scotland, p.684;
Walker, Principles of Scottish Private Law, p.315.
25. S. 4. of Illegitimate Children (Scotland) Act 1930.
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26. Walker, Principles of Scottish Private Law, p.323; for two years or 
more but not beyond the 21st year according to a statute but beyond this 
age under common law.
27. Art. 1477 (1) of the Gr.C.C.
28. Art. 1477 (2) of the Gr.C.C.
29. Art. 1546 (2) of the Gr.C.C.
30. Art. 1546 (b) of the Gr.C.C.
31. doag and Henderson, Introduction to the Law of Scotland, p.684.
32. Art. 1484 (1) of the Gr.C.C.
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